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FOREWORD
Many American workers, regardless of industry or occupation, are exposed to fall hazards daily during
performance of their job tasks.  This monograph describes the magnitude of the problem of occupational
falls in the U.S., identifies potential risk factors for fatal injury, and provides recommendations for
developing effective safety programs to reduce the risk of fatal falls.
This monograph summarizes surveillance data and investigative reports of fatal work-related falls from
elevations. The surveillance data were derived from the National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities
(NTOF) surveillance system maintained by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH).  The NTOF data are based on death certificates for workers aged 16 years or older who died
from traumatic injuries in the workplace.  The fatality investigations were conducted as part of the NIOSH
Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program, a research program for the identification
and investigation of fatal occupational injuries.  The goal of the FACE program is to collect information
on factors that may have contributed to occupational fatalities, using an epidemiologic approach, and to
develop and disseminate recommendations for prevention of similar incidents in the future.
Based on the NTOF surveillance data, falls from elevations were the fourth leading cause of occupational
fatalities from 1980 through 1994.  The 8,102 deaths due to falls from elevations accounted for 10% of all
fatalities and an average of 540 deaths per year.  Between 1982 and 1997, NIOSH investigated 90 falls
incidents which resulted in 91 fatalities.
Part I of this monograph provides an overview of fall hazards in the workplace, a summary of the
epidemiology of fatal occupational falls, and recommended elements for an effective safety program for
the prevention of falls in the workplace.  Part II contains case summaries and prevention recommendations
from all 90 FACE fall investigation reports prepared by NIOSH for further information and reference.
This monograph reviews what is known about occupational fatalities due to falls from elevations, identifies
common risk factors and exposures, and recommends general approaches to preventing these fatal events.
Our hope is that this document will serve as a valuable resource for safety and public health professionals,
safety and health trainers, and researchers, prompting further injury prevention efforts to reduce fatal falls
in the workplace.
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H.
Director, National Institute for
    Occupational Safety and Health
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PUBLIC HEALTH SUMMARY
What are the hazards?
Based on data from the NIOSH National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) surveillance system,
falls from elevations were the fourth leading cause of workplace death from 1980 through 1994.  The 8,102
deaths due to falls from elevations accounted for 10% of all occupational fatalities during this period and
an average of 540 deaths per year.
How can a worker be exposed or put at risk?
Falls from elevation hazards are present at most every jobsite, and many workers are exposed to these
hazards daily.  Any walking/working surface could be a potential fall hazard.  An unprotected side or edge
which is 6 feet (1.8m) or more above a lower level should be protected from falling by the use of a guardrail
system, safety net system, or personal fall arrest system.  These hazardous exposures exist in many forms,
and can be as seemingly innocuous as a changing a light bulb from a step ladder to something as high-risk
as connecting bolts on high steel at 200 feet in the air.
What recommendations has the federal government made to protect workers’ health?
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) sets forth requirements and criteria for fall
protection in construction workplaces in Subpart M, Fall Protection, 29 CFR 1926.500 to 1926.503.
Subpart M provides the basic standards for all fall protection systems and for mandatory employee training
in fall hazards.  It also sets forth the circumstances in which an employer may provide a fall protection plan
in place of conventional systems and provides an example of such a plan in one of the five non-mandatory
appendices to the section.
Fall protection is also covered in other parts of the construction standards.  Requirements for specific
operations are covered in Subpart L-Scaffolding; Subpart N-Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Elevators, and
Conveyors; Subpart R-Steel Erection; Subpart S-Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams and
Compressed Air; Subpart V-Power Transmission and Distribution; and Subpart X-Stairways and Ladders.
Subpart D of the General Industry Standards, Walking and Working Surfaces, Sections 1910.21 to
1910.32, deals with the basic elements of workplace—floor and wall openings, stairs, ladders, scaffolding,
and with one of the most basic safety practices, good housekeeping.
Where can more information be found?
The references included in this document provide a useful inventory of published reports and literature.
Additional information from NIOSH can be obtained by calling the following number:
1-800-35-NIOSH
(800-356-4674)
xi

1PART I
FATAL FALLS FROM ELEVATIONS
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3OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS FOR FALLS FROM ELEVATIONS
Falls from elevations occur in all industries, in all occupations, and in a myriad of work settings, from the
ironworker connecting steel columns 200 feet in the air, to the laborer washing windows from a suspended
scaffold 60 feet from the ground, to the stock clerk retrieving goods from a shelf using a 4-foot stepladder.
Fatal falls from elevations are classified by external cause of death codes (E-codes) E880-E888 of the
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, (ICD-9).1  For the purpose of this monograph, the
following categories will be discussed:  1) falls from ladders (E881.0), 2) falls from scaffolding (E881.1),
3) falls from or out of buildings or other structures (E882), 4) other falls from one level to another (e.g., falls
from stationary vehicles and falls from trees) (E884.9), and 5) other and unspecified falls (E888).  The E-
codes E885, E886 (falls on the same level), and E887 (falls resulting in fractures with cause unspecified),
were excluded from this monograph since these types of falls were not investigated as part of the FACE
program.  Figure 1 illustrates examples of common elevated working environments.
Figure 1.  Common Types of Fall Environments
Mobile Scaffold Roof
Fixed Ladder Tower
4FALL ENVIRONMENTS
Ladders (E881.0)
Ladders are designed and manufactured to be fixed or portable and are intended to provide easy access to
various work settings.  Ladder configurations vary by length, load rating (e.g., type IA, I, II, or III), and
ladder material (e.g., wood, aluminum, or fiberglass).  Common types of ladders include straight, step,
trestle, extension trestle, platform, combination, mason’s, and two- and three-section extension ladders.
Ladder sizes range from 2-foot step ladders to 72-foot, three-section extension ladders as well as fixed
ladders that can extend hundreds of feet (e.g. providing access to the top of a water tower).
Safety features that have been designed into some ladders, or are available as retrofits, are slip resistant
rungs/steps, positioning feet that fully articulate, and top and bottom stabilizers.  Fixed ladders typically
have a glide-rail system through the middle that is accessed and egressed while using a full body harness
with a glide lock attached to a chest D-ring.  Other fixed ladders have caging systems which are a less
effective tool for fall protection.  Some important factors to be considered before using or climbing a ladder
are placement, securing or tying down, climbing style, angle of inclination, three-point contact, and tasks
to be performed.
Factors that contribute to falls from ladders are ladder slip (top or bottom), overreaching, slipping on rungs/
steps, defective equipment, and improper ladder selection for a given task.  There are appropriate uses for
stepladders and for extension ladders, but the choice of the wrong ladder for a particular job can put the
user at increased risk for a fall.
Scaffolds (E881.1)
Scaffolds are defined as temporary elevated platforms and their substructures, that are used for supporting
workers or materials or both.  Scaffolds vary greatly in type, size, material, and function and are used in
a multitude of work settings.  Familiar tasks associated with scaffold use include drywall and stucco
application, sand blasting and painting, window washing, structural cleaning, caulking, removing
asbestos, performing maintenance, installing piping/conduit, laying brick/concrete block, and inspecting.
See the glossary for definitions of scaffold types.
Factors associated with falls from scaffolds include improper maintenance or erection/dismantling
procedures, incorrect methods for mounting or dismounting, overloading, absence of guardrails, scaffold
component failures, defective personal protective equipment (PPE), or absence or improper use of PPE.
Falls from or out of buildings or other structures (E882)
Included in this group are falls from or through roof and floor openings and edges, structural framing,
skylight fixtures, utility poles and towers, bridges, tanks, window openings, and platforms.
Regardless of the industry or occupation, a worker may, at some time in his or her working career, be
exposed to one or more of the fall-from-elevation environments described above.  For example, in the
construction industry numerous tasks associated with fall hazards will be performed by workers every day.
Tasks such as installing shingles on roofs, erecting skeleton steel for buildings and structures, climbing
towers, painting bridges and storage tanks, or installing and maintaining skylight fixtures can and do result
5in injuries and death to workers.  These tasks represent only a few of the many tasks that can result in injuries
and death to workers due to failure to recognize fall hazards, failure to use personal protective equipment,
overreaching, loss of balance, tripping, slipping, or equipment failure.
Other falls from one level to another (including falls from embankments, haystacks, stationary
vehicles or trees) (E884.9)
Falls from embankments, haystacks, and trees occur in limited work settings and to selected occupational
groups, whereas falls from stationary vehicles occur in numerous industries and occupations, since vehicles
are used in a wide variety of industrial sectors.  Vehicles include automobiles, buses, trucks, vans,
construction machinery being used as transport vehicles on public highways, farm and industrial
machinery, fire engines, motorcycles, motorized bicycles or scooters, and trolley buses not operating on
rails.  Primary hazards relating to vehicles include lack of or failure to use seat belts, and slipping/tripping.
Conclusions
One of the serious and oftentimes deadly hazards found in the workplace is falls from elevations. Fall-
prevention measures can be general, varied, specific, or elaborate; and the recognition, planning, and
implementation of a sound fall-prevention program is the first step in reducing falls in the workplace.  When
fall hazards are recognized, provisions to abate the hazards can be developed, implemented, and reinforced
on a timely basis to prevent deaths and injuries resulting from falls in the workplace.
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7EPIDEMIOLOGY OF FATAL FALLS FROM ELEVATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Falls were identified as the fourth leading cause of occupational-injury fatality in the United States between
1980 and 1989 by the National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) surveillance system of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), accounting for 10% of all occupational-
injury deaths.2  NTOF data also showed that workers in the construction, mining (including oil and gas
extraction), and agriculture/forestry/fishing industries had the highest fatality rates due to falls during the
decade.  The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
reported that falls to a lower level comprised 9.9% of fatalities in 1996.3 The CFOI data identified roofs,
ladders, and scaffolds as the most common fall locations.  Other studies have noted falls associated with
steel erection,4,5  falls from equipment or materials,4 and falls through floor openings.5,6
Previous research has identified falls as a leading cause of fatalities in the construction industry.  Falls
accounted for 25% of the construction deaths identified by NTOF for 1980 through 1989,7 32% reported
by the 1996 CFOI,3 and 33% of construction fatalities investigated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) between 1985 and 1989.6  Falls comprised 29% of construction fatalities in
Washington State between 1973 and 1983,8 and 46% in New Jersey between 1983 and 1989.9
Occupational groups identified with high frequencies of fatal falls include roofers, painters, ironworkers,
carpenters, construction laborers, and tree trimmers.9-11
The following analysis combines 15 years of data from the NTOF surveillance system with final reports
on 91 fatalities investigated by NIOSH through the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE)
program to describe work settings in which fatal falls are likely to occur and the associated risk factors.
METHODS
The NTOF surveillance system is based on death certificates from all 50 states and the District of Columbia
meeting the following criteria:  age 16 years and older, external (injury) cause of death, and the certifier
noted that the injury occurred at work.2  The inclusion in NTOF of the injury description, cause of death,
occupation, and industry in narrative form provides an opportunity for detailed examination of fall-related
fatalities.
Limitations of the use of death certificates in ascertaining work-relatedness and as a source of occupational-
fatality data have been described previously.2, 12-15  Among the chief limitations are a lack of specific
employment information, the customary use of  “usual” occupation and industry as they appear on the death
certificate as proxies for occupation and industry at the time of injury, and the absence of national guidelines
for completion of the “injury at work?” item on the death certificate at the time these NTOF data were
collected.  Despite these limitations, it has been demonstrated that death certificates identify, on the average,
80% of work-related fatalities nationally, more than any other single source.14   The frequencies presented
here should be viewed as the minimum number of fall-related fatalities occurring during the study period.
8This analysis includes NTOF data from 1980 through 1994 for fatal falls from elevations identified by external
cause of death codes (E-codes) E880-E884 and E888 of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9),
Ninth Revision (Table 1).1
Table 1.  ICD-9 External Cause of Death Codes for Falls from Elevations
Falls on the same level (E885 and E886) were excluded from this analysis, as were falls resulting in fractures with
cause unspecified (E887).  Cases assigned these three E-codes comprised less than 3% of the 8,545 total cases
for the period 1980-1994.  Several other types of fall-related incidents are excluded from the ICD-9 falls rubric,
notably falls from machinery in operation, falls from railway trains or in water transport, falls from moving motor
vehicles, falls while boarding or alighting from motor vehicles, falls preceded by the collapse of a building or
structure, falls from burning buildings or structures, and falls preceded by electrocution.  Cases that had fall-
related E-codes but whose injury descriptions matched the exclusions described above were also eliminated
from the analysis, as were cases with an E-code of E888 whose injury descriptions were consistent with falls
on the same level, resulting in a final total of 8,102 fatalities.
In the analysis of fall-related fatalities, E-codes provide insufficient detail to ascertain specific
circumstances and hazards, particularly in the instance of E882, falls from buildings or structures.  The
injury description and cause of death narratives in NTOF were used to obtain more precise information
about the location from which the worker fell.
Cases were classified by major industry division according to the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) system,16 and by occupation division according to Bureau of the Census classification schemes.17,18
Average annual employment data used to calculate fatality rates by industry division were obtained from
the Current Population Survey, a monthly household survey conducted for the Bureau of Labor Statistics
by the Bureau of the Census.19  Because of lack of comparability with earlier classification systems (before
1983), fatality rates by occupation were calculated only for the years 1983 through 1994.
Between 1982 and 1997, the NIOSH FACE program investigated 90 fatal fall incidents in which 91
workers were killed.  FACE investigations yield detailed information pertaining to the risk factors and
sequence of events leading to fatalities.  In addition to site investigations and employer interviews, FACE
investigators use police and medical examiner reports, death certificates, OSHA documents, newspaper
accounts, and other sources to develop summary reports containing recommendations for prevention of
similar incidents.  FACE investigations constitute a case series; results of analyses of FACE data may not
be generalized to all fatal falls from elevations. FACE data are not directly comparable with sources such
as NTOF which seek to enumerate all occupational fatalities.  However, FACE data complement NTOF
surveillance data by providing greater detail for identifying and describing work situations associated with
fatal injury.
ICD-9 DESCRIPTION
E880 Falls on or from stairs or steps
E881 Falls on or from ladders or scaffolding
E882 Falls from or out of buildings or other structures
E883 Falls into a hole or other opening in the surface
E884 Other falls from one level to another (e.g., tree, stationary vehicle, haystack, embankment)
E888 Other and unspecified falls
9RESULTS
Between 1980 and 1994, 8,102 workers in the United States died as a result of falls from elevations.  There
was an average of 540 deaths per year, comprising 9.6% of work-related fatalities over the 15-year period.
The average annual fatality rate was .49 per 100,000 workers.  The annual rate declined from .68 in 1980
to .42 in 1994 (Figure 2).  This 38% decrease paralleled the overall 41% decrease in rates for all causes of
death.
Figure 2.  Work-related Fall Fatality Rates, NTOF, United States, 1980-1994 (N=8,102)
Ninety-seven percent of the workers (7,859) were male.  Decedents ranged in age from 16 to 96, with a
median age of 42.  While the greatest number of falls occurred among workers aged 25 to 34 years, the rate
of fall fatalities increased with age (Table 2).
Table 2.  Number and Rate Per 100,000 Workers of Fatal Falls
by Age of Worker, United States, 1980-1994
Source:  National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF)
Surveillance System
Age Group (Years) N % RATE
16-19 220 2.7 0.23
20-24 749 9.2 0.38
25-34 1870 23.1 0.40
35-44 1567 19.3 0.39
45-54 1479 18.3 0.54
55-64 1469 18.1 0.86
65+ 741 9.1 1.57
Unknown 7 0.1 ----
Total 8102 100.0 0.49
0
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0.3
0.4
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0.6
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0.8
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The distribution of workers by race was 86.8% white, 8.9% black, 1.9% other races, and 2.3% of unknown
race.  Fatality rates due to falls from elevation were .49 deaths per 100,000 workers among whites, .44
among blacks, and .31 among workers of other races.
The greatest numbers of deaths occurred within the construction, manufacturing, and services industry
divisions, and the highest rates per 100,000 workers were observed in construction, mining, and
agriculture/forestry/fishing (Table 3).
Table 3.  Number and Rate Per 100,000 Workers of Fatal Falls
by Industry Division, United States, 1980-1994
Source: National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) Surveillance
System
NTOF contained detailed SIC codes for fatalities occurring between 1990 and 1994, a total of 2,381 cases.
The greatest numbers of deaths were found in construction industry subgroups (Table 4).
Table 4.  Detailed SIC Codes with 50 or More Fatalities Due to Falls from Elevations,
United States, 1990-1994
Source: National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) Surveillance System
*   Default category when death certificate specifies building construction
**  Default category when death certificate specifies only construction
INDUSTRY DIVISION N % RATE
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 507 6.3 0.99
Mining 211 2.6 1.69
Construction 4044 49.9 3.89
Manufacturing 943 11.6 0.30
Transportation/Communications/Public Utilities 518 6.4 0.45
Wholesale Trade 145 1.8 0.22
Retail Trade 250 3.1 0.09
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 106 1.3 0.10
Services 765 9.4 0.14
Public Administration 181 2.2 0.23
Not Classified 432 5.3 ----
Total 8102 100.0 0.49
SIC CODE DESCRIPTION DEATHS
1542 General Contractors — Nonresidential 205 *
Buildings, Other Than Industrial
Buildings and Warehouses
1611 Highway and Street Construction, 177 **
Except Elevated Highways
1761 Roofing, Siding, and Sheet Metal Work 147
1791 Structural Steel Erection 121
1751 Carpentry Work 79
1721 Painting and Paper Hanging 71
1521 General Contractors — Single Family Houses 63
1731 Electrical Work 59
7349 Building Cleaning and Maintenance 56
Services, not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.)
783 Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services 56
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Analysis of age-specific rates by industry revealed a pattern consistent across most industry divisions.  In
general, rates increased slowly with age up to age 55, then increased markedly among workers aged 55
to 64 years, and rose even more sharply beginning at age 65 (Figure 3).  The only exception to this pattern
was the mining industry, where the lowest rate was observed among workers aged 35 to 44 years, and
workers below age 25 had fatality rates nearly as high as those seen among the oldest workers.  In all other
industry divisions, fatality rates among workers aged 65 years and older were five to ten times higher than
those among workers below age 25.
Figure 3.  Rates of Work-related Fatal Falls by Age for Selected Industry Divisions,
NTOF, United States, 1980-1994
Occupation divisions in which the greatest numbers of fall-related fatalities occurred were precision
production, craft, and repair; laborers; executive, administrative, and managerial; and service.  Fatality rates
were highest among laborers, crafts workers, and workers in farming, forestry, and fishing occupations
(Table 5).  Detailed occupations with the greatest numbers of deaths between 1990 and 1994 were
construction laborers, carpenters, roofers, managers and administrators, n.e.c., structural metal workers,
and construction supervisors, n.e.c.
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LOCATION N %
Stairs or steps 207 2.6
Ladder 994 12.3
Scaffolding 1055 13.0
Scaffold collapse (n=74)
Building 1774 21.9
Roof (n=1230)
Floor (n=83)
Specified structures 657 8.1
Unspecified structure/building 381 4.7
Fall into hole or other opening 391 4.8
Other fall from one level to another 1346 16.6
Tree (n=234)
Stationary vehicle/machine (n=177)
Fall, n.e.c./unspecified 1297 16.0
Total 8102 100.0
Table 5.  Number and Rate Per 100,000 Workers of Fatal Falls
by Occupation Division, United States, 1980-1994
* 1983-1994
Source: National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF)
Surveillance System
Location of Fall
Buildings (particularly roofs), ladders, and scaffolds were the most frequently observed locations from
which workers fell (Table 6).
Table 6.  Work-related Fatal Falls by Location From Which Worker Fell, United States, 1980-1994
Source: National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF)
Surveillance System
Falls from Ladders
Construction industry workers accounted for a far greater proportion of falls from ladders (46%) than did
workers in any other industry.  An additional 11% of workers were employed in manufacturing and 11%
in service industries.  Between 1990 and 1994, the greatest numbers of deaths occurred among General
Contractors — Nonresidential, Other Than Industrial Buildings and Warehouses (SIC 1542), and Painting
and Paper Hanging (SIC 1721).
OCCUPATION DIVISION N % RATE*
Executive/Administrative/Managerial 513 6.3 0.24
Professional Specialty 260 3.2 0.12
Technicians/Support 74 0.9 0.13
Sales 185 2.3 0.09
Clerical 117 1.4 0.04
Service 508 6.3 0.2
Farmers/Foresters/Fishers 488 6.0 0.91
Precision Production/Craft/Repair 3569 44.1 1.7
Machine Operators 409 5.0 0.32
Transportation/Material Moving 369 4.6 0.5
Laborers 1307 16.1 1.79
Not Classified 303 3.7 ----
Total 8102 100.0 ----
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N %
Falls through roof
Through roof opening 43 3.5
Through roof (non-supportive materials) 13 1.1
Through skylight 83 6.7
Through roof, n.e.c./unspecified 103 8.4
Falls from Roof
From roof structural member 19 1.5
From roof 961 78.1
Roof, n.e.c./unspecified 6 0.50
Total 1230 100.0
Ladders were the leading cause of fatal work-related falls in the retail trade (22%) and finance, insurance,
and real estate (21%) industry divisions, and the second leading cause in services (14%) and public
administration (18%).  They were associated with 20% of fatal falls among sales occupations, more than
any other fall-related cause.  Ladders accounted for 17% of falls among executive, administrative, and
managerial workers and 18% of falls among technician/support and service occupations.
Workers aged 55 years or older were involved in 27% of all fatal falls, but accounted for 42% of falls from
ladders.  Less than 7% of ladder-related deaths were among workers under the age of 25  years.
Falls from Scaffolds
Construction industry workers accounted for over 70% of falls from scaffolding.  Fourteen percent of
scaffold-related fatalities between 1990 and 1994 occurred among workers in General Contractors —
Nonresidential, Other Than Industrial Buildings and Warehouses (SIC 1542), 11% in Highway and Street
Construction, Except Elevated Highways (SIC 1611), and 10% in Masonry, Stone Setting, and Other
Stone Work (SIC 1741).  Workers in crafts occupations experienced 58% of fatal falls from scaffolding.
Detailed occupations with the greatest numbers of fatal falls from scaffolding between 1990 and 1994 were
construction laborers, carpenters, and brickmasons and stonemasons.
Falls from Buildings or Structures
Sixty-one percent of fatal falls from buildings and structures occurred within the construction industry, 8%
in manufacturing, and 8% in services.  Between 1990 and 1994, the specific industries with the greatest
proportions of these fatalities were General Contractors — Nonresidential, Other Than Industrial Buildings
and Warehouses (SIC 1542); Roofing, Siding, and Sheet Metal Work (SIC 1761); and Highway and Street
Construction, Except Elevated Highways (SIC 1611).
More than 50% of workers who died in falls from buildings or structures were employed in the crafts
occupation division; 18% were laborers.  Between 1990 and 1994, the greatest numbers of these fatalities
were seen among construction laborers, roofers, and carpenters.
Of the 1,774 fatal falls from buildings, 1,230 (69%) were falls through or from a roof (Table 7).
Table 7.  Circumstances of Fatal Roof-related Falls, United States, 1980-1994
Source: National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF)
Surveillance System
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Workers in crafts occupations experienced 56% of fatal falls through or from roofs.  Between 1990 and
1994, the greatest numbers of roof-related falls occurred among roofers, carpenters, and construction
laborers.
Disproportionately high numbers of falls from specified structures were observed in the mining industry,
which includes oil and gas extraction, and in transportation/communications/ public utilities (TCPU).  In
mining, 36% of all fatal falls were from specified structures, the majority of which were rigs and derricks.
Fatal falls in mining were most prevalent within SIC Major Group 13, Oil and Gas Extraction (101 of 144
fatal falls assigned to a major group, or 70%).  Fifty-nine (58%) of the 101 were clearly falls from oil rigs,
derricks, or towers.  An additional 17 mining fatalities not classified to a major group were falls from rigs
or derricks.  In other mining sectors, the incidence of fatal falls was much lower than in Oil and Gas
Extraction: metal (9), coal (11), and nonmetal (23).
In TCPU, 23% of fatal falls were from structures, predominantly poles and towers.  This industry
contributed only 6% of falls overall, but 18% of falls from structures.
Other Falls from Elevation
Falls from trees (17%) and stationary vehicles (13%) were most prevalent among the 1,346 other falls from
elevation.  The greatest numbers of falls from stationary vehicles or machinery occurred within
manufacturing and TCPU.  Within both industries, the majority of these were falls from stationary trucks.
Workers in the agriculture/forestry/fishing industry accounted for only 6% of all fatal falls, but suffered 57%
of falls from trees.  The majority of fatalities in this industry division occurred within agricultural crop
production (Major Group 01) and agricultural services (Major Group 07).  In crop production, fatal falls
were evenly distributed among falls from ladders, roofs, structures such as silos, stationary vehicles, and
trees.  In contrast, falls from trees comprised over two-thirds of fatal falls in the agricultural services sector.
FACE Investigations
Between 1982 and 1997, the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) project investigated 90
fatal fall-related incidents resulting in 91 deaths.  The fatalities occurred in 13 states.  Eighty-eight of the
workers (97%) were male.  The workers ranged in age from 16 to 70 years, with a median age of 36. The
majority (78%) were white and non-Hispanic.  Nine percent were black, 8% were Hispanic, and 5% were
of other races.
The majority of fatal falls investigated by FACE (82%) occurred in the construction industry.  In 51 of the
75 construction cases (68%), the worker was employed by a special trades contractor (SIC Major Group
17).  The specific industries noted most frequently in the FACE data were SIC 1761 (Roofing, Siding, and
Sheet Metal Work), SIC 1721 (Painting and Paper Hanging), and SIC 1542 (General Contractors —
Nonresidential Buildings, Other Than Industrial Buildings and Warehouses).  The remainder of FACE fall
investigations were in agriculture/forestry/fishing, manufacturing, TCPU, wholesale trade, services, and
public administration.
The majority of workers (76%) were employed in crafts occupations; 13% were laborers.  The specific
occupations observed most frequently were painters, structural metal workers, carpenters, construction
supervisors, n.e.c., and roofers.
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Eighty-two percent worked for private sector employers; the remainder were self-employed (14%) or
government employees (2%).  The employment class of one worker was unknown.  Company size ranged
from one employee to more than 10,000, with a median of 40 (Figure 4).  In 36% of the cases, the employer
had been in business for 5 to 10 years.  In another 28%, the employer had been in business for 11 to 20 years.
Figure 4.  Distribution of Work-related Fatal Falls by Company Size,
FACE Investigations, 1982-1997 (N=91)
The worker’s length of employment with his or her current employer ranged from 1 day to 24 years; 16
of the workers (18%) had been employed by their company for 1 month or less (Figure 5).  The median
employment period was 18 months.  Nearly half (49%) had been working for their current employer for
less than 12 months; 83% of these were employed in construction.  In many of the fatal falls in construction
investigated by FACE, the worker had little additional experience performing the same task for another
employer.  Only 4 of the 35 construction workers with 12 months or less service with their current employer
had more than a year’s experience doing the same type of work, and only 3 had more than a year of
experience in the specific job task associated with the fatality.
Figure 5.  Distribution of Work-related Fatal Falls by Time with Employer,
FACE Investigations, 1982-1997 (N=91)
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Forty-nine percent of the employers had a designated safety officer, and 58% had a written safety program.
However, only 37% had written rules covering the task being performed by the worker at the time of the
fatal fall.  Thirteen percent of employers provided no employee training; 59% provided on-the-job training
only.  A combination of training methods (on-the-job, classroom, and manuals) was used by 23% of
employers, and training status was unknown in 4% of cases.
Availability and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was ascertained for over three-fourths of the
fatalities investigated.  Nonuse and incorrect use (n=41) were more frequent than PPE not being available
at the worksite (n=18) (Table 8).  The kinds of equipment most frequently present at the worksite or used
by the worker were safety belts and lanyards, guardrails, and lifelines.
Table 8.  Fatal Falls by Availability and Use of PPE, FACE, 1982-1997
The greatest numbers of incidents investigated through FACE were falls from roofs, scaffolding, and
ladders (Table 9).
Table 9.  Fatal Falls by Location From Which Worker Fell, FACE, 1982-1997
PPE STATUS N %
PPE not available 18 19.8
PPE available, but not wearing 15 16.5
Wearing PPE, but not using 14 17.6
Using PPE incorrectly 12 13.2
Using PPE, but PPE failed 2 2.2
PPE not applicable 9 9.9
Unknown 21 23.1
Total 91 100.0
The kinds of ladders involved in fall fatalities investigated by FACE were extension ladders (3), fixed
ladders (3), rope ladders (1), and stepladders (1).  Four of the eight fatalities occurred inside tanks or towers
(three fixed ladders and one rope ladder).  Absence of confined space entry procedures or failure to adhere
to existing procedures played a role in all four fatalities.  In two of these cases that involved fixed ladders,
personal protective equipment such as harnesses, safety belts, lifelines, and respirators were required by
the employer and available at the site but not used by the worker who fell.
LOCATION N %
Stairs or steps 0 0.0
Ladder 8 8.8
Scaffolding 17 18.7
Scaffold collapse (n=2)
Building 40 44.0
Roof (n=26)
Floor (n=10)
Specified structures 7 7.7
Unspecified structure/building 11 12.1
Fall into hole or other opening 0 0.0
Other fall from one level to another 8 8.8
Tree (n=1)
Stationary vehicle/machine (n=5)
Fall, n.e.c./unspecified 0 0.0
Total 91 100.0
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Three of the falls from ladders investigated by FACE occurred while the worker was ascending or
descending.  In the fatality involving a rope ladder, the worker used an inappropriate climbing procedure,
facing the ladder rather than ascending it along the side to minimize swaying.  In another instance, the upper
section of an extension ladder was used without the bottom section, and the bottom of that section slipped
out on the wet concrete work surface.
Six of the scaffolds were suspended scaffolds; one of these events resulted in two fatalities.  Six were tubular
welded-frame scaffolds; two were mobile scaffolds; and the remaining two were other types.  FACE
investigations identified several factors associated with falls from scaffolds:  improper maintenance or
erection procedures (e.g., failure to lock casters, failure to check tightness of bolts, failure to check
suspension rope for damage, or failure to secure planking); incorrect methods of mounting and dismounting
(e.g., using guardrails or diagonal braces to climb from one level to another); and absence of guardrails.
Of the roof-related falls, nine were through roof openings (four of which were openings cut for skylights);
eight were from a roof edge; five were from roof structural members; and two were through skylights.
FACE investigations identified several factors associated with roof-related falls including unguarded roof
openings, unsecured or unstable materials, and loss of balance.  Loss of balance occurred in conjunction
with work activities such as carrying metal decking, attempting to free a snagged cable, or unwinding an
extension cord.  Investigations of the skylight-related fatalities revealed that the employers failed to provide
the standard skylight cover or fixed standard railing on all exposed sides as required by OSHA General
Industry Standard 29 CFR 1910.23(a)(4).20   These investigations also suggested that workers may have
been unaware that the structural integrity of the skylights was insufficient to support their weight.
Overall, the mean height of the fall was 41 feet, and the median was 28.  Eight percent of the workers for
whom fall height was known fell 10 feet or less; 22% fell more than 50 feet (Figure 6).  In four of the six
falls from ladders, the worker fell 20 feet or less.  The 16 fatalities which were falls of 15 feet or less were
evenly distributed among falls from ladders, scaffolds, roofs, floors, and vehicles.  Twelve of the 26 falls
from roofs (46%) were from heights of 21 to 30 feet.  Eight of the 17 falls from scaffolding (47%) were
from heights of 46 feet or more.
Figure 6.  Distribution of Fatal Falls by Height of Fall, FACE Investigations, 1982-1997 (N=91)
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DISCUSSION
Analysis of NTOF data on fatal work-related falls in the United States identified falls as the fourth leading
cause of workplace fatalities.  Fifty percent of all fatal falls identified by NTOF occurred in the construction
industry, which had both the highest frequency and rate of fatal falls between 1980 and 1994.  The industry
is characterized by self-employment, small firms, irregular and seasonal employment, temporary and
inexperienced workers, intense pressure to meet deadlines, multiple contractors and subcontractors
working at the same site, and changing work settings (within a single jobsite or between sites).21-23
FACE investigations showed that the above characteristics of the construction industry can contribute to
fatal falls.  Lack of hazard recognition can result from lack of coordination of work tasks between
contractors, rapid physical changes in the work environment, and worker inexperience.  Deviation from
standard operating procedure and lack of adherence to safety standards (e.g., failing to use PPE and
allowing accumulated debris to create fall hazards) may be associated with contract deadlines, the worker’s
inexperience, the worker’s lack of familiarity with the task or the work environment, and the employer’s
lack of written task-specific work procedures.
For many construction workers, exposure to fall hazards is a nearly constant aspect of employment.  Fall
prevention challenges facing the construction industry are not necessarily limited to recognition that
hazards exist and that means of fall protection are required and available.  Also of concern are the difficulties
in providing regular, consistent safety training, coordinating work activities among a variety of contractors
and subcontractors, and development of safe work practices in a changing workforce amid changing work
settings.
The manufacturing and services industry divisions had the second and third highest frequencies of fatal
falls.  These industries, however, had lower fatality rates, and levels of exposure to fall hazards may be less
constant than in construction.  Thus, employer and worker recognition of fall hazards may be lower.  In
addition, because work environments in these industries vary widely no single fall location predominates,
and injury prevention programs may have to address various kinds of hazards.  This presents diverse
challenges to those responsible for protecting workers in these industries from fall hazards.
Following the construction industry, the highest fall-fatality rates were observed in the mining (including
oil and gas extraction) and the agriculture/forestry/fishing industries.  Fatal falls within mining were
concentrated within the oil and gas extraction sector, suggesting that fall prevention programs for the
industry should emphasize hazards associated with working from rigs and derricks.  The wide variety of
fall types seen in agricultural production suggests that fall prevention programs targeted at farmers need to
address a wide variety of fall hazards.  On the other hand, falls from trees predominated in the agricultural
services sector (particularly SIC 0783, Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services), where prevention efforts
could most effectively be directed at this specific hazard.
The NTOF analysis corroborated previous research in identifying roofers, carpenters, construction
laborers, structural steel workers, painters, and tree trimmers as occupations that experienced high
frequencies of fatal falls.  NTOF also identified notable numbers of falls among managers, administrators,
and construction supervisors, who may have less constant levels of exposure to fall hazards than workers
such as roofers and structural steel workers.  Emphasis on hazard recognition skills and use of PPE are
important not only to managers’ personal safety but to demonstrate management commitment to safe work
practices.
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Ladder-related incidents were the leading cause of fatal falls in  retail trade and finance, insurance, and real
estate, and the second leading cause in services and public administration.   Although these industries had
low fall-fatality rates overall, it is nonetheless important to recognize the risk posed by ladders in these work
settings and to provide appropriate worker training where ladders are in use.
Workers aged 55 years and older accounted for a disproportionately high share of fatal falls from ladders,
42%.  Ladders are generally used with minimal fall protection, with workers relying on balance and
coordination to avert falls.24  Even minor declines in balance, coordination, and reaction times associated
with the normal aging process may result in increased risk of falls from ladders among older workers.24
The NTOF data also showed that fall fatality rates due to all causes increased with age, particularly after
age 65.  Compared with younger workers, injuries to older workers tended to result in more complications
and prolonged recovery periods and were more likely to result in death.25, 26  Another source reported that
workers aged 55 years or older were at decreased risk for nonfatal injury yet spent greater median days away
from work when injured (10 days vs. 6 days for younger workers).27
NTOF and FACE data reveal that the risk and nature of fatal falls vary substantially by factors such as
industry, age, work setting, and experience.  In some industries a single type of fall or similar group of fall
types predominates (falls from rigs and derricks in oil and gas extraction, and falls from trees in agricultural
services).  For these industries, fall prevention strategies should include intensive training and interventions
directed at specific hazards.  In other sectors, such as construction, agricultural production, and
manufacturing, workers are at risk for a wide variety of fall types.  Safety programs for these industries
should address risks associated with working from ladders, working from various buildings and structures,
and operating and maintaining machinery and vehicles.
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PREVENTION: ELEMENTS OF A FALL PROTECTION PROGRAM
Every day at worksites across the nation many workers are required to work at elevations and are exposed to
numerous fall hazards.  Therefore, it is essential for employers to develop and implement comprehensive, written
fall-protection programs where workers are exposed to fall hazards.  Fall protection programs should always be
applied to all tasks with identified fall hazards—including work involving: aerial-lifts; walking/working surfaces
with questionable strength and structural integrity; bridges; demolition; floor-openings; leading edges; low-
slope, steep, and built-up roofs; personnel  platforms;  precast concrete; safety nets; scaffolds; silos/tanks; steel
erection; and tree trimming.
Implementation of written fall-protection programs can reduce the number of fall-related injuries.  These
written programs should describe the appropriate fall-protection systems and equipment to be used for each
anticipated fall hazard.  Fall-protection systems covered in a written fall-protection program may utilize
either passive or active systems.  Passive systems, when installed, protect workers without the need for them
to take additional action on their own behalf.  Examples of passive systems include guardrails, parapet
walls, railings, safety nets, and hole covers.  Active systems, on the other hand, are protection systems or
devices that require each worker to take positive action to protect against/or arrest a fall.  An example of
an active system is when a worker puts on a full-body harness and connects a lanyard or a self-retracting
lifeline to a proper anchorage point.  Where possible, passive systems should be used because their
effectiveness does not depend on specific actions by the worker being protected.
There are two basic fall-protection systems in use in the construction industry, namely fall-prevention and
personal fall-arrest systems.   Fall-prevention systems usually involve passive components, such as guardrails
and hole covers.  However, when passive systems are not feasible, it is possible to prevent falls by having workers
tie off to self-retracting lifelines that are short enough to prevent the worker from reaching the fall hazard.  Personal
fall-arrest systems are designed to limit the distance that a worker can fall, thus limiting the forces acting on the
worker’s body in the event of a fall.  Fall-arrest systems require the use of a full-body harness to distribute fall
arrest forces so as to minimize the extent of injury sustained in a fall.  Other components of a fall-arrest system
may include one or more of the following— rope grabs, shock absorbing lanyards, various types of connection
hardware (e.g., snap hooks or carabiners), horizontal or vertical lifelines, and  anchorage points sufficient to
withstand 5000 pounds or two times the load expected in a fall.
The employer should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive, written fall protection program.
The program should be in writing and at a minimum meet the requirements of  OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502.20
The following elements are recommended as a guide in developing a fall protection program.  The program
should include, but not be limited to, the following:
1. Addressing all aspects of safety and hazards in the planning phase of projects.
2. Identifying all fall hazards at the worksite.
3. Training employees in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the OSHA
regulations applicable to their work environment to control or eliminate the hazards. OSHA
recommends that fall-protection training include classroom instruction supplemented by hands-on
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training with the equipment. Training should commence at the time of hire for new employees exposed
to fall hazards, and continue periodically thereafter.  Involve workers, when feasible, to help identify
which tasks create fall hazards, and what methods could be used to eliminate these hazards.  Employee
participation and acceptance is crucial to implementing an effective fall protection program.
4. Performing a job hazard analysis for each task to be performed.
5. Providing appropriate fall protection equipment, training workers on the proper use of fall
protection equipment and enforcing its use, and daily inspection of equipment.
6. Conducting scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections of the worksite.
7. Addressing:
a) environmental conditions,
b) multi-language differences,
c) alternative methods/equipment to perform assigned tasks,
d) establishment of medical and rescue programs.
8. Encouraging workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Fall protection equipment is very specific in its application, and great care should be taken to choose the
correct system for the application intended, in accordance with industry standards or guidelines on specific
worker needs.  Manufacturer’s instructions for correct use and maintenance must be followed explicitly;
otherwise, injuries and fatalities can result.  Compatibility of a fall-protection system’s components is
crucial.  Employers and employees should realize that not all components (such as lanyards, connectors,
lifelines, deceleration devices, and harnesses) are interchangeable.  The benefits derived from safely
performed work at heights include more organization, more employee cooperation, greater productivity for
management, less danger to life on the job and a lower insurance risk for hazardous work in high places.
OSHA regulations under 29 CFR 1926.501 require employers to provide workers who are exposed to fall
hazards of over 6 feet with adequate fall protection, which may involve the installation of either fall-prevention
systems, or of personal fall-arrest systems.  However, the OSHA regulations provide an exception in selected
work situations where the employer can demonstrate that it is infeasible, or creates a greater hazard to install these
systems.  Employers have the option of developing and implementing a fall protection plan in lieu of installing
fall protection systems only when they can demonstrate the infeasibility, or greater hazard created by fall
protection systems.  This exception in the OSHA fall protection regulation is further described below.
Exception: When the employer can demonstrate that it is infeasible or creates a greater hazard to use these
systems, the employer shall develop and implement a fall protection plan which meets the requirements of
paragraph (k) of 1926.502 (e.g., employers engaged in leading edge work, precast concrete construction
work and residential construction).
The fall protection plan shall be prepared by a qualified person and developed specifically for the site where the
leading edge work, precast concrete work, or residential construction work is being performed and the plan must
be maintained up to date.  A “qualified person” is one with a recognized degree or professional certificate and
extensive knowledge and experience in the subject field who is capable of design, analysis, evaluation and
specifications in the subject work, project, or product.  The implementation of the fall protection plan shall be
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under the supervision of a competent person.  A “competent person” is one who is capable of identifying existing
and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or
dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.  This
plan is designed to enable employers and employees to recognize the fall hazards on this job and to establish the
procedures that are to be followed in order to prevent falls to lower levels or through holes and openings in
walking/working surfaces. Each employee will be trained in these procedures and strictly adhere to them except
when doing so would expose the employee to a greater hazard.  The fall protection plan shall document the
reasons why the use of conventional fall protection systems (guardrail systems, personal fall arrest systems, or
safety net systems) are infeasible or why their use would create a greater hazard.  The fall protection plan shall
include a written discussion of other measures that will be taken to reduce or eliminate the fall hazard for workers
who cannot be provided with protection from the conventional fall protection systems. For example, the
employer shall discuss the extent to which scaffolds, ladders, or vehicle mounted work platforms can be used
to provide a safer working surface and thereby reduce the hazard of falling.  Where no other alternative measure
has been implemented, the employer shall implement a safety monitoring system.
To help reduce occupational fatalities resulting from falls from elevations, NIOSH recommends the following
prevention strategies, in addition to the general recommendations provided on pages 21 - 23, by fall hazard
environment (i.e., ladders, scaffolds, buildings or other structures, machinery, and trees).  The prevention
strategies were derived from worksite incident investigations conducted by NIOSH personnel, requirements
contained in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standards for General Industry and
the Construction Industry, and standards from the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
Ladders
The following recommendations were based on NIOSH investigative/research experience, and OSHA20
and ANSI 28-32 safety standards for ladders.  Every worker should be knowledgeable of the following when
using ladders.
Prior to using a ladder, workers should visually inspect it for:
• structural damage, such as split/bent side rails, broken or missing rungs/steps/cleats
• missing or damaged safety devices, such as rung locks, lock spreaders or safety shoes/feet/spurs/
spikes
• grease, dirt, or other contaminants that could cause slips or falls
• paint or stickers (except warning labels) that could hide possible defects.
Damaged ladders should be: Tagged or marked for repair, replacement, or destruction.
Climbing guidelines
• Wear slip-resistant footwear.
• Keep the area around the top and bottom of the ladder clear.
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• Wear approved fall protection equipment, if applicable.
• Never carry large objects while ascending or descending the ladder.  Use a hoist or pulley
mechanism to move large/awkward objects up to working level or down to the ground.
• Keep both hands free for climbing.
• Face the ladder and maintain three-point contact (two hands and one foot or one hand and two feet
on the ladder) at all times.
• Do not load ladders beyond the maximum intended load for which they were built, nor beyond their
manufacturer’s rated capacity.
• Use ladders only for the purpose for which they were designed.
Portable ladders (OSHA §1910.26 and §1926 Subpart X)20
There are two basic classifications of portable ladders, self-supporting (step ladders) and non-self-
supporting (straight or extension ladders).  Remember to use the proper ladder for the job/task being
performed.  In choosing between a self-supporting and a non-self-supporting ladder, an important factor
to consider is the bottom (working surface) and top support conditions.  If unsure of what the proper ladder
selection should be, consult the ladder manufacturer or the nearest OSHA office.  Proper selection of a
ladder is essential for ensuring safety and reducing the potential for injury events.
A portable ladder must:
• be long/tall enough to safely reach the work area
• have a load rating that can support the weight of the user, materials, and tools
• have non-conductive side rails, when used near energized equipment.
When using a non-self-supporting straight or extension ladder, observe the following precautions:
• Use ladders only on stable and level surfaces unless secured to prevent accidental displacement.
• Extend ladder side rails at least 3 feet above the upper landing to which the ladder is used to gain access.
• Set up the ladder so that the height-to-base ratio is 4 feet  to 1 foot (e.g., 4 feet away from vertical
member for a 16-foot ladder).   A general “rule of thumb” is to place feet at base of ladder; extend
arms; hands should just touch side rails.
• Have another person hold the ladder during ascent or descent, or tie/stake/foot it in place (top and
bottom).
• Set ladder so that both rails of the ladder maintain equal contact with the supporting structure.
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TYPE DUTY DUTY RATING
Type IA Extra heavy 300 lbs.
Type I Heavy 250 lbs.
Type II Medium 225 lbs.
Type III Light 200 lbs.
16 ft - 36 ft >36 ft - 48 ft >48 ft - 60 ft
3 feet 4 feet 5 feet
Normal Length of Ladder
• Use adjustable feet to level the ladder, if applicable.
• Never lean more than 12 inches beyond either side rail. Belt-buckle rule: always keep your belt
buckle inside the side rails of the ladder.
• Carry small tools and other work materials in your clothing or attached to a tool belt.
• The third highest rung is the maximum climbing height
When using a self-supporting step ladder:
• Use a step ladder only on a solid, level surface.
• Never try to use a folded step ladder as a straight ladder.
• Fully extend and lock the spreaders.
• Never climb or stand on the leg braces, the top step, or on the service tray.
• Avoid using an unprotected step ladder in a doorway or high-traffic areas.
• When working in a high-traffic area, lock or barricade doors, mark the area off, or have a co-worker
monitor the area while work is performed.
• Carry small tools and other work materials in your clothing or attached to a tool belt.
• Maintain three-point contact if it is necessary to carry large objects up or down a ladder.
General Information (ANSI A14 and OSHA §1910.26)20
The duty rating is to be considered the maximum working load, which includes the weight of the user,
materials, and tools.  The following summarizes the classification of ladders by duty rating:
Each section of a multi-section ladder, when fully extended, should overlap the adjacent section by at least
the number of feet indicated in the table below.
Minimum required overlap (extension ladders)
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The length of single ladders or individual sections of ladders shall not exceed 30 feet.  Two-section ladders
shall not exceed 48 feet in length and ladders with more than two sections shall not exceed 60 feet in length.
Maximum lengths for wooden, aluminum, and fiberglass step ladders.
Stepladders shall not exceed 20 feet in length.
Fixed Ladders (§1926.1053)20
• Fixed ladders shall be used at a pitch no greater than 90 degrees from the horizontal, as measured
to the back side of the ladder.
• Each step or rung shall be capable of supporting a single concentrated load of at least 250 pounds
(114 kg) applied in the middle of the step or rung.
• The rungs and steps of fixed metal ladders shall be corrugated, knurled, dimpled, coated with skid-
resistant material, or otherwise treated to minimize slipping.
• Where the total length of a climb equals or exceeds 24 feet (7.3 m), fixed ladders shall be equipped
with one of the following: cages, wells, ladder-safety devices, or self-retracting lifelines.
Scaffolds (§1926.451)20
The following recommendations were based on NIOSH investigative/research experience, and OSHA20
and ANSI 28-32 safety standards for scaffolds.  Every worker should be knowledgeable of the following
when using scaffolds.
• The footing or anchorage for scaffolds should be sound, rigid, and capable of carrying the
maximum intended load without settling or displacement.  Unstable objects, such as barrels, boxes,
loose bricks, or concrete blocks, should not be used to support scaffolds or planks.
• No scaffold should be erected, moved, dismantled, or altered except under the supervision of a
competent person.
• Guardrails and toeboards should be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than 10
feet above the ground or floor, except needle-beam scaffolds and floats.
• Guardrails should be 2 by 4 inches, or the equivalent, approximately 42 inches high, with a midrail,
when required. Supports should be at intervals not to exceed 8 feet, and toeboards should be a
minimum of 4 inches in height.
• Scaffolds 4 feet to 10 feet in height, having a minimum horizontal dimension in either direction of less
than 45 inches, should have standard guardrails installed on all open sides and ends of the platform.
DUT Y RAT ING LENGT H
Type IA and Type I 20 feet
Type II 12 feet
Type III 6 feet
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• Scaffolds and their components should be capable of supporting without failure at least 4 times the
maximum intended load.
• Any scaffold having accessories such as braces, brackets, trusses, screw legs, ladders, etc. which
are damaged or weakened from any cause should be immediately repaired or replaced.
• All scaffold platforms should be tightly planked with scaffold plank grade, or equivalent, as
recognized by approved grading rules for the species of wood used.
• After the erection of scaffolding at any project site, the employer should designate a competent person
to initially inspect the scaffolding and, at designated intervals, re-inspect the scaffolding.  Areas of
consideration for inspection should include but not be limited to the following: 1) braces, 2) brackets,
3) footing (anchorage), 4) guardrails and toeboards, 5) ladders, 6) legs, 7) locking pins, 8) overhead
protection, 9) planking, 10) poles, 11) securing, 12) slippery conditions, 13) trusses, and 14) uprights.
• Suspension-scaffold rigging should be inspected periodically by a competent person to ensure that
all connections are tight and that no damage to the rigging has occurred since its last use.
• Synthetic rope used in suspension scaffolding should be protected from heat-producing sources.
• Employers should ensure that employees are informed of the hazards of using diagonal braces as
a means of climbing scaffolds and instruct workers on the proper way to climb scaffolding.
Falls from buildings (§1926.502)20
The following recommendations were based on NIOSH investigative/research experience, and OSHA20
and ANSI 28-32 safety standards for falls from or out of buildings or other structures.
• Designers of buildings such as multi-tiered steel-framed structures should provide for fall protection
anchorage systems as part of the overall design of the structure.
• Designers of tanks should incorporate anchorage points (for securing scaffolds and lifelines) and toe
boards into the design of their products; owners of tanks should consult with tank manufacturers to
devise means of installing these safety features on existing tanks.
• A competent person should evaluate potential tie-off anchorage points and determine if the available
safety equipment can work as designed.  If the equipment will not work as designed, contact equipment
manufacturers to determine what equipment is available that can do the job properly.
• A competent person should routinely inspect all protective devices (e.g., guardrails, lifelines, etc.) to
ensure they operate properly.
• Employers should ensure that workers follow pre-fabrication building plans and procedures and comply
with existing standards regarding structural steel assembly.
• Employers should ensure that workers using personnel hoists and work platforms comply with existing
standards regarding the use of personnel hoists and work platforms.
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• Plant/facility owners/operators should identify areas that may be hazardous to all personnel, including
contractors, and restrict or prohibit the use of, or access to, these areas.
• Unused or unsecured construction materials should be stored only in designated areas.
• Lifts or hoists should be used to raise tools and materials to working heights or to lower tools and
materials to ground level.
Roof Openings
• Install guarding and/or fall protection on all roof openings.
• Warning signs should be present on all roof openings.
• Employers should consider, when applicable, cutting the roof openings as the last action on the roof to
help minimize exposure to this type of hazard.
Floor Openings
• Install guarding in the form of a standard railing and toe boards on all sides of floor openings, or install
a cover capable of supporting the maximum intended load and so installed as to prevent accidental
displacement.
• Hatchway floor openings should be guarded by hinged-floor-opening covers of standard strength and
construction, equipped with standard railings or permanently attached thereto so as to leave only one
exposed side.  When the opening is not in use, the cover shall be closed or the exposed side shall be
guarded at both top and intermediate positions by removable standard railings.
Skylights
• Install guarding in the form of standard railing around skylight openings, or install a cover capable of
supporting the maximum intended load.  Covers over skylight openings should be installed so as to
prevent accidental displacement.
• To guard against falls through skylights by maintenance or other personnel who must access the roof once
construction is completed, building owners should consider installing permanent railings around skylight
perimeters or protective covers over individual skylights.
• Skylight manufacturers and building owners should voluntarily affix warning signs (e.g., “DANGER—
skylights have been installed on this building.  Stepping or sitting on the skylight may result in severe injury
or death.”) on the skylights and at or near points of access (e.g., roof hatches, fixed ladders, stairways,
doors, etc.) to areas containing these skylights.
• Designers/manufacturers of skylights should evaluate current designs with a view toward increasing load
capacities and/or incorporating safeguards (e.g., protective grillwork).
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Leading Edges and Wall Openings
• Provide fall protection measures along unguarded roof perimeters and balconies.
• During steel erection, secure temporary flooring from displacement.
• Work near an open or damaged window should be done from the side rather than from directly in front
of the window, whenever possible.  This is also true of door and window openings prior to installation
of the door and window.  Guardrails should be installed across the opening until the door or window
is installed.
Stationary Vehicles and Tree Work
The following recommendations were designed for aerial lifts (§1926.556),20 fork lifts (powered industrial
trucks)(§1910.178), and tree work,11 and should be followed where applicable.
Aerial lifts can be defined as any vehicle-mounted aerial device used to elevate personnel to jobsites above
ground such as extensible boom platforms, aerial ladders, articulating boom platforms, vertical towers, or
any combination of these devices.
• A full-body harness should be worn and a lanyard attached to the boom or basket when working
from an aerial lift.
• Attaching the lanyard to an adjacent pole, structure, or equipment while working from an aerial lift
should not be permitted.
• Employees should always stand firmly on the floor of the basket, and should not sit or climb on the
edge of the basket or use planks, ladders, or other devices for a work position.
• An aerial lift truck should not be moved when the boom is elevated in a working position with
personnel in the basket, except for equipment which is specifically designed for this type of
operation.
• Climbers should not be worn while performing work from an aerial lift.
• The brakes should be set, and when outriggers are used, they should be positioned on pads or a solid
surface.  Wheel chocks should be installed before using an aerial lift on an incline, provided they
can be safely installed.
• Regular inspection and maintenance should be performed on all tools and equipment prior to use.
Fork lifts
Whenever a truck used for lifting personnel is equipped with vertical controls only, or vertical and
horizontal controls elevatable with the lifting carriage or forks, the following precautions should be taken
for the protection of the personnel being elevated:
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• A safety platform firmly secured to the lifting carriage and/or forks should be used.
• Means should be provided whereby personnel on the platform can remotely shut off power to the
truck.
• Protection from falling objects should be provided.
Trees
• Workers should not perform tree trimming or cutting without appropriate safety training.
• Use safe work procedures provided by the employer and/or equipment manufacturer for climbing,
felling, topping and pruning trees.
• Use safe work procedures provided by the employer and/or equipment manufacturer to prevent the
cutting of climbing ropes, lanyards, and harnesses or straps.
• Ensure that proper fasteners are used at the connectors for all climbing-cradle ropes.
• Inspect trees and limbs for structural weakness and the presence of powerlines before climbing or
cutting.
• Inspect all equipment, including fall-protection equipment, before use to ensure that it is not
damaged or defective.
• Operate mobile equipment (e.g., aerial lifts) only if properly trained.
• Evaluate the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system.
Summary Recommendations
The following is a summary of recommendations that may be applicable to all fall environments.  These
recommendations are based on the 90 FACE investigations and should be considered as part of an overall
fall protection program.
Employers should:
• Coordinate site-specific safety programs between multiple contractors.
• Prime contractors and subcontractors should abide by the Rules of Construction, which state:  “The
prime contractor and any subcontractors may make their own arrangements with respect to
obligations which might be more appropriately treated on a jobsite basis rather than individually.”
Thus, for example, the prime contractor and his subcontractors may wish to make an express
agreement that the prime contractor or one of the subcontractors will provide all required first-aid
or toilet facilities, thus relieving the subcontractors from the actual, but not any legal, responsibility
(or, as the case may be, relieving the other subcontractors from this responsibility). In no case shall
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the prime contractor be relieved of overall responsibility for compliance with the requirements of
this part (1926.16)20 for all work to be performed under the contract.
• Instruct new employees in the proper methods to be used in the performance of assigned tasks and
periodically observe the working habits of new employees to ensure that they are performing their
assigned tasks in a safe manner.
• Design, develop, and implement a verbal and/or written post-training examination to reinforce and
evaluate the effectiveness of the safety training program.
• Recognize and provide for language differences among workers.
• Conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections.
• Consider all environmental conditions prior to the commencement of work activities.
• Provide appropriate signs/placards at areas where fall hazards may exist such as roofs containing
skylights or floor openings secured with barriers.
• Use standby persons where work is performed in confined spaces.
• Design, develop, and implement procedures to be followed in the event of a medical emergency,
including rescue operations.
• Incorporate safety program requirements in contract language.
• Follow applicable safety rules and standards established by OSHA and ANSI.
Conclusion
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was established “to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources.”33  One means of achieving this goal is by providing for the development and promulgation of
occupational safety and health standards.  Included in these standards are safety and health regulations
applicable to fall protection and guarding which include, but are not limited to, ladders, scaffolds, floor and
wall openings, vehicles, tree trimming, and personal protective and life saving equipment.  These
regulations and other applicable standards from the American National Standards Institute along with
NIOSH recommendations, should be followed where the possibility of falls from elevations exists.
Additionally, NIOSH has developed and disseminated the following Alerts as a further means to
help reduce the number of fatalities resulting from falls from elevations:  Falls Through Skylights
and Roof Openings,34 Preventing Falls and Electrocutions During Tree Trimming,11 and Preventing
Worker Injuries and Deaths Caused by Falls From Suspension Scaffolds.35
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GLOSSARY
The Code of Federal Regulations list the following scaffold types.20
  1) Boatswain’s chair -- A seat supported by slings attached to a suspended rope, designed to
accommodate one worker in a sitting position.
  2) Bricklayer’s square -- A scaffold composed of framed wood squares which support a platform,
limited to light and medium duty.
  3) Carpenter’s bracket -- A scaffold consisting of wood or metal brackets supporting a
platform.
  4) Crawling boards or chicken ladders -- A plank with cleats spaced and secured at equal intervals,
for use by a worker on roofs, not designed to carry any material.
  5) Float or ship -- A scaffold hung from overhead supports by means of ropes and consisting of a
substantial platform having diagonal bracing underneath, resting upon and securely fastened to two
parallel plank bearers at right angles to the span.
  6) Horse -- A scaffold for light or medium duty, composed of horses (i.e., sawhorses or other simple
framing) supporting a work platform.
  7) Interior hung -- A scaffold suspended from the ceiling or roof structure.
  8) Ladder jack -- A light duty scaffold supported by brackets attached to ladders.
  9) Manually propelled mobile -- A portable rolling scaffold supported by casters.
10) Mason’s adjustable multiple-point suspension -- A scaffold having a continuous platform
supported by bearers suspended by wire rope from overhead supports, so arranged and operated
as to permit the raising or lowering of the platform to desired working positions.
11) Needle beam -- A light-duty scaffold consisting of needle beams (i.e. , a horizontal beam or group
of beams for carrying the load of a column, wall, or other part of a structure) supporting a platform.
12) Outrigger -- A scaffold supported by outriggers or thrustouts projecting beyond the wall  or face
of the building or structure, the inboard ends of which are secured inside of the building or structure.
13) Plasterer’s, decorator’s, and large area single-pole scaffold -- Platforms resting on putlogs or
cross beams, the outside ends of which are supported on ledgers secured to a single row of posts
or uprights, and the inner ends of which are supported on or in a wall.
14) Roofing or bearer bracket -- A bracket used in slope roof construction, having provisions  for
fastening to the roof or supported by ropes fastened over the ridge and secured to some suitable
object.
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15) Single-point adjustable suspension -- A manually or power-operated unit designed for  light-duty
use, supported by a single wire rope from an overhead support so arranged and operated as to permit
the raising or lowering of a platform to desired working positions.
16) Stone setter’s adjustable multiple-point suspension -- A swinging-type scaffold having a
platform supported by hangers suspended at four points so as to permit the raising or lowering of
the platform to the desired working position by the use of hoisting machines.
17) Tube and coupler -- An assembly consisting of tubing which serves as posts, bearers, braces, ties,
and runners, a base supporting the posts, and special couplers which serve to connect the uprights
and to join the various members.
18) Tubular welded frame -- A sectional panel or frame-metal scaffold substantially built up of
prefabricated welded sections which consists of posts and horizontal bearer with intermediate
members.
19) Two-point suspension (Swinging scaffold) -- A scaffold, the platform of which is supported by
hangers (stirrups) at two points, suspended from overhead supports so as topermit the raising or
lowering of the platform to the desired working position by tackle or hoisting machines.
20) Window jack -- A scaffold, the platform of which is supported by a bracket or jack which projects
through a window opening.
21) Double pole or independent pole -- A scaffold supported from the base by a double row of
uprights, independent of support from the walls and constructed of uprights, ledgers, horizontal
platform bearers, and diagonal bracing.
Additionally, scaffolds are classified into weight-bearing categories which include heavy-duty scaffolds
which are designed and constructed to carry a working load not to exceed 75 pounds per square foot.
Medium-duty scaffolds are designed and constructed to carry a working load not to exceed 50 pounds per
square foot, and light-duty scaffolds are designed and constructed to carry a working load not to exceed
25 pounds per square foot.
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PART II
FATALITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL EVALUATION (FACE)
 REPORTS, 1982-1997
FALLS FROM ELEVATIONS
The following 90 FACE investigations were conducted between May 1982 and September 1997.  The
investigations have been divided into four categories according to their E-code classifications as follows:
The first two numbers of the FACE report (e.g., 87) denote the year in which the incident was investigated.
The last two numbers of the FACE report (e.g., 47) identify a sequential file number for a particular year.
N umbe r of
Inve s tigations E-code D e scription
B e ginning
Page
N umbe r
8 881.0 falls from ladders 39
16 881.1 falls from scaffolds 64
58 882.0 falls from or out of buildings or other structures 120
8 884.9 other falls from one level to another 300
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FACE 87-47:  Worker Dies Inside Filtration Tank in Michigan
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR)
is currently conducting the Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) Project, which is
focusing primarily upon selected electrical-related and confined space-related fatalities. The purpose of the
FACE program is to identify and rank factors that influence the risk of fatal injuries for selected employees.
On May 12, 1987, a city worker died while checking the inside of an empty filtration tank at a sewage
treatment plant.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
The Water Pollution Control Federation (WPCF) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this
fatality and requested technical assistance. This case has been included in the FACE Project. On June 15-
16, 1987, a DSR research industrial hygienist conducted a site visit, collected incident data, photographed
the site, and interviewed representatives of the employer and comparison workers.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this incident is a municipality with a resident population of approximately 160,000. The
victim worked at the wastewater treatment plant (in the wastewater treatment department) which has a total
of 56 employees, primarily plant operators and plant maintenance personnel. Additionally, there are five
lab technicians, three plant foremen, a chemist, a civil engineer, office personnel, and a plant supervisor.
New employees are given a half-day orientation concerning the operating policy of the city. Time off is
provided for mandatory reading of safety booklets. All employees are given formal training in hazardous
communication, material safety data sheets/"right to know", and the use of self-contained breathing
apparatus. Continual on-the-job task training also addresses various hazards encountered on a day-to-day
basis. Workplace safety is stressed as a responsibility of each employee. A wastewater treatment plant
safety committee which consists of the plant superintendent, two union stewards (a plant maintenance
worker and a plant operator), a maintenance foreman, and the civil engineer meets monthly. Accident
reports, safety equipment, safety complaints from employees, the implementation of safety directives from
management, etc. are discussed at these committee meetings. The two union stewards are given additional
time to evaluate employee complaints and safety concerns in the plant. No training is given on confined
space entry; however, plant supervisors have necessary testing equipment available to test a confined space
atmosphere for oxygen (O2), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), and explosive gases. The plant also has several self
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) throughout the plant facility.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
A 55 year-old wastewater treatment plant operator (the victim) with 25 years of experience was inspecting
one of twelve open-top concrete filter tanks (used for tertiary wastewater treatment) when this incident
occurred. Each filter tank is 15 feet wide x 24 feet long x 12 feet deep and is divided vertically in the middle
by a concrete baffle. The bottom of each tank contains a filter bed (several feet of filter media composed
of graduated sized stone, covered by approximately 12 inches of wheat-sized anthracite coal). Four trough-
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like weirs spaced equally apart span the width of each tank half, three feet above the top of the filter media.
A concrete walkway with steel safety rails is located around the top of each tank. Each tank operates with
approximately nine feet of wastewater and is backwashed three times per day. During this process, a small
amount of the filter media (i.e. coal) is washed away. In order to determine the amount of filter media lost,
the victim (or other plant operators, when assigned) periodically drain each tank and measure the depth of
the filter media. To do this employees are required to lower an aluminum ladder into the tank, positioning
the feet of the ladder inside a weir, climb into the tank with a steel tape, measure the depth of the filter media,
climb back out, and place the filter tank back in operation. This process is repeated for all the filter tanks.
The victim had been assigned to inspect the depth of the filter media in all of the filter tanks (a task which
he had done at least twice before). Four days prior to the day of the accident the victim had inspected six
tanks. The acting plant foreman (the victim's supervisor) was not aware of the victim having experienced
any ill effects from these tank inspections.
On May 12, 1987, the victim reported to work at 8:00 a.m. and was asked by the plant foreman if he required
any assistance in the completion of the remaining six tank inspections. The victim said "no" and completed
the inspection of one tank and, although there were no eye witnesses, it is presumed that he was in the
process of climbing either into or out of a second tank when he fell from the ladder into the weir. The victim
struck his head on a ladder rung or on an edge of the weir.
At approximately 10:55 a.m. the victim's supervisor noticed that the filter tank being inspected had no filter
tank valve changes documented on the computer for several minutes. The supervisor left the control room
and entered the tertiary filter tank building to check on the victim. The supervisor found the victim lying
unconscious inside a weir at the bottom of the tank. The supervisor immediately notified office personnel
in the plant, who notified the city fire department emergency rescue squad and then summoned a
maintenance worker for help. The supervisor and the maintenance worker entered the filter tank, but did
not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The rescue squad arrived on the scene approximately
two and a half minutes after being called, entered the tank, hoisted the victim out, and began to administer
CPR. Resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful. The county medical examiner arrived on the scene at about
1:00 p.m. and pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
An autopsy was conducted and the cause of death listed by the medical examiner was hypertensive and
arteriosclerotic heart disease. Also, according to the medical examiner: "Advanced emphysema of the
lungs may have contributed to the death. The deceased was considerably overweight . . .", the ". . .
laceration of the left side of the head was sustained as a result of the terminal fall.", and "Yellow
discoloration of the skull may have been related to diabetes mellitus."
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Workers who are required to enter confined spaces to perform tasks as part of
their job responsibilities should receive pre-placement and periodic physical examinations to determine
that they are physically capable of performing these duties.
Discussion: Simply entering and exiting the filter bed placed a great deal of stress on the victim's
cardiopulmonary system. Because of pre-existing medical problems (emphysema, arteriosclerotic heart
disease, obesity, and diabetes), which were apparently unknown to the victim, he was unable to withstand
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this stress. This fatality underscores the advisability of pre-placement and periodic physical examinations
for any strenuous work, especially in a confined space.
Recommendation #2: The employer should develop a written comprehensive safety program that clearly
documents procedures for safe entry into confined spaces.
Discussion: All employees who work in or around confined spaces (wastewater treatment plant employees)
should be aware of potential hazards, possible emergencies, and specific procedures to be followed prior
to entering a confined space. These procedures should include, but not be limited to:
1. Air quality testing to determine adequate 02 level.
2. Ventilation of the space to remove air contaminants.
3. Monitoring of the space to determine a safe oxygen level is maintained.
4. Employee training in confined space entry, testing, and use of personal protective equipment
(respirators, clothing, etc.).
5. Standby person outside the confined space for communication and visual monitoring.
6. Emergency rescue procedures.
Even though there were no dangerous air contaminants in the confined space and normal oxygen levels
were found in air samples taken inside the filter tank by the DSR research industrial hygienist at the time
of the on-site evaluation, entry into confined spaces should not be attempted until atmospheric testing of
the confined space insures that the atmosphere is safe. This testing requirement applies to all confined
spaces, including the inside of open-top tertiary filter tanks. Testing must be done by a qualified person prior
to entry. Specific recommendations regarding safe work practices in confined spaces can be found in the
NIOSH Publication No. 80-106, "Working in Confined Spaces". This publication also defines and
provides recommendations on hot work, isolation, purging, ventilation, communication, entry and rescue,
training, posting, safety equipment, clothing, etc.
Recommendation #3: A trained standby person should remain outside of the confined space when a
worker enters or works inside. The standby person should visually monitor the tasks being performed
inside and should be able to communicate with the worker(s) inside the confined space.
Discussion: A person trained in emergency rescue procedures, assigned to remain on the outside of the
confined space for communication and visual monitoring of the person inside is of utmost importance.
Recommendation #4: Employees should be trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
Discussion: CPR should begin as soon as possible, minimally within 4 minutes (in accordance with
American Heart Association guidelines) in order to achieve the best results. To meet this criteria for
successful resuscitation, workers should be trained in CPR to support the victim's circulation and
ventilation until trained medical personnel arrive. While some employees had apparently received CPR
training in the past, employees who arrived at the scene of the accident (prior to the arrival of emergency
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medical personnel) did not begin CPR on the victim. Retraining in CPR is necessary, usually on an annual
basis.
Recommendation #5: The procedure used to measure the level of filter media present in a tank should
be evaluated to determine if the procedure could be modified to eliminate the need to enter the confined
space.
Discussion: Prior to entry into a confined space one of the first questions that needs to be addressed is
whether entry is necessary. The procedure used to measure the level of filter media present in a tank should
be evaluated to determine if it could be modified to eliminate the need for entry into the tank.
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FACE 88-14:  Labor Foreman Falls to His Death Inside Municipal Water Tank in Indiana
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On March 21, 1988, a 28-year-old male labor foreman died when he fell 50 feet inside a 700,000-gallon
municipal water tank.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program for the State of Indiana notified DSR of this
fatality and requested technical assistance. A research safety specialist discussed this case with the OSHA
compliance officer and on April 4 met with the employer's representatives. On April 5 a meeting was held
with municipal officials and with responding ambulance personnel. The incident site was also photographed
on this date.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this incident is a multistate corporation specializing in cathodic protection systems which
provide a form of protection against electrolytic corrosion. Of the company's 250 employees, 16 perform
the same type of work as the victim. The company has a written safety policy which prescribes the use of
fall protection where there is potential that a worker may fall in excess of 10 feet. This policy also calls for
testing the atmosphere prior to entering any confined space, and for the use of a lifeline, safety harness, and
appropriate respirator when working inside a confined space. The victim was employed as a tank
department foreman and served as supervisor at various sites where work on cathodic protection systems
for water tanks was being performed.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim and a co-worker were assigned routine maintenance work on the cathodic protection system
within an elevated municipal water tank. Approximately 2 months prior to this incident, the tank developed
a leak and was drained. A small amount of water remained in the tank at a level below the riser which serves
as the tank drain. There was ice on the surface of the water.
The cylindrical tank is approximately 40 feet wide by 60 feet high. A ladder on one of the legs supporting
the tank provides access from the ground to a catwalk on the tank. The catwalk circles the tank
approximately 125 feet above the ground. A second permanently mounted ladder extends from the catwalk
to the top of the tank. At the top of the tank, a 2-foot-square door provides entry to the tank.
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On the day of the incident, the victim and his co-worker arrived at the jobsite at 11:00 a.m. Prior to climbing
the tank, they noticed an entry hatch on the side of the tank bowl at the level of the catwalk. They decided
not to use this entry hatch because they weren't sure they could properly seal it at the conclusion of the work.
At approximately 12:15 p.m., the two men climbed to the top of the tank and found the entry door locked.
The men descended the tank, obtained a key from city officials, climbed again to the top of the tank, and
opened the door. They suspended a rope ladder through the door to provide access to the tank floor.
The maintenance work on the cathodic protection system required that they replace a fitting which was
below the level of the water in the tank. The victim used a section of garden hose to begin siphoning the
water from the bottom of the tank and routing it down the wet riser at the center of the tank bowl. Because
the water would not be removed by the end of their shift, they performed other necessary maintenance
work, planning to return the following day to finish the job.
At approximately 5: 10 p.m., the co-worker exited the tank and stopped on the catwalk to wait for his
supervisor. When the supervisor did not follow after 4 to 5 minutes, the co-worker climbed to the top of
the tank in search of him. The co-worker saw the supervisor inside the tank approximately one quarter of
the way up the ladder. The supervisor stated that he was tired and that his arms were numb. The supervisor
then continued to climb the ladder.
The co-worker noticed that the supervisor "was climbing wrong and had a funny look on his face." (The
supervisor was facing the ladder, as opposed to the standard procedure for climbing a rope ladder from the
side thereby producing less swaying motion.) The co-worker asked the supervisor if he needed help. Upon
receiving a positive response, the co-worker descended the ladder to assist him. The co-worker managed
to grasp the supervisor's hand, however the supervisor was unresponsive to the co-worker's repeated calls
to grasp the ladder. The co-worker was unable to retain his grip, and the supervisor slipped from the ladder
and fell approximately 50 feet to the bottom of the tank. The co-worker descended the ladder to aid the
victim and moved him slightly from the facedown position near the water where he landed. He returned
to the top of the tank where he cried out for help. He got the attention of several individuals located at a
business establishment across the street who, in turn, summoned help.
The local fire department received the report of the accident via telephone at 5:15 p.m. and were on the scene
at 5:19 p.m. Two firefighters and an EMT from the local ambulance company entered the tank through the
manway located at the catwalk. The victim was found to be bleeding from the mouth and nose, with
noticeable deformation of his forearm and right upper leg. No vital signs were detected. The victim was
secured to a back board and lowered to the ground. The ambulance departed the scene at 5:54 p.m. and
arrived at the local medical center at 6:00 p.m. where the victim was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
Neither the co-worker nor the responding rescue personnel noted any unusual odors in the tank, nor did
they experience any symptoms indicative of possible oxygen deficiency.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Medical Examiner gave the cause of death as a skull fracture and lacerations of the brain, along with
contusions to the lungs.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should periodically re-evaluate company confined space work
procedures to ensure that the following areas are addressed:
• atmospheric testing is performed prior to entry
• safe climbing devices are employed where needed
• safety harness and lifeline are used in all cases (for rescue as well as fall protection when
working at elevations)
• an observer outside of the confined space is available to summon help if needed.
• communication devices are available to ensure adequate communications between workers in
confined spaces and those outside.
Discussion: The company that employed this foreman has written safety procedures that require the testing
of the atmosphere of any confined space prior to entry. In addition, the procedures specify that a lifeline
and safety harness are to be worn while working in a confined space, and that an appropriate respirator be
worn when indicated by the atmospheric testing. None of these procedures were followed in this case, nor
was any provision made for the use of safe climbing devices. In addition no observer was present, nor was
any means provided for communication between the tower and anyone on the ground. If an oxygen
deficient atmosphere existed within the tank, it could have proved fatal to both workers.
Recommendation #2: Employers should provide periodic refresher training which stresses the hazards
that exist within confined spaces to all employees who work in or around confined spaces.
Discussion: Although the victim in this case was a supervisor who had received training in confined space
entry procedures, he elected to forego written company safety procedures regarding atmospheric testing
and the use of safety harnesses and lifelines. His failure to follow standard written procedures concerning
confined space work was an important factor in this incident.
Recommendation #3: Company management (safety) personnel should conduct periodic worksite
evaluations to ensure that written procedures are being followed in the field.
Discussion: In this case a foreman apparently chose to ignore company procedures regarding work in
confined spaces. Since safety is an inherent function of management, workers cannot be expected to follow
safety procedures if their supervisors do not. Periodic inspection of worksites by company safety personnel
would serve to show management's interest in the safety program and reinforce within all workers the need
to follow company standard operating procedures.
Recommendation #4: An evaluation of the worksite should be performed prior to the start of all
operations to determine potential safety and health hazards as well as concerns which would affect the
efficiency of the operation.
Discussion: An evaluation of the worksite prior to the start of work would permit safety hazards to be
identified and plans for corrective action to be prepared prior to employee exposure. In the above case such
an evaluation might have enabled the workers to avoid the initial climb up the tower to unlock the door at
the top of the tank. In addition, a thoughtful evaluation might have convinced the supervisor to utilize the
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hatch at the catwalk rather than the opening at the top of the tank. Such action may have eliminated the need
for the rope ladder and thus prevented the fall.
Recommendation #5: Rescue personnel entering confined spaces should utilize appropriate protective
equipment.
Discussion: In the above case, rescue personnel entered a confined space where a victim became ill and
had fallen for unknown reasons without either checking the atmosphere first or utilizing self-contained
breathing apparatus. In similar situations rescue personnel themselves often become victims. NIOSH
investigations of 41 confined space incidents have revealed that 18 (31%) of the 59 victims were would-
be rescuers.
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FACE 89-05:  Painter Dies in a 140-Foot Fall at a Municipal Water Tower
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On September 22, 1988, a 34-year-old male painter died when he apparently inhaled vapors from paint
containing xylene, lost consciousness, and fell 140 feet within the vertical water supply pipe of a municipal
water tower.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On December 13, 1988, a
DSR field team met with the employer, the county coroner, and local emergency services personnel; and
visited and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this incident is a small contractor specializing in painting water towers. The contractor has
been in operation for 7 years and employs seven individuals. The company has no formal safety program
and all training is "on the job." The victim had been employed by the company for 3 months, and had
worked as a painter for the 2 months prior to the incident.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was a member of a seven-man crew involved in painting a municipal water tower. The crew
consisted of a foreman, four painters and two "groundmen." The crew had worked on this tower for several
days prior to the incident.
The tower is a large, elevated water tank supported by seven legs. A 5-foot-diameter riser (vertical water
supply pipe) extends from the center of the tank bowl to the ground approximately 145 feet below. Access
to the top of the tank is provided by a fixed ladder on one of the tank legs. A hatchway on top of the tank
provides access to the interior, with a second fixed ladder leading down to the tank floor. The top of the
riser, located in the center of the tank floor, is normally covered with a metal grating; however, this grating
had been removed for the painting operation. The interior of the riser contains a fixed ladder leading to the
bottom, and a 6-inch-diameter overflow pipe. A 24- by 15-inch port located 5 feet above the bottom of the
riser provides access to the interior of the riser from the ground.
Prior to painting the interior of the tower, air lines (for supplied-air respirators) and paint lines (for the paint
spray guns) had been run through the bottom port and up the riser to the tank bowl. A 3/8-inch steel lifeline
had been run from the top of the riser to the bottom for use during painting of the riser interior. A boatswain's
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chair (a seat supported by slings attached to a suspended rope to support one person in a sitting position)
was suspended at the top of the riser for the painter's use while working inside the riser.
At the time of the incident the victim was working alone, painting the inside of the riser. On previous days,
he had applied two coats of paint to the interior. Three other painters were working on the exterior of the
tank, and the two groundmen were handling the paint lines and air lines on the ground.
The previous afternoon the foreman had observed the victim exiting the riser in an apparently intoxicated
condition. The victim had not been wearing his issued supplied-air respirator, relying instead on a bandana
worn across his mouth and nose. Since the paint being used contained both xylene and methyl ethyl ketone,
the victim had probably become intoxicated by breathing vapors containing these chemicals. The foreman
reprimanded the victim for not wearing his respirator.
On the morning of the incident, the foreman reminded the victim that he must wear his respirator when
painting inside the tank. The victim and one co-worker entered the tank to prepare the equipment for
painting the interior of the riser. The victim told the co-worker that he would be painting the riser from the
fixed ladder instead of using the boatswain's chair because it was "easier." Once preparations for this work
were completed, the co-worker left the interior of the tank.
The victim had been painting for approximately one-half hour when one of the groundmen, who was
located outside near the access port at the base of the riser, heard a noise and observed the paint line falling
within the riser. Moments later the victim, who had fallen from the ladder, landed at the base of the riser.
The groundman immediately called to his co-workers that a man had fallen within the riser. Members of
the local fire department rescue squad who were training in a field adjacent to the tower, immediately
arrived at the scene. One paramedic, who entered the riser through the access port, examined the victim
and was unable to detect any vital signs. The victim's body was removed through the access port and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was begun. CPR was continued while the victim was transported to
the local hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Fire department personnel involved in the rescue attempt reported that the victim was wearing a safety belt
when they reached him inside the riser, but that the belt was not connected to the lifeline within the riser.
They further reported that the victim was wearing a bandana over his face, and that no respirator was present
on the body. A police department detective along with one of the victim's co-workers entered the tank
approximately 1 1/2 hours after the incident occurred. The police detective reported that vapor was visible
in the tank at this time. (The vapor is also visible in photographs taken by the detective.) The victim's
supplied-air respirator was found lying on the floor of the tank. Later inspection revealed that the victim
had painted the top 8 to 10 feet of the riser before falling.
An autopsy conducted on the victim revealed 0.2mg% xylene in a sample of blood taken from the victim's
heart.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's office gave the cause of death as multiple fractures and internal injuries. The fall
which produced these injuries was very likely a direct result of loss of consciousness due to acute xylene
toxicity.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that all employees understand hazards associated with
their jobs.
Discussion: The employer in this case had provided no formal training, relying instead on on-the-job
training to prepare workers for the tasks to which they are assigned. Although the victim had previously
been reprimanded for failure to use his respirator, he apparently did not understand that the respirator was
essential for his safety during this job and he neglected to wear it, relying instead on a bandana to protect
himself from the chemicals in the paint. A training program providing the employee with knowledge of the
possible consequences of breathing the vapors from this paint might have increased his understanding of
the potential danger involved in painting without a respirator. In addition, the victim failed to use the
boatswain's chair and to connect his safety belt to the lifeline provided for fall protection. A comprehensive
safety training program which stressed the importance of using the safety equipment provided by the
employer, and which increased employee understanding of hazards and how to utilize protective
equipment might have prevented the fatal fall.
Recommendation #2: Employers should verify that safety equipment provided is used by their
employees.
Discussion: The victim in this case had been reprimanded the previous day for failure to use his respirator,
and had again been reminded to wear it the day the fatality occurred. Employers should ensure that
employees understand why they need to use their safety equipment at all times. Appropriate disciplinary
action or additional training should be provided when employees continually neglect to use this equipment.
Periodic spot checks to verify compliance with safety rules might have encouraged the victim to use his
equipment and might have prevented this fatality.
Recommendation #3: Rescue considerations should be addressed by employers whenever workers are
assigned to areas where the potential for falls or entrapment exist.
Discussion: In this case the victim was working at an elevation within a confined space. Because of this,
the potential for falling or being overcome by chemicals within the confined space existed. Despite the
hazards involved, no pre-planning for any type of rescue operation had been made. When working in
similar locations employers should develop a written rescue procedure to be used in the event an incident
should develop. This rescue procedure should include actions to be taken by other employees as well as
prior notification of local fire department/rescue personnel.
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FACE 90-07:  Laborer Dies After Fall From Ladder in South Carolina
SUMMARY
A masonry contractor had been contracted to construct a life center building across the road from a hospital
complex. A construction laborer (victim) had been instructed by his foreman to prepare a batch of mortar
on the second level of a new construction project, and carry it to the third level. The mortar was carried by
pails from the second level via stairs to the third level. For some unknown reason, the victim decided to use
the top section of an aluminum extension ladder (without safety feet). He placed one end of the ladder on
the wet concrete floor, leaned the other end against a wall, and started to climb. The ladder apparently
slipped on the wet floor causing him to fall approximately 12 feet. NIOSH investigators concluded that,
in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers and employees must:
• ensure that ladders are used in accordance with existing safety standards
• instruct workers that upper sections of extension ladders should not be used as single ladders
• train employees in the proper use of tools and equipment needed to perform their assigned tasks
• designate an individual as the company safety officer to visit the various jobsites, identify
potential hazards, and ensure that those hazards are eliminated.
INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 1989, a 46-year-old male construction laborer fell while climbing a ladder. He died on
September 24, 1989, from injuries sustained in the fall.
On October 11, 1989, the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the
Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the incident and requested technical assistance.
On October 19, 1989, a DSR safety engineer conducted an investigation. The investigator visited and
photographed the incident site, reviewed the case with company officials, talked with employees who were
present at the time of the incident, and contacted the county medical examiner's office for information about
the incident.
The employer is a masonry contractor who has been in business for 30 years and has 267 employees.
Although the company has written safety rules and procedures and company officials conduct regular
safety meetings, it has no company safety officer. The company places a safety flier in the weekly pay
envelope to try to keep the employees aware of proper safety practices. Safety information is primarily
conveyed via on-the-job training. The victim had worked for the employer for about 12 months as a laborer
prior to this incident.
INVESTIGATION
A masonry contractor had been contracted to construct a life center building across the road from a hospital
complex. At the time of the incident, the victim was preparing a batch of mortar as instructed by the foreman.
The victim's duties included mixing mortar and transporting it to the desired location in pails. The rest of the crew,
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including the foreman, went up to the third level of the building, which was about 12 feet above the second floor
where the victim was working. The workers used a stairway to access the third floor work area.
Although no one saw the victim fall, evidence at the site suggested that the victim took the top portion of
an aluminum extension ladder (without safety feet), placed one end on the wet concrete floor, and leaned
the other end against a wall to reach the third floor area. Without attempting to tie off the ladder or secure
it in any fashion, the victim began to climb the ladder. The bottom of the ladder apparently slipped on the
wet floor, causing the victim to fall. There were no indications at the scene that the victim was carrying a
pail of mortar when he fell.
The victim was discovered by an employee of another contractor on the site. This individual said that the
victim was conscious, but was talking incoherently and bleeding from his ears. By the time the emergency
rescue squad arrived 15 minutes after the fall, the victim had lost consciousness. He was transported to the
hospital where he died 3 days later.
During the interviews, the employer could offer no reason why the victim used the ladder, which belonged
to another contractor, instead of the stairway to access the work area. The general contractor stated that the
victim's employer did not have any extension ladders at the jobsite. There was no indication that the victim
had used a ladder in this way prior to the incident. The incident occurred on the employer's last day of work
at the site.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed multiple traumatic injuries sustained from the fall as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that ladders are used in accordance with requirements
of existing Federal safety standards.
Discussion: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) construction standards require that
the base, or feet, of portable metal ladders be placed on a substantial base (1926. 450(a)(6)); that they be
set up at a proper angle (1926.450 (a)(7)); and that ladders in use be tied, blocked, or otherwise secured
to prevent displacement (1926.450(a)(10). Employers should be familiar with the Federal safety standards
that apply to their businesses, including those that relate to the tools and equipment they use.
Recommendation #2: The upper sections of extension ladders should not be used as single ladders.
Discussion: Although referring to wooden sectional ladders, 29 CFR 1910.25(d)(2)(xvii) (which is a
General Industry Standard) prohibits the use of top sections of such ladders unless equipped with safety
feet. It would be prudent to follow this requirement whether the ladder is wooden or metal. The upper
sections of extension ladders are not regularly equipped with safety feet and are not intended to be used
as single ladders. Using sections of extension ladders in this manner creates potential hazards that can result
in serious injuries or death.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should train workers in the proper use of tools and equipment used
to perform their assigned tasks.
Discussion: Had the victim been trained in the proper use of ladders, he would have known to use a ladder
with safety feet, to place it at a safe angle, and to secure the ladder in compliance with existing standards.
The victim placed a ladder without safety feet on a wet surface and did not secure it before starting to climb
the ladder. A review of safety procedures involving ladders would be a good topic for a training session
at a company safety meeting. Training sessions should be conducted and documented by company
officials.
Recommendation #4: The employer should designate an individual as the company safety officer.
Discussion: At present the safety function is not overseen by one individual. Assigning one individual the
responsibility for coordinating all of the safety activity of the company would most likely result in a better
overall safety program. The company safety officer should be required to routinely visit the various jobsites,
identify potential hazards, and ensure that those hazards are eliminated. This person should also discuss
pertinent safety issues with the foreman on the jobsite on a regular basis.
REFERENCES
1. 29 CFR 1926.450(a)(6) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
2. 29 CFR 1926.450(a)(7) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
3. 29 CFR 1926.450(a)(10) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
 4. 29 CFR 1910.25(d)(2)(xvii) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register
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FACE 93-22:  Roofer Dies After Fall From Ladder--North Carolina
SUMMARY
A 56-year-old male roofer (the victim) died after falling approximately 15 feet from a ladder he was
ascending. The victim was part of a five-man crew that was replacing a 35,000 square-foot office complex
roof, which was 27 feet above ground. The workers were using a 40-foot fiberglass extension ladder tied
off at roof level to access their work area. They began work at 8:30 a.m. and had only to install the flashing
around the roof perimeter to complete the job. Three workers were already on the roof. The victim stopped
at the tar kettle and asked the tar kettle attendant for a rag, then began to climb the ladder to the roof. The
tar kettle attendant watched the victim climb the ladder approximately half-way up. The attendant turned
away from the ladder, then heard something hit the ground behind him. When he turned around, he saw
the victim lying face up on the ground. The emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned by phone
from the office complex and one co-worker ran up the hill to the local hospital to summon help. The EMS
arrived within 5 minutes, administered first aid, and transported the victim to the local hospital where he
was pronounced dead by the attending physician. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar
occurrences, employers should:
• stress to all employees the importance of exercising caution when climbing ladders to their
workplace
• develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program.
INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 1993, a 56-year-old male roofer (the victim) died after falling approximately 15 feet from a
40-foot extension ladder. On June 14, 1993, officials of the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested
technical assistance. On August 11, 1993, a safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and
reviewed the circumstances with a company representative, and the NCOSHA compliance officer and
supervisor assigned to the case.
The employer in this incident was a roofing contractor that employed 8 workers and had been in operation
for 30 years. The employer had a general safety program but no written safety procedures. All workers had
received documented training in roofing and ladder safety. The victim had worked for the company as a
roofer for 25 years. This was the first fatality the company had experienced.
INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to replace a 35,000 square-foot, 27-foot-high built-up roof on an office
complex. A five-man crew was performing the work. The workers had been at the site for 1 week and work
had progressed to the point that the only task remaining was the installation of the flashing around the
perimeter of the roof. The day of the incident was to be the last day at the site.
At 8:30 a.m. on the morning of the incident, the foreman and two of the roofers climbed the ladder to the
roof. The 40-foot fiberglass extension ladder had a 300-pound load limit rating.
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On his way to the ladder, the victim passed the tar kettle where he asked for, and obtained from the attendant,
a rag to use for the day. The attendant watched the victim climb the ladder to a height of approximately 15
feet, then turned away to prepare the tar kettle for transport from the site. The attendant heard something
hit the ground behind him and thought the workers on the roof were throwing waste to the ground; however,
when he turned, he saw the victim lying on his back on the gravel driveway.
The attendant yelled to the foreman, who, with one of the co-workers, descended the ladder to the ground.
The co-worker went into the office complex to have someone summon the emergency medical service
(EMS). The co-worker then ran to the hospital, which was located up the hill from the complex, to summon
help.
The foreman began cardiopulmonary resuscitation but stopped when he realized the victim had broken ribs.
The EMS arrived within 5 minutes and transported the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead
by the attending physician.
Although the tar kettle attendant saw the victim ascend the ladder to approximately 15 feet above ground
level, the event was unwitnessed. It is not known whether the victim slipped or tripped, then fell from the
ladder. The steps of the ladder were clean and dry.
The medical examiner stated that there was no evidence of any physical condition that might have
contributed to the incident. Blood alcohol and toxicology reports were negative. No citations for non-
compliance with occupational safety and health standards were issued by NCOSHA for this incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as pericardial tamponade and right ventricle rupture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/ DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should stress to all employees the importance of exercising caution
when climbing ladders to their workplace.
Discussion: The ladder in this incident was clean and there was no evidence of a foreign substance that
might have been a factor in the incident. Additionally, the workers had received training in ladder safety.
Employers should constantly stress to employees the importance of exercising caution when climbing or
working from ladders.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety
program.
Discussion: The written safety program should include, but not be limited to, ladder safety, the recognition
and avoidance of fall hazards, and address appropriate worker training in the proper selection and use of
fall protection equipment.
55
FACE 93-23:  Painter Dies After Fall Inside 250,000 Gallon Water Tank--North Carolina
SUMMARY
A 20-year-old male painter (the victim) died after falling from an undetermined height inside a 250,000
gallon municipal water tank. The victim was part of a four-man crew painting the interior and exterior of
the tank. Three painters, including the victim, were sandblasting and priming the exterior of the tank and
the steel-grate catwalk around the circumference of the tank. The men were working from the catwalk, 112
feet above ground level. The crew foreman was inside the tank at floor level spraying an epoxy primer on
the walls. A worker on the outside of the tank would periodically climb 25 feet to the top of the tank, using
a permanently fixed side ladder, to check on the foreman through the 24-inch top opening at the crown of
the tank. At approximately 3 p.m., the foreman, wearing a supplied-air respirator hood, heard a nearby noise
and turned to see the victim lying on the floor of the tank. The victim was semi-conscious and having
difficulty breathing. The foreman called to the outside workers for help. The victim was fitted with a body
harness and lowered 85 feet to the ground through the 4-foot-diameter tank riser, located at the bottom of
the tank body. The victim was then loaded by co-workers into a van and transported to the local hospital.
The victim received no first aid at the site, nor was the EMS summoned. The victim arrived at the hospital
at 4:18 p.m., was life flighted to a major trauma center at 5 p.m., and was pronounced dead at 9:13 p.m.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar incidents, employers should:
• develop and implement a comprehensive written confined space entry program
• develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program
• train all workers in the administration of basic first aid
Additionally, property owners should:
• require that all contractors have a written safety program specific to the work to be performed.
INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1993, a 20-year-old male painter (the victim) died after falling from an undetermined height
inside a 250,000 gallon municipal water tank. On July 9, 1993, officials of the North Carolina Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this
fatality, and requested technical assistance. On August 11 and 12, 1993, a safety specialist from DSR
conducted an investigation of the incident and reviewed the circumstances of the incident with the
NCOSHA district supervisor and health compliance officer assigned to the case, along with employer
representatives. NCOSHA photographs of the scene following the incident were reviewed during the
investigation.
The employer was a painting contractor that had been in operation for 8 years and employed 6 workers.
The contractor specialized in refinishing steel structures such as municipal water tanks. The contractor had
a basic confined space entry program; however, workers had not received confined space entry training
or training in the proper use of respirators. Workers received training for sandblasting and painting on the
job. The victim had worked for the contractor for 2 months. The con- tractor had experienced no previous
fatalities.
56
INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted by a local municipality to sandblast, prime, and paint the interior and
exterior of a 250,000 gallon water tank that served as a fresh water reservoir for the municipality. The tank
was 140 feet high at its summit, and was encircled by a steel-grate catwalk 112 feet above ground. A 4-
foot-diameter riser extended from the tank bottom, 85 feet to the ground. The riser had a 24-inch-diameter
portal located 30 inches above the ground (Figure). Both the air lines for the supplied-air respirator hood
and the sandblaster, and service ropes, ran from the ground through the riser to the interior of the tank. The
men climbed up to the interior entrance of the tank through the riser, by means of fixed steel steps.
The crew had been at the jobsite for 3 weeks. The entire interior and exterior of the tank body had been
sandblasted. Three painters (including the victim) were working on the catwalk, sandblasting the exterior surface
and applying an epoxy primer. The crew foreman, equipped with an air-line respirator hood, was inside the tank
spraying the interior walls with primer. No artificial interior lighting or additional ventilation was used.
Approximately every 30 minutes, one of the painters would climb a fixed ladder approximately 25 feet to
the top of the tank to look through the 24-inch-diameter opening and check on the foreman. At
approximately 3 p.m. the victim, without notifying the other workers, climbed to the top of the tank and
entered. The foreman, spraying the epoxy primer, heard a noise and turned to see the victim lying on the
tank floor. The foreman went to the victim and found him unconscious and breathing with some difficulty.
The foreman yelled to the other workers, who entered the tank to help assist the victim. The men placed
a full body harness on the victim, then placed him on the foreman's back. The foreman climbed down the
fixed steps in the tank riser, assisted by the two other workers, who lowered the victim with a rope attached
to the body harness. When the foreman reached the ground, he pulled the victim through the portal at the
base of the riser. When the other workers reached the ground, the victim was loaded into a van. The victim
was given no first aid at the site and the emergency medical service (EMS) was not summoned. The three
men drove the victim to the hospital, arriving at 4:18 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., the victim was life flighted to a major
trauma center where he died at 9:13 p.m.
The event was unwitnessed; however, it is possible that the victim entered the tank and either slipped or
tripped and fell from the fixed ladder inside the tank. It is also possible that the victim entered the tank and
was affected by epoxy vapors, causing him to become dizzy and fall.
The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for the epoxy primer warned against inhalation of the vapors,
stating that inhalation of vapors would affect the brain or nervous system, causing dizziness. The MSDS
also advised the epoxy primer be applied in a well-ventilated area with workers wearing airline respirators.
An atmospheric testing meter was on-site; however the oxygen sensor was not functioning.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as excessive pooling of blood in the brainstem. The victim had also
sustained fractures of the fifth and sixth cervical vertebrae.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written confined
space entry program.
57
Discussion: Employers should develop and implement a written confined space entry program to address
all provisions outlined in the following NIOSH publications: Working in Confined Spaces: Criteria for a
Recommended Standard [Pub. No. 80-106]; NIOSH Alert, Request for Assistance in Preventing
Occupational Fatalities in Confined Spaces [Pub. No. 86-110]; A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces
[Pub. No. 87-113]; and NIOSH Guide to Respiratory Protection [Pub. No. 87-116].
A confined space entry program should contain the following:
• written confined space entry procedures
• evaluation to determine whether entry is necessary
• issuance of a confined space entry permit
• evaluation of the confined space by a qualified person
• testing and monitoring the air quality in the confined space to ensure:
- oxygen level is at least 19.5 %
- flammable range is less than 10% of the LFL (lower flammable limit)
- absence of toxic air contaminants
• training of workers and supervisors in the selection and use of:
- safe entry procedures
- respiratory protection
- environmental test equipment
- lifelines and retrieval systems
- protective clothing
• training of employees in safe work procedures in and around confined spaces
• training of employees in confined space rescue procedures
• conducting regular safety meetings to discuss confined space safety
• availability and use of proper ventilation equipment
• monitoring of the air quality while workers are in the confined space.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety
program.
Discussion: The safety program should include, but not be limited to, the recognition and avoidance of fall
hazards. When employees are required to work from elevations, employers should provide appropriate fall
protection equipment and include appropriate worker training in the proper selection and use of fall
protection equipment.
Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that supervisors and workers are aware of the potential
hazards of all substances with which they are required to work.
Employers should ensure that Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are available for all chemicals, paints,
solvents and other substances that are used, and that supervisors and workers are aware of their potential
hazards and appropriate protective measures. It is unclear whether the workers were familiar with the
hazards associated with the epoxy primer that was being sprayed inside the tank.
Recommendation #4: Employers should train all workers in the administration of basic first aid.
Discussion: All workers should be trained in the administration of basic first aid, and instructed to summon the
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) prior to moving an injured person if the possibility of serious injury exists.
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Recommendation #5: Employers should require that all contractors have a written safety program
specific to the work to be performed.
Discussion: Although the contractor had a basic confined space entry program, the contractor was not
required to have a written safety program or confined space entry procedures specific to the work being
performed in the water tank. The contract language should address specific safety and health requirements
for any contractors. Additionally, worker safety and health issues should be included as one of the
evaluation criteria for selecting the appropriate contractor.
REFERENCES
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Working in Confined Spaces: Criteria for a
Recommended Standard. DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 80-106, December 1979.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Alert, Request for Assistance in Preventing
Occupational Fatalities in Confined Spaces. DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 86-110, January 1986.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces. DHHS
(NIOSH) Publication No. 87-113, July 1987.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Guide to Respiratory Protection. DHHS (NIOSH)
Publication No. 87-116, September 1987.
Figure.
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FACE 94-01:  Hotel Grounds Maintenance Man Dies After 16-Foot Fall From Ladder--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 53-year-old male hotel grounds maintenance man (the victim) died after falling 16 feet from a ladder and
striking his head on a concrete parking lot surface. The victim and a co-worker were trimming palm trees
and shrubbery located on a concrete island in the hotel parking lot. The victim was using pruning shears
to trim the trees while working from a 32-foot aluminum extension ladder 16 feet above ground. The co-
worker was facing away from the victim while trimming shrubs at ground level. The co-worker heard a
thud and turned to see the victim lying on his back in the concrete parking lot. The co-worker ran to the
victim, who was not breathing, and initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). A worker exiting the
hotel office saw the co-worker administering CPR and told management personnel in the office to summon
the emergency medical squad (EMS). The victim was transported to the local hospital, then transferred to
a major trauma center where he died 4 days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar
occurrences, employers should:
• stress to all employees the importance of exercising caution when working from ladders
• develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program.
INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 1993, a 53-year-old hotel grounds maintenance man (the victim) died of injuries sustained
in a 16-foot fall from an aluminum extension ladder on October 19, 1993. On October 28, 1993, officials
of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division
of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On December 20, 1993, a
safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and reviewed the incident with a company representative,
and the SCOSHA compliance officer and supervisor assigned to the case.
The victim had been employed at a resort hotel as a grounds maintenance man and painter. The hotel had
been in operation for 30 years and employed 40 workers. The employer had no written safety program or
procedures; however, training was provided on the job. Maintenance workers were provided with safety
glasses and gloves. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The victim and co-worker began work daily at 6 a.m. by hosing down and straightening up the area around
the outdoor swimming pool. On the day of the incident, after these tasks were completed, the two men were
instructed to trim three 25-foot-high palm trees and the shrubbery located on an island in the hotel parking
lot.
At approximately 7:45 a.m., the victim, working from a 32-foot aluminum extension ladder, began to trim
the palm trees (using pruning shears), while the co-worker remained at ground level to trim the shrubbery.
Two trees were trimmed without incident. As the co-worker continued trimming the shrubbery, with his
back to the victim, he heard the victim positioning the aluminum extension ladder against the third tree. The
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co-worker turned to see the victim climb to the 16-foot level, then turned back to his work. He immediately
heard a thud, then the sound of the ladder striking the parking lot. He turned to see the victim lying on his
back in the concrete parking lot, 10 feet from the base of the tree. The co-worker ran to the victim, who
was not breathing, and initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). A worker exiting the hotel office
noticed the co-worker administering CPR to the victim and told management personnel to summon the
emergency medical service (EMS). The EMS arrived within 5 minutes and transported the victim to the
local hospital. The victim was transferred to a major trauma center where he died 4 days later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed the cause of death as closed-head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should stress to all employees the importance of exercising caution
when working from ladders.
Discussion: The event was unwitnessed but evidence suggests that the ladder and victim fell together away
from the tree. The ladder in this incident was clean and there was no evidence of a foreign substance that
might have been a factor in the incident. Employers should constantly stress to employees the importance
of exercising caution when climbing or working from ladders, and should ensure that employees adhere
to 29 CFR 1910.26 (c)(3)(iv), which regulates the proper use of extension ladders. Additionally, a strap
or rope cradle could be used to fasten a ladder to an uneven surface, such as the tree in this incident.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety
program.
Discussion: Enforcement of this safety program should reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to
hazardous situations. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, ladder safety, the use of
safety equipment, and the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1910.26 (c)(3)(iv) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
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FACE 94-12:  Carpenter Dies After Falling 10 Feet From A Step Ladder/Porch Floor--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 37-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died after falling 10 feet and striking his head on a concrete block
retaining wall. The victim and two co-workers had been assigned clean-up work at a private residence that
was under construction. The victim was working out of sight of co-workers when the incident occurred.
The victim was last observed by his co-workers standing on a step ladder affixing blocks of wood to the
ceiling rafters of a covered porch. Although the incident was unwitnessed, it can be assumed that the victim
either lost his balance and fell from the ladder, or was descending the ladder and stepped backwards off
the ladder and off the edge of the porch. The victim struck his head on a concrete block retaining wall,
located about 6 feet below the open-sided porch floor. Guardrails around the porch floor perimeter were
not present at the time of the incident. When the co-workers found the victim he was unconscious but
breathing. One co-worker ran across the lot to another residence that was under construction, and asked
the foreman to call for an ambulance. The ambulance arrived in less than 10 minutes, the victim was
stabilized and transported to the local hospital. Two days later the victim was pronounced brain dead, all
life support systems were removed and consequently he died that day. NIOSH investigators concluded
that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide adequate guarding for open-sided floors, platforms, and runways
• review and revise, where applicable, existing safety programs
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1994, a 37-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died from injuries received in a 10-foot fall from
a step ladder/porch floor on March 21, 1994. On April 21, 1994, officials of the South Carolina Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality,
and requested technical assistance. On May 18, 1994, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of this
incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer, county coroner, and SCOSHA compliance officer
assigned to the case. Photographs of the incident site were taken during the investigation.
The employer was a house-framing contractor that had been in business for 19 years and employed five
workers, three of whom were carpenters. The employer had a written safety program, but the program was
incomplete regarding specific guardrail requirements. The victim had been employed for 2 days prior to
the incident; however, he had worked for the employer for a 2-year period about 1 year previously. He had
about 15 years experience as a carpenter. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted to do the framing work for a new residence under construction at
a private residential housing community. The house was a three-story wooden structure with a covered
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porch located at the second story level. The porch was located about 10 feet above ground level and a 4-
foot concrete block retaining wall was located directly below the porch. Work had been in progress for 6
weeks, and the day of the incident was to have been the last day on the job. The workers (the victim and
two co-workers), had been assigned clean-up work for the day.
On the day of the incident, the workers started work around 7 a.m. and proceeded to different parts of the
house to clean up. The victim was last observed by his co-workers standing part way up an 8-foot-high
fiberglass step ladder on the porch floor. The ladder was positioned with the ladder steps facing toward the
open side of the porch, about 1-foot from its edge. The ladder was apparently being used by the victim to
access the porch ceiling rafters. He had been using a hammer and nails to affix pieces of wood to the porch
ceiling rafters in preparation for the hanging of sheetrock. Although the incident was unwitnessed, it is
assumed the victim either lost his balance and fell from the ladder, or was descending the ladder, stepped
backwards off the edge of the porch, and fell and struck his head on the concrete block retaining wall. The
porch floor was located about 6 feet above the top of the concrete block retaining wall, and guardrails
around the porch floor perimeter were not present at the time of the incident.
The co-workers found the victim unconscious but breathing about 10:30 a.m. One co-worker ran across
the lot to another residence that was under construction, and asked the foreman to call for an ambulance.
The ambulance arrived in less than 10 minutes, the victim was stabilized and transported to the local
hospital. Two days later the victim was pronounced brain dead and all life support systems were removed.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner's report listed the cause of death as subdural hemorrhage.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate guarding for open-sided floors, platforms,
and runways.
Discussion: The victim was using a stepladder positioned on the floor of a porch about 1 foot from its edge.
The floor was open-sided and unguarded. Also, the porch was 10 feet above ground level; a 4-foot-high
concrete block retaining wall had been erected directly below the porch area where the victim was working.
Guarding of the open-sided porch floor with a standard railing as required by CFR 1926.500 (d)(1)(i) was
not present.  NOTE: Since the incident, the employer has revised the safety program to require the guarding
of all open-sided floors, platforms, and runways prior to the commencement of any work being performed.
Recommendation #2: Employers should review and revise, where applicable, existing safety programs.
Discussion: Although the employer had a written safety program, there was no procedure regarding the
protecting of open-sided floors with guardrails and handrails. Safety programs should be periodically
reviewed and revised, as necessary, to reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to hazardous situations.
The safety program should include, but not be limited to, protecting open-sided floors with appropriate
guardrailing and handrails, ladder safety, the use of safety equipment, and the recognition and avoidance
of fall hazards.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety
inspections.
Discussion: Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a competent1 person
to ensure that worksites are free of hazardous conditions. Regardless of how comprehensive, a safety
program cannot be effective unless implemented in the workplace. These inspections may not guarantee
the elimination of occupational hazards, but they do demonstrate the employer's commitment to the
enforcement of the safety program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #4: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was working in an area without sufficient guarding. Workers and co-workers should
look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper way to perform their tasks. Employers
must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace safer. Increased worker
participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1)(i) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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FACE 82-02:  Fall from a Scaffold Involving a Construction Foreman
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Division of Safety Research (DSR)
is currently conducting the Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) Study. By scientifically
collecting data from a sample of similar fatal incidents, this study will identify and rank factors which
increase the risk of fatal injury for selected employees.
On August 16, 1982, a 29-year-old male foreman fell from the platform of a 16' welded tubular scaffold
and landed head first on the 6" concrete slab. The foreman died approximately 24 hours later in the intensive
care unit of a local hospital. The attending medical examiner notified DSR on August 20, 1982.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Subsequent to receiving notification, DSR sent a research team, consisting of an epidemiologist, safety
researcher, civil engineer, safety engineer and safety specialist, to visit the company on August 26, 1982
and the incident site on August 26 and 31, 1982. Interviews were held with the co-owner of the company,
new construction foreman and co-workers. Information obtained from these interviews pertained to
company history and processes, policies and procedures, incident scenario, safety and training programs,
employee evaluations, injury records, and relevant work practices. The incident site was surveyed in the
presence of the witnesses who were able to describe the appearance of the site at the time of the incident.
The scaffold and truss involved in the incident were still at the site and were observed. During the survey,
the locations of the victim, scaffold and truss were identified and 35mm pictures were taken.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
This construction company had been established for approximately 12 years and had erected numerous
commercial metal buildings. According to the co-owner,, the company had no prior history of occupational
fatalities nor disabling injuries.
The construction activity consisted of the erection of a commercial metal building designed to be a retail
tire store. The design consisted of 35 metal trusses (each of which was approximately 60' long, 11' high
at the apex, and 300 lbs. in weight) set 40" apart and attached to 18' sidewalls (masonry block and metal
columns) built upon a 6" concrete slab. The building was approximately 60' wide and 110' long with two
garage doors on each side with showroom windows and a main entrance door at the front.
At the time of the incident, the slab with the block and metal sidewall framing (without exterior panels) were
complete and (31 of 35) of the 35 trusses had been set and secured in place. The erected trusses had been
raised with either a hydraulic, telescoping boom crane or a backhoe with extension attachment. Wooden
spacers constructed from 2 x 4's were used to align the truss at a proper distance from a previously placed
truss and to minimize its lateral movement until secured. The trusses were secured to the sidewalls by two
metal screws at each end and to the proximal trusses by two metal roof purlings which would be attached
to the truss by screws.
The working foreman (the victim) and three other employees were involved in the activity of raising, setting
and securing the metal trusses on the afternoon of August 16, 1982. There were four trusses left to be
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installed, and the workers hoped to finish those that afternoon. The victim and another employee were on
the 16' scaffold's 8' x 4' platform which did not have guardrails. The other employee was using a 6' wooden
stepladder to reach and remove the hoist chain attached to the truss which had just been raised into place
and aligned with a wooden spacer. In the process of removing the chain, the truss began to rotate on its base,
in a downward direction. The foreman and other employee grabbed the truss in an attempt to prevent its
movement and subsequent damage. The foreman and other employee were not able to maintain the truss.
The other employee had to let go while the victim continued to hold on. The truss then continued to rotate
on its ends downward and knocked over the scaffold and ladder. It is not clear whether the victim fell before
or after the truss hit the scaffold. The other employee was able to hold onto a previously secured truss and
this prevented him from falling.
A resident of a nearby home was a trained EMT and was able to provide quick emergency care for the
victim. This care consisted of fitting the victim with a cervical collar and keeping him warm. An ambulance
arrived approximately 40 minutes after the incident occurred and transported the victim to a nearby hospital.
MEDICAL FINDINGS
While in the hospital, neurosurgery was attempted to relieve cerebral pressure caused by a massive subdural
hematoma. The damage was irreversible and the victim died approximately 24 hours after being admitted.
Toxicologic tests of blood for alcohol and urine for basic neutral and narcotic drugs were all negative.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several factors contributed to this fatal incident. The truss' involved in the incident apparently began to
move due to the slippage or shearing of the wood spacer. Spacers observed at the incident site were open-
ended and cracked. These conditions diminish their ability to adequately hold an unsecured truss. When
the truss began to fall, the victim not only grabbed it but also apparently refused to let go in apparent
disregard for his own safety. Also, although less contributory since the entire scaffold was knocked over,
the victim and other employees were working from a platform which had no guardrails.
It is recommended that future efforts be made to utilize a more suitable type of temporary spacer. A spacer
made of metal and with clasps to fasten it in place would be less likely to be dislodged. Safety training should
stress that workers should not grab onto large objects in motion. Future efforts should stress the importance
of and strictly enforce the proper use of guardrails around scaffold platforms.
The courtesy and cooperation of the company officials and employees are gratefully acknowledged.
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FACE 88-27:  Dry Wall Finisher Dies in Fall from Ladder on Scaffold
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On June 23, 1988, a 55-year-old male dry wall finisher was fatally injured when he fell 22 feet from a
portable wooden stepladder that was on top of a 17-foot-high mobile scaffold.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
On June 27, 1988, a state Occupational Safety and Health official notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On July 12, 1988, NIOSH met with a company representative, discussed the incident
with the OSHA compliance officer, photographed the site, interviewed a co-worker who witnessed the
incident, and obtained a report from the local fire department's emergency medical service (EMS) rescue
squad that responded.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was a dry wall finisher working for a general contracting construction company. The company
has been in business for approximately 4 years and currently employs 90 employees, including 4 dry wall
finishers. The company uses written safety rules and procedures and provides on-the-job training to
employees. The construction jobsite superintendent is responsible for administering the safety program
which includes conducting weekly jobsite safety meetings with all the employees. The victim had almost
4 years' experience as a dry wall finisher. He had never received a reprimand for violating safety rules or
procedures.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The construction company had been contracted to build a multilevel brick high school. Construction started
in October 1986, with completion scheduled for September 1988. At the time of the incident, most of the
exterior work had been completed and the interior finishing work was in progress.
On June 23, 1988, two dry wall finishers were putting filler compound over the heads of the screws that
secured sheetrock panels to the interior walls. They were working in the same room from separate scaffolds.
The scaffolds were mobile metal scaffolds, 17 feet high, 7 feet long, and 5 feet wide, which were equipped
with 8-inch rubber tires with locking casters. The victim's work platform was made up of two 2-inch by
10-inch, 7-foot-long wooden boards and one 2-foot-wide by 7-foot-long standard aluminum plank
mounted across the top railing of the scaffold. Additionally, the victim placed an 8-foot wooden stepladder
on top of the work platform to reach the upper sections of the wall, which was 25 feet high.
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Prior to the incident a co-worker told the victim that the casters on the scaffold were not locked. The victim
replied, "I want them that way." The victim positioned the stepladder on the scaffold platform and leaned
the top of the ladder against the wall. When the victim climbed the ladder, the force exerted at the ladder's
foot caused the scaffold to roll. The victim fell headfirst onto a concrete floor 22 feet below.
The construction superintendent, who was in an adjacent room, heard a disturbance and ran to the incident
site. He immediately called the local EMS squad using a two-way walky-talky. An ambulance arrived 4
minutes later, and EMS personnel provided advanced life support. The victim was transported to a local
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner reported the cause of death as traumatic injuries to the head and chest.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that all employees required to work from elevated work
platforms understand the potential danger of a fall, and the proper methods of erecting, placing,
securing, and using scaffolds and ladders.
Discussion: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR
1926.451(e)(8) states that, "Scaffolds in use by any persons shall rest upon a suitable footing and shall stand
plumb, also the casters or wheels be locked to prevent any movement." The employer should ensure that
all employees understand the danger of working on scaffolding; this includes the necessity of locking
casters or wheels. Employers should also instruct all employees to report all unsafe working conditions
(e.g., the unlocked casters observed by the co-worker) to the supervisor. If the victim had locked the casters
or the co-worker had reported this unsafe working condition, this fatality may have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that appropriate guardrails and toeboards are installed
on mobile scaffolding used for work at levels exceeding 10 feet above the ground or floor.
Discussion: OSHA Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR 1926.451(a)(4) requires that guardrails and
toeboards be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than 10 feet above the ground or floor.
The work platform of the mobile scaffolding was 17 feet above the floor, and all four sides surrounding
the platform were open. The employer should have equipped the mobile scaffolding with guardrails and
toeboards before the platform was used.
Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that mobile scaffolding platforms are tightly planked.
Discussion: OSHA Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR 1926.451(e)(4) requires that mobile scaffolding
platforms be tightly planked for the full width of the scaffold. In addition to the hazard created by leaning
an 8-foot wooden stepladder against the wall, the platform was only partially planked, creating an opening
approximately 17 inches wide by 7 feet long. The employer should regularly inspect to ensure that all
scaffolding meets the requirements established by the OSHA Safety and Health Standards (e.g., locked
casters, installed guardrails, and tightly planked platforms, etc.).
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Recommendation #4: In the event an employee is injured on the job, the employer should review, and
revise if necessary, the safety rules and procedures, inspect the worksite for unsafe working conditions,
and initiate actions to ensure safe working conditions before work activities continue.
Discussion: This fall is one of four falls experienced by employees of the contractor or sub-contractor at
this specific jobsite (initiated October, 1986). Although the previous three falls did not result in death, the
workers involved received severe injuries including fractures and lacerations. One of these workers is
permanently paralyzed as a result of a fall. It is evident that safety conditions are poor at this specific
worksite; the employer should initiate immediate action to correct these unsafe working conditions.
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FACE 88-29:  Painter Falls to his Death from a Scaffold
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On March 24, 1988, a 30-year-old male painter died and a co-worker was injured when they fell from a
scaffold to the street and sidewalk 52 feet below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On July 28, 1988, a DSR research industrial hygienist conducted a site visit,
photographed the incident site, and met with representatives of various companies and local police and fire
departments who were involved in the incident.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a small painting and decorating contractor which employs six workers. The company has
no safety program, no safety training, and does not conduct safety meetings with employees. Most of the
work the company does is commercial painting and decorating. The victim had worked as a painter for the
company intermittently for the past 10 years.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The employer had been contracted to paint the outside trim on a seven-story office building. The victim
and a co-worker were painting from a 12-foot-long scaffold which was 52 feet above the sidewalk. The
employer had provided safety belts and lanyards, but did not require the workers to use them. Also, the
workers had been offered a bonus to complete the job before a time deadline. These factors may have
influenced their decision not to use fall protection equipment.
The scaffold was suspended by two 5/8-inch-diameter steel cables that were attached with large steel hooks
to a ledge near the top of the building. The cables ran vertically to a hand-operated hoist winch on each end
of the scaffold that allowed workers to raise or lower the scaffold to the desired height. The suspension
cables above the scaffold lay across a horizontal metal gutter that was attached to the side of the building.
The slack portion of each cable dangled free under the ends of the scaffold.
On March 24, 1988 (16 days after the job began), the victim and co-worker were within a day of completing
the job. They were painting at a level approximately 20 feet above and 4 feet horizontally from a utility pole
that held a 3-phase, 7200-volt power line. One of the cables dangling under the scaffold was less than a
foot from the power line nearest the building.
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At the time of the incident the wind was blowing at 15 to 20 miles per hour. As the victim attempted to crank
the hoist, the dangling cable nearest the power line contacted the energized wire nearest the building. The
scaffold's two suspension cables grounded out and burned in half where they crossed against the metal
gutter, causing the scaffold to fall. The scaffold struck the top of the utility pole, breaking off the cross arm
and power lines. The victim and co-worker were thrown from the scaffold. The victim landed on the
sidewalk below. The co-worker landed on a bank sign, breaking off the brackets where it was attached to
the side of the building. He then jumped the remaining vertical distance (approximately 10 feet) to the street
below. The scaffold remained across the top of the utility pole with the downed power lines in the street.
The local emergency rescue squad was immediately summoned and arrived at the scene in 2 minutes. The
victim and co-worker were treated at the scene and enroute to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead
at the hospital 1 hour and 44 minutes after the incident occurred. The co-worker survived with multiple
fractures.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner reported that death resulted from multiple traumatic injuries to the head, chest, and
abdomen resulting from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation# 1: Where the potential for a fall from an elevation exists, employers should ensure
that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers.
Discussion: The use of a safety belt/lanyard combination is required by 29 CFR 1926.104. Use of the safety
belt or body harness/lanyard with a rope grab device is appropriate for persons working from scaffolds at
varying heights. Properly used, this type of fall protection would have prevented the workers in this incident
from falling.
Recommendation #2: To ensure proper protection when working near electrical power lines, employers
should request that the electrical utility company de-energize the lines or cover them with insulating line
hoses or blankets.
Discussion: Energized power lines in proximity to a work area are hazardous and extra caution must be
used when working near these power lines. A safe distance between power lines and scaffolds, ladders,
or tools should be maintained at all times; at least one state requires that a 6-foot minimum clearance be
maintained. The power line in this instance was only 4 feet from the side of the building. Due to the scaffold
location, one of the dangling scaffold cables was less than 1 foot from the power line. In this situation, the
power lines should have been de-energized or covered with insulating hoses or blankets before work was
begun.
Recommendation #3: The employer should develop and implement a safety program designed to help
workers recognize and avoid hazards.
Discussion: The dangers associated with working from scaffolds in the proximity of power lines are
obvious. OSHA Standard 1926.21(b)(2) states that "the employer shall instruct each employee in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to
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control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. " The company in this incident did
not provide any training in safe work procedures and did not have written safety rules. Even though it is
a small company, the employer should evaluate the tasks performed by workers and identify all potential
hazards. A safety program addressing these hazards should be developed and implemented on the job.
Recommendation #4: Employers should perform job hazard analyses to identify the hazards encountered
by their employees, and develop measures for controlling each hazard.
Discussion: A job hazard analysis is one method of identifying the hazards associated with a specific task.
The job hazard analysis, through its breakdown of a job into specific steps, the hazards associated with each
step, and the measures planned to control the hazards, provides an ideal means to relay this information to
employees. For example, a thorough inspection by the employer would have disclosed the hazard
associated with working at this elevation with equipment in such close proximity to a power line. Noting
this, injury prevention measures (Recommendations #1 and #2) could have been taken. Failure to
adequately identify and control these hazards increases the risk of injury to employees.
Recommendation #5: Employers should use the job hazard analysis when training employees on the
hazards associated with specific jobs and on the countermeasures to control these hazards.
Discussion: General training on company safety procedures should be supplemented by training on
specific hazards associated with specific jobs. Such training can make employees aware of the hazards to
which they are exposed. At the same time, countermeasures can be explained.
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FACE 89-07:  Foreman and Painter Die in 48-Foot Fall When Scaffold Collapses
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On November 15, 1988, a 53-year-old male foreman and a 28-year-old male painter died when the scaffold
from which they were working collapsed, causing them to fall 48 feet to the ground below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On December 15, 1988, a DSR research industrial hygienist met with the state OSHA
official who investigated the incident and representatives of various companies and local police and fire
departments that were involved in the incident, and photographed the site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a painting company with 50 employees. The company consists of a painting division with 29
painters and a small construction division. Most of the company business involves painting buildings and other
outdoor structures. The company's Hazard Communication Program consists of a brief verbal orientation to new
employees concerning the potential hazards of various chemicals contained in paint. The company also has
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) available. However, the company has no written safety program, and did
not have any safety meetings or training specifically addressing fall prevention or fall protection.
The foreman involved in this incident had a total of 20 years of experience as a painter, including 15 years with
the company as a painter foreman. The other painter had 2 years of experience with the company as a painter.
It should be noted that two painters with the same company died in separate, previous work-related
incidents. In 1987, a painter fell to his death from an aerial bucket, and in 1972, a painter suspended in a
boatswain's chair came in contact with a power line and was electrocuted.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company was hired to paint the outside of several tanks at a petrochemical storage plant. The storage
tanks are 48 feet high and 56 feet in diameter. Stairs that wind around the tanks provide access to the top.
The top of the tanks are smooth and have a slight downward slope that extends from the center to the outside
edge.
The two workers began painting the tanks from the bucket compartment of an aerial bucket truck without
wearing any type of fall protection equipment. The painters used this painting method for several days and
had completed one tank and were nearing completion of a second tank. However, gaining access to the
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unpainted side of the tank by using the bucket truck was not possible because other tanks were too close
and some above-ground piping was in the way. Therefore, the foreman decided to finish painting the
second tank using a two-point suspension scaffold.
The two workers arrived at the site in the morning on November 15, 1988 and set up the scaffold. The
scaffold consisted of a worker platform of tubular steel, measuring 2 feet wide by 17 feet long, with two
outside guardrails 24 inches and 48 inches above the platform. The platform was suspended by two wire
suspension cables, each of which was 5/16th of an inch in diameter. The cables hung vertically from two
tubular steel outriggers placed on top of the tank with the outboard ends extending 24 inches beyond the
edge of the tank. The cables ran through an electrically-operated hoist on each end of the scaffold platform.
This allowed the workers to raise or lower the scaffold platform to the desired height.
Although there were no eyewitnesses of the incident, physical and circumstantial evidence suggests the
following:
1. The scaffold outriggers had been installed on top of the tank with only 200 pounds of counterweight.
There were two 50-pound steel bars on each of the two outriggers. The outriggers had been set up
to keep the suspension cables at a horizontal distance of 24 inches from the side of the tank. In order
to maintain this horizontal distance, the scaffold manufacturer required a minimum of 600 pounds
of counterweight for this type of scaffold (300 pounds on each outrigger) to counterbalance the
work load.
2. The outriggers were not tied off to prevent them from slipping.
3. One end of a lifeline had been tied to a large vent pipe on the top center of the tank and the other
end looped around the side of the scaffold guardrail.
4. Two buckets, each containing approximately 4 gallons of paint, were placed on the scaffold
platform.
5. The two workers climbed onto the scaffold platform, raised  the scaffold platform all the way to the
top, got off on top of the tank, climbed down the tank stairs, and went to lunch.
6. Presumably, some time during the afternoon while the workers were on the scaffold platform, the
outriggers slid off the top edge of the tank and the entire scaffold along with the two workers fell
approximately 48 feet to a hard-packed gravel surface below.
The two workers were not discovered until 4:56 p.m. At that time a truck driver at the petrochemical storage
plant was on his way to lock up the plant premises when he noticed the bodies and scaffold wreckage. The
truck driver immediately notified the local fire department emergency medical service. Paramedics arrived
at the scene in approximately 5 minutes and upon examining the victims, could not detect any signs of life.
The county coroner subsequently arrived and pronounced the two workers dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner reported the cause of death for both workers as multiple blunt force trauma.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that all employees required to work from elevated work
platforms understand the potential danger of a fall, and the proper methods of erecting, placing,
securing, and using scaffolds.
Discussion: occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR
1926.451(g)(3) requires that the outriggers of this type of scaffold be securely anchored and that properly
designed scaffolds, "... shall be constructed and erected in accordance with such design." For this type of
scaffold and the way it was being used, the scaffold manufacturer recommends: (1) a minimum of 600
pounds of counterweight on the inboard end of the outrigger beams (300 pounds on each outrigger), and
(2) that the outriggers also be securely tied back.
The fact that the workers only used 200 pounds of counterweight (100 pounds on each side) and that they
did not tie back the outriggers indicates they did not fully understand the proper methods of erecting and
securing this type of scaffold. The employer should ensure that all employees understand the danger of
working on scaffolding. This includes the necessity of properly securing scaffold suspension points.
Properly set up, the type of scaffold and anchoring system used in this incident would not have fallen.
Recommendation #2: Where the potential for a fall from an elevation exists, employers should ensure
that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers.
Discussion: Although a safety line had been tied to the top of the tank and the workers had safety belts with
rope-grab devices at the site (and possibly on the scaffold) during the incident, they were not being worn
by the workers. The use of a safety belt/lanyard combination is required by 29 CFR 1926.451(i)(8) for use
on two-point suspension scaffolds. The use of the safety belt or body harness/lanyard with a rope grab
device is appropriate for persons working from scaffolds at varying heights. Properly used, this type of fall
protection would have prevented the workers in this incident from falling even when the scaffolding fell.
Recommendation #3: Scaffolds should be erected under the supervision of persons who are competent
in the use of scaffolds.
Discussion: OSHA Standard 1926.451(a))(3) states: "No scaffold shall be erected, moved, dismantled, or
altered except under the supervision of competent persons. " The fact that the workers in this incident did
not set up the scaffold according to the manufacturer's specifications points out that the workers did not
understand the correct way to erect the scaffold under those circumstances. The scaffold erection should
have been supervised by a worker experienced in erecting this type of scaffold.
Recommendation #4: When workers are assigned hazardous tasks, or must work at hazardous
workstations (such as elevated scaffolds), a standby person should be assigned to continually observe,
give assistance, and ensure timely response in the event of an emergency. Additionally, close supervisory
contact should be maintained periodically throughout the duration of the work.
Discussion: On the day of the fatal incident, the two victims apparently worked alone, unobserved. They
were not discovered until 4:56 p.m. when a truck driver was locking up the plant. No one was assigned
to observe the work from the ground; additionally, the workers were apparently unsupervised from the time
they installed the scaffold until the scaffold collapsed and they fell to the ground. Had the scaffold collapse
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and resultant fall been observed by someone standing by on the ground, help might have been summoned
and emergency medical care administered promptly to the victims improving their chances of surviving the
traumatic injuries they received. In any workplace situation which involves the potential for traumatic
injury, a "buddy system" and close, periodic supervision are essential to protect the lives of exposed
workers.
Recommendation #5: The designers/owners of tanks of this type should design and install appropriate
tank anchorage points for maintenance purposes.
Discussion: Permanent structures of this type are known to require extensive maintenance when they are
designed. It is essential that designers/owners of these facilities incorporate anchorage points on tank roofs
to which workers can adequately secure scaffolds and lifelines. Omission of designed anchor points causes
workers to improvise anchors or not use them at all. This increases the possibility that a scaffold will be
erected incorrectly. If scaffold anchor points had been available on the tank involved in this incident, the
scaffold may not have been incorrectly erected, resulting in its failure. Also, if anchor points had been
available, it's likely that the workers in this situation may have been tied off, thus preventing their fall when
the scaffold fell.
Recommendation #6: All employers should develop and implement a safety program designed to help
workers recognize, understand, and control hazards.
Discussion: Company management must ensure that employees are trained to recognize and avoid
hazardous work conditions and that the work environment is safe. Employers should develop and
implement a safety program to protect workers as required by OSHA Standard 1926.20. Additionally,
OSHA Standard 1926.21(b)(2) requires employers to "...instruct each employee in the recognition and
avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or
eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." The company had no formal safety program,
and there were no standard operating procedures for any of the tasks performed. Even after having two
previous worker fatalities, the employer failed to provide written safety rules and training in safe work
procedures. Although a relatively small company, the employer should immediately evaluate the tasks
performed by workers, identify all potential hazards, and then develop and implement a safety program
addressing these hazards. Prior to starting any job, the employer should conduct a jobsite survey, identify
all hazards, and implement appropriate control measures.
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FACE 89-21:  Cement Finisher Dies After 160-Foot Fall from Scaffold
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 19, 1988, a 27-year-old male cement finisher was dismantling suspended scaffolding inside
a 172-foot-high circular concrete silo when he lost his balance and fell from the scaffolding. His safety
lanyard broke and he fell 160 feet to the concrete floor of the silo.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On February 13, 1989, a DSR
research team conducted a site visit, interviewed company representatives, photographed the site of the
incident, and discussed the incident with the OSHA compliance officer and state medical examiner
personnel.
OVERVIEW OF THE EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 3 years by a construction company that specializes in slip form
construction. The company had 28 workers on site. Concrete forms of different dimensions are erected,
set into place and then concrete is pumped into the forms. The company has been in operation since 1928
and employs a corporate safety director. The job superintendent is responsible for safety at the jobsite.
Safety meetings are conducted each Monday morning prior to the start of work. Each employee is issued
a company safety manual upon hire and training is provided on the job.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to construct a holding facility for cement. This included constructing
three interconnected concrete silos and installing equipment inside these silos. The silos were 172 feet high
and 40 feet in diameter, with 10-inch-thick walls. The project began in October 1988, and by the day of
the incident the silos had been constructed and the interior walls had been finished on two of the silos. On
the day of the incident the victim and a co-worker were completing the interior finish of the third silo. The
two men were working at a height of 160 feet from a suspended scaffold. The scaffold, which was shaped
to fit the curvature of the interior wall of the tank, was erected around half the inside diameter of the tank
and was suspended from ropes anchored at the top of the silo. As the men finished the inside surface of one
half of the tank, they disassembled the scaffold from each end toward the center where a door would provide
access to the outside of the silo. The scaffolding, dropped to the floor piece-by-piece as it was disassembled,
was then erected around the other half of the tank. The interior walls of all three silos were finished using
these procedures.
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At the time of the incident the men had completed the interior finish of the third silo and had begun to
disassemble the scaffolding. Each man was using a nylon rope lanyard attached to a chain on a scaffold
bracket. The brackets were spaced 6 feet apart. As each man reached a point in the operation where he was
ready to drop a bracket to the ground, he hooked his lanyard to the chain on the next bracket.
At some point the victim lost his balance and fell off the end of the scaffolding. The co-worker stated that
he saw the victim fall and jerk upwards as the lanyard caught him. As the victim's weight dropped back
on the lanyard, it snapped, causing him to fall 160 feet to the concrete floor below. The emergency rescue
squad was summoned immediately by the company secretary. Employer representatives stated that it was
approximately 30 minutes before the rescue squad arrived at the scene. The victim was pronounced dead
at the scene.
When the lanyard was inspected, burn damage was discovered in several places, including the point at
which it had snapped. This damage probably occurred during welding or burning operations from a
previous job.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Although the medical examiner had not completed his report at the time of this investigation, the cause of
death is presumed to have been multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fall-arresting devices should be periodically inspected for damage by a qualified
person, and faulty equipment should be immediately removed from service. Additionally, employees
required to wear fall protection should inspect their own equipment before the start of each job.
Discussion: In this instance, fall-arresting equipment was not individually assigned, but was obtained from
a common pool. It was possible that a worker would not use the same piece of equipment on a daily basis.
For this reason, fall protection equipment should be periodically inspected by a qualified person to
determine if it is in suitable condition to be used by workers. Additionally, employers should train workers
in inspection techniques that would allow them to identify faulty equipment. Workers should inspect their
equipment before the start of work each day. Faulty equipment should be immediately removed from
service to ensure worker safety. A properly trained worker would have identified the faulty lanyard upon
inspection. Had the faulty lanyard been removed from service, and an undamaged one used instead, this
fatality might have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: Personal protective equipment should be able to withstand the harshest conditions
to which it may be subjected on any given job.
Discussion: The nylon lanyard involved in this incident received burn damage, probably while being used
in the vicinity of welding or cutting operations. Many materials, including nylon, can be easily damaged
in the presence of extreme heat. For this reason, nylon lanyards should not be used where they might be
exposed to conditions that could include extreme heat; rather, steel mesh or wire core lanyards would have
been more suitable. Personal protective equipment should be evaluated before being used on any job to
ensure that it can withstand the harshest conditions to which it may be subjected without sustaining damage
that would jeopardize the safety of a worker.
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Recommendation #3: OSHA requires that workers working from float or ship scaffolds (scaffolds
suspended from overhead supports) be protected by an approved safety lifebelt, lanyard, and lifeline
secured above the point of operation to an anchor point or structural member.
Discussion: According to 29 CFR 1926.451 (w)(6), workers working from float or ship scaffolds shall be
protected by a safety lifebelt and lanyard hooked to a lifeline which is secured above the point of operation.
In this instance, no lifeline was used and the lanyard was hooked directly to the scaffold. Even the required
fall protection, however, would not have prevented this incident because a damaged lanyard was used. For
this reason, the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system should be evaluated. For example, if a lifeline
and a lanyard, each anchored at different points on the structure, were both hooked to the safety lifebelt or
body harness, two points of suspension would exist. In such a redundant system, if a lanyard broke (as in
this instance), the lifeline would still support the worker. If a redundant fall-arresting system had been in
effect, this incident might have been prevented.
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FACE 89-29:  Caulking Mechanic Dies in Fall when Scaffold Fails
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On March 15, 1989, a 33-year-old male caulking mechanic died when the scaffold upon which he was
working failed, causing him to fall 60 feet to the ground.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On April 18, 1989, a DSR
safety specialist and safety engineer discussed this case with state officials and emergency services
personnel. The incident was reviewed with company officials and the incident site was visited and
photographed.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a caulking contractor with 13 employees, including seven caulking mechanics. The
company has been in existence for 52 years. The victim had been employed by the company for the past
16 years, working the last 12 years as a caulking mechanic. The company has no formal safety program.
Employee safety training in recognition, identification and control of job hazards is provided through on-
the-job training. The victim was serving as the foreman of a two-person crew at the time of the incident.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the morning of the incident, the victim and one co-worker completed a 2-hour caulking job, then went
to the site of a newly constructed 7-story building to continue a caulking job they had started several days
earlier. The front and rear building exterior utilized a combination of precast concrete panels and plate glass,
while the sides were entirely of plate glass. They were caulking the precast concrete panels which were
architecturally arranged from ground level to the sixth floor.
The caulking contractor provided a personnel lift on site; however, it did not reach above the fifth floor.
In order to caulk the precast concrete panels at the sixth-floor level, the workmen would have to use a
suspended scaffold.
The victim and co-worker arrived on the site at approximately 9:30 a.m. A window washing contractor was
on site and had already rigged a powered 2-point suspended scaffold on the building. The scaffolding was
located so that the caulking crew could caulk part of the sixth-floor level. The victim and a window washer
decided that they would share the suspended scaffold while the two remaining co-workers, one caulker and
one window washer, would share the personnel lift. With this arrangement, the caulking contractor's
employees would not have to rig the scaffold they had brought to the jobsite.
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The victim and the window washer began their work from the scaffold at the six-floor level. Although the
victim had brought safety belts and lifelines to the site, neither group of workers used this personal
protective equipment. They had completed work on a section of the sixth floor, and as they began their
descent, the end of the scaffold where the victim stood suddenly dropped until the scaffold platform was
in a vertical position. The victim, who was not tied off to an independent lifeline, fell approximately 60 feet
from the scaffold to hard packed earth. The window washer managed to cling to the other end of the scaffold
and a nearby ledge until the personnel manlift could be moved to the scene approximately 25 minutes after
the fall.
The victim struck the building numerous times as he was falling. Workers in the area immediately
telephoned the local Emergency Medical Service which arrived on the scene approximately 5 minutes after
the incident. The victim, who was still conscious, was immediately transported to a nearby medical center
where he died from massive internal injuries.
Although the victim had several years of experience using similar 2 point suspension scaffolds, he had not
been trained to use this particular type. When the workers were ready to descend, the victim may not have
disengaged the parking brake before activating the climber in a downward direction. With this brake set,
the scaffold would not lower. Instead, it would lift the cable hanging beneath the scaffold, causing the cable
to accumulate slack in the climber housing mechanism. When the victim noticed his end of the scaffold was
not descending, he possibly realized the brake was set and released it. When this occurred, the scaffold
began to fall because of the accumulated slack line in the housing. It continued to fall because either the
slackened line condition allowed the cable to get free of the climber mechanism, or the impact force of the
falling scaffold was greater than the resisting force of the climber mechanism.
In addition to the parking brake, these climbing scaffold units are equipped with a centrifugal safety brake.
This spring-loaded mechanism is designed to be in contact with the suspension cable and rotate as the cable
passes by it. The brake is designed to activate when the centrifugal force of the rotating mechanism exceeds
the force of the springs. Although this braking device was designed to activate in this type of circumstance,
it malfunctioned because a spring had apparently come loose and jammed in the brake device. This allowed
the victim's end of the scaffold to drop to a vertical position. The other climbing unit held the scaffold in
suspension. (The problem with the centrifugal safety brake was discovered by the state OSHA compliance
officer during inspection of the equipment immediately following the incident.)
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Medical Examiner gave the cause of death as a ruptured liver due to acute abdominal injuries received
as a result of the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Appropriate personal protective equipment should be worn whenever the
potential for a serious fall exists.
Discussion: In this case, none of the four workers (two caulking mechanics and two window washers) were
using any form of personal fall protection, despite the fact that the caulking contractor's employees had
safety belts and lifelines in their truck. Although the scaffold climbing mechanism was equipped with an
emergency braking device, the device malfunctioned allowing the end of the scaffold to lose its support
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causing the victim to fall 60 feet to the ground. Failure to use personal fall protection equipment contributed
to the severity of this incident. If fall protection equipment had been used, this fatality may have been
prevented.
Recommendation #2: Employees should receive training in the safe operation of all equipment prior to
use.
Discussion: The victim had worked with suspension scaffolds for several years, but had no experience with
the particular type of scaffold involved in this incident. Although most such scaffolds are similar in design,
the controls are not standardized. The victim was not trained in the operation of this scaffold. This lack of
training in operation of the scaffold involved in this incident may have contributed to this incident.
Recommendation #3: Equipment should be periodically inspected to ensure that all components are
operational. This inspection should be accomplished by personnel thoroughly familiar with the
equipment and the design capabilities.
Discussion: While the scaffold in this incident had reportedly been inspected the previous week, the
inspector apparently did not detect the broken spring in the emergency brake. Failure to detect and correct
this problem contributed to this incident.
Recommendation #4: Manufacturers of suspension scaffolds should review design of controls for these
units to determine if practical design changes could be made which would reduce the chance of
incidents like this in the future.
Discussion: A design modification which automatically disengaged the parking brake whenever the hoist
mechanism is engaged to raise or lower the scaffold could prevent this type of incident from developing.
In addition, a standardization of control design for these scaffolds among all manufacturers could reduce
the chance of employee error in the operation of the scaffold.
Recommendation #5: The employer should design, develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive
safety program.
Discussion: Employers should ensure that employees are trained to recognize and avoid hazardous work
conditions and that the work environment is safe. Employers should design, develop, implement, and
enforce a comprehensive safety program to protect workers as required by OSHA Standard 1926.20. The
company had no formal comprehensive safety program, and unsafe work practices had been tolerated.
Although a relatively small company, the employer should immediately evaluate the tasks performed by
workers; identify all potential hazards; and then design, develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive
safety program addressing these issues. Also, prior to starting any job, the employer should conduct a
jobsite survey, identify all hazards, and implement appropriate control measures.
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FACE 89-35:  Stucco Mason Dies in Fall from Scaffold
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On April 21, 1989, a 28-year-old male stucco Mason died as the result of falling approximately 48 feet from
a scaffold.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On May 15, 1989, two
research safety specialists met and discussed the incident with the company's representative and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer assigned to the case. The
foreman assigned to the job was interviewed, and the incident site was inspected and photographed.
Reports relating to the incident were obtained from the responding emergency medical service and
investigating police department.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 6 months as a stucco mason by a contracting company that has been
in operation for 18 months. (Stucco is a material which is applied while in a plastic state to masonry or frame
walls to form a hard exterior finish.) The company employs 16 workers, including 8 stucco masons. The
employer has no written safety policy and does not use written safety rules or procedures. Also, personal
protective equipment was not used at the jobsite, except for head protection (i.e., hard hats).
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to apply stucco to the outside walls of a recently built six-floor college
dormitory. Tubular welded frame scaffolding had been erected around the perimeter of the dormitory from
ground level to the uppermost floor to enable the workers to apply the stucco material.
On the morning of the incident the victim was working as a member of a 16-person crew assigned to continue
work on the dormitory. Several small (2-3 person) groups were involved in different phases of work on two sides
of the dormitory. The victim and two co-workers were affixing lath (i.e., 2-foot by 8-foot sheets of heavy gauge
perforated paper laminated to approximately 14-gauge wire) to the outer wall of the dormitory. The lath would
later be covered by the stucco material. The victim was working from the scaffolding at the fifth level, while the
two co-workers were working from the scaffolding at the fourth and sixth levels.
Although the incident was unwitnessed, it is assumed that the victim started to climb to the next level of
scaffolding by stepping onto the bottom guardrail. (The victim had been previously observed climbing from
level to level of the scaffolding without using the built-in scaffold ladder.) The guardrail, which may have
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been loosely secured or not secured at all to the scaffolding uprights, gave way allowing the victim to fall
approximately 48 feet to the ground. Another employee saw the victim strike the scaffold planking at the
first level before he struck the ground (see Figure).
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel arrived at the scene in approximately 4-5 minutes. EMS
technicians found the victim unconscious and breathing intermittently. They began advanced life saving
support treatment and then transported the victim to the local hospital emergency room. The victim died
at the hospital approximately 90 minutes after the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner reported the cause of death as multiple blunt force trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Where the potential for a fall from an elevation exists, employers should ensure
that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers.
Discussion: The use of safety belt/lanyard combination is required by 29 CFR 1926.104. Use of the safety belt
or body harness/lanyard with a rope grab device and lifeline is appropriate for persons working from scaffolds
at varying heights. This type of fall protection permits employees to move about the scaffold without being
restricted while still providing fall protection. Properly used, this type of fall protection may have prevented the
worker in this incident from falling. In this case, however, no fall protection equipment of any type was provided
for the workers, clearly indicating management's lack of concern for worker safety.
Recommendation #2 Employers should conduct initial and periodic inspections of erected scaffolding.
Discussion: After the erection of scaffolding at any project site the employer should designate a competent
person to initially inspect the scaffolding and again, at designated intervals, re-inspect the scaffolding.
Areas of consideration for inspection should include, but not be limited to the following:
1) Braces
2) Brackets
3) Footing (anchorage)
4) Guardrails and Toeboards
5) Ladders
6) Legs
7) Locking Pins
8) Overhead Protection
9) Planking
10) Poles
11) Securing
12) Slippery Conditions
13) Trusses
14) Uprights.
The loose or unsecured guardrail may have been identified and corrected had proper installation, initial
inspection, and/or periodic inspection procedures been used.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should comply with OSHA standards 1926.451 (a)(4), which requires
guardrails and toeboards be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than 10 feet above
the ground or floor, and 1926.451(a)(6), which requires screens between guardrails and toeboards
where persons are required to work or pass under the scaffold.
Discussion: Although additional injuries to other employees haven't occurred, the potential does exist. The
scaffolding around the perimeter of the dormitory does not have any toeboards or protective screens
installed. Employees working on the ground are at risk of being struck by falling objects (e.g., tools,
materials). Employers should comply with OSHA standards 1926.451(a)(4) and 1926.451(a)(6) to further
protect these employees at risk.
Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that foreign-born workers fully understand all
information, particularly safety-related information, pertaining to their jobs.
Discussion: The victim was of Korean descent and could not speak any English. He was from a different
culture with possible different ideas of "safe" work ethics. The company has the responsibility to ensure
that all workers understand the hazards associated with the work involved. Companies that employ foreign-
born (immigrant) workers should identify the different languages spoken by the employers and design,
implement, and enforce a comprehensive multilanguage safety program. The program should include, but
not be limited to, a competent interpreter to explain the safety regulations to the foreign-speaking
employees. Also, the employer should develop and post, at conspicuous places, safety posters/signs in that
language.
Recommendation #5: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of all
work projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all work projects during planning
and throughout the entire project. In this instance, safety procedures for the work being performed were
not planned. Employees were allowed to work in an area where the potential for a fall existed without
adequate written and verbal instructions in recognition and avoidance of fall hazards, and without adequate
fall protection equipment.
Recommendation #6: The employer should design, develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive
safety program which includes worker training in recognizing and avoiding hazards.
Discussion: The company had no formal comprehensive safety program, and unsafe work practices had
been tolerated. Although a relatively small company, the employer should immediately evaluate the tasks
performed by workers; identify all potential hazards; and then design, develop, implement, and enforce a
comprehensive safety program addressing these issues as required by OSHA standard 1926.20. Addition-
ally, OSHA Standard 1926.21(b)(2) requires employers to "instruct each employee in the recognition and
avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or
eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." Also, prior to starting any job, the employer
should conduct a jobsite survey, identify all hazards, and implement appropriate control measures.
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Figure.  The victim fell from the fifth-floor level of the scaffolding shown here, when he either stood on or
fell against the guardrail causing it to give way.  The victim was not wearing any fall protection equipment.
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FACE 90-12:  Painter Dies When Scaffold Falls Inside Municipal Water Tank in Indiana
SUMMARY
A journeyman painter died when the swing scaffold he was using to access the interior of a 68-foot-tall by
32-foot-diameter municipal water tank fell. The painter was working from a single point suspension
scaffold near the top of the tank. The painter was wearing a safety belt and lanyard secured to a lifeline.
When he finished painting the upper area of the tank the painter disconnected his lanyard from the lifeline
and moved to the other end of the scaffold to hand the spray paint gun he was using to his foreman. The
foreman had just taken the spray paint gun from the victim when he heard a "pop" and saw the scaffold
on which the victim was standing fall to the floor of the tank 65 feet below. Investigation after the incident
revealed that the two "U" bolts on the cable which supported the block and tackle from which the scaffold
was suspended had loosened enough to allow the cable to slip through them, causing both the scaffold and
all of its supporting hardware to fall. The victim was pronounced dead at the local hospital approximately
1 1/2 hours after the incident. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent similar incidents in
the future, employers must ensure that:
• appropriate personal protective equipment be worn properly and consistently whenever the
potential for a serious fall exists
• suspension scaffold rigging be inspected periodically to ensure that all connections are tight and
that no damage to the rigging has occurred since its last use.
INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1989, officials of the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the
Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death of a 37-year-old male painter who died on October 21,
1989, when the suspension scaffold he was working fell 65 feet inside a municipal water tank. Technical
assistance was requested by the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and on November
30, 1989, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of this incident. The investigator discussed
the case with state officials and emergency services personnel. The investigator reviewed the incident with
company officials, and investigated and photographed the incident site.
The employer, a painting contractor with 20 employees, has been in business for 7 years. The company
has a designated safety officer and written safety rules and procedures, but no formal training program. The
victim was hired as a journeyman painter, and had worked for the company for 1 month at the time of the
incident. The victim had previously been employed as a painter by other contractors for approximately 10
years.
INVESTIGATION
The victim was a member of a three-man crew engaged in painting the interior and exterior of two 68-foot-
tall by 32-foot-diameter municipal water tanks. The crew had been working on this project for 2 weeks prior
to the incident, and had completed all work on one tank and most of the exterior work on the second.
On the day of the incident, the crew arrived at the worksite at approximately 11:30 a.m. The crew consisted
of a foreman, the victim, and a groundman. The foreman was going to spray paint the interior of the water
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tank while the victim was to finish work on the exterior of the tank. The groundman was to work inside
the tank handling the spray paint lines used in the operation. The victim, a journeyman painter, asked to
paint the interior of the tank. The foreman agreed, and the victim proceeded to paint the interior of the tank
while the foreman finished work on the exterior of the tank.
Access to the interior of the tank was provided through a manhole on the side of the tank at ground level,
and a second manhole located on top of the tank. This second manhole was reached by climbing a fixed
ladder on the exterior of the tank.
The interior sidewalls of the tank were reached via a swing scaffold rigged inside the tank. This scaffold
consisted of an aluminum ladder secured to a steel "stirrup" (a steel bar bent into a box shape and installed
perpendicular to the ladder) at each end. The ladder was thus subjected to loading while in a horizontal
position, rather than in the vertical position for which it was designed. Cables from each stirrup ran to a
common tie-off point. A cable from this common tie off point then passed through a block and tackle. By
pulling on this cable the entire scaffold could be raised and lowered from the ground level of the interior
of the tank (Figure). The block and tackle which supported the scaffold was secured by a single cable which
looped around a vertical steel pipe on top of the tank and fastened back to itself by two "U" bolts.
The entire crew entered the tank through the lower manhole. The groundman and the supervisor then raised
the scaffold with the victim on it to the top of the tank. The victim was wearing a safety belt and lanyard
which was secured to a lifeline, with the lifeline secured to a steel railing on the top of the tank. The victim
proceeded to paint the top few feet of the tank's interior. The foreman climbed the exterior ladder to the
manhole on top of the tank to help complete work near the tank's top. At approximately 1:00 p.m., the victim
completed painting at the upper level. He then disconnected his lanyard from his lifeline and moved over
to where he could hand the paint spray gun to the foreman so the foreman could finish a small area at the
top of the tank. The foreman had just taken the spray gun from the victim when he heard a "pop" and saw
the victim and the scaffold on which he was standing, fall to the floor of the tank 65 feet below. The victim
and the scaffold struck the floor of the tank, barely missing the groundman. The foreman called to the
groundman and told him to go next door and call an ambulance. The foreman then descended the ladder
on the exterior of the tank and went in to assist the victim. The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) unit
arrived on the scene approximately 5 minutes after the incident, removed the victim from the tank via the
lower manhole, and transported him to the local hospital. The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital
at 2:29 p.m.
Investigation after the incident revealed that the two "U" bolts on the cable which supported the block and
tackle had allowed the cable to slip through them, causing both the scaffold and all of its supporting
hardware to fall. This particular rig had been used daily for 2 weeks preceding the incident with no
problems.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was listed by the coroner as "hemorrhage from severe liver laceration and brain stem
hematoma."
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Appropriate personal protective equipment should be worn at all times whenever
the potential for a serious fall exists.
Discussion: In this case the victim was wearing a safety belt and lanyard, however at the moment when
the incident occurred he was not hooked up to his lifeline. This failure to use PPE at all times during the
job allowed the victim to experience a fatal fall when a scaffold failure occurred.
Recommendation #2: Suspension scaffold rigging should be inspected periodically to ensure that all
connections are tight and that no damage to the rigging has occurred since its last use.
Discussion: The scaffold rigging in this case had been used daily for 2 weeks prior to the incident; however,
no periodic inspection program was in place. It appears that the "U" bolts holding the scaffold had loosened
over time, although this loosening had not been observed by workers at the site.
Recommendation #3: Equipment should only be used for the purpose for which it was designed.
Discussion: The "scaffold platform" in this incident was a simple aluminum ladder. This ladder was
designed to support a load in a vertical position but was being utilized to support a load while in a horizontal
position. While this did not directly contribute to this incident, the potential for a failure of the ladder while
being used in this manner was certainly present.
Figure.
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FACE 90-13:  Asbestos Worker Dies in Fall from Scaffold in Indiana
SUMMARY
A 21-year-old asbestos worker died as a result of injuries sustained in a 12-foot fall from a scaffold. The victim
was a member of a six-man crew engaged in the removal of asbestos-contaminated insulation from a series of
large ducts on the exterior of an electric power generation plant. The victim was removing asbestos insulation
from a large outdoor metal duct approximately 14 feet above the ground. The worksite was accessed by tubular
metal scaffolding. The victim was working at the 12 foot level of the scaffold. The scaffold was not decked at
this level. Instead, the crew had installed a single 2-inch by 12-inch plank across the tubing. The plank extended
beyond the tubing on both sides and was not fastened in position to the tubing. Instead, the crew had driven two
nails into each end of the plank at 45 degree angles to hold the plank against the tubing while allowing them to
slide the plank along the tubing to various areas where they were working. The nails on one end of the plank
had loosened sufficiently to slip free from the scaffold. The weight of the victim on the opposite end of the plank
caused the plank to rise up in the air, dropping the victim to the ground below. NIOSH investigators concluded
that, in order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, employers and employees must:
• fully deck all scaffolds and secure decking material in accordance with existing OSHA
regulations
• provide appropriate fall protection equipment to all employees whenever the potential for a
serious or fatal fall exists
• provide safety training to all employees which address all potential hazards to which the
employee may be exposed, especially the proper use of scaffolding and fall protection equipment.
INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 1989 officials of the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified DSR of
the death of a 21-year-old male asbestos worker who died as a result of a 12-foot fall from a scaffold on August
18, 1989 and requested technical assistance. On November 29, 1989 a DSR safety specialist conducted an
investigation of this incident. The case was discussed with state officials and emergency services personnel, and
the incident was reviewed with company officials.
The employer is a large, multistate insulation contractor. The company employs 500 individuals, including 100
asbestos workers who remove asbestos-contaminated insulation. The company has a designated safety officer
and written safety policy and procedure manuals. The victim had been employed by the company for 1 month
at the time of the incident. Although the victim had received safety training from the company, the primary focus
of this training was asbestos removal procedures. (Note: The company had no policy in place requiring the use
of fall protection equipment at the time this incident occurred. Since the incident, a policy has been implemented
requiring the use of safety belts/lifelines whenever employees are working on any elevated surface.)
INVESTIGATION
On the day of the incident, a six-man crew was removing asbestos-contaminated insulation from a series
of large ducts on the exterior of an electric power generation plant. The crew had been working
intermittently at the plant (as environmental conditions permitted) for several days prior to the incident.
90
On the morning of the incident, the crew started work at 7:00 a.m. The victim was removing asbestos
insulation from a large outdoor metal duct approximately 14 feet above the ground. The worksite was
accessed via metal tubular scaffolding.
Each section of the scaffolding formed a 10-foot by 6-foot rectangle. The victim was working at the 12-
foot level where the scaffold was not decked. Instead, the work crew had installed a single 8-foot-long, 2-
inch by 12-inch plank across the tubing. This plank extended approximately 14 inches past the end of the
scaffold tubing on one side, and approximately 10 inches past the tubing on the other side. This plank was
not fastened in position on the scaffold tubing; rather, the crew had driven two nails into each end of the
plank at 45 degree angles, to hold the plank against the tubing (Figure). This procedure allowed the workers
to slide the plank along the tubing (along the 10-foot side) to various areas where they were working.
The victim was sitting astride the tubing, on the end of the plank with the 14-inch overhang, to remove
asbestos from the duct. Two co-workers had stepped off of the same plank about 5 minutes earlier.
Although no one witnessed the incident, it appears that the nails on one end of the plank had loosened
sufficiently to allow the plank to slip free from the scaffold. The weight of the victim on the opposite end
of the scaffold caused the plank to rise up in the air, dropping the victim to the ground below where he was
struck by the falling plank. The two co-workers heard the victim and the plank strike the ground. The co-
workers immediately called for help and went to the victim. The victim was conscious but told the co-
workers that he "couldn't feel anything." He asked the co-workers to "put my hands on my chest," which
they did.
Local Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel arrived on the scene approximately 8 minutes after
the incident, and promptly transported the victim to a local hospital. The victim died in the hospital 65 hours
after the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Coroner gave the cause of death as bronchopneumonia and sepsis complicating blunt force injury of
the neck.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: All scaffolding should be fully decked and all decking material secured in
accordance with 29 CFR 1910.28(1) and 1926.451(2).
Discussion: The scaffold in this incident was not properly decked, and the planking used for decking was
not properly secured. These two conditions were major contributors to this incident.
Recommendation #2: Appropriate fall protective equipment should be employed wherever the potential
for a serious or fatal fall exists.
Discussion: The victim was not using any type of fall protection equipment when this incident occurred.
A safety belt and lanyard could have prevented this fatality had they been utilized.
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Recommendation #3: Employee safety training should address all potential hazards to which an
employee may be exposed.
Discussion: While the employer in this case did have a safety training program, this program dealt
specifically with the hazards of asbestos removal work. The employer's program failed to address other
hazards to which employees may be exposed, such as falls and the proper installation and use of scaffolding.
A comprehensive safety training program emphasizing the hazards posed by falls and stressing the use of
appropriate personal fall protection equipment, might have prevented this fatality.
REFERENCES
1. 29 CFR 1910.28. Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register.
2. 29 CFR 1926.451. Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register.
Figure.
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FACE 90-16:  Painter Dies Following a 40-foot Fall from Scaffold Inside Water Tank in Ohio
SUMMARY
A painter sandblasting the interior of a water tank, died after falling 40 feet from a four-point suspension
scaffold when one of the nylon suspension ropes broke. The painter had previously welded some steel
brackets to the inside top wall of the tank in order to install a fall protection anchor cable. Later, as the painter,
a co-worker, and the company owner were raising one end of the scaffold platform during a sandblasting
operation, a suspension rope broke, causing the painter to fall. An OSHA investigation determined that the
rope broke at a point where it had been burned, presumably when the steel brackets were welded. NIOSH
investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• prohibit welding in the vicinity of synthetic rope suspension scaffolding
• construct and maintain suspension scaffolding in accordance with OSHA and ANSI Standards
• ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers as needed
• develop and implement a safety program to help workers recognize and control hazards
• develop and implement procedures for entry and work in confined spaces.
Additionally, tank designers/manufacturers should:
• design and install appropriate tank anchor points for maintenance purposes
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1989, a 39-year-old male painter (victim) fell 40 feet from a scaffold, when one of the
nylon suspension ropes supporting the scaffold broke. Although the incident occurred in Ohio, the victim
died in a Pennsylvania hospital. On November 30, 1989, officials from a county coroner's office in
Pennsylvania notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical
assistance. On December 12, 1989, a research industrial hygienist from DSR traveled to the incident site
to conduct an investigation. The DSR investigator reviewed the incident with company representatives and
the OSHA compliance officer assigned to the case, and obtained photographs and diagrams of the incident
site.
The employer is an industrial painting contractor who has been in business for 10 years. Most of the
employer's business involves painting building exteriors and other outdoor structures. Contracted work is
either done by the owner himself or with the help of one or two hired workers, depending on the job. The
victim in this incident was the owner's brother, who also owned his own painting company and had been
an industrial painter for 15 years. The employer has no safety program.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted by a manufacturing company to sandblast and paint the interior and
exterior of a 250,000- gallon steel water tank, which measures 48 feet high by 30 feet in diameter. The tank
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has an 18-inch-diameter manway on the side 12 inches from the bottom, and a 3-foot-square hatch on top
of the tank near the edge.
The employer hired a laborer to help him with the job. The owner and laborer had sandblasted and painted
the outside of the tank 3 weeks prior to the incident, using a two-point suspension scaffold. The scaffold
consisted of a platform (20 feet long and 2 feet wide) constructed of angle iron and wood planks with a metal
guardrail. The top rail of the guardrail was 40 inches above the platform. The platform was suspended by
two, 5/8-inch-diameter nylon ropes from a triangular framework ("stirrup") of angle iron at the ends of the
platform. The nylon ropes passed through a block and tackle hoist at both ends of the platform. The other
end of each rope was tied to a vent pipe on top of the tank. By pulling and letting up on the individual ropes
and tying them to the platform, the scaffold platform could be positioned at the desired height.
After painting the exterior of the tank, the owner hired his brother (the victim) to help him sandblast and paint
the interior. In order to remove the moisture and condensation inside the tank, the owner opened the manway
and hatch, and positioned two propane salamander heaters equipped with blowers just outside the manway to
blow warm air into the tank. The owner, the victim, and the laborer entered the tank through the manway and
hatch with the necessary scaffold parts, and set up a suspension scaffold similar to the two-point suspension
scaffold used on the outside of the tank. However, with this scaffold, three platforms were joined together by
overlapping the ends of two other platforms inside the stirrups at the ends of the center platform. The resulting
configuration formed a "U"-shaped, four-point suspension scaffold (Figures 1 and 2).
Before the suspension scaffold was raised into position, the victim climbed a ladder to weld steel brackets
to the opposite side walls at the top of the tank. The brackets were used to anchor a horizontal 3/8-inch-
diameter steel cable (to be used as a fall protection anchor cable). The nylon suspension ropes were lying
on the floor of the tank while the brackets were being welded. After the welding, the owner inspected the
suspension ropes by passing each rope length through his hands, but did not notice any apparent damage
to the ropes.
The four suspension ropes and two, 300-watt portable utility lights were then tied to angle iron roof support
beams at the top of the tank. Another 300-watt utility light was secured to the center scaffold platform. The
entire scaffold platform was raised to approximately 40 feet above the floor and the victim began
sandblasting the top portion of the tank wall. During the sandblasting, the victim wore a supplied air
respirator (without an auxiliary, escape-only SCBA), a sandblaster's hood, gloves, and coveralls. The
owner urged the victim to wear a safety belt, secure it to a vertical rope (lifeline) with a rope-grab device,
and secure the other end of the lifeline to the horizontal steel cable at the top of the tank. The victim chose
not to wear the fall protection equipment, saying that it would get in his way. After the victim had
sandblasted as much of the top portion of the tank as he could reach, the platform was lowered to the floor
of the tank and the nylon suspension ropes were reattached to roof support beams above the portion of the
tank which had yet to be sandblasted. The three men began raising the scaffold platform by alternately
raising each suspension point a few feet at a time. Again, the victim did not wear any type of fall protection
equipment. The laborer, however, did wear a safety belt/lifeline tied off to the steel cable as the owner had
suggested. The owner was standing at the bottom of the tank during this time.
While the victim (who was standing on the platform at one end) was pulling on a suspension rope to raise
one end of the scaffold, it broke, causing that end of the platform to fall. The victim fell approximately 40
feet, landing on a horizontal, 2-inch-diameter water pipe at the bottom of the tank. The laborer managed
to remain standing on the other platform leg which stayed intact (Figure 2). The owner rushed to the victim
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(who was unconscious but still breathing), placed the victim on a piece of planking, and the owner and
laborer subsequently removed him from the tank through the manway. The laborer then ran to the
manufacturing plant for help. The county emergency medical service (EMS) was notified and arrived at
the site 12 minutes later. The victim was rushed to a local hospital and then air transported to a larger hospital
where he died in the operating room 3 hours later. An OSHA investigation determined that the suspension
rope broke at a point where it had been burned.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as blunt force trauma to the head and trunk.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Synthetic rope used in suspension scaffolding should be protected from heat
producing sources.
Discussion: Paragraph 3.25 of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) "Safety Requirements
for Scaffolding," A10.8-1977, states that "Special precautions shall be taken to protect scaffold members,
including any wires, fiber, or synthetic rope when using a heat producing process." Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) standard 29 CFR 1926.451(a)(18) states that "No welding, burning,
riveting, or open flame work shall be performed on any staging suspended by means of fiber or synthetic
rope." An OSHA investigation after the incident determined that the rope had broken at a point where it
had been burned. Exactly how the rope was burned is not clear. The victim had previously welded steel
support brackets to the inside of the tank. Although the welding was not done from the scaffolding platform,
it was performed above the nylon rope which was lying on the floor of the tank before the scaffolding was
raised. Also, the 300-watt utility lights may have come too close or contacted the nylon suspension ropes
sometime during the sandblasting operation.
Recommendation #2: Suspension scaffolding should be constructed and maintained in accordance
with OSHA Standard 19 CFR 1926.451, and ANSI Standard A10.8-1977.
Discussion: The OSHA and ANSI Standards require synthetic or fiber rope used for scaffold suspension
to be capable of supporting at least six times the rated load (29 CFR 1926.451(a)(19) and (i)(5), and ANSI
A10.8-1977, 3.23). Due to the size and type of rope being used it is questionable whether it was capable
of meeting this requirement.
Recommendation #3: Where the potential for a fall from an elevation exists, employers should ensure
that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers.
Discussion: Although fall protection equipment, consisting of a steel anchor cable secured horizontally
across the top of the tank (to secure lifeline ropes), lifeline ropes, safety belts, and rope-grab devices, was
available at the site during the incident, it was not used by the victim. The use of a safety belt/lanyard
combination is required by 29 CFR 1926.451(i)(8) for use on two-point suspension scaffolds. The use of
the safety belt or body harness/lanyard with a rope-grab device is appropriate for persons working from
scaffolds at varying heights. Properly used, this type of fall protection would have prevented the victim from
falling even when the scaffolding fell.
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Recommendation #4: Employers should develop and implement a safety program designed to help
workers recognize, understand, and control hazards.
Discussion: OSHA Standard 1926.21(b)(2) states that "the employer shall instruct each employee in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to
control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." Even small companies should
evaluate the tasks performed by workers, identify all potential hazards, then develop and implement a safety
program addressing these hazards, and provide worker training in safe work procedures. Prior to starting
any job, the employer should conduct a jobsite survey, identify all hazards, and implement appropriate
control measures.
Recommendation #5: Employers should develop and implement specific procedures for entry and work
in confined spaces.
Discussion: The owner and workers in this incident were working inside a confined space. Even though
the victim died from the result of a fall, there were other potential hazards associated with the work to be
performed inside the tank ( i.e., painting the inside of a tank with a toxic and flammable paint). Although
most of the work contracted by the employer does not require confined space entry, it is reasonable to expect
that future work might require the employer and hired workers to enter other types of confined spaces. The
company should therefore, develop and implement a confined space entry program as outlined in NIOSH
publications 80-106, "Working in Confined Spaces," and 87-113, "A Guide to Safety in Confined
Spaces." Minimally, the following items should be addressed:
1. Has the air quality in the confined space been tested for safety?
• Oxygen supply at least 19.5%
• Flammable range less than 10% of the lower explosive limit
• Absence of toxic air contaminants
2. Have employees and supervisors been trained in the selection and use of personal protective
equipment and clothing?
• Fall protection
• Respiratory protection
• Emergency rescue equipment
• Protective clothing
3. Have employees been trained for confined space entry?
4. Have employees been trained in confined space rescue procedures?
5. If ventilation equipment is needed, is it available and/or used?
6. Is the air quality tested when the ventilation system is operating?
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Recommendation #6: The designers/manufacturers of tanks of this type should design and install
appropriate anchor points for maintenance purposes.
Discussion: Permanent structures of this type are known to require extensive maintenance when they are
designed. It is essential that designers/owners of these facilities incorporate appropriate anchor points on
tanks to which workers can adequately secure scaffolds and lifelines. Omission of designed anchor points
causes workers to improvise anchors or not use them at all. This increases the possibility that a scaffold will
be erected using improper procedures and components.
REFERENCES
1. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Inc., Safety Requirements for Scaffolding. ANSI A10.8-
1977, 1977.
2. Office of the Federal Register. Code of Federal Regulations. Labor. 29 CFR Part 1926, pages 20, 180-
181, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Washington, D.C.
3. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Criteria for a Recommended Standard ... Working
in Confined Spaces. DHHS (NIOSH) Publication Number 80-116, December 1979.
4. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces. DHHS
(NIOSH) Publication Number 87-113, 1987.
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Figure 1.  Water Tank (Side View)
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Figure 2.  Water Tank (Top View)
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FACE 90-20:  Mason Dies after Falling 36 Feet from Scaffolding
SUMMARY
A male brick mason (victim) fell 36 feet to his death while working from a tubular welded frame scaffold.
The victim was working as part of a brick laying crew on the exterior of a new building. At the time of the
incident, the crew was working from the 6th level of the scaffold. When the work had been finished at this
level, the foreman told the workers to take a break while he and a laborer raised the planks to the next level.
For some unknown reason, the victim stayed on the scaffolding. Prior to his unwitnessed fall 36 feet to the
ground, the victim was seen with one foot on a scaffold brace and the other on the brick sill of the building.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that employees are informed of the hazards of using diagonal braces as a means of
climbing a scaffold
• conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections regularly at each jobsite
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety program that includes, but is not limited
to, training workers in the proper methods of erecting and working from scaffolds
• provide appropriate fall protection equipment to all workers who may be exposed to a fall hazard.
INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1989, a 33-year-old brick mason died after falling 36 feet from a tubular metal frame
scaffold. On November 9, 1989, officials of the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death and requested technical assistance. On
December 12, 1989, a DSR safety engineer conducted an investigation and met with a company official
to discuss the incident. Photographs of the incident site were taken and emergency medical services (EMS)
records were obtained.
The employer is a masonry construction company that has been in business for 6 years. The company
employs 100 workers, including 30 masons. The company has a designated safety officer and a written
safety policy and safety procedures. The company holds regular safety meetings and provides both on-the-
job and classroom safety training. Prior to this incident the company had gone approximately 2 years
without a lost-time injury. Since this incident, the company has instituted measures for taking disciplinary
action for failure to comply with safety rules.
The victim had been hired as a mason/foreman approximately one month prior to the incident. The victim
had worked as a mason for over 10 years prior to coming to work for this company.
INVESTIGATION
The victim was working as part of a four-person crew (foreman, two masons and a laborer) laying brick
on the exterior of a new building. The crew was working from the 6th level of a tubular welded frame
scaffold. (Each level of the scaffold was 6 feet high.) The scaffolding was erected about 2 feet parallel from
the face of the building and had attached outriggers (metal brackets installed on the scaffolding toward the
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building) on which planks were placed for the masons to work from. The crew had just finished laying the
brick for the window sill at the third floor level. The foreman told the victim and another mason to take a
break while he and a laborer raised the planks to the next level. The co-worker stepped from the scaffold
into the building and went down to the ground floor to get some coffee. The victim, for unknown reasons,
decided not to leave the work area. He was noticed by a worker to have one foot on the brick sill and his
other foot on one of the scaffold's diagonal braces. Witnesses stated that there was some moisture on the
scaffolding components that morning which may have made the metal slippery. The victim apparently lost
his balance (or slipped) and fell, unwitnessed, to the ground through the center of the scaffolding. The
foreman had his back to the victim and was two sections of scaffolding away when the incident happened.
The sound created when the victim hit the ground alerted the other workers that he had fallen.
The emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned and arrived at the scene within 2 minutes after
receiving the call. The EMS records indicate that the victim was unconscious and in respiratory arrest. He
was bleeding from both ears and the nose and had a compound fracture of the skull. The technicians were
unable to determine the victim's blood pressure and 8 minutes after arriving were no longer able to detect
a pulse. The victim was transported by helicopter to a trauma center where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that the cause of death was due to head injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that employees are informed of the hazards of using
diagonal braces as a means of climbing a scaffold.
Discussion: The victim was apparently climbing or maneuvering on the scaffolding by using the diagonal
braces as a foot support. Employers should instruct workers that the proper way to climb scaffolding is via
the ladders provided.
Recommendation #2: Employers should conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections
regularly at each jobsite to ensure worker compliance with established safe work procedures.
Discussion: Employers should conduct, or appoint safety personnel to conduct, scheduled and unscheduled
safety inspections at each jobsite to ensure that established safety procedures are being followed.
Conducting such safety inspections demonstrates to workers a management commitment to enforcing its
safety policies and procedures.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety
program that includes, but is not limited to, training workers in the proper methods of erecting and
working from scaffolding.
Discussion: Employers should emphasize worker safety by developing, implementing, and enforcing a
comprehensive safety program to reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to hazardous situations. The
safety program should include, but not be limited to, the proper methods for erecting and working from
scaffolding.
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Recommendation #4: Employers should provide appropriate fall protection equipment for all workers
who may be exposed to a fall hazard.
Discussion: Employers should provide appropriate fall protection equipment for all workers exposed to fall
hazards, and should provide worker training in the proper use of this equipment. Once this training is
provided, employers should initiate measures to ensure the use of this fall protection equipment. A safety
belt and lanyard would be appropriate fall protection equipment for use on scaffolding.
102
FACE 91-02:  Electrician Dies After Fall in South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 34-year-old male electrician died after falling 12 feet from a scaffold that he was erecting. The
victim and a helper were installing conduit for the lighting system in a new shopping mall directly
below the steel-beam framework of the building's ceiling. The victim and his helper were using a
mobile, aluminum-tubular-frame scaffold with 6-foot-high tiers, to access their work area. After
dismantling the scaffold and moving to a location 30 feet from their previous work area, they erected
the first tier and locked it in place. The victim erected the second tier of scaffold while the helper
returned to the previous location to get some components for the third tier. At the time the helper left,
the victim was moving two wooden floorboards from the second tier to the third tier. When the helper
returned, he found the victim lying facedown on the concrete floor. The victim was bleeding severely
from the nose and mouth, but was conscious. The supervisor at the scene called the job superintendent
in the company trailer by two-way radio and told him to call the emergency medical service (EMS).
Five minutes after the incident occurred, the victim lost consciousness and no vital signs could be
detected. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was initiated immediately by co-workers. The
emergency medical service (EMS) arrived 15 minutes after being called and transported the victim to
the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order
to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide required personal protective equipment to employees, and ensure that it is used
• provide safety training to all new employees
• periodically observe the working habits of new employees to ensure that they are accomplishing
their assigned tasks in a safe manner.
INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 1990, a 34-year-old electrician died after falling 12 feet from a mobile scaffold. On
October 16, 1990, officials of the South Carolina Safety and Health Administration notified the
Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On November
8, 1990, two safety specialists from DSR traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The
investigators reviewed the incident with the jobsite superintendent, the city police, and the county
coroner. Photographs of the incident site and a final report were obtained from the county coroner.
The police report was also obtained.
The employer is an interstate electrical contractor that has been in operation 70 years and employs 250
workers. The 17 workers employed at this jobsite included 7 electricians, 8 helpers, 1 supervisor, and
the jobsite superintendent. The company hired the electricians and helpers from applications obtained
through the local job service. The victim had been on the job for 2 days. New employees receive a
handbook that contains the company safety rules. Weekly tailgate safety meetings are conducted at
the jobsite by the job superintendent. The company provides on-the-job training, and funding for
employees to attend a certified technical college. The job superintendent is responsible for safety.
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INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to install the electrical system for a new shopping mall complex under
construction. The company had been working at the site for 4 months. On the day of the incident, the victim (an
electrician) and a helper were installing conduit directly below the steel-beam framework of the structure's ceiling.
The 1/2-inch conduit would encase the conductors for the structure's lighting system. The victim and the helper
were using a mobile, aluminum-tubular-frame scaffold to access their work area. The scaffold was three tiers
high. Each tier measured 4 feet wide by 8 feet long by 6 feet high. The work area was about 22 feet above ground.
The two men began work at 7:00 a.m., and by 8:00 a.m. were ready to move the scaffold to a new position. The
two top tiers were dismantled and the bottom tier unit was moved 30 feet across the concrete floor to a new work
area. Once in position, the scaffold's outriggers were put in place and the casters were locked. The men began
to re-assemble the top two tiers of the scaffold. The second tier was put in place and the bottom section for the
third tier was placed across its top. The victim began to move the two 2-inch by 8-inch by 8-foot floor boards
from the second tier to the third tier. He had moved one of the boards when the helper walked to the previous
work area to retrieve one of the side sections for the third tier.
When the helper returned, he found the victim lying facedown on the concrete floor. The victim was bleeding
severely from the nose and mouth. The supervisor in the area called the superintendent in the company trailer
by two-way radio and told him to call the emergency medical service (EMS). Five minutes after the incident
occurred, the victim stopped breathing and no vital signs could be detected. Co-workers immediately initiated
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The EMS arrived 15 minutes after being called and transported the victim
to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead by the attending physician.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed head trauma as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate personal protective equipment and ensure its use.
Discussion: As required by 29 CFR 1910.268(g), safety belts and straps should be provided and the
employer should ensure their use when work is performed at heights more than 4 feet above ground.
Recommendation #2: Employers should instruct new employees in the proper methods to be used in the
performance of assigned tasks.
Discussion: Employers should ensure that new employees are instructed in the proper methods for
performing assigned tasks, such as erecting and working from scaffolds, prior to the initiation of work.
Recommendation #3: Employers should periodically observe the working habits of new employees to
ensure that the workers are performing their assigned tasks in a safe manner.
Discussion: Employers should conduct periodic random safety inspections to ensure that employees are
performing their assigned tasks in accordance with established safe work procedures. Any violation of
safety rules should be corrected immediately.
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FACE 91-06:  Construction laborer Dies After Falling 61 Feet From Work Platform in Virginia
SUMMARY
A 33-year-old male construction company laborer (victim) died after falling 61 feet from an elevated,
electric-powered, mast climbing work platform. Brickmasons and other company employees (including
the victim) were working from the platform to complete the brick-laying phase for the exterior of a six-story
building. At the beginning of the work day, the work platform had been raised to the fifth floor level when
the victim realized that the work he needed to do was on the fourth floor level. The victim notified one of
the brickmasons (co-worker), who lowered the platform. When the platform walkway cleared the top of
a window opening (measuring 4 feet wide by 5 feet high), the victim sat down on the walkway edge and
attempted to step onto the window sill about 3 feet below. The victim's feet slipped off the sill, and he fell
through the opening between the window and platform walkway to the ground 61 feet below. The victim
died from injuries sustained in the fall. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future
similar occurrences, employers should:
• conduct jobsite surveys to identify potential hazards and implement appropriate control
measures
• provide safety training that specifically addresses all identified jobsite hazards
• develop and implement safe work procedures for workers who are exposed to fall hazards
• provide appropriate fall protection equipment to all workers who may be exposed to a fall hazard.
INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 1990, a 33-year-old male construction laborer died after falling 61 feet from a
brickmason's motorized lift/work platform. On November 14, 1990, officials of the Virginia Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (VOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death
and requested technical assistance. On December 6, 1990, a research industrial hygienist from DSR
traveled to the incident site and conducted an investigation. The DSR investigator reviewed the incident
with the company owner, the medical examiner, and the VOSHA compliance officer assigned to the case.
Photographs of the incident site were obtained during the investigation.
The employer in this incident is a construction company that has been in business for 36 years. Most of the
work performed by the company involves masonry construction for large buildings. The company employs
50 workers, most of whom are brickmasons and laborers. The victim had been employed by the company
over the previous 4 years as a laborer. The company has a written safety program consisting of general
construction safety requirements. Enforcement of the company safety requirements is documented and had
resulted in previous terminations of some employees. Construction safety is the responsibility of the jobsite
foreman, who also conducts weekly "tailgate" safety meetings. The victim had attended numerous weekly
safety meetings for this construction project. These safety meetings covered such subjects as general
construction site safety, jobsite emergencies, and scaffolding. New employees receive on-the-job safety
training from supervisors and co-workers.
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INVESTIGATION
A general contractor subcontracted the employer to lay the exterior brick for a six-story building at a
university. The employer assigned a construction crew consisting of a foreman, four brick- masons, and
two laborers (one of whom was the victim) to do the job. The crew had been working at the jobsite for about
2 weeks. By this time they had completed laying the bricks up to the fifth floor on one side of the building.
The brick work was done from an electric-powered, mast-climbing work platform (Figure). The platform
was supported by a steel-frame mast secured to the building with cross members. The base of the mast was
supported on an I-beam frame trailer (26 feet by 5 feet) with outriggers. The center of the main platform
rode up and down the mast on a rack and pinion carriage, and was powered by two, 4-horsepower electric
gear motors. The platform was operated with a remote pendant controller located on the platform.
The work surface of the steel-frame platform measured 7 feet wide by 50 feet long. It consisted of a plywood-
surfaced main platform for holding materials (bricks, mortar, etc.), 5.5 feet wide by 50 feet long, and a wood-
planked walkway platform ("foot boards") 20 inches wide by 50 feet long where workers stood to lay the brick.
The walkway was positioned 18 inches below the surface of the main platform and extended along the
working face of the building at about 4 inches clearance. The outboard side and ends of the entire work
platform were surrounded by a 42-inch-high steel frame/wire mesh guardrail and fence. Under normal
working conditions, a guardrail is not installed on the walkway side of the platform.
At 6:30 a.m. on the day of the incident, the victim, co-worker and other brickmasons arrived at the site and
climbed on the work platform to begin their work for the day. Using the pendant controller, the co-worker
raised the work platform to the fifth story of the building. After reaching this level, the victim realized that
the work he needed to do was inside the building on the fourth floor. He mentioned this to the co-worker,
who lowered the work platform back toward the fourth floor.
As the platform descended, the victim attempted to enter the building through a window opening
(measuring 4 feet wide by 5 feet high) on the fourth floor (Figure). When the platform walkway cleared
the top of a window opening, the victim sat down (facing the building) on the walkway edge and began
to step onto the window sill frame. When he did this, the walkway was still about three feet above the sill.
At this moment, the co-worker yelled to the victim, "Wait a minute ... Wait a minute." The victim responded,
"That's okay Buddy, no problem."
The victim supported himself with his elbows on the walkway foot boards. As he placed his feet on the
sill and pushed off with his elbows, he slipped, falling forward. The victim struck his chin on the window
sill, fell 61 feet, struck a horizontal I-beam on the trailer base, and landed 18 inches below the I-beam on
the ground in the center of the trailer base.
The co-worker was the only one who witnessed the victim's fall. He yelled to the other brickmasons that
the victim had fallen. The foreman, who was on the ground near the trailer, ran to the victim. The co-worker
lowered the platform to a few feet above the ground. The co-worker and other brickmasons administered
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) while the foreman called the emergency medical service (EMS).
Personnel from the local EMS and the university police arrived approximately five minutes after receiving
the call. EMS personnel checked the victim's vital signs, then called the local coroner, who pronounced
the victim dead at the scene.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed multiple severe injuries as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should conduct jobsite surveys to identify potential hazards and
implement appropriate control measures.
Discussion: Employers should conduct jobsite and equipment surveys to identify potential worker hazards.
Once potential hazards have been identified, appropriate control measures should be recommended and
implemented prior to the start of work at any jobsite.
Workers on this type of work platform (or scaffolding) at positions in front of open areas (e.g., windows,
cantilevered sections, etc.), are exposed to a fall hazard. Fall protection consisting of a guardrail or other
appropriate fall protection equipment (e.g., safety belt and lifeline) should be provided in accordance with
OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1926.451(a)(4), and ANSI Standard A.92.6-90, Self-Propelled Elevating Work
Platforms.
Recommendation #2: Employers should provide safety training that specifically addresses all identified
jobsite hazards.
Discussion: OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(2) states, "The employer shall instruct each employee
in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work
environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." Workers who use
work platforms, scaffolds, etc., are exposed to fall hazards, and should be trained in specific safe work
procedures and the use of fall protection equipment pertaining to their work.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop and implement safe work procedures for workers who
are exposed to fall hazards.
Discussion: The platform manufacturer had provided an operator's manual for the work platform. There
are safe work procedures in the manual, but none specifically address fall protection. Printed safe work
procedures for all elevated work platforms should address fall protection, especially for situations when the
platform is in front of open areas at locations more than 4 feet above the ground level, and/or when the
platform is in motion. Workers should not be allowed to stand or sit on the walkway of this type platform
while the platform is in motion.
Recommendation #4: Employers should provide appropriate fall protection equipment for all workers
who may be exposed to a fall hazard.
Discussion: Employers should provide appropriate fall protection equipment for all workers exposed to fall
hazards, and should provide worker training in the proper use of this equipment. Once this training is
provided, employers should initiate measures to ensure the use of this fall protection equipment.
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FACE 93-15:  Painter/Sandblaster Dies Following a 30-foot Fall from Scaffolding Inside a Water
Tank--South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 48-year-old male painter/sandblaster (the victim) died of injuries received after falling 30 feet from a
tubular welded frame scaffold. The victim was part of a three-man crew that was sandblasting the interior
of a newly constructed water storage tank needed for fire fighting. In preparation to sandblast and spray
paint the tank's interior, workers on the daylight shift (7 a.m to 5 p.m.) had erected 2 separate 30-foot-high
tubular welded frame scaffoldings inside the tank. The victim and foreman were working the afternoon shift
(5 p.m. to 3 a.m.) sandblasting the tank's interior walls, each working from an individual scaffold. A third
crew member, the hole- watch, had been assigned ground duties which primarily consisted of getting
supplies and assisting the sandblasters. At about 12:30 a.m. the following morning, the holewatch noticed
that the victim had shut off his blast hose. A few minutes later, the foreman descended from the scaffolding
upon which he was working and informed the holewatch he was ready to move his scaffolding. The
foreman, after talking with the holewatch, wondered why the victim had stopped work and went looking
for him. The victim was found lying injured and conscious, but incoherent, on the deck of the tank. The
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) was called and arrived in less than 5 minutes. EMS personnel
administered first aid and transported the victim 7 miles to the local hospital where he died 8 days later.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by workers where the potential for
a fall from an elevation exists
• evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific training procedures emphasizing
the importance of recognizing hazards in the workplace, and following established safe work
procedures with particular consideration to using appropriate personal protective equipment
• designate a competent person to conduct regular safety inspections.
INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1993, a 48-year-old male painter/sandblaster (the victim) was injured when he fell 30 feet from
a scaffold. He died 8 days later, on April 15, 1993, as a result of the injuries he received in the fall. On April
22, 1993, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA)
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On May
13, 1993, a safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and reviewed the circumstances with one
of the two company owners and the SCOSHA compliance officer assigned to the case. Photographs of the
incident site were taken, and the medical examiner's report was requested.
The employer in this incident was a commercial and industrial painting contractor that had been in operation
for 14 years and employed about 100 workers, of which approximately 90 were painters/sandblasters. The
employer had a written safety policy and a safety program which consisted of job-specific safety
procedures, a confined space entry program, a hazardous communication program, random drug testing,
and a disciplinary program. Company management personnel were responsible for the enforcement of the
safety program on a collateral-duty basis. The employer provided on-the-job training, and management
personnel conducted tool-box safety meetings on a weekly basis. The victim worked for the company for
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1 day as a painter/ sandblaster, but had approximately 20 years' experience working in this occupation. This
was the first fatality the company had experienced.
INVESTIGATION
On the day of the incident, the victim arrived for his first day of work at about 4:40 p.m. The painting contractor
had been hired by a paper processing plant to paint a metal, 40-foot-high by 40-foot-diameter water storage tank
that had recently been constructed to store water for fire fighting. The contractor had rented tubular welded frame
scaffolding to be used in completing the sandblasting and painting of the tank's interior. The daylight shift erected
2 separate 30-foot-high scaffoldings inside the tank in preparation for sandblasting during the afternoon shift.
The victim was picked up at the plant gate by the daylight foreman and given a site orientation which
consisted of a review of basic safety rules for the paper processing plant (e.g., the need to wear eye and head
protection within the plant) and location of the water storage tank. Following the orientation, the foreman
spent 5 to 10 minutes with the victim discussing basic on-the-job safety rules, which included using
personal protective equipment (e.g., safety belt, face shield, and blast hood). The victim was driven to the
contractor's supply paint trailer (which was located on-site) and issued his blast hood, face shield, and safety
belt and lanyard. Next, he was driven to the water tank and introduced to the afternoon foreman who was
overseeing work at the water tank. Since the victim had approximately 20 years of experience, the afternoon
foreman assumed he knew how to perform the job safely, and instructed him to start work. [Note: The
victim apparently left the safety belt and lanyard that he had been issued in the daylight foreman's truck.]
At the time of the incident, approximately 12:30 a.m., the victim and foreman were each working from one
of the 30-foot-high tubular welded frame scaffolds, sandblasting the interior wall of the tank. A third crew
member, the holewatch, whose duties were restricted to ground activities, procured supplies and helped
the sandblasters move the scaffolds. At about 12:35 a.m., the holewatch noticed that the victim had shut
off his blast hose. A few minutes later, the foreman descended from the scaffolding upon which he was
working, and informed the holewatch he was ready to move his scaffolding. The foreman, after talking with
the holewatch, wondered why the victim had stopped work and went looking for him. He found the victim,
lying injured and conscious, but incoherent, on the deck of the tank (Figure). The EMS responded in less
than 5 minutes to the call for assistance, administered first aid, and transported the victim 7 miles to the local
hospital, where he died 8 days later on April 15, 1993.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as closed head injury.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by
workers where the potential for a fall from an elevation exists.
Discussion: Employers should ensure by observation that fall protection equipment is being used. A lifeline for
attaching a safety belt and lanyard was secured to the tanks' interior wall and was available during the incident;
however, the victim apparently left the fall protection equipment he had been issued in the back of the daylight
foreman's truck when he was driven to the worksite. The victim had approximately 20 years' experience in this
occupation, and it was assumed he was aware of the need to wear fall protection equipment.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific
training procedures emphasizing the importance of recognizing hazards in the workplace, and
following established safe work procedures with particular consideration to using appropriate personal
protective equipment.
Discussion: In addition to developing a written safety program, employers should provide workers with
appropriate training for the work they are to perform, and ensure they are proficient in job safety procedures
before work begins. Such training should include recognizing hazards in the workplace, following
established safe work procedures, and wearing appropriate personal protective equipment.
Recommendation #3: Employers should designate a competent person to conduct regular safety
inspections.
Discussion: A competent person1 should conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections of
worksites to help ensure that established company safety procedures are being followed, and that
appropriate personal protective equipment is used. Such inspections also demonstrate that the employer is
committed to the company safety program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
Figure.  Exterior and Interior of Water Tank
Not to Scale
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FACE 94-15:  Carpenter Dies After Falling 17 Feet From A Scaffold-- South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 28-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died after falling from a scaffold and striking his head on the
ground. The victim and two co-workers had been assigned to install soffit board around the roof overhang
of a private residence that was under construction. A co-worker observed the victim standing on the
scaffold platform, nailing a board to the roof overhang, when he either lost his balance and fell, or became
ill and fell onto the scaffold. He sat upright and started leaning to his right. At that time, a co-worker yelled
to another co-worker in the area, to grab the victim as he might fall off the scaffold. Seconds later, the victim
toppled off the unguarded scaffold, 17 feet to the ground, striking his head. The co-workers ran to the victim
and found him unconscious and not breathing. One co-worker started cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
while the other co-worker called for an ambulance. The ambulance and coroner arrived about the same time
and the coroner pronounced the victim dead at the scene. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent
similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide adequate guarding on scaffolding
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program
• utilize contract language that requires sub-contractors to implement a site-specific safety and
health program prior to the initiation of work
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1994, a 28-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died from injuries received in a 17-foot fall
from a scaffold. On July 23, 1994, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested
technical assistance. On September 21, 1994, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of this
incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer, county coroner, and SCOSHA compliance officer
assigned to the case. Police and coroner's reports were obtained during the investigation.
The employer was a roofing contractor that had been in business for 12 years and employed four workers,
all of whom were carpenters. The employer had no written safety program, but informal safety talks were
said to have been given at each job- site. The victim had been employed for 1 day prior to the incident, and
had about 4 years experience as a carpenter. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted to do outside trim work at a residence under construction in a private
residential housing community. The house was a two-story wood and aluminum structure, and work had
been in progress for about 2 days prior to the incident.
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On the day of the incident, the workers (victim and two co-workers), arrived at the jobsite about 6:30 a.m.,
and were assigned to install soffit boards around the roof overhang of the house. Two carpenter's bracket
scaffolds (i.e., scaffolds consisting of wood or metal brackets supporting a platform), were erected on
opposite sides of the house. The scaffold from which the victim fell was 17 feet high and the platform
consisted of one board (2-inches thick by 12-inches wide, which extended to a length of about 29 feet and
was about 18 inches from the wall of the house. The platform, which was not protected by any guardrails,
was supported by five pieces of angle iron irregularly spaced and attached to the studs of the house (Figure).
The victim had been working from the platform nailing soffit boards to the overhang of the roof when the
incident occurred. He was observed by a co-worker bending over, just prior to falling to the platform. It
is unknown whether the victim became ill or lost his balance and fell to the platform; however, earlier that
morning the victim had been complaining of chest pains but refused to go to the hospital for an examination.
After the victim fell to the scaffold platform, he sat upright and began leaning over to his right. The co-
worker on the ground had witnessed the event and yelled to the other co-worker, who was inside the house
by the bay window, to grab the victim as he might fall off the platform. Seconds later, the victim toppled
off the end of the unguarded scaffold, 17 feet to the ground, striking his head. The co-workers ran to the
victim and found him unconscious and not breathing. One co-worker started cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
while the other co-worker called for an ambulance. The ambulance and coroner both arrived about 10
minutes after being notified and the coroner pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner's report listed the cause of death as severe head injury and fractured cervical spine.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate guarding on scaffolding.
Discussion: The victim was nailing soffit boards to a roof overhang while standing on an unguarded
scaffold platform. Guarding of the scaffold platform, as required by CFR 1926.451 (a)(4), which states
"Guardrails and toeboards shall be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than 10 feet above
the ground or floor," was not present.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop, implement and enforce a comprehensive written
safety program.
Discussion: The employer did not have a written safety program. The development, implementation, and
enforcement of a comprehensive safety program should reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to
hazardous situations. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, protecting scaffold platforms
with appropriate guardrailing and toeboards, the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards, and the use of
appropriate safety equipment such as safety nets or safety belts and lanyards.
Recommendation #3: Employers should utilize contract language that requires sub-contractors to
implement a site specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Discussion: General and subcontractors should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to
identify how they intend to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of
work. Subcontractors' safety pro- grams should be consistent and compatible with the general contractor's
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safety program. The contract should contain clear and concise language as to which party is responsible
for a given safety or health issue. Any differences should be negotiated before work begins. Once the
provisions for these responsibilities have been established, the respective parties should ensure that the
provisions of the contract regarding safety and health are upheld.
Recommendation #4: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace
safety inspections.
Discussion: Employers should be cognizant of the hazardous conditions at jobsites and take an active role
to eliminate them. Additionally, scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a
competent person1 to ensure that jobsites are free of hazardous conditions. Even though these inspections
do not guarantee the elimination of occupational injury, they do demonstrate the employer's commitment
to the enforcement of the safety program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #5: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was working from a platform 17 feet from the ground without any guarding. Workers
and co-workers should look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper way to perform
their tasks. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace
safer. Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.451 (a)(4) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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Figure.  Scaffolding Layout (Side View)
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FACE 95-06:  Painter Dies After 35-Foot Fall From Scaffold--Tennessee
SUMMARY
A 60-year-old male painter foreman (the victim) died after falling 35 feet from the top stage of a tubular
scaffold. The victim and a co-worker were painting the window frames and roof eaves of a church. The
victim was working from a mobile tubular scaffold scraping and painting the roof eaves, while the co-
worker was working on the windows from an extension step ladder. The top stage of the scaffold, from
which the victim was working, was not equipped with side rails. After their morning break, the men
repositioned the scaffold. The victim began to climb the scaffold to the top, and told the co-worker to put
scrapers and a propane torch in the tool basket and tie the basket to the pull rope attached to the top rail of
the scaffold. The victim was standing on two, 12-inch-wide by 6-foot-long unsecured boards that covered
only 2/3 of the floor of the scaffold stage. As the co-worker was placing the tools in the basket, he heard
a noise and looked up to see the victim falling from the top of the scaffold. The victim fell between the boards
and the outside rails of the scaffold for approximately 15 feet. He then struck a scaffold cross brace that
flipped him to the outside of the scaffold, and fell another 20 feet onto a 36-inch-high air conditioning unit.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide adequate guarding on scaffolding and ensure its proper set-up
• ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available and correctly used when working
where there is a danger of falling
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On November 21, 1994, a 60-year-old male painter foreman (the victim) died of injuries received in a 35-
foot fall from a scaffold. On January 30, 1995, officials of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (TOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested
technical assistance. On March 15, 1995, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of this
incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer and the TOSHA compliance officer assigned to
the case. The medical examiner's report, the death certificate, and photographs of the site immediately
following the incident were obtained during the investigation.
The employer was a commercial painting contractor that had been in business under the present ownership
for 23 years, and employed anywhere from 20 to 90 painters, depending upon the workload. The employer
had a written safety policy and basic written safe work procedures. Weekly safety meetings were conducted
by the supervisor at the jobsite and training was conducted on the job. Fall protection equipment such as
safety belts and lanyards were supplied by the employer. The victim had worked for the employer for 20
years. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
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INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to scrape, prepare, and repaint the window frames and roof eaves of
a church. The work had progressed on a part-time basis over a 2-month period. Up to that point, the men
had finished most of the window frames using extension ladders and were ready to begin work on the roof
eaves using a mobile tubular scaffold. The scaffold stages were 5-feet-high by 3-feet-wide by 6-feet-long.
Seven stages were necessary to access the eaves. The men did not put the side rails on the seventh stage.
Two 12-inch-wide boards were placed on the floor of the 7th stage, leaving a 12-inch gap between the edge
of the board and the outside rail of the scaffold.
On the day of the incident, the victim was working from the scaffold scraping the eaves while the co-worker was
working from an extension ladder finishing the windows. After their morning break, the victim began to climb
the scaffold and instructed the co-worker to place additional scrapers and a propane torch in the tool basket that
was tied to a pull rope attached to the top rail of the scaffold. As the co-worker was gathering the tools to place
in the basket, he heard a noise and looked up to see the victim falling from the top of the scaffold. The victim fell
between the edge of the floor board and the outside of the scaffold, falling approximately 15 feet before striking
a cross brace on the scaffold. The victim was flipped to the outside of the scaffold and fell an additional 20 feet,
landing on a 36-inch-high air conditioning unit. The victim was unconscious but breathing. The emergency
rescue service was summoned by phone from the church parsonage and transported the victim to the local
hospital, where he was pronounced dead by the attending physician.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as traumatic shock due to closed head trauma, ruptured
spleen, and blunt force trauma, due to a fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate guarding on scaffolding and ensure its
proper set-up.
Discussion: The victim was scraping the roof eaves while standing on a scaffold stage without guardrails
or toeboards. Guarding on scaffold platforms, is required by 29 CFR 1926.451 (a) (4), which states
"Guardrails and toeboards shall be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than 10 feet above
the ground or floor." Additionally, there were only two 12-inch-wide boards on the floor of the scaffold
stage, leaving the 12-inch gap which the victim fell through. Proper set-up procedures include the
installation of guardrails, midrails, and toeboards around the platform perimeter, as well as ensuring that
the working surface is completely covered, eliminating floor openings.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available
and correctly used when working where there is a danger of falling.
Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) states that "each employee on a walking/working surface (horizontal
and vertical surface) with an unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet (1.8m) or more above a lower level
shall be protected from falling by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest
systems." In this incident, the scaffold was not equipped with guardrails, and although safety belts and
lanyards were available in the truck, they were not used.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written
safety program.
Discussion: The employer had basic written safety rules; however, the development, implementation, and
enforcement of a comprehensive safety program should identify, and reduce or eliminate worker exposures
to hazardous situations. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, ensuring that scaffold
platforms are equipped with appropriate guardrails and toeboards; employing worksite hazard assessments
to enable the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards; and providing, and enforcing, the use of appropriate
safety equipment such as safety nets, or safety belts and lanyards.
Recommendation #4: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace
safety inspections.
Discussion: Employers should be aware of the hazardous conditions at jobsites and should take an active
role to eliminate them. Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a competent
person1 to ensure that jobsites are free of hazardous conditions. Even though these inspections do not
guarantee the prevention of occupational injury, they may identify hazardous conditions and activities that
should be rectified. Further, they demonstrate the employer's commitment to the enforcement of the safety
program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #5: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was working on a scaffold 35 feet above the ground without any guarding or safety
equipment. Workers and co-workers should look out for their personal safety and the safety of co-workers.
When workers observe hazardous conditions or activities, they should, depending on the circumstances,
notify management and/or remind co-workers of the proper way to perform their tasks and protect
themselves. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace
safer.
Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.451 (a) (4) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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FACE 88-06:  Plumber Falls to His Death Through a Roof opening
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On October 30, 1987, a 24-year-old plumber died when he fell 22 feet through a skylight opening to a
concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officials notified DSR concerning this
fatality and requested technical assistance. On December 10, 1987, a DSR research team conducted a site
visit, met with employer representatives and co-workers, and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was employed as a plumber by a construction company which employs 50 workers. The
employer has a written safety program and the victim had received both written and verbal safety
instruction. The victim had worked for the company for approximately 6 months at the time of the incident.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim was working as a member of a crew installing various plumbing
fixtures/fittings on the 36,000-square-foot roof of a new building. The victim had been working on this
project for several days. The incident occurred near the end of the work day, after the victim had been on
the job for 7 1/2 hours.
Numerous 4-foot-square openings, framed by 2- by 6-inch material, were present in the roof. These
openings were to be used for installing "fire dome"--type skylights. No guards were present around these
skylight openings, nor was any fall protection provided underneath the openings.
At the time of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were discussing the relocation of a fixture on the
roof. The victim was walking away from his co-worker while looking back over his shoulder to talk. He
stepped into one of the skylight openings and fell approximately 22 feet to the concrete floor below, striking
his head, neck, and shoulders.
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were called to the scene and arrived approximately 15
minutes after the fall occurred. Medical care was provided both at the scene of the incident and while the
victim was being transported to a nearby hospital. The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital
approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes after the incident.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner ruled that death was due to multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide a level of guarding and/or fall protection around all
roof openings that is equivalent to requirements specified by OSHA 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(4).
Discussion: A guardrail, as required by OSHA 29 CFR 1926.500(b)(4), could have prevented the fall. In
instances where the use of a standard guardrail is not practical for the type of work, an alternative form of
fall protection, such as safety nets, catch platforms, etc., should be used. Construction which utilizes large
numbers of skylight openings is becoming more commonplace. Consequently, numerous openings can be
present on roofs during construction activities. As this type of building design increases, the potential for
falls continues to grow. Guarding and/or fall protection must be utilized during the construction process,
otherwise an increase in this type of incident is to be expected.
Recommendation #2: Employers should periodically monitor worksites to evaluate field compliance
with company safety rules and procedures.
Discussion: While the company had a written safety program, field compliance was inadequate to protect
the victim from the worksite hazards. A safety program, no matter how detailed or comprehensive, cannot
be effective unless it is implemented at the worksite.
Recommendation #3: Employers should perform job hazard analyses to identify the hazards to be
encountered by their employees and to develop hazard control measures for the jobsite.
Discussion: A job hazard analysis is one method of identifying the hazards associated with performing a
job. Failure to adequately identify and control these hazards results in unnecessary employee exposure to
harmful and potentially fatal energy sources.
Recommendation #4: Employers should utilize the job hazard analysis as a tool for training employees
on the hazards associated with specific jobs and on the measures the employer intends to use to control
these hazards.
Discussion: General training on company safety procedures should be supplemented by training on
hazards known to exist during a specific job. Such training can make employees aware of the hazards to
which they are exposed. At the same time, employees can be shown the measures which are to be taken
for their protection. The job hazard analysis, through its breakdown of a job into specific steps, the hazards
associated with each step, and the measures planned to control the hazards, provides an ideal means to relay
this information to employees.
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FACE 88-07:  Roofer Falls to His Death from a Roof in Maryland
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On November 16, 1987, a 41-year-old male roofer died when he fell from roof framing to a concrete floor
22 feet below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program for the State of Maryland notified DSR of this
fatality and requested technical assistance. On December 11, 1987, a DSR research team met with
employer representatives to review this incident. Prior to a field investigation, DSR personnel discussed
this incident with personnel from the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was employed by a roofing company which presently employs 45 persons and has been under
the same management since it began operation 4 years ago. The victim had worked for the employer for
2 years prior to the incident and had approximately 20 years experience as a roofer. The employer has a
written safety program and employees receive both written and verbal safety instruction. In addition, safety
programs on videotape are presented to employees on days when weather or other conditions preclude
exterior work.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim was working with a co-worker to install roof decking panels on a new
building. Four other workers were installing the overlying roofing material on another area of the roof.
The decking panels being installed by the victim were composed of wood fiber and portland cement. Each
panel was 32 inches wide by 8 feet long by 2 inches thick and weighed 80 pounds. A tongue-and-groove
system on the 32-inch ends permitted the interlocking of adjacent panels. Framing material consisted of 4-
inch " I " beams on 5-foot centers, with 1 7/8-inch-wide inverted "T"-shaped purlins, 32 inches apart,
forming the support for the decking panels.
At the time of the incident, the victim was standing with one foot on a panel which had already been installed
and his other foot on one of the 1 7/8-inch purlins. He was pushing on one end of an 8-foot panel to force
the tongue to engage the groove on the adjacent panel. His co-worker was at the far end of the panel guiding
it into the groove. According to the co-worker's statement to Maryland OSHA, the panel suddenly dropped
into place, and this action may have caused the victim to lose his balance. The co-worker looked up and
saw the victim fall through a gap in the framing. The victim fell approximately 22 feet to a concrete floor
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and experienced multiple injuries to the head and chest. A supervisor standing on the floor below saw the
worker falling. No fall-arresting devices such as safety belts, lanyards, or safety nets were present.
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were immediately called and were on the scene in
approximately 2 minutes. The victim was treated at the scene and enroute to the hospital. The victim was
pronounced dead at the hospital 1 hour and 6 minutes after the incident occurred.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that death resulted from multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation: Whenever any work is performed where the potential for a fall from elevation exists,
employers should ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and utilized by their employees.
Discussion: The use of a safety belt/lanyard combination, as required by 29 CFR 1926.104(d), is sometimes
not practical during construction operations. However, alternative forms of worker protection, such as the
safety nets specified in 29 CFR 1926.105 should be considered. Safety nets can be equally effective in
preventing injury or death when a worker falls. The use of safety nets below the workers may have
prevented the fatality described above.
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FACE 88-08:  Construction Laborer Falls to His Death from a Roof in Ohio
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 7, 1987, a 26-year-old construction laborer in Ohio died when he fell 27 feet from the roof
of a building under construction.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the Industrial Commission of Ohio (ICO) notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical
assistance. On January 5, 1988, a DSR research team met with the employer to conduct an evaluation of
this incident. DSR investigators discussed this incident with ICO personnel, and then conducted a field
evaluation.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 2 months as a construction laborer by a small construction company
specializing in the erection of prefabricated metal buildings. The company has been in existence for 6 years
and has been involved in the erection of prefabricated metal buildings for the past 2 years. At the time of
the incident, 26 employees worked for the company. Employees receive both classroom and on-the-job
training for tasks which they are assigned. Written safety rules are given to employees who must sign a
receipt acknowledging that they have received and read a copy of company safety policies. Although the
victim had only been employed for 2 months, he had received training in proper work procedures, including
specific instruction on how to avoid falls.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim was working as a member of an eight-man crew assigned to install
roofing on a large (150 feet by 180 feet) prefabricated building. The pitch of the roof on the building is
1/2 foot per 12 feet. At the peak of the roof, a flat area 1 foot wide provides a walkway the length of the
structure. Roofing materials were located in bundles on the roof near the area where they were to be
installed. Normally this material is packaged in the order in which it is to be installed.
The crew began stretching a roll of heavy, reinforced insulation over the "Z" purlins which form the main
supports for the roof. Next, 24-inch-wide, tongue-and-groove metal roofing panels were placed above the
insulation and secured with a special crimping machine to form a solid one-piece surface for the roof.
Workmen standing on the walkway at the peak of the roof, and on existing secured panels, installed the
next roll of insulation and secured the metal roofing above this insulation prior to proceeding further out
onto the roof. No fall protection equipment of any type was present, nor was any required by the company's
standard operating procedures for this type of job.
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At the time of the incident, the victim was standing on the walkway at the peak of the roof beyond the area
where roofing tasks were being performed. A single panel of metal roofing 24 inches wide by 25 feet long
had been laid across the "Z" purlins in this area. This panel was not secured and would not ordinarily have
been placed in this area. For some unknown reason, the victim stepped from the walkway onto this
unsecured panel. The panel twisted and gave way, and the victim fell 27 feet through a gap in the metal
bracing to the concrete floor.
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were called to the scene and arrived approximately 10
minutes after the incident occurred. Casualty care was provided at the scene and while the victim was being
transported to a nearby hospital. The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital approximately 26 hours
after the incident occurred.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was listed by the medical examiner as multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever any work is performed from an elevation where the potential for a
serious or fatal fall exists, employers should ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and
utilized by their employees.
Discussion: The use of a "traditional" safety belt/lanyard combination, as required by 29 CFR 1926.104(d),
is sometimes not practical during construction operations. However, alternative forms of worker protection,
such as the safety nets specified in 29 CFR 1926.105, should be considered. Safety nets can be equally
effective in preventing injury or death when a worker falls. The use of safety nets below the workers may
have prevented the fatality described above.
Recommendation #2: Unused or unsecured construction materials should be stored only in designated
areas.
Discussion: For some reason, possibly because of its length, a roofing panel had been laid across the "Z"
purlins at a location away from the work area. The victim may have thought that the panel was secured,
and therefore safe to walk upon. If the unsecured panel had been placed in a designated storage area, this
fall may not have occurred.
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FACE 88-09:  Ironworker Falls to His Death from a Steel Truss in Ohio
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 16, 1987, a 56-year-old male ironworker died and a male co-worker was seriously injured
when they fell 47 feet from a steel truss to a concrete floor below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the Industrial Commission of Ohio (ICO) notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical
assistance. On January 5, 1988, a DSR research team met with the employer to conduct an evaluation of
this incident. Prior to conducting a field evaluation, DSR investigators discussed this incident with ICO
personnel, and then conducted a field evaluation.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim and a co-worker were employed as ironworkers by a small industrial contracting firm which
currently has 70 employees. The company has been in business for 41 years and has a formal safety
program. Workers complete an apprenticeship program with the union as well as classroom and on-the-
job training with the employer. Reviews of jobsite conditions and hazards are performed prior to the
commencement of each day's work. In addition, any employee found to be in violation of company safety
policies is subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim, an ironworker with 38 years of experience, and two co-workers were
replacing steel roof support material in a building that was 59 years old.
The men were working from a 1-foot-wide steel truss as they burned out smaller cross braces and replaced
these with new "wind trusses" measuring 19 feet by 11 inches. The truss they were standing on was steel,
and the roofing material above them had been removed prior to the start of this work. Company policy calls
for the use of safety belts, lanyards, and lifelines during all such work operations.
Prior to the start of the job, horizontal guy lines were installed for tying off lanyards. The workers were
wearing safety belts and lanyards which were not secured to the guy lines at the time of the incident. At
a pause in the work, one co-worker turned away momentarily. When he looked back around both of his
co-workers were gone, having fallen 47 feet from the truss to a dirt-covered concrete floor.
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Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were summoned to the scene by the plant nurse and arrived
approximately 7 minutes after the incident. The victim was dead at the scene. The co-worker was treated
at the scene and transported to a nearby hospital where he was admitted with multiple traumatic injuries.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was given by the coroner as multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #l: Employees should be constantly reminded of the importance of using their safety
equipment.
Discussion: The company was aware of the need for fall protection systems since they had experienced
a similar incident 4 years earlier. That incident led to the development of a company policy requiring the
use of fall protection systems at elevated work areas. The company attempted to follow the policy at this
worksite by installing a lifeline and providing employees with safety belts and lanyards. The victim, an
ironworker of 38 years experience, was wearing a safety belt, yet he failed to secure his lanyard. It is
recognized that the nature of the work being performed by ironworkers often requires them to detach their
lanyards from a lifeline in order to reposition themselves. For this reason, the feasibility of using safety nets
or catch platforms as additional fall protection should be considered. Additionally, efforts to keep
employees aware of the dangers posed by failure to use personal protective equipment must be continual.
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FACE 88-12:  Company President Falls to His Death from Roof
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On February 23, 1988, the 29-year-old male president of a roofing company exited a manlift, and fell
approximately 52 feet from the edge of a roof to a concrete entryway at ground level.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officials notified DSR concerning this
fatality and requested technical assistance. On March 29, 1988, a DSR research team conducted a site visit,
met with an employer representative, discussed the incident with the OSHA Compliance Officer, and
photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was the president of a roofing company that employed four workers. The company, which had
been in existence since August 1987, had no written safety policy or program.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
A renovation project was underway at a local high school when the sub-contractor responsible for the
roofing operations went out of business. The general contractor then arranged for a new sub-contractor,
the victim's company, to complete the remaining roofing operations.
To provide access to the roof (which was 51 feet, 10 inches above ground level), the general contractor
mounted a platform on a 60-foot, articulating hydraulic lift. Guardrails around the perimeter of the platform
provided fall protection while workers were being lifted and lowered. When the platform was raised in
place, access to the roof was provided by a gate on the side of the platform. Hydraulic lift controls were
on the platform side opposite the gate. The lift boom was sufficiently long to extend the platform over the
edge of the roof, so that workers could easily step down onto the roof (or up onto the platform from the roof).
Workers for both sub-contractors complained to the general contractor about the jerking motion of the lift.
At the time of the incident, the new sub-contractor had finished installing the roofing materials and was
ready to install the ridge cap at the top of the roof. The victim and two co-workers rode the lift to the edge
of the roof. One co-worker opened the gate and stepped onto the roof. As he began to follow, the victim
instructed the remaining co-worker, who was operating the lift, to lower the platform. As the co-worker
activated the lift controls, the platform jerked and the victim fell from the roof. It is not known whether the
platform struck the victim or if the victim was still grasping the gate when the platform jerked. Emergency
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medical service (EMS) personnel were summoned by school officials. The victim was transported to a
nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Medical Examiner listed multiple traumatic injuries as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: The employer should not use equipment if mechanical problems are reported.
The equipment should be removed from service, thoroughly inspected, and repaired if necessary.
Discussion: The victim's employees as well as the employees of other sub-contractors had complained to
the general contractor about the jerking motion of the lift. Although the equipment had not been repaired,
the victim chose to use it in order to complete the job. If the equipment had been repaired, this incident may
not have occurred.
Recommendation #2: The employer should prepare a hazard analysis of each activity making up a
roofing job.
Discussion: A proper hazard analysis involves three distinct steps: (1) outlining each step of a task or
activity, (2) identifying all potential hazards associated with each step, and (3) developing measures for
controlling each hazard. If a hazard analysis had been performed, the employer may have identified the
dangers associated with personnel not being clear of moving machinery and subsequently taken measures
to prevent this incident. In this case, however, the victim reportedly had a habit of pushing the platform from
the roof as it began moving away. He may have been doing this when the platform suddenly jerked, causing
him to lose his balance and fall. Individual behaviors are often difficult to anticipate and, therefore, difficult
to control.
Recommendation #3: The general contractor should designate only qualified personnel to operate
mechanical materials handling equipment.
Discussion: The general contractor allowed several sub-contractor employees to operate the equipment as
needed. It is not clear if the general contractor assessed the qualifications of these individuals as operators.
However, the general contractor may have been more responsive about repairing the equipment had a
qualified operator complained of the problems.
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FACE 88-15:  Ironworker Falls to His Death from a Steel Column
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On March 28, 1988, a 35-year-old male ironworker died when he fell 60 feet from a steel column to a
concrete pad.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State Occupational Safety and Health Administration officials notified DSR concerning this fatality and
requested technical assistance. On April 6, 1988, NIOSH met with company representatives and witnesses,
photographed the incident site, and contacted emergency services personnel in the city where the fatality
occurred.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this incident, a multi-state construction company involved in steel erection work, had been
in business since 1968. An earlier employee of this company was killed in a fall in 1980. The company
currently employs 160 persons in various construction operations. Approximately 16 men were employed
by the company at the site where this fatality occurred. Company policy requires that workers use a safety
belt and lanyard at all times when working off the ground or when not on a properly protected floor. The
victim in this incident was a professional ironworker with more than 10 years experience. Although the
victim had been working for only 2 months at this construction site, he had previously worked for the same
employer on numerous other construction jobs.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was a 35-year-old ironworker who worked as a "connector." A connector performs the initial
bolt-up of structural steel to hold the various beams and columns in place until they can be plumbed and
permanently bolted. On the day of the incident, the victim was a member of a construction crew setting a
tier of exterior steel columns for a large multi-story building. The crew was in the process of setting a large
30-inch by 24-inch by 30-foot steel column. The column was 30 inches wide on the flange side, and the
flanges were 6 inches thick. This column was to extend between the fifth and seventh floors of the building.
Because of its size, two tower cranes were used to position the column. Once the column had been secured
in position, it was necessary to disconnect the cables which were used to hoist and position the column.
One cable was secured to the column at the lower end, while the other was attached to the upper end of
the column approximately 90 feet above the ground.
In order to disconnect the upper cable assembly, the victim climbed the 30-inch-wide face of the column,
holding on to the flanges. Since the flanges were 6 inches thick, the victim could not grip the flange as he
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could on a smaller column; rather, he had to pull himself against the column using body compression for
his support. Witnesses state that as the victim neared the top of the column he reached above himself with
his right hand to grab a lug located at the top of the column. He needed to hold this lug while he disconnected
the hoist cable assembly from the column. The victim was unable to reach this lug, and as he reached back
to grasp the flange, he began sliding down the column. As he approached the bottom of the column his right
hand was observed to be out of contact with the flange. The victim's right leg struck the bottom collar of
the column and the victim fell sixty feet from the column to a concrete pad below.
Fire department paramedics were called to the scene and arrived approximately 5 minutes after the fall. The
victim was reported to be unconscious and in shock, with multiple internal injuries. The victim was
transported to a local medical center where he died approximately 2 hours after the fall.
No fall prevention or fall arresting equipment was used by the victim at the time of the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report lists the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fall protection should always be provided when the potential for a serious or fatal
fall from elevation exists.
Discussion: While traditional forms of fall protection, such as the safety belt/lanyard combination, may not
be practical or applicable to all situations, an equally effective alternative should be utilized to eliminate the
possibility of a fatal or serious fall. Some alternative methods which could have been used in this situation
to protect the worker include: (1) safety nets rigged below the work area, or (2) a controlled descent device
(retractor reel) secured to the crane rigging above the column. A cable from such a device running to a safety
belt on the employee could have prevented this fall.
Recommendation #2: Safety considerations should be addressed during the planning phases of all
construction projects. Potential safety problems, such as handling the oversize steel column, should be
addressed in a pre-construction meeting between the contractor, architectural engineer, and the
property owner.
Discussion: Often construction contracts contain generic requirements for the implementation of safety and
health standards by referencing "compliance with all applicable local, state, and federal laws." Such broad-
based requirements fail to address specific safety concerns which may be inherent to a project. If discussion
of specific safety problems had been addressed prior to the start of the construction, provisions could have
been made for the use of alternative safety measures while handling the oversize column, and the fatal fall
could have been prevented.
Recommendation #3: Management should ensure that written safety policies and procedures exist and
that they are enforced at the worksite.
Discussion: While company policy in this case required the use of a safety belt and lanyard at "all times
when off the ground or off a properly protected floor," this policy was not enforced at the worksite. In this
132
case the employee had a safety belt and lanyard at the worksite; however, when the use of this equipment
was impractical, the employee was permitted to work without fall protection of any type. A fatal fall was
the result. When existing procedures or equipment are not sufficient for the job at hand, supervisors must
take responsibility for implementing an alternative which provides at least the same level of protection as
required by normal procedures. If some alternative form of fall protection had been utilized, this fatality
would not have occurred.
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FACE 88-18:  Sheetmetal Helper Falls to His Death Through a Skylight Opening in South Carolina
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On January 6, 1988, an 18-year-old male sheetmetal helper in South Carolina died when he fell 33 feet
through a skylight opening to a concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program for the State of South Carolina notified DSR of
this fatality and requested technical assistance. On April 19, 1988, a DSR research team collected incident
data, photographed the site, and discussed the incident with the OSHA compliance officer and an employer
representative.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 3 months as a sheetmetal helper by a small roofing/sheetmetal company.
The company has been in existence for 14 years and employs 14 workers. Employees receive on-the-job
training for assigned tasks and the supervisor reviews safety procedures to be followed before the start of
each day's work. However, the employer does not have a written safety program.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On January 6, 1988, the victim was working as a member of a five-man crew assigned to replace corrugated
metal roof sheeting (3 feet by 25 feet) and to install sections of chain-link fence material on top of
approximately 24 white fiberglass panels (3 feet by 8 feet) used as skylights.
The fencing material was being installed to guard against the fall hazard presented by the fiberglass
skylights. In October 1987, a company employee had fallen to his death through a skylight in this building.
In the same month, another company employee fractured his hip and legs when he fell through a skylight
of another building.
The pitch of the roof of the building is 1/2 foot per 12 feet. There were numerous vent stacks protruding
through the roof. The victim was assigned the task of replacing sheet metal around the vent stacks to prevent
water leakage. The other crew members were replacing the metal roof sheeting and installing the chain link
fencing over the existing fiberglass panels (skylights). No fall protection guards of any type were present
around these skylights at the time of the incident.
At 9:30 a.m. the supervisor ordered the crew to stop working until he called the office for further
instructions. While awaiting further instructions, the crew left the work area and to warm themselves
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walked toward a vent stack which was emitting heat. The victim stepped on the unguarded fiberglass panel
and fell 33 feet through the opening to a concrete floor, landing on the back of his head and neck.
Emergency first aid was provided by the contractor's dispensary personnel until an ambulance arrived
approximately 15 minutes later. The victim was transported to a nearby hospital where he died 2 hours later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was listed by the coroner as multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Guarding and/or fall protection such as that required by OSHA 29 CFR
1926.500(b)(4) or an equivalent form of fall protection should be provided in the area of all roof
openings.
Discussion: A guardrail or adequate cover as required by OSHA 29 CFR 1926.500(b)(4) could have
prevented this fall. Also, in instances where the use of a standard type of guardrail or cover is not practical
for the work being done (such as the task of installing permanent protective covers), alternative forms of
fall protection which provide an equivalent level of protection, such as safety nets, catch platforms, etc.,
should be used. Construction and/or maintenance work which involves skylights is becoming commonplace
throughout the nation. As the need for this type of construction/maintenance work increases, the potential
for falls also increases. Unless fall protection methods and equipment are used, increased exposure might
well lead to an increase in the number of injurious and fatal falls through skylights.
Recommendation #2: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of
construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning. These safety concerns should ensure worker safety throughout the entire life of the project. In
this instance, poor planning and lack of concern for safety was demonstrated by allowing employees to
work on the roof of a building without providing adequate guarding and/or fall protection.
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FACE 88-38:  Construction Foreman Falls to his Death from a Roof
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On August 11, 1988, a 53-year-old male construction foreman died when he fell from the roof of a building
under construction to a dirt floor 30 feet below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 7, 1988, a
research safety specialist met with a company representative, and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a general construction company specializing in roofing/sheetmetal erection. The company
has been in operation for 13 years and employs 15 workers, including 4 job foremen. The company uses
written general safety rules and procedures, but no written task-specific safety rules or procedures exist.
The victim had been employed by the company for 8 years.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The construction company was sub-contracted to complete the roofing/sheetmetal work on a building 850
feet long by 180 feet wide by 30 feet high. At the time of the incident the walls of the building had been
completed and approximately one-fourth of the roofing panels had been installed.
The roofing panel supports consist of 5-inch-wide bar joists (i.e., light steel joists of open web construction
with a single zigzagged bar welded to upper and lower chords at the points of contact). These are positioned
on 5-foot centers running the width of the building. Fiberglass insulation is placed on the bar joists and metal
roofing panels cover this insulation.
The crew, consisting of 5 workers and the victim, had all been working on separate tasks prior to the
incident. At approximately 11:30 a.m. the victim and a co-worker went to the roof to begin applying
fiberglass insulation over the bar joists. The co-worker obtained a roll of fiberglass insulation 5 feet wide
by 77 feet long. The co-worker rolled the insulation toward the victim, who was standing on the edge of
the recently installed roofing panels. As the co-worker came within 10 feet of the victim, the victim stepped
from the edge of the roofing panels out onto the 5-inch bar joist, lost his balance and fell to the ground.
The co-worker ran to the contractor's office (approximately 900 feet away) and summoned help. The
emergency medical service arrived in 12 minutes and provided basic life support. The victim was
transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced dead in the emergency room.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was listed by the coroner as multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever work is performed at an elevation where the potential for a serious or
fatal fall exists, employers should ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and used by
employees.
Discussion: The use of a traditional safety belt/lanyard combination, as required by 29 CFR 1926.104(d),
is sometimes not practical during construction operations. However, alternative forms of fall protection,
such as safety nets as specified in 29 CFR 1926.105, should be used. The use of safety nets may have
prevented this death.
Recommendation #2: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of
construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout the entire project. In this instance, poor planning of safety procedures was
demonstrated by allowing employees to work on the roof of a building without providing adequate fall
protection.
Recommendation #3: The employer should review the current safety program and incorporate written
safety rules and procedures for specific tasks.
Discussion: A comprehensive safety program should address all aspects of safety, especially those related
to specific tasks. These rules and procedures should include, but not be limited to, the recognition and
elimination of fall hazards.
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FACE 88-39:  Lineman Dies from Fall from Utility Pole
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On July 26, 1988, a 33-year-old male lineman died after falling 23 feet from a utility pole.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 6, 1988, a
research safety specialist met with company officials and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this case was a large municipal power company with 2500 employees. The company has
written safety policies and procedures but there is no designated safety officer. The responsibility for safety
compliance rests with area managers. The victim had been employed by the company for 9 years; however,
he had only 1 year's experience performing the work task during which he was killed. He was considered
a "trainee" and was only allowed to perform his job when accompanied by a supervisor.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was an automatic switchman involved in maintenance and troubleshooting work. On the day
of the incident the victim and his supervisor were engaged in routine maintenance on an electrical
distribution system. This work involved performing "load tests" on transformers to determine if the
overload conditions had damaged the transformers. A period of extended high temperatures in the weeks
preceding this incident had resulted in high demands for electrical power for residential air conditioning
units. These periods of high demand had caused numerous "surges" resulting in the temporary overloading
of pole-mounted transformers. Company policy calls for inspection of all units which show a "red light"
indicating that they have experienced an overload. The victim had checked three similar units from a bucket
truck the week prior to the incident.
At the time of the incident the transformer on the pole where the fall occurred was in a "red light" condition.
Because of the location of this pole it was impossible to gain access to the transformer by a bucket truck.
The victim, wearing leather gloves, a standard lineman's tool belt and safety strap, ascended the pole. The
transformer was located 26 feet above the ground, 3 feet above a cable television line. The victim could
not climb to the transformer with the safety strap around the pole because of this television line.
Accordingly, he climbed up the pole with his safety strap over his left shoulder (a standard practice for him)
with the intention of securing the strap around the pole after he was above the cable.
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When the victim's feet were just below the cable, he grasped a neutral guy wire with his left hand while
reaching around the pole with his right hand to remove his safety strap from his left shoulder and secure
it around the pole. In the process of reaching around the pole the victim's right hand contacted an energized
120-volt secondary line on the transformer. The supervisor, standing on the ground below, observed the
victim in contact with the energized line. As the victim struggled to pull away from this line he fell
backwards, striking the ground head first. The supervisor, who was trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR), immediately summoned help on his two-way radio and began CPR on the victim. Emergency
medical personnel responded in approximately 5 minutes. Neither the supervisor nor the responding
emergency medical personnel were able to detect any vital signs following the incident. The victim was
transferred to a local medical center where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner's office listed the cause of death as a broken neck.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Personal protective equipment must be utilized whenever the potential for a
serious or fatal fall exists.
Discussion: The belt and safety strap worn by the victim would have been adequate to prevent a fall if used,
but these were not utilized due to the difficulty in passing the television cable. A second strap, to provide
protection until the climber had the primary strap in place above the lower cable, could have prevented this
fall.
Recommendation #2: Insulated personal protective equipment should be utilized whenever work is
performed near energized power lines.
Discussion: In this incident the victim was only wearing leather (noninsulated) gloves when he contacted
the energized line. If insulated gloves and sleeves had been worn, the victim would not have received the
electrical shock which contributed to the fatal fall.
Recommendation #3: Employers should establish and enforce safe work practices for all employees.
Discussion: The procedure of not using the safety strap during the climb, as in this incident, exposes the
employee to the potential for a serious or fatal fall. Since this is a common type of situation encountered
by linemen, the employer should develop and implement a modified work practice which would abate this
hazard.
Recommendation #4: The work environment should be modified to prevent hazards.
Discussion: In this incident, the cable television lines introduced a hazard to the lineman. Had the lines not
been on the same pole, the lineman would not have been exposed to this hazard. Alternatively, the power
pole should have been placed so that it could have been accessed by a bucket truck--this would have
decreased the probability of a fall.
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FACE 88-42:  Female Cement Finisher Dies in 165-Foot Fall at Construction Site
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On August 25, 1988, a 29-year-old female cement finisher died when she fell 165 feet from a high-rise
office complex under construction.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 7, 1988, a
research safety specialist met with company officials and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a multi-state, multi-divisional corporation that employs 14,000 workers in its construction
division. The employer has a written safety policy and a comprehensive written safety program that
provides new employee orientation and periodic training for all employees. Daily tailgate meetings are held
by crews at the worksite. The victim had been employed for only 4 days; however, she had previous
experience in high-rise construction.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
Construction work on the office complex, begun in December 1987, had progressed to the l7th level by
August 1988. An electric hoist was used to reach every floor of the complex. A 6-foot-high by 6-foot-wide
chain link gate was present across the entrance of the hoist at every floor. The U-shaped latch on each gate
was padlocked to prevent unintentional opening and the hoist operator had the only key. The 6-foot-high
chain link fence extended 10 feet from the gate in both directions on each floor. Two lengths of 1/2-inch
wire rope, at heights of 24 inches and 42 inches from floor level, provided fall protection for the remaining
perimeter of each floor.
On the day of the incident the victim and a co-worker were taken by hoist to the 12th floor with orders to
patch any holes or rub out any rough spots on the 12th and 13th floors. By lunch time the victim and her
co-worker had started work on the 13th floor. The victim and co-worker decided to return to the ground
floor to eat lunch and pushed the call button for the hoist. The hoist operator stated during interviews that
he had not previously stopped the hoist on floor 13 that day.
The victim then placed her hands in her pants pockets and leaned back against the gate. The gate opened
and the victim fell backward 165 feet to the ground. What caused the gate to open could not be determined.
It is possible that the clamp attaching the U-shaped latch to the body of the gate may have been loose. This
would have allowed the latch to turn and the gate to open. This could not be determined due to the extensive
140
damage done to the gate. (The hoist, which was above the 13th floor when the victim pushed the call button,
had severely damaged the gate as it descended.) However, all witnesses stated that the padlock was locked
in place on the U-shaped latch.
The emergency medical service was summoned and arrived within 10 minutes. The paramedics
determined that the victim was dead and summoned the county coroner, who pronounced the victim dead
at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner ruled multiple trauma as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should stress the necessity of safe work habits to all employees.
Discussion: During new employee orientation, tailgate safety meetings, and periodic safety training,
employers should stress the need to follow safe working habits. Although the victim had been employed
for only 4 days, she did have prior high-rise construction experience. To lean against an outer perimeter
barrier is a poor safety practice and, in this instance, resulted in her death.
Recommendation #2: The employer should routinely inspect all protective devices to ensure they operate
properly. Although the gate was padlocked, it was a mechanical device and a malfunction was possible.
Discussion: Since the incident, the employer has performed random stress tests on the padlocked gates.
None of the tested gates opened when pulled to the outside with 250 pounds of pressure. The employer
has also welded the latch clamps to the body of all the gates and the gate hinges to their vertical poles to
prevent any movement.
Periodically, the hoist operator could stop at each floor to inspect the gates, clamps, and padlocks to ensure
that every component of this critical fall protection system remains intact. Just prior to the end of each shift
might be an advantageous time to conduct such a floor-by-floor inspection. Had the hoist stopped at floor
13 prior to the fatal incident, the discrepancy which caused the gate latch to fail might have been discovered.
Since the incident, the employer has installed safety bars on all gates that will prevent the doors from
opening to the outside. One additional measure the employer might take would be to install signs in clear
view on each gate warning workers to stand back until the gate is opened by the hoist operator.
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FACE 88-43:  Carpenter Dies in 14-Foot Fall from Roof
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On August 17, 1988, a 38-year-old male carpenter died as the result of head injuries sustained in a 14-foot
fall from a garage roof.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of the fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 8, 1988, a
research safety specialist met with the company owner, photographed the incident site and discussed the
incident with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer and county
coroner.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was one of five carpenters employed by a general contractor who had been in operation for 11
months. The employer had no written safety policy or safety program and did not provide safety training
to employees.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been sub-contracted to frame and finish the exterior of single dwellings in a new housing
development. The victim, four co-workers and the owner had been working for 2 weeks on the dwelling
involved in the incident. On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were applying the 4-foot-
wide by 8-foot-long pieces of sheeting to the roof of the garage portion of the dwelling. The roof had a 10:12
slope (i.e., it rose 10 inches for each foot in length). Short pieces of 2-inch-thick boards (i.e., toe boards)
were nailed to the top surface of the sheeting to provide footholds for the workers. The front of the structure
was open with no exterior siding in place. The cement floor of the garage had been finished.
When the victim and his co-worker finished applying the sheeting, the victim prepared to cut a 6-inch
overhang off the front of the garage roof. The victim lowered a rope to the ground where a second co-
worker attached a 7 1/4-inch circular saw. The victim pulled the saw up to the roof, then called to the second
co-worker to throw him an extension cord. The victim caught the extension cord, but as he began to unwind
and lower it back to the ground to be plugged in, he lost his balance. The victim fell off the roof but was
able to grasp the toe board at the edge of the roof. The first co-worker tried to pull the victim back onto the
roof but was unable to do so (because their hands and arms were slippery from perspiration).
The victim fell feet first through the open front of the dwelling, but as he fell, his feet struck a rafter. This
caused his body to turn 180 degrees and he hit the concrete garage floor head first.
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The emergency medical service, summoned by co-workers, arrived within 10 minutes and transported the
victim to the local hospital. The victim was later transferred to a second hospital where surgery was
performed. At 11: 30 a.m., August 18, 1988, the victim was pronounced brain dead by the attending
physician. He died 4 hours later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed multiple cerebral contusions as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should strive to provide their workers with the safest possible work
environment.
Discussion: Employers involved in roofing operations should provide employees with fall protection
devices and ensure the use of these devices. This would provide the safest possible work environment for
employees. The use of fall protection devices in this incident would have greatly reduced the possibility
of a fatal fall.
Current OSHA regulations pertaining to fall protection during roofing operations do not address falls of
under 16 feet. However, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation's
Construction Safety Standards contain Articles that do address these falls. These standards are developed
with the cooperation of The Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. , and others. Although not
usually required, these should be followed to ensure employee safety.
Article 13.221.1 of these standards requires that employees engaged in roofing activities where the roof
edge to ground distance is greater than 6 feet shall be protected by one or a combination of the following
types of fall protection:
a. Lifelines, safety belts, and landyards
b. Standard guardrails
c. Safety nets
d. Catch platform.
This requirement applies to all employees working within 10 feet of the roof perimeter or on a roof with
a slope of 1:3 (a rise of 1 inch for every 3 inches in length). Although the roof involved in the incident had
a slope that was more than twice the slope limit in the above-mentioned regulation, no type of fall protection
was utilized.
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FACE 89-02:  Ironworker Dies Following a 35-Foot Fall at Construction Site
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On October 8, 1988, a 29-year-old male ironworker (a steel beam connector) died as a result of injuries that
occurred when he fell 35 feet at a construction site on September 29, 1988.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On November 4, 1988, a
DSR field team met with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration compliance officer, a city
building inspector, and company officials. The incident site was visited and photographed.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a steel construction firm employing 40 individuals in steel erection operations. Of these,
14 are steel beam connectors. The company has been in business for the past 50 years. The company has
written safety policies and procedures; however, it relies upon the employees' labor union to provide safety
training for the employees.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was a member of a six-man crew erecting the structural steel framework for an addition to an
existing building. The victim, a connector, performed the initial "bolt-up" of the structural steel members.
After the connector completes work on a component, other members of the crew perform the final bolting
operation, "trueing" the involved steel components, inserting all remaining bolts in the column, and
tightening these bolts to the required torque.
At the time of the incident a vertical steel column had been installed and the crew was placing a horizontal
beam to connect this column to an adjacent one. The adjacent column had already been "trued" and final
bolt-up of this column completed. As the crew attempted to place the horizontal beam in position they found
that the former vertical column was out of alignment. In order to proceed, the bolts securing this vertical
column had to be loosened and the column moved slightly so there was clearance for the horizontal beam.
To do this the victim sealed the column and, while holding onto the column with one hand, attempted to
loosen the connecting bolts with the other. As he applied pressure to the wrench it slipped, causing him to
lose his balance and fall from the column. The victim fell 34 feet 6 inches to the concrete floor below,
striking his head. Personnel on the scene immediately after the incident reported seeing a small pool of blood
on the floor around the victim's head. Emergency medical service paramedics were immediately called to
144
the scene and arrived approximately 5 minutes after the fall. The victim was transported to a local medical
center where he died 10 days later.
The victim was not using any fall protection equipment at the time of the incident. According to company
officials at the scene, this was "standard procedure" for connectors.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's ruling as to cause of death was pending at the time of this report.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fall protection should always be provided when the potential for a serious or fatal
fall from elevation exists.
Discussion: The standard procedure which permitted the victim to work without fall protection failed to
provide safety for the worker. While belts and lanyards were present at the worksite, they were not used
in connecting operations. Although in some situations traditional forms of fall protection such as the belt/
lanyard combination may not be practical, some alternative form of fall protection should always be used
to prevent a serious fall. Some alternative methods for these situations include (1) safety nets rigged below
the work area as required by 29 CFR 1926.106, or (2) a controlled descent device (retractor reel) secured
to an overhead crane and to the worker's safety belt. If either of these systems had been employed this fatality
could have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: Management should develop written safety policies and procedures addressing
the hazards to which employees are exposed, and should enforce these safe work practices at the
worksite.
Discussion: In this company the acceptance of a potentially serious or fatal fall, as indicated by the standard
procedure of working without fall protection during connecting operations, demonstrates a lack of
commitment to employee safety. Companies should emphasize safety of their workers by developing,
implementing, and enforcing safe work procedures to prevent incidents such as this.
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FACE 89-03:  Painter Dies in 96-Foot Fall from Highway Bridge
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On October 29, 1988, a 43-year-old male painter died when he fell from a bridge he was painting to the
rocky ground 96 feet beneath the bridge.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. A research safety specialist
discussed this incident with the responsible compliance personnel. On November 3, 1988, a meeting was
held with state officials, and the site was visited and photographed.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer in this incident is a small company with 22 years in the painting business. The company
normally employs 12 to 16 individuals, all of whom work as painters. The company has no formal safety
program.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim, working as a member of a three-man crew, was painting a highway bridge spanning a large
river. The victim and his co-workers had been working on the same bridge for approximately 6 weeks prior
to the incident.
On the day of the incident the victim and one co-worker had just finished lunch and were moving materials
from one "bay" beneath the roadway to an adjacent "bay" prior to beginning the afternoon's work.
Both men were wearing a safety belt and lanyard, with the lanyards secured to a steel lifeline running along
the side of the bridge. To reach the new work area it was necessary to step from one steel "I" beam to another
approximately 4 feet away. An expansion joint in the area prevented the workers from making this step
while their lanyards were connected to the lifeline.
Although the incident was not witnessed, it appears that the victim, while carrying a partially filled 5-gallon paint
bucket, disconnected his lanyard and attempted to step across the 4-foot gap to the next beam. In doing so, he
either slipped or lost his balance and fell 96 feet, striking the back of his head on the rocky ground below.
The co-worker, and a supervisor who arrived on the scene just as the incident occurred, immediately
summoned local police and rescue personnel. The victim, who suffered partial decapitation, was
pronounced dead at the scene by the local medical examiner.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner gave the cause of death as multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fall protection should be provided and used at all times when the potential for
a serious or fatal fall exists.
Discussion: A safety belt and lanyard, as referenced in 1910.28(g)(9) and 1926.104 or safety nets
(1926.105), if utilized, could have prevented this fatality. While safety belt/lanyard combinations were used
during actual work at this location, fall protection was not employed either when accessing the area (via
vertical ladder from the bridge deck) or when moving from area to area beneath the bridge. Failure to
employ fall protection during all phases of the operation resulted in this fatality.
Recommendation #2: Safety should be addressed during the planning phases of all work operations.
Discussion: Potential safety problems, such as the need for fall protection during access and when traveling
from area to area beneath the bridge, should be noted prior to the start of work. Specific actions should be
taken at that time to ensure that the workers are protected during all phases of the job.
Recommendation #3: Fall protection at the worksite should be sufficient to protect the worker from
serious injury or death.
Discussion: The fall protection equipment employed at this site failed to provide continual protection to the
worker, specifically during access to the worksite and while relocating from area to area at the site itself.
In addition, the safety belt which could have prevented the fall had it been employed, might have inflicted
severe or possibly fatal injuries to the victim. Individuals suspended by the traditional safety belt may
experience breathing difficulties and other cardiopulmonary problems within a few minutes because of
abdomen and chest compression. Because of the remote area where this incident occurred and the difficulty
in conducting a rescue operation in this location, it is possible that a worker protected by a traditional belt/
lanyard combination might have experienced asphyxiation before being rescued. Alternative forms of fall
protection, such as the full body harness or safety nets below the worksite would greatly increase the
chances that a falling worker will survive without serious injury.
Recommendation #4: Rescue operation procedures should be established prior to the start of work in
all situations where such an operation may become necessary.
Discussion: The worksite in this case was remote, with extremely difficult and limited access. In such a case
a rescue plan, developed prior to work Initiation, could increase a victim's chances for survival if he or she
falls.
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FACE 89-12:  Ironworker Dies following a 12-Foot Fall from Metal Decking onto Concrete
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 13, 1989, a 20-year-old male ironworker died when he fell 12 feet onto a concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the state Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On January 26, 1989, an industrial hygienist, safety engineer, and occupational health
nurse from DSR interviewed a company official, conducted a site evaluation, and photographed the
incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed since his arrival in the U.S. as an ironworker by a small construction
company that does steel erection and decking. He had only been in the U. S. about 7 months at the time
of the incident. Although he spoke and understood English, his principal language was Spanish. The
company has been in existence for 20 years. At the time of the incident about 60 people worked for the
employer. Employees receive on-the-job training for all tasks by the foreman. The company has written
safety rules; however, there is no specific safety officer. The job foreman acts as the company's safety
representative. There had not been a safety meeting conducted on this particular jobsite, but one had been
held with the same crew on a similar job about 1 month before the Incident. The company requires the
workers to furnish their own work shoes. Other safety equipment, such as gloves, hard hats and safety belts,
are supplied by the employer.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was a member of an eight-person crew engaged in steel erection at a two-story building under
construction. The structure had a floor area of about 30,000 square feet. The concrete ground floor had been
finished earlier so that work could continue through the winter months. At the time of the incident the victim
and a co-worker were placing corrugated metal decking on steel beam gridwork to serve as the formwork
for a concrete floor. The 20-gauge steel decking sheets were 26-feet-long by 3-feet-wide and weighed
about 120 pounds. One edge formed an inverted "U" that was slipped over the vertical edge of an adjacent
sheet to secure the decking together. The decking rested on four 6-inch I-beams on 8-foot centers. After
a sheet was positioned, it was tack-welded to the structural framework.
A co-worker stated that the victim was trying to handle a sheet of decking alone. The victim was dragging
the sheet toward the edge of the installed decking when he lost his balance and fell backward. He landed
striking the left side of his head against the concrete floor 12 feet below.
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One worker went to aid the victim while another called the county emergency medical service (EMS). The
EMS team was at the scene within 15 minutes of the incident. EMS care, including back and neck
stabilization and oxygen, was provided at the scene and while the victim was being transported to a nearby
hospital. The victim was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner stated that head injuries sustained in the fall caused death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever any work is performed from an elevation where the potential for a fall
exists, employers should ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and utilized by their
employees.
Discussion: The use of a "traditional" safety belt/lanyard combination as required by 29 CFR 1926.104(d),
is sometimes not practical during construction operations, particularly where worker mobility is required.
Use of a retracting lifeline equipped with a locking device, and attached to a support line, can provide
sufficient mobility in some cases. In this case, the work was being done only 12 feet above a concrete floor.
A retracting lifeline, connected to a safety line and preplanned placement of the decking stack might have
prevented this fatality. Alternative forms of worker protection, such as safety nets (as specified in 29 CFR
1926.105), or a catch platform, should be considered. Safety nets can effectively prevent injury or death
when a worker falls. Also, in this situation, wheel-mounted scaffolding might have been placed under the
workers to serve as a catch platform. This portable scaffolding can be moved to a new location as each area
is finished. The use of alternative fall protection systems must be carefully considered, regardless of what
height is involved.
Recommendation #2: Hazard identification should be done as a part of the initial job planning.
Discussion: The employer should identify all potential hazards. One way is by analyzing the sequential
steps in routine operations to identify potential hazards, and attempting to develop procedures or other
control measures which effectively eliminate or reduce the hazards. This type of analysis is known as job
hazard analysis. Additionally, each specific job involves hazards particular to that job or working
environment. Therefore, employers should conduct a jobsite survey, identifying all hazards, and implementing
appropriate control measures prior to starting any job. A jobsite survey in this instance would have
identified the need for some type of fall protection. Both job hazard analysis and pre-job survey techniques
can be effectively used to train workers in hazard identification and appropriate control measures.
Recommendation #3: The employer needs to train employees in the recognition of hazards, and methods
to control such hazards, including the use of appropriate safety equipment.
Discussion: According to 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(2), employers are required to instruct each employee in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions, and to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure
to illness or injury. Although the Spanish-speaking victim could speak and understand English, he may not
have fully understood the potential hazards involved with this job. In this and similar situations the employer
may need to provide additional training to ensure that these employees understand the hazards and how
to properly use safety equipment to protect themselves.
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Recommendation #4: Designers of buildings such as this multitiered steel-framed structure should
provide for fall protection anchorage systems as part of the overall design of the structure.
Discussion: The building design should allow construction and maintenance activities to be done utilizing
safety equipment to protect the workers during potentially hazardous activities. This would include
incorporating anchor points for lifelines and/or safety nets as part of the building structure. The
incorporation and use of anchorage points in the building design could result in the possible prevention of
fall-related fatalities by making it easier for workers to use fall protection during the construction phases
of a building.
Recommendation #5: The employer should ensure that workers are using proper material-handling
techniques.
Discussion: The victim in this incident was trying to drag a 120-pound piece of steel decking into place by
himself. While attempting this task he lost his balance and fell. If another worker had been assisting the
victim in placing the piece of decking, the victim may not have fallen.
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FACE 89-13:  Ironworker Dies Following a 25-Foot Fall through a Roof Opening
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 14, 1988, a 41-year-old male ironworker died when he fell 25 feet after stepping through
a roof opening.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the state Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On January 26, 1989, a research industrial hygienist, safety engineer, and occupational
health nurse from DSR interviewed a company official, conducted a site evaluation, and photographed the
incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for about 18 years as an ironworker by a small construction company that
has done steel erection services for 20 years. At the time of the incident about 60 people worked for the
employer. Employees receive on-the-job training for the tasks they perform. The company has written
safety rules, but does not have a safety officer. The job foreman is expected to act as the company's safety
representative. A safety meeting was held at this jobsite on November 16, 1988 (the topic of the meeting
is unknown). Although workers are required to furnish their own work shoes, the company supplies other
safety equipment, such as gloves, hard hats and safety belts.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim was part of an eight-person crew that was finishing the steel erection for a six-story building.
Steel decking had been installed on all lower floors and part of the roof. At the time of the incident, the crew
had just come back from a break and was going to finish laying the formwork decking in the mechanical
area on the roof. (The mechanical area contained the elevator penthouse, and heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning equipment).
When members of the crew noticed that the victim had not returned to the roof, they started looking for him.
This was about 5 minutes after the rest of the crew was back on the roof. They found the victim lying
semiconscious on the fifth floor, where he had apparently fallen after stepping into a 2-foot-square stairway
ventilation opening on the roof. Presumably he had picked up a 3-foot by 6-foot piece of decking that had
been placed over the opening to keep workers from stepping into the hole. A piece of decking of similar
dimensions was needed in the work area. The victim had earlier stated that he knew where such a scrap
piece was located. The victim apparently fell about 18 feet onto the concrete stairs and then another 7 feet
to the floor where he was found lying across a guy wire.
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Upon finding the victim, one worker went to call for emergency help while the others tried to assist the
victim. The emergency medical service (EMS) was on the scene within 10 minutes of being notified.
Treatment provided on the scene included stabilizing the victim for possible spinal injury. The victim was
transported to a trauma center by helicopter 1 hour after he had fallen. He died at the trauma center 12 hours
later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Although the medical examiner's report was not available at the time this report was prepared, the traumatic
injuries sustained in the fall are presumed to have caused death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: The employer should implement 29 CFR 1926.500(b)(8), which requires that all
floor and roof openings be protected with standard railing or a floor hole cover secured against
displacement.
Discussion: The roof opening was covered by a piece of decking which was neither secured in place nor
identified as a protective covering. Thus, the victim picked up the decking without realizing it was covering
an opening. Had the cover been secured in place and prominently labeled, it is less likely that the victim
could have removed the cover and fallen through the opening.
Recommendation #2: Hazard analysis should be an ongoing part of each job phase.
Discussion: Before starting each phase of the job, the foreman needs to identify and review the potential
hazards with the workers and discuss how the work can be done safely. These discussions should include
information on hazards in the immediate work areas as well as information on the activities of other
contractors on the site that could create hazards for the foreman's workers. Not only was the roof opening
unguarded in accordance with 29 CFR 11926.500(b)(8), but the foreman also failed to inform the crew that
he had placed a piece of decking over the stairway vent opening. This would have alerted workers of the
opening underneath the piece of decking, and might have prevented this death.
Recommendation #3: The employer should consider cutting the roof openings as the last ironworking
activity on the roof to help minimize exposure to this type of fall hazard.
Discussion: By cutting the roof openings as the last activity on the roof, the steel erector reduces the chance
that a worker might step into one of these openings. At the time the openings are made in the roof, the steel
erector should be required by contract to install covers which are secured in place and clearly labeled, so
that other work crews on the roof will not be exposed to the potential fall hazard. The steel erection company
foreman should check with the general contractor's representative on the jobsite to determine how the
covers are to be secured and labeled. The general contractor will be responsible for the area after the erector
leaves and needs to have some control over work activity at the roof opening(s). This can be done by
labeling the cover and stating that the general contractor must be contacted for permission to work around
the opening.
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FACE 89-14:  Carpenter's Helper Dies in 24-Foot Fall from Building Under Construction
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On January 6, 1989, a 26-year-old carpenter's helper died as the result of head and neck injuries sustained
in a 24-foot fall from the second floor of a building under construction.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State Officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On January 26, 1989, a
research safety specialist met and discussed the incident with one of the two company owners and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer assigned to the case.
Photographs of the incident site were taken.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 3 days as a carpenter's helper by a small construction company that has
been in operation for 6 years. The company employs 12 workers, including 6 carpenter's helpers. The
employer has neither a written safety policy nor a safety program, and does not provide safety training to
employees.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The construction company was hired to renovate and erect an addition to an existing building. The 30-foot-
wide by 50-foot-long by 40-foot-high addition was to be used for a clothing store and business offices.
On the day of the incident the victim was working on the addition as a member of a six-person crew. The
victim and a carpenter/foreman were on the second floor installing 2-inch by 6-inch gable studs of various
lengths. The victim was using a pneumatic round head nailer to secure the bottom of the gable studs to the
frame with 3-inch nails. The carpenter/foreman, working off an extension ladder, was securing the tops of
the studs to the frame using a conventional claw hammer. Neither the victim nor the foreman was using
fall protection and none was required by the company.
At the time of the incident the victim was kneeling on the floor, nailing the outside bottom of a stud to the
frame. After the stud had been nailed the victim began to reposition the pneumatic nailer to the side of the
stud when he unintentionally hit his left leg above the knee with the nose (i.e., the cylinder that discharges
nails) of the nailer. The nailer discharged a 3-inch nail into the victim's leg. The victim called to the foreman
and told him what had happened. The foreman descended the ladder, went to the victim, and tried to remove
the nail from the victim's leg using the claw hammer. The foreman could not extract the nail with the
hammer, so he decided to go to the floor below and borrow a pair of pliers from an electrician. When the
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foreman returned to the area of the incident he noticed the victim still kneeling but slumping over toward
the open end of the building. Before the foreman could reach him, the victim fell head first out of the opening
onto an 8-foot-high stack of lumber that had been piled next to the addition, and then fell the remaining
distance to a sand-covered asphalt road. (See Figure).
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were called and arrived at the scene in approximately 3
minutes (according to the employer). Advanced life support was provided at the scene and while the victim
was being transported to a nearby hospital. Cardiopulmonary arrest occurred enroute to the hospital, and
the victim was pronounced dead on arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Medical Examiner listed multiple traumatic injuries as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: When the potential for a serious or fatal fall exists, the employer should provide
fall protection equipment and ensure that it is used by all employees working at elevations.
Discussion: The victim was working 24 feet above ground level in an area where the potential for a fall
existed. According to 29 CFR 1926.28 (a), "the employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous
conditions." If the employer had provided and required the use of fall protection (i.e., safety belt, lanyard,
and lifeline) this incident may have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: The employer should design, develop, and implement a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: A comprehensive safety program should address all aspects of safety, especially those related
to specific tasks. These rules and procedures should include, but not be limited to, the recognition and
elimination of fall hazards. The employer should comply with 1926-21(b)(2), by instructing each employee
to recognize and avoid hazardous conditions and follow the regulations applying to the specific
environment to control or eliminate any hazards.
Recommendation #3: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of
construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout the entire project. In this instance, there was no planning of safety procedures
because employees were allowed to work in an area where the potential for a fall existed without any
adequate fall protection.
Recommendation #4: The employer should design, develop, and implement procedures to be followed
in the event of a medical emergency.
Discussion: Preceding the fall, the victim had embedded a 3-inch nail into his left leg above the knee. The
foreman, after trying unsuccessfully to extract the nail from the victim's leg, left the victim alone in the area
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where the potential for a fall existed. When the foreman returned he witnessed the victim slump over and
fall out of the opening to his death. 29 CFR 1926.50(b) and (c) state that, "Provisions shall be made prior
to commencement of the project for prompt medical attention in case of serious injury. Also, in the absence
of an infirmary, clinic, hospital, or physician that is reasonably accessible in terms of time and distance to
the worksite, which is available for the treatment of injured employees, a person who has a valid
certification in first-aid training from the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the American Red Cross, or equivalent
training that can be verified by documentary evidence, shall be available at the worksite to render first aid."
The employer should develop and implement medical emergency procedures to be followed by all
employees prior to beginning any project. These procedures should include, but not be limited to, providing
for the victim's immediate safety following an incident (in this case moving the victim to a safe area,
providing first-aid, and summoning trained paramedics).
Recommendation #5: The pneumatic round head nailer should be evaluated to determine whether the
human factors engineering design is adequate.
Discussion: Although the pneumatic nailer was not directly responsible for the victim's death, it may have
been a contributing factor. The pneumatic nailer weighs 9 pounds, 7 ounces, and has only a pistol-grip
handle for the operator to hold. Also, the nailer is equipped with an automatic fastener feed, approximately
2 feet long, which makes it even more cumbersome to handle and work with, especially over a long period
of time. (At the time of the incident, the nailer was being operated with 120 pounds per square inch of
pressure.) Human factors engineers should evaluate this type of round head nailer to determine whether
modifications can be made to improve its design. Even if this worker had not fallen, he still would have
received a potentially serious injury from the nailer.
Figure.
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FACE 89-20:  Construction Worker Dies in 36-foot Fall at Construction site.
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research
(DSR), performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a
participating state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these
evaluations is to prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the
worker, the task the worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange
resulting in fatal injury, and the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On January 18, 1989, a 37-year-old male construction worker died when he fell 36 feet after a gust
of wind caught a piece of metal decking material he was moving and blew him from the roof of a
structure.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On February 21, 1989,
a research safety specialist met with the employer and local emergency services personnel, and
photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was employed by a steel erection firm which has been in operation for 22 years. The
company has approximately 200 employees. The victim was one of approximately 40 workers--
known as "sheeters"--who install metal sheeting for siding and roofing. The victim had 18 years'
previous experience in sheet metal work, but had been employed by this company for only 2 weeks
at the time of the incident. Although the company has written safety rules and procedures, it has no
designated safety officer. The responsibility for safety is delegated to the foreman at each individual
jobsite. Weekly tailgate meetings are held to discuss safety and conditions at each individual jobsite.
No formal safety training program exists. The company had experienced a fatal fall at the same site
3 months prior to this incident.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
At the time of the incident the victim was working as a part of a crew on the construction of a new
steel mill. One portion of this mill consists of a 440-foot-long by 96-foot-wide tunnel which connects
two of the main buildings at the mill. The height from the ground to the eave of the tunnel is 36 feet.
The roof of the tunnel has a 1:12 pitch (one foot of rise for every 12 feet of width). A 2-foot-wide
opening at the ridge of the tunnel roof runs the entire 440-foot length of the tunnel. Upon completion
of the mill, a roof vent was to be installed in this opening.
On the day of the incident, the victim had been at work for approximately I hour when he and a co-
worker were instructed to go to the roof of the tunnel and place a temporary cover over the 2-foot-wide
opening at the ridge.  They were to use 3-foot-wide by 36-foot-long sections of 24-gauge decking to
cover the tunnel. Each of these sections weighed approximately 120 pounds.
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To reach the roofed area of the tunnel, the victim and his co-worker crawled across an unroofed area of
the tunnel on steel "I" beams. Although the beams were more than 36 feet above a concrete floor, neither
employee used fall protection equipment.
When they reached the roofed section of the tunnel, the two men proceeded to the first section of decking
material they were going to use to cover the ridge vent opening. This section of decking was lying
diagonally on the roof of the tunnel. At the time of the incident, the roof surface was dry; however, the wind
had been gusting intermittently.
As the co-worker lifted the high (ridge) side of the decking section to move it into position, the victim lifted
the low side. The victim was 12 to 14 feet away from the edge of the roof. As the men lifted the decking
material, a gust of wind caught it and lifted it upwards. The co-worker immediately released his hold on
the section of decking, and the wind carried the decking, with the victim still holding on, over the edge of
the roof. The victim was observed holding onto the decking even after he had cleared the roof.
The victim fell 36 feet, landing headfirst on a pile of metal scrap material. The local emergency medical
service (EMS) was immediately summoned by telephone and arrived on the scene approximately 10
minutes later. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was begun by EMS personnel and continued while the victim
was transported to the local hospital. The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital approximately I hour
after the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner gave the cause of death as cerebral hemorrhage due to massive head injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever any work is performed at an elevation where the potential for a serious
or fatal fall exists, the employer should ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by
all employees.
Discussion: The victim was working more than 36 feet above ground level in an area where the potential
for a fall existed. According to 29 CFR 1926.28(a), "the employer is responsible for requiring the wearing
of appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous
conditions." If the employer had provided and required the use of fall protection (i.e., safety belt, lanyard,
and lifeline) this incident may have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: Management must actively support employee safety and ensure that workers
understand hazards related to their job.
Discussion: This same company had experienced a fatal fall of a worker at this site just 3 months prior to
this incident. In that incident, as in this one, no personal protective equipment was being used.
Management's responsibility in regard to the use of personal protective equipment is clearly stated in 29
CFR 1926.28(a). The continued failure to enforce the use of fall protection indicates a lack of management
concern for employee safety. Unless management stresses the need for work safety in both written policy
and on the jobsite, deaths such as this will continue to occur.
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Recommendation #3: Hazards posed by the weather should be addressed in all construction operations.
Discussion: Written company policy called for work to cease if the wind velocity exceeded 15 miles per
hour; however, this was usually at the discretion of the site foreman. No consideration was given to the
effect of sudden gusts of wind upon a large sheet of material such as was involved in this incident. If wind
conditions had been considered and this work postponed until gusting had subsided, this incident might
have been prevented.
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FACE 89-22:  Roofer/Carpenter Dies After 26-Foot Fall From Roof
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On January 3, 1989, a 28-year-old male roofer fell 26 feet, 6 inches from the roof of a newly constructed
six-unit condominium complex. He died as a result of his injuries four days later.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On February 15, 1989, a
safety engineer and two safety specialists from DSR met with the employer and discussed the incident with
OSHA representatives and the state medical examiner.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was one of four employees (including the owner) of a roofing/aluminum siding company that
has been in operation for 13 years. The company has no written safety policy or program. Training is
provided on the job. New employees work directly with the owner until they demonstrate that they
understand the proper way to perform the job. All employees are provided with safety belts and lifelines
to be used as fall protection. The owner requires that all employees wear work boots that are in good
condition with substantial tread on the soles. Jobsite tailgate safety meetings are held at the beginning of
each job to detail the specific procedures to be followed for that job.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been sub-contracted to install felt paper and asbestos shingles to the roof of a newly
constructed six-unit condominium complex. The roof had a pitch of 6:12 (i.e., the roof rose 6 inches for
every 12 inches in length). The structure was 120 feet long and 26 feet wide, and the edge of the roof was
26 feet, 6 inches above ground. On the day of the incident (the first day of work on the structure), the crew
arrived at the site at 8:00 a.m. The crew consisted of the owner, his son, the victim, and one other worker
(hereinafter referred to as the "co-worker"). All were carpenters experienced in roofing and siding work.
Standard operating procedure called for the owner to inspect the roof of a new structure to see if it was
properly prepared before his crew accessed the roof. On this day the entire crew climbed the ladders to the
roof. Since the roof was wet from dew, the owner instructed the crew to sit on the bundles of shingles placed
on the roof by the contractor and wait until the roof dried. The crew's safety equipment and tools were still
in the owner's truck.
At 8:45 a.m. the owner felt that the roof had dried sufficiently and told the crew that he was going to inspect
the roof. The owner and his son were on one side of the roof; the victim and the co-worker were on the
opposite side. Both pairs of men, who were near the ridge (top) of the roof, began to walk toward the
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opposite end of the structure. As the victim stepped around a bundle of shingles on the ridge of the roof,
he fell to his hip and began to roll to the edge of the roof. The co-worker stepped toward the victim to grab
him but was unsuccessful. The victim rolled off the roof and fell to the packed dirt surface below. The co-
worker stated that the victim did not appear to slip, cry out, or attempt to halt his fall. Workers on the ground
said that the victim fell in a prone position and made no visible effort to land on his feet.
A worker on the ground immediately summoned the emergency medical service (EMS), fire department,
and police. The owner went to the road to show the rescue squad the way to the scene. The fire department
arrived within 5 minutes . As the owner was speaking to fire department personnel, a worker yelled that
the victim had stopped breathing. A member of the fire department crew administered cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) and the victim began breathing on his own again. The EMS squad arrived and
transported the victim to the local hospital. The victim was later transferred to a hospital with a shock-trauma
unit. On January 4, 1989, the victim was placed on life-support systems. The victim was pronounced brain
dead on January 6, 1989, the life-support systems were removed, and he died the following morning.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report gave the cause of death as multiple injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Worker exposure to identified hazards should be limited and controlled.
Discussion: The company's standard procedure, whereby the owner inspects the worksite prior to allowing
the crew to access the roof, limits the crew's exposure to fall hazards. In this instance, the crew did not follow
the standard operating procedure, and climbed onto the roof before the owner inspected it. The owner
unnecessarily exposed the crew to the fall hazard by permitting them to wait on the roof prior to and during
roof inspection. Although this inspection procedure does not eliminate the initial exposure of the owner
(during inspection) or the initial exposure of the workers when they access the roof prior to hooking their
lifelines, it does reduce the duration of exposure without fall protection. The risk of falls from elevation in
the roofing industry should always be minimized to the extent possible.
Recommendation #2: Existing OSHA standards related to fall protection need to be re-evaluated.
Increased effort must be placed on developing new methods of fall protection which provide protection
during all phases of the job, and promulgating new and revised standards where appropriate.
Discussion: Existing methods of fall protection such as perimeter netting, catch platforms, and air bags or
other shock-absorbing materials should be evaluated for feasibility, cost effectiveness, and mechanical
effectiveness to determine if they can be successfully used to prevent falls. Additionally, existing safety
standards regarding falls must be re-evaluated to determine if they sufficiently address the safety hazards
inherent in methods of construction that have been developed since the promulgation of OSHA Standards.
Some jobs that expose workers to fall hazards, but are not adequately addressed by current OSHA
standards include roofing, skylight installation, and pre-fabricated steel building construction. Increased
efforts must be undertaken to develop new methods and safety standards to protect workers from falling.
However, during standards development, employers must take the initiative to protect workers by using
existing standards and new fall protection techniques and equipment.
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FACE 89-23:  Painter Dies in 25-Foot Fall from Tank Top onto Concrete Pad
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 8, 1989, a 63-year-old male painter died when he fell 25 feet from the top of a tank onto a
concrete pad.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the state Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and requested
technical assistance. On February 14, 1989, DSR representatives interviewed a company official,
conducted a site evaluation and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The company, a small painting contractor, employed five people at the time of the incident. The victim, who
had owned the company for most of its 40-year existence, sold it to his son (the present owner) a few years
prior to the incident.
The company has a designated safety officer and written safety procedures. The procedures require that
safety measures be discussed before each job. The victim and his son had attended a union safety seminar
for painting contractors 2 weeks prior to the incident.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had a contract to paint the exterior of several outdoor tanks for a food processing company.
The tank involved in the incident was 25 feet high and 10 feet in diameter. A guardrail nearly circled the
perimeter of the domed top of the tank. A 2-foot gap in the guardrail permitted worker access to the top.
However, the tank did not have a permanent vertical ladder for access. In order to reach the tank top, the
painters climbed a permanent vertical ladder on an adjacent tank, then used small pipes, running between
the two tanks, as a walkway to access the top of the tank to be painted. The distance between the two tanks
was approximately 6 feet.
About a week before the incident, the victim and his son applied the primer coat to the exterior of the tank,
using boatswain's chairs and spray guns. (A boatswain's chair is a seat supported by slings attached to a
suspended rope, which is designed to accommodate one worker in a sitting position.) They decided not to
use ladders because the small tank diameter made placement of the ladders difficult and unstable.
On the day of the incident, the victim was spraying on the finish coat of paint, a catalyzed urethane, using
a boatswain's chair tied off to the guardrail atop the tank. He had reached the top of the tank to tie off the
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boatswain's chair by climbing the ladder on the adjacent tank, and crossing on small pipes that run between
the two tanks. After finishing one section of the tank from the boatswain's chair, he climbed onto the
adjacent tank and crossed the pipes once again. While moving the ropes that secured the boatswain's chair
to the guardrail, he slipped and fell through the unguarded gap in the guardrail about 25 feet onto the
concrete around the base of the tank.
Two steamfitters working in the area saw the victim fall. They said that the victim made no sound and made
no attempt to grab onto the railing when he fell. A call was made within minutes for emergency rescue
personnel.  The victim was pronounced dead at the scene.
Following the incident the victim's son learned that his father had slipped and struck his chest on a truck
bed a few days prior to the incident. At least two witnesses reported seeing the victim appear to "black out"
for short periods of time in the 2 days before the incident. The son thinks that his father may have had a
"black out" spell while moving the boatswain's chair rigging, since he apparently made no attempt to stop
the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that death was caused by internal injuries resulting from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: The employer needs to identify specific job hazards and take corrective action to
ensure the safety of his employees.
Discussion: A review of potential hazards associated with working on the tank would have identified the
hazards inherent in climbing onto and working from the top of the tank. This particular tank did not have
a permanent ladder providing access to the tank top. Also, the guardrail did not extend around the entire
perimeter of the tank. Finally, there was no toe board around the perimeter of the top of the tank to prevent
someone from sliding beneath the guardrail. When reviewing how to paint this tank, the employer should
have identified methods for protecting workers assigned tasks atop the tank. For example, a section of
scaffolding with rails could have been placed between the two tanks to provide safe access to the tank being
painted. Also, the opening in the guardrail could have been closed with rope or other material to protect
the worker moving the boatswain's chair. To off set the absence of a toe board, the worker should have been
tied off with safety belt and lanyard while moving around on top of the tank. The employer used a similar
hazard identification process in arriving at the decision not to use ladders to paint the tank.
Recommendation #2: The employer should require that appropriate safety equipment be used, and
check to see that it is being used properly.
Discussion: In 29 CFR 1926.28(a), employers are given the responsibility to require that employees wear
personal protective equipment when exposed to hazards. While working from the boatswain's chair and
while positioned on top of the tank, the worker should have been required to wear a safety belt and lanyard
attached to an independent lifeline. Thus if the boatswain's chair or rigging had failed, or if the worker had
slipped or lost his balance while on top of the tank, he would not have fallen to the concrete below.
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Recommendation #3: Since there are a number of tanks in the area of the plant with no protection at
the opening in the guardrail and no toe boards, the food processing company which owns the tanks
needs to review and revise company safety practices and procedures for working on the outside storage
tanks.
Discussion: A guardrail opening for access needs a means of closure such as chains or gate as per 29 CFR
1910.23 (a)(2), which states that "a platform shall be guarded by a standard railing ... with the passage
through the railing either provided with a swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into
the opening." When working on top of tanks without toe boards, workers should be required to tie off.
Without a toe board, a worker could slip and fall under the railing. The owner also needs to determine how
the tank top can be safely accessed. If the adjacent tank is to be used, a walkway should be installed between
the tanks. If the tank will be accessed by lift or portable ladder, then use of the small pipes running between
the tanks as means of access must be prohibited.
Recommendation #4: Designers of tanks of this type should incorporate anchorage points (for securing
scaffolds and lifelines) and toe boards into the design of their products; owners of tanks of this type
should consult with tank manufacturers to devise means of installing these safety features on existing
tanks.
Discussion: Designers of permanent structures such as tanks of this type know that they will require regular
maintenance. Designers and owners of such structures must design and install anchorage points on these
structures (e.g. , on tops of tanks) to which workers can secure scaffolds and lifelines. Omission of designed
anchor points causes the workers to improvise anchors or not use them at all.
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FACE 89-24:  Carpenter Dies in 90-Foot Fall from Top of Parking Garage
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On October 29, 1988, a 49-year-old male carpenter fell 90 feet to his death from the top of a parking garage
which was under construction.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the state Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR concerning this fatality and
requested assistance. On February 14, 1989, two safety specialists and a safety engineer from DSR met
with company representatives, and visited and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was employed by a construction company that has been in business for 14 years. The company's
principal business is the erection of concrete structures. The company employs approximately 800 workers,
including 530 carpenters. The employer has a safety officer and written safety rules and procedures.
Weekly tool box safety meetings are held at the jobsite, and on-the-job training is provided. Most of the
employees are members of local trade unions. The victim had been a carpenter for about 30 years, and had
been working for this employer for about 7 months.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The victim and a co-worker were preparing a form for pouring a prestressed concrete column at the 10th-
floor level of a parking garage. The design required that weld plates be embedded in the surface of the
finished concrete column. The columns are designed to support precast concrete panels that form the
exterior wall of the garage. The panels are secured to the columns by joining the panel weld plates to the
column weld plates and then welding them together.
The stressing cable reinforcements, commonly called tendons, had already been installed in the column
form and prestressed to their required load. (Prestressing is an operation that places tension in the cable or
stretches it by putting it under an applied load of up to 200,000 pounds per square inch of cable cross-
sectional area. This causes the cable to become taut much like a guitar string.) In order to get the column
weld plates through the maze of reinforcement cables to their proper location, the workers had to use a pry
bar to deflect the cables. The weld plate then had to be fitted and secured to the form.
The victim, working from a wooden beam, was tied off to a 1 1/2-inch- diameter rebar in the following
manner. The victim secured one end of a 6-foot lanyard to one "D" ring on his safety belt, fed the other
end of the lanyard through a second "D" ring on his belt, and then secured it to the first "D" ring. This created
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a loop with the lanyard. He took an 8-foot lanyard and, at its midpoint, wrapped it several times around the
1 1/2-inch rebar. He took one end of the 8-foot lanyard, passed it through the loop of the 6-foot lanyard
and fastened the snap hook to the snap hook at the other end.
The victim asked his co-worker to get him a portable power saw. The co-worker turned and saw the victim
fall off the edge of the building. The victim did not cry out when falling. The co-worker said that he saw
the lanyard unwrapping from the rebar.
The victim landed facedown in the dirt just outside the building. The co-workers on the scene moved the
victim's head enough so that he could breathe. The emergency squad was called within a few minutes of
the incident and arrived within 10 to 15 minutes. The victim had no pulse and was pronounced dead by
a deputy medical examiner.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner stated the cause of death was multiple internal injuries sustained from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: The employer should train employees in the proper use of the safety equipment
provided for worker protection.
Discussion: According to the employer, the victim was tied off in the manner previously described. Since
the co-worker reported seeing the 8-foot lanyard unwrapping from the rebar as the victim fell, it is possible
that one snap hook rolled out of the other snap hook. (Rollout occurs when the latch is forced open by a
twisting or turning action. This typically occurs when two snap hooks are attached together. A typical snap
hook needs only about 2 pounds of force to open the hook or latch.)
From the information obtained from state compliance personnel, there were tie-off points that the
employees could have used to make the proper use of the available safety equipment. The employer said
that the victim had been hired from a union hall and had received previous training. It is difficult to determine
accurately what type and level of training a newly-hired employee received from previous employers.
Therefore, each employee should be trained in the use of the specific types of safety equipment provided
by the company. The employer should be aware of potential hazards (such as snap-hook "rollout") and
inform employees of the circumstances that could allow this to happen.
Recommendation #2: The employer should evaluate potential tie-off points and determine if the available
safety equipment can work as designed. If the equipment will not work as designed, the employer should
contact equipment manufacturers to determine what equipment is available that can do the job properly.
Discussion: The employee tied himself off to a 1 1/2-inch rebar. It is possible that the snap hooks on the
lanyards would not fit onto the rebar, and the employee had to come up with another method of securing
himself to the rebar. By connecting the two hooks together, the employee created a situation where the
potential for rollout existed. He apparently was not aware of this problem. The employer should verify that
employees are tying off correctly. When incorrect methods are observed, the employer should take steps
to correct the situation. Having employees use locking hooks might have prevented this fatality. (Locking
hooks require over 200 pounds of force to open under pressure.)
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FACE 89-25:  Sheet Metal Mechanic Dies Following a 22-Foot Fall Through a Roof Opening
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On December 20, 1988, a 26-year-old male sheet metal mechanic died as a result of injuries that occurred
when he was knocked through a roof opening and fell 22 feet to a concrete floor below.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On February 16, 1989, a DSR
safety specialist met with an owner of the company involved in the incident, discussed the incident with
the OSHA compliance officer, and visited and photographed the incident site.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The employer is a plumbing and heating contractor which has been in business for 22 years. The company
employs 15 individuals, including 6 sheet metal mechanics. The employer has no written safety policy or
safety program and does not provide safety equipment or safety training to the employees.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to fabricate and install a sheet metal cap over an opening on the flat roof
of a large fiberglass manufacturing plant. The 50-inch-square opening was created when an air conditioning
duct was removed. The 54-inch-square cap was fabricated from galvanized steel with angle-iron
reinforcement. This cap weighed approximately 75 pounds.
On the day of the incident the victim and a co-worker were preparing to install the cap. The victim and the
co-worker leaned the cap against a 30-inch-high by 48-inch-wide metal frame that had been previously
used to support the air conditioning unit. The frame, located approximately 34 inches from the roof opening,
is constructed of 3-inch angle iron. The victim positioned himself between the leaning cap and the roof
opening, while the co-worker positioned himself on the other side of the opening. Neither worker was
wearing any type of fall protection equipment. The co-worker was kneeling and the victim was stooped
over applying caulking to the 6-inch raised curb bordering the opening. A gust of wind blew the cap over.
The cap struck the victim, causing him to fall headfirst through the roof opening, to a concrete floor 22 feet
below (see Figure).
Workers inside the plant saw the victim fall and immediately summoned help from personnel within the
plant. A plant nurse arrived within 3 minutes and initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation. When the local
emergency medical service was called, a local doctor heated the emergency call over the radio and
responded. He pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that death resulted from multiple traumatic injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever any work is performed at an elevation where the potential for a serious
or fatal fall exists, the employer should ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by
all employees.
Discussion: The victim was working 22 feet above ground level in an area where the potential for a fall
existed. According to 29 CFR 1926.28 (a), "the employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of
appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous
conditions." If the employer had provided and required the use of fall protection (i.e., safety belt, lanyard,
and lifeline) this incident may have been prevented.
Recommendation #2: The employer, should design, develop, and implement a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: A comprehensive safety program should address all aspects of safety, including job hazard
analyses. A job hazard analysis should be performed by all employers, prior to the commencement of work,
to identify and control all hazards likely to be encountered by all employees. Environmental conditions may
also create or contribute to hazardous working conditions, and appropriate precautions should be addressed
in the initial job hazard analysis. The employer should have performed a job hazard analysis at the worksite
prior to the commencement of work. Such an analysis might have enabled the employed to identify the
hazards (i.e., potential for fall, placement of fabricated cap, and gusting wind conditions) and take
precautionary measures to protect the employees from injury. If a job hazard analysis had been performed
this incident may have been prevented.
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FACE 89-30:  Electrician's Helper Falls to His Death Through a Skylight
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On April 18, 1989, a 39-year-old male electrician's helper died after falling 16 feet through a skylight to
a concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State Officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On April 27, 1989, a research
safety specialist met and discussed the incident with the company's vice-president and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer assigned to the case. Photographs and a
police report of the incident were also obtained.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 9 months as an electrician's helper by an electrical contracting company
that has been in operation for 21 years. The company employs 40 workers, including 10 electrician's
helpers. The employer has a written safety policy and uses written safety rules and procedures. On-the-job
training is provided to employees and weekly safety meetings are also conducted.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to install lighting and outside receptacles, as well as remove an existing
company sign at an industrial building. The building is 50 feet wide by 200 feet long and is divided into
two sections. One section is 20 feet high and the other is 16 feet high.
On the day of the incident the victim was working with an electrician/foreman assigned to finish work on
the building. All work had been completed except for removing the sign attached to the side of the 20-foot-
high section. The foreman, working from a bucket truck, attached a hemp rope to the sign. The victim, who
was on the roof, secured the rope to a fixed metal ladder which provided access between the roof of the
lower section to the roof of the higher section. The rope was approximately 1 1/4 inches in diameter by 120
feet long. The foreman disconnected the electric power to the sign and unfastened the bolts which secured
the sign to the side of the building. He raised the bucket to a position level with the roof of the building to
help the victim lower the sign to the ground. After they lowered the sign, the foreman lowered the bucket
to ground level so he could disconnect the rope and load the sign on a truck. The foreman told the victim,
still on the rooftop, to coil up the rope and return it to the storage area.
The victim, apparently untied the rope from the ladder, and either tripped, stepped, or possibly sat on a 4-
foot-square smoke dome type skylight located near the work area. The skylight broke and the victim fell
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16 feet to a concrete floor (see Figures 1 and 2). A 1-foot length of rope was found hanging through the
broken skylight following the incident.
The foreman, after loading the sign on the truck, drove around the building and went inside the warehouse
section where he found the victim lying facedown on the floor. The foreman checked the victim for vital
signs (i.e., pulse and breathing) and found none. He then summoned personnel outside the building to call
for help.
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel arrived at the scene approximately 17 minutes after being
called. At this time no vital signs were present and the county medical examiner pronounced the victim dead
at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report for this incident has not been completed at this time, but severe head injuries
incurred as a result of the fall are presumed to have caused death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: The employer should review, revise where applicable, and enforce a comprehensive
safety program that is task specific.
Discussion: The majority of work performed by the employer is electrical-related and the employer's
existing written safety rules and procedures applied primarily to electrical safety. Other safety aspects need
to be taken into consideration (e.g., recognition and elimination of fall hazards), incorporated into the safety
program, and enforced by the employer. A comprehensive safety program should address all aspects of
safety, especially those related to specific tasks and work environments. These rules and procedures should
include, but not be limited to, fall hazards. The employer should comply with OSHA standard 1926.21(B)(2),
which requires the employer to instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe
conditions and regulations applicable to the work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other
exposure to illness or injury.
Recommendation #2: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of all
work projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all work projects during planning and
throughout the entire project. In this instance, the planning of safety procedures was incomplete for the work
being performed by allowing employees to work in an area where the potential for a fall existed without providing
adequate written and verbal instructions to recognize and avoid fall hazards. In addition, employers should inform
workers of the potential hazards associated with stepping, standing or sitting on skylights.
Recommendation #3: Skylight manufacturers and owners of buildings where skylights have been
installed should voluntarily affix accident prevention signs on the skylights, and at or near points of
access (e.g., roof hatches, fixed ladders, stairways, doors, etc.) to areas containing these skylights.
Discussion: Although skylights are required to withstand specified amounts of weight (e.g., OSHA
standard 1910.23(e)(8) - at least 200 pounds applied perpendicular at any one area), deaths still occur as
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a result of workers falling through these skylights. Skylight manufacturers should voluntarily affix accident
prevention signs (Figure 3) at conspicuous places on the skylights. Also, owners of building where
skylights have been installed should voluntarily affix similar signs (Figure 4) at or near points of access to
areas containing these skylights. These signs would visually warn individuals of the potential fall hazard
posed by stepping, standing, or sitting on a skylight. Characteristics of accident prevention signs and tags
(i.e., classification, design, color, layout, finish, lettering, placement, illumination, and symbols), should
comply with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards Z35.1-1972, and OSHA
standards (general industry and construction industry) 29 CFR 1910.145 and 1926.200.
Signs should be easily visible to anyone approaching the area, should contain specific information on
procedures, should be inspected on a regular basis, and should be printed both in English and in the
predominant language of non-English-reading workers. Also, workers unable to read posted signs should
receive instructions regarding hazardous area.
Recommendation #4: Designers/manufacturers of skylights should evaluate current designs with a
view toward increasing load capacities and/or incorporating safeguards.
Discussion: Skylight materials may weaken due to age and/or environmental conditions. As a result, the
probability that a person could exert sufficient pressure to break through skylights may increase. Designers/
manufacturers should consider design modifications to skylights which would strengthen these units
sufficiently to enable them to support a person should that person step, sit or fall onto a skylight. If the smoke
venting effectiveness of the skylight would be adversely affected by such changes, consideration should
be given to development and utilization of other alternatives for increasing the strength of skylights, e.g.,
a dome-shaped wire cover to fit over the skylight.
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Figure 1. A Diagram Showing the Roof Area of the Industrial Building
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Figure 2.  This Figure Shows an Intact Smoke Dome Type Skylight Just Opposite
the Broken Skylight.  The Fixed Ladder Providing Access to Roof of the Higher
Section of the Building is Shown at Left.
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Figure 3.  Recommended Accident Prevention Sign to be Installed at Areas Containing Skylights.
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Figure 4.  Recommended Accident Prevention Sigh to be Applied to Skylights.
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FACE 89-34:  Ironworker Dies in Fall from a Warehouse Under Construction
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On April 29, 1989, a 40-year-old male ironworker died as a result of injuries that occurred when he fell
nearly 40 feet from a steel beam of a warehouse under construction.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On May 17, 1989, two
research safety specialists discussed the incident with the company and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's (OSHA) district office. The county coroner was contacted and photographs of the
incident site were taken.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 13 years as an ironworker by a steel erection company. The company,
which has been in business for 15 years, normally employs 5 workers. The company does not have a written
safety and health program. At the time of the incident, hard hats were the only personal protective
equipment being used by the company's employees.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The construction company had been subcontracted to erect the steel framework for a 300,000-square-foot
distribution warehouse. The warehouse frame was constructed mainly of vertical "I" beams measuring 37
feet 8 inches tall, 5 1/2-inch-wide flange horizontal "I" beams, and bar joists (i.e., light steel joists of open
web construction with a single zig-zagged bar welded to upper and lower chords at the points of contact)
to support the roof.
On the day of the incident the victim was working as a member of a six-person crew which included the
company owner. Since only half of the building frame had been erected, the crew was still in the process
of erecting the skeleton steel.
The victim's task was to connect bar joists to the horizontal 5 1/2-inch-wide flange "I" beams. The victim
was positioned on the top of a beam (approximately 38 feet above the ground) in order to connect the beams
with bolts and nuts. After completing a connection, he stood up on the beam and began moving to the
location of the next connection. The owner, who was operating a crane to move a bar joist into position
for connection, saw the victim slip and fall from the beam. The victim struck a horizontal "I" beam 15 to
20 feet below, and then fell to the brick-and dirt-covered ground.
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The owner/crane operator told an employee to telephone for an ambulance. The Emergency Medical
Service (EMS) responded in approximately 4 minutes after being called. The EMS provided advanced life
support and transported the victim to the local hospital. The victim was pronounced dead in the hospital's
emergency room a short time later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The county coroner stated that death resulted from multiple traumatic injuries sustained from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Whenever any work is performed at an elevation where the potential for a serious
or fatal fall exists, the employer should ensure that fall protection equipment is provided and used by
all employees.
Discussion: The victim was working 37 feet 8 inches above the ground in an area where the potential for
a fall existed. The Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR 1926.28 (a)) states that "the employer is
responsible for requiring the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where
there is an exposure to hazardous conditions." If the employer had provided and required the use of fall
protection (i.e., safety belt, lanyard, and lifeline) this incident may have been prevented.
Additionally, when the traditional safety belt/lanyard combination is impractical, an alternate form of fall
protection (e.g., safety nets as specified in 29 CFR 1926.105) should be used. The use of safety nets may
also have prevented this death.
Recommendation #2: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of
construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout all construction phases of the project. In this instance, there was no planning of
safety procedures because employees were allowed to work in an area where the potential for a fall existed
without adequate fall protection. Employees walked across steel beams without using fall protection (e.g.,
lifeline, belt/lanyard) or having passive fall protection (e.g., nets, catch platforms) in place.
Recommendation #3: The employer should design, develop, and implement a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: In this company the acceptance of a potentially serious or fatal fall, as indicated by the normal
operating procedures of working without fall protection during connecting operations, demonstrates a lack
of commitment to employee safety. Employers should emphasize safety of their employees by designing,
developing, implementing, and enforcing a comprehensive safety program to prevent incidents such as this.
The safety program should include, but not be limited to, the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards and
the use of appropriate fall protection.
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Recommendation #4: Prime contractors and subcontractors should abide by 29 CFR 1926.16 (a), Rules
of Construction, which states: "In no case shall the prime contractor be relieved of overall responsibility
for compliance with this part for all work to be performed under the contract."
Discussion: Although the subcontractor failed to provide a safety and health program for the employees,
the prime contractor was equally at fault by not addressing the issue. The prime contractor should use
contract language that requires subcontractors to identify how they intend to implement a site safety and
health program. The program should be consistent with the prime contractor's program and differences
should be negotiated before the subcontractor begins work. In this particular case, it is evident that the prime
contractor did not require the subcontractor to utilize fall protection measures. Had such language been in
the contract and enforced on the site, the subcontractor would probably have implemented some type of
fall protection measures along with a written safety and health program for this particular site.
178
FACE 89-41:  Carpenter Dies After 13-foot Fall Through Roof Opening Onto Concrete Floor
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On June 8, 1989, a 27-year-old male carpenter fell through a duct opening on a roof, to a concrete floor
13 feet, 4 inches below, sustaining massive head injuries. He died 6 days later from the injuries.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On June 27, 1989, a DSR
research team consisting of a safety engineer and a safety specialist conducted a site visit, interviewed a
company representative, photographed the site of the incident, and discussed the incident with local
emergency personnel and state medical examiner personnel.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 2 months by a construction company that was building a shopping mall.
He was hired as an experienced carpenter from the local union hall. The company has about 70 employees
total, had 3 carpenters at the shopping mall site. The company has no designated safety officer. The job
superintendent has conducted safety meetings in the past, but indicated that the last safety meeting he
conducted was over a year prior to the incident. The company has written safety rules that were not made
available to the investigators. The company provides no safety training, relying upon the union and
previous employers to provide safety training.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to construct a small shopping mall. The victim had been made the lead
carpenter of a 3-man carpenter crew about a week before the incident. On the day of the incident, the victim
and the job superintendent discussed what work was to be performed. The victim intended to work on the
roof with electric power tools. He told co-workers that he was going onto the roof to drop an electrical cord
down for someone at floor level to plug into an outlet.
A short while later, co-workers heard the sound of a piece of wood falling. Upon investigation, they found
the victim lying on the concrete floor of the structure bleeding from injuries to the right side of his forehead.
The victim was conscious and one co-worker provided first aid while another notified the superintendent,
who immediately called for emergency services. Local fire department personnel responded within 6
minutes of notification and, upon evaluating the situation, called for a trauma transport unit. Emergency
medical service (EMS) personnel stabilized the victim's head, took vital readings, did a spinal immobilization,
provided oxygen, and prepared for transportation by helicopter. A medical helicopter transported the victim
to the trauma unit of an area hospital. The victim died in the hospital 6 days after the incident.
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There were no eyewitnesses to the incident. Investigation of the scene after the incident revealed that
the nails had been removed from one side of a 4-foot by 8-foot sheet of 5/8-inch plywood that was
placed over a 37-inch by 67-inch roof opening for a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning unit. The
victim apparently removed the nails from one side of the plywood cover so that he could drop an
electric cord down to the floor where power outlets were available. He apparently knelt down and
leaned into the opening with the plywood resting on his back in order to look for somebody to plug
the cord into an electrical outlet. While kneeling, the victim either lost his balance or the weight of the
plywood caused him to fall headfirst onto the concrete floor below.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report has not yet been received; presumably, multiple traumatic injuries
resulting from the fall caused his death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: During planning for any job, consideration should be given to providing
temporary power to locations where powered tools will be needed.
Discussion: The job planning should have identified that electrically-powered tools would be needed
to work on the roof. Provisions should have been made to provide temporary electrical outlets on the
roof at several locations. This would have eliminated the need to drop a cord down through an opening
and could have prevented this incident.
Also, the installation of temporary power on the roof would allow management to establish specific
tool use areas. Minimizing the number and length of electrical cords at worksite locations minimizes
the creation of tripping hazards, and the potential that insulation on the electrical cords might be
damaged, possibly leading to electrical shock hazards.
Recommendation #2: Warning signs should be present on all roof covers.
Discussion: The cover should have been affixed with a warning sign indicating that the plywood sheet
was covering an opening and should not be removed without the job superintendent's permission. The
victim obviously knew there was an opening below the plywood since he was attempting to provide
electric power to the roof by dropping a cord through the opening. A warning sign might have made
him stop to evaluate if there was a safer place to drop the electric cord down to the ground floor.
Recommendation #3: The company should develop and implement an active safety program.
Discussion: The company has no active safety program. The job superintendent indicated that he had
not had a safety meeting in over a year. The company should implement a safety training program in
compliance with CFR 1926.21(b)(2), which requires employers to instruct all employees in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions that could lead to injury.
Areas that the safety program should cover include:
• Housekeeping (The housekeeping in the building was poor.)
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• Hazard recognition. (An employee without a hard hat was cleaning up trash immediately below
workers on the roof.)
• Fall protection (A carpenter was working 15 feet above the ground without any fall protection
equipment.)
• Ladder safety (A ladder that was used to access the roof did not extend 3 feet above the roof and
was tied off with a piece of scrap binder twine.)
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FACE 89-47:  Laborer Falls to His Death Through a Skylight Opening
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On July 24, 1989, an 18-year-old male laborer died after falling through a skylight opening 27 feet to a
concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On August 23, 1989, a DSR
field team met and discussed the incident with a company representative and an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer assigned to the case. On the following day, the DSR
team conducted an investigation at the incident site. Police, emergency medical service, and coroner reports
relating to the incident were obtained.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed as a laborer for 8 days by a roofing and metal fabrication contractor. The
company, which has been in business since November 1984, employs 60 workers, including 20 laborers.
At the time of the incident, the employer had no written safety policy or safety program. The employer
provides on-the-job training, and requires each employee to view a 15-minute videotape on general safety.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The company had been contracted to install foam insulation boards and single-ply rubber roofing over a
newly constructed 225,000-square-foot, corrugated-steel-paneled roof. The main roof is flat and contains
an area (penthouse) which extends 7 feet higher than the main roof. Lengthwise, the 30-foot-wide
penthouse spans the width of the main roof. At the time of the incident, the penthouse roof contained 4
unguarded 10-foot-square openings, which were to be used for installing skylights.
On the day of the incident, the victim was part of a six-person crew assigned to move insulation boards from
a storage area on one side of the main roof, over the penthouse roof, to the other side of the main roof where
the boards were to be installed. The subcontractor had intended to place the boards on the same side of the
main roof where they were to be installed, but wet ground conditions precluded moving the crane to that
side of the building and the boards were unloaded on the opposite side of the roof. Two members of the
crew carried insulation boards from the storage area to the penthouse area. Two other crew members,
including the victim, carried the boards to the opposite side of the penthouse where the remaining two crew
members moved the boards to the work area. At some point during the task, the victim was walking
backwards dragging insulation boards when he fell through the skylight opening to a concrete floor 27 feet
below (see Figure 1).
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A crew member immediately notified the job foreman, who called the local rescue squad. The rescue squad
responded within 5 minutes and stabilized the victim. The victim was then evacuated from the site to a
hospital trauma center by a state police helicopter. The victim died the following day.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed multiple head and chest injuries as cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Prime contractors and subcontractors should contractually agree on specific site
safety and health programs to be implemented prior to the initialization of work.
Discussion: Although the subcontractor failed to provide a safety and health program for the employees,
the prime contractor should ensure that all subcontractors address safety and health issues on the jobsite.
The prime contractor should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to identify how they
intend to implement a site safety and health program. The subcontractor programs should be consistent with
the prime contractor's program and differences should be negotiated before the subcontractors initiate
work.
In this particular case, it is evident that the prime contractor did not require the subcontractor to utilize fall
protection measures (e.g., provide guarding for roof openings). Had such a requirement been in the contract
and enforced on the site, the subcontractor would probably have implemented some type of fall protection
measures along with a written safety and health program for this particular site.
Recommendation #2: The prime contractor or subcontractor should have implemented 29 CFR
1926.500 (f)(6), which requires that all skylight openings that create a fall hazard be guarded with a
standard railing, or covered with a material capable of supporting the maximum intended load and so
installed as to prevent accidental displacement.
Discussion: Employers should assume the responsibility of providing for the safety and health of the
workers. Neither the prime contractor nor the subcontractor took the necessary precaution--guarding the
skylight opening. If the skylight had been guarded in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.500 (f)(6), the incident
may have been prevented.
[Note: During the DSR investigation, it became apparent that guards had been installed around the skylight
openings subsequent to the incident. These guardrails, however, did not appear to meet the requirements
specified in 1926.500 (f)(1) (see Figure 2). The guardrails, as erected, did not include an intermediate rail
midway between the top rail and toeboard.]
Recommendation #3: Worker safety should be considered and addressed in the planning phase of
construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout the entire project.  In this instance, planning was inadequate. Employees were
allowed to work in close proximity to unguarded skylight openings without adequate fall protection.
183
Recommendation #4: The employer should design, develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive
safety program.
Discussion: This company accepted the risk of a potentially serious or fatal fall by failing to provide fall
protection for workers exposed to unguarded skylight openings. Employers should emphasize safety of
their employees by designing, developing, implementing, and enforcing a comprehensive safety program
to prevent incidents such as this. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, the recognition
and avoidance of fall hazards.
[Note: The employer has designed and implemented a written safety program since the time of the mishap.]
Figure 1.  Top and Side Views of the Roof Area Where the Fatal Fall Occurred.
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Figure 2.  Specifications for Guardrails as Contained in 29 CFR 1926.500 (f) (1)
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FACE 89-49:  Window Mechanic Dies in 250-Foot Fall
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On August 17, 1989 a 30-year-old male window mechanic died when he fell 250 feet through a window
opening while attempting to replace the window.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 20, 1989 a
DSR safety specialist and an epidemiologist conducted an investigation and met with local officials and
the manager of the property where the incident occurred. The DSR representatives then visited and
photographed the incident site and discussed the case with witnesses.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim in this incident was self-employed. He had worked in the glass business for several years prior
to going into business for himself approximately 4 1/2 years ago. The victim had one employee. The
company had no safety program.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim and his employee went to a 21-story office building to replace a
damaged window on the 21st floor. The exterior walls of the building were brick, with rows of windows,
9-feet-high by 56-inch-wide at each floor and on all sides of the building. These windows consisted of an
outer pane of bronze-tinted glass and an inner pane of clear glass separated by a 1/2-inch air space. A single
metal frame held the two panes of glass in place.
The outer pane of a window in one corner of a large conference room on the 21st floor broke several days
prior to the incident. To prevent possible injuries to pedestrians, building security personnel, after making
sure there was no one below, tapped on the inner pane and window frame to dislodge the broken pieces
of glass, causing them to fall to the ground below. The inner pane of glass was left intact in the frame.
The victim was contracted to replace the damaged window. He had replaced damaged windows in the same
building on several previous occasions. To replace the window, the victim first had to loosen and remove
the bolts which secured the window frame to the structure, and then remove the existing inner pane and
frame from the opening. Subsequently, he could install a new window and frame combination in the
opening, and complete the job by installing the bolts to hold the new frame in position.
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The victim and his employee arrived at the incident site accompanied by a security guard. The victim began
removing the bolts which held the window frame in place. In order to reach the bolts at the top of the frame
the victim placed a 3-foot-high wooden stepladder next to the window. Standing on the second step of this
ladder, he attempted to loosen one of the bolts (located above his right shoulder) by striking the bolt with
a hammer held in his right hand. In doing so, he missed the bolt and struck the window pane. The window
shattered under the impact of the hammer, and the victim and the ladder on which he was standing, fell
sideways through the window opening to a brick courtyard 250 feet below.
The corporate security director observed the victim falling past his 14th floor office window and
immediately had his secretary call local emergency services (911). Fire, rescue, and police personnel were
on the scene within 7 minutes of the incident.
The victim was pronounced dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as generalized trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fall protection options should be considered, and selected methods and/or
equipment used whenever the potential for serious or fatal falls exists.
Discussion: Windows of the type involved in this incident are designed to be of sufficient structural strength
and integrity to prevent someone from falling through them. However, when a window, or any other
structural component, is damaged, and the resultant structural strength and integrity is not evaluated, any
task or activity involving the damaged component should be approached with extreme caution. Had the
work proceeded to the point at which the window was removed, the resultant unprotected wall opening
would have posed a serious fall hazard to the workers installing the new window. In this case, the most
prudent approach may have been to treat the damaged window as if it were an unprotected wall opening
during the entire course of the dismantling and replacement work.
An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard (29 CFR 1926.500(c)) requires that
any wall opening "from which there is a drop of more than 4 feet, and the bottom of the opening is less than
3 feet above the working surface" be guarded. Since the removal of the window would have been impeded
if not precluded by installation of a guardrail, and the use of a portable ladder may have offset the protection
afforded by a guardrail anyway, this protective option would probably have been impractical in this
instance. However, personal fall protection equipment, such as safety belts with lanyards attached to a
structurally sound anchorage point, could have been employed instead. The use of personal fall protection
equipment by maintenance personnel dismantling and replacing damaged windows, such as in this
incident, may prevent future similar incidents.
While the men in this case were working within a completed structure, the work they were performing
would have resulted in the creation of a large vertical opening when the window was removed. The fact
that they were intending to create this opening should have prompted them to employ fall protection
equipment (safety belts with lanyards) while accomplishing this work. Had they used this equipment this
fatality could have been prevented.
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Recommendation #2: Work near a known damaged window should be accomplished from the side
rather than from directly in front of the window whenever possible.
Discussion: The work being performed by the victim at the time of the incident could just have easily been
accomplished with the ladder (and the victim) positioned by an adjacent, undamaged, side window instead
of directly in front of the damaged window unit. Had this been done this incident might have been
prevented.
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FACE 90-15:  Ironworker Foreman Dies Following a 37-foot Fall Through Platform Opening in
Indiana
SUMMARY
An ironworker foreman died after falling 37 feet from a steel grating platform. This incident occurred as the
foreman and his crew of four ironworkers were installing foundry process equipment from the platform. Running
vertically through the platform was an 8-foot-diameter vent stack. The platform had been installed with a 12-inch
annular space between the vent stack and the grating in anticipation of placing insulation material around the vent
stack. The foreman was standing approximately 1 foot away from the annular space with his back to the vent
stack giving task-related instructions to his crew. After giving the instructions, he stepped backwards and fell
through the annular space, landing on the concrete floor 37 feet below. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in
order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers and employees must:
• guard floor openings with a railing or a floor opening cover secured against displacement
• conduct a hazard analysis before each job and implement appropriate controls.
INTRODUCTION
On September 12, 1989, a 46-year-old male ironworker foreman (the victim) died after he fell 37 feet from an
industrial building platform. On November 2, 1989, officials of the Occupational Safety and Health program
from the State of Indiana (State OSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death and
requested technical assistance. On December 7, 1989, a research industrial hygienist from DSR traveled to the
incident site to conduct an investigation. The DSR investigator reviewed the incident with company
representatives and State OSHA personnel, and obtained photographs and diagrams of the incident site.
The employer in this incident is an industrial building construction company that employs an average of
1500 workers. Most of the employees are ironworkers, carpenters, electricians, pipefitters, boilermakers,
and laborers hired through their respective local union halls. The victim had a total of 10 years' experience
as an ironworker and had been employed by the company for 12 months as an ironworker foreman. The
company has a corporate-level, full-time safety manager and written safety requirements specifying
procedures concerning the use of fall protection equipment and fall prevention methods. The general
foreman at each construction site is responsible for jobsite safety issues and "tailgate" safety meetings,
which are conducted weekly.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to construct an industrial vacuum degassing building for a foundry. The
work included the installation of vacuum degassing process machinery and equipment. Approximately 150
construction workers were employed on site to complete this project. The project, which had been under
construction for about 12 months, was nearing completion. The building structure had been completed and
most of the equipment had been installed. According to company representatives, workers were using
appropriate fall protection equipment during this period of construction. The victim had been supervising
a crew of 4 ironworkers who were assigned to finish installing equipment 37 feet above the ground floor
on a permanently installed steel grating platform. The edge of the platform was surrounded by a steel railing
3 1/2 feet high. An 8-foot-diameter vent stack ran vertically through the center of the platform (Figure). The
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platform had been installed with a 12-inch annular space between the vent stack and the grating in
anticipation of placing insulation material around the vent stack. The annular space was not protected with
a temporary cover or railing because the victim did not consider it large enough for a worker to fall
completely through. However, the platform opening was built with a 4-inch vertical lip (toeboard) around
the edge.
The crew had been at work for about 1 hour on the morning of the incident. Standing on the platform with
his back to the vent stack (and approximately 1 foot away from the annular space), the victim began giving
task-related instructions to the crew. After giving instructions to the workers, the victim turned slightly
while stepping backwards and fell through the annular space to the concrete floor 37 feet below. The
foundry emergency medical service (EMS) was immediately notified, and arrived at the site within 3
minutes, administered emergency medical care to the victim (who was still breathing), and transported him
by ambulance to a local hospital where he died 1 hour later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Platform and floor openings large enough for workers to fall through should be
adequately guarded.
Discussion: The employer should implement 29 CFR 1926.500(b)(1) and (8), which require that all floor and
platform openings be protected with a standard railing or a floor opening cover secured against displacement.
Although the annular space in the platform was only 12 inches wide, it was, nevertheless, a "floor opening"
(according to 29 CFR 1926.502(b)). The platform opening did have a toeboard. However, a standard railing or
floor opening cover should also be installed to comply with the aforementioned standards. At the time of the
incident, the platform had another unprotected opening near the vent stack (triangular in shape, measuring
approximately 2 1/2 feet by 4 feet). This opening was not protected at the time of the incident because it was being
used for hoisting equipment and materials. Even though the victim did not fall through this opening, it did pose
a hazard to workers in the area and therefore should have been guarded.
Recommendation #2: Hazard analysis should be included as an ongoing part of each construction
phase.
Discussion: Before starting each phase of the construction, each crew foreman should identify and review
the potential hazards with his crew and discuss how to control the hazards and how the work can be done
safely. These discussions should include information on hazards in the immediate work area as well as
information on the activities of other work crews on the site that could create additional hazards for workers.
Such a procedure might have identified the floor openings as hazards such that corrective action to guard
the openings could have been taken.
REFERENCES
1. Office of the Federal Register Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 CFR Part 1926. U.S. Department
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Washington, D.C. 1989.
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Figure.  Vacuum Degasser
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FACE 90-19:  Welder Dies after Falling 22 Feet from a Roof at Mall Construction Site in Maryland
SUMMARY
A welder fell 22 feet to the ground from a bundle of roof decking stacked on the roof of a mall under
construction and died as a result of his injuries less than an hour later. The victim was welding bridging in
place between roof bar joists when his welding cables became snagged. The victim stood on a bundle of
roof decking and tried to free the cables by whipping them up and down and pulling on them. The welding
cable connectors separated and the victim lost his balance and fell headfirst to the ground. Although the
victim was wearing a safety belt and lanyard, he was not tied off at the time of the incident. Based upon
investigation findings, NIOSH suggests that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers
should:
• provide the necessary fall protection equipment and the means and training to properly use the
equipment
• develop and implement safe methods for handling welding cables with employees
• develop and implement comprehensive safety training programs with task-specific safety procedures
• consider the use of other approaches, such as elevated work platforms, in reducing worker
exposure to falls from elevations
INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 1989, a 48-year-old welder died as a result of injuries sustained from a 22-foot-fall. On
November 9, 1989, the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the Division of
Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical assistance. On December 13, 1989, a DSR
safety engineer conducted an investigation and met with a company official to discuss the incident. The
DSR investigator photographed the incident site and reviewed emergency medical services (EMS) records.
The employer is a small construction welding company that has been in business for 10 years. The company has
seven full-time employees, including five welders. The company has no safety officer and no written safety rules.
Since this incident the owner has contacted his insurance company for assistance in developing a safety program.
The victim worked for this company only 5 days before the incident. He had 20 years of experience as a
welder and had worked as a welding instructor in the local vocational technical school.
INVESTIGATION
The company had contracted to weld structural steel components at a new mall complex being built in the
area. The victim was electric arc welding bridging between the roof bar joists which were 22 feet above
ground. (Bridging is a system of lateral braces placed between joists to distribute the load on the roof, and
hold the joists in position.) At the time of the incident, the victim was wearing a safety belt and lanyard.
The victim, as well as the other welders, typically secured their lanyards to a structural member when
working in one area for an extended period of time. Since the victim was only working in an area for a few
minutes, he did not attach his lanyard to any structural member. The victim needed an additional foot of
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welding cable to complete the weld on a piece of bridging. When the victim pulled on the cables, he
discovered they had become snagged. In an attempt to get the additional cable, the victim stood on the edge
of a bundle of decking placed on the roof and whipped the cables up and down while pulling on them. As
he did so, a welding cable connector came loose, causing the victim to lose his balance and fall backward
through the bar joists to the ground (Figure). Witnesses stated that he landed on his head and shoulders.
Workers in the area saw the victim fall and called emergency medical services. The co-workers did not
move the victim for fear of causing further damage. The rescue squad arrived about 12 minutes after the
victim fell, placed the victim on a backboard with an immobilizer, and started cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR). The victim was transported to the local hospital where he died less than an hour after
the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that the cause of death was neck injuries sustained from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION:
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide the necessary safety equipment and means to properly
use the equipment.
Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.18(a) requires an employer to ensure that employees properly use personal
protective equipment when exposed to hazardous conditions. The victim was wearing a safety belt and
lanyard, but was not able to tie off to a lifeline as none was present. After this incident, the employer installed
lifelines to enable the people working at elevations to tie-off while working. Prior to this incident, the
employer did not require workers to tie off when working at heights. The employer has since instructed
his employees to tie off whenever they are working above 10 feet.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and implement safe methods of handling welding
cables.
Discussion: When welding cables are caught, the correct way to handle the situation is to trace the cables
back to where they are caught. Either the welder or a co-worker should check the cables to determine where
they are caught, and free them if possible. A brief, periodic "toolbox" discussion of the proper methods of
handling cables might have reinforced the victim's understanding of the need to take a few minutes to handle
the cables in a safe manner.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive safety training
program with task-specific safety procedures.
Discussion: There were no safety training or safety programs in effect. Since this incident, the employer
has contacted his insurance company for assistance in establishing a written safety policy, a comprehensive
safety training program, and task-specific safety procedures. In the past, the employer has relied on the
previous experience of his employees to substitute for safety training. Safety training should address:
• care and inspection of the welding equipment
• personal protective equipment such as eye protection, safety shoes, clothing, fall restraints, etc.
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• the need to tie-off while working at heights (particularly during work on structural components
which are not always fully secured, as sudden movement may cause a worker to lose balance and
fall).
Recommendation #4: Employers should consider the use of other approaches for reducing worker
exposure to falls from elevations.
Discussion: Use of an elevated work platform, such as a scissors lift or other device, might have reduced
the welder's exposure to this fall hazard. Another approach to fall protection would be the use of safety nets.
An alternative method of construction would be to assemble sections of bar joists and bridging on the
ground and then lift the completed sections into place, provided it would not expose workers to additional
hazards.
REFERENCES
1. 29 CFR 1926.18(a) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register.
2. OSHA Instruction STD 3-31 July 18, 1983 Subject: Fall Protection in Construction: 29 CFR 1926.28(a)
and 29 CFR 1926.105(a)
Figure.
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FACE 90-21:  Roofer Dies after Falling through Skylight Fixture in Maryland
SUMMARY
A roofer died from injuries sustained after falling 30 feet through a skylight fixture. The victim was part
of a crew removing a tar and gravel built-up roof. He positioned a wheelbarrow full of gravel alongside
a skylight so that he could talk to one of the company managers. As he turned back to resume work he fell
through the skylight to the concrete floor below. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent
future similar concurrences:
• employers should take steps to protect workers from falling through skylights by installing
guardrails or covers over the skylights
• prime contractors and  subcontractors should ensure that safety and health issues are included
as part of the contract provisions
• building owners should consider installing protective covers over skylights
• designers/manufacturers of skylights should evaluate load capacities of current designs and
consider strengthening skylight components and/or incorporating safeguards, such as protective
screens, into skylight designs. NIOSH has prepared a Hazard Alert publication detailing the
hazards associated with falls through skylights and roof openings (DHHS (NIOSH) Publication
No. 90-100).
INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 1989, a 51-year-old male roofer fell through a skylight 30 feet to the concrete floor below. On
November 17, 1989, Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Officials notified the Division of Safety
Research (DSR) of the fatality and requested technical assistance. On December 14, 1989, a DSR safety engineer
conducted an investigation. The DSR investigator examined and photographed the incident site, interviewed
company personnel about the incident, and obtained emergency medical services (EMS) and police records.
The employer in this incident is a small roofing and siding contractor who has been in business for 10
months. At the time of the incident, the company employed about 20 people. The company does not have
a safety officer but has a written safety policy and safety procedures that were obtained from another roofing
company. The co-owners of the company do conduct toolbox safety meetings and on-the-job safety
training. The victim had been working for the company for 3 months.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted by the prime contractor to replace the roofing on a bottling plant.
The prime contractor was installing insulation below the roof while the subcontractor was to remove the
tar and gravel built-up roof and replace it with a new rubber membrane material. The victim and fellow
employees were removing the gravel from the roof top.
The roof has 15 rectangular smoke-dome-type, curb-mounted skylights (42 inches by 80 inches). As the
victim was moving a full wheelbarrow of gravel toward a trash chute, he stopped and set the wheelbarrow
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next to a skylight and went over to talk to a company manager. When he returned to the wheelbarrow, he
fell through the skylight 30 feet to the floor below. None of the workers on the roof saw the victim fall, but
they heard the victim scream as he fell through the skylight. Workers within the bottling plant observed the
victim fall feet first and strike a 3-foot-high pallet of bottles, which caused his body to flip and his head to
hit the concrete floor.
The EMS was called within a few minutes of the incident. The time of arrival was not included in the emergency
services report. When the medical technicians arrived at the scene, the victim was not breathing and had no vital
signs. The victim was transported to a hospital where he was later pronounced dead. The EMS records had no
information on the time of death. After the incident the employer removed all of the skylights and secured
plywood over the openings. The skylights were reinstalled when the work on the roof was completed.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report stated that the cause of death was traumatic injuries sustained from the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should initiate measures to protect their employees from falling
through skylights.
Discussion: According to the subcontract with the prime contractor, the roofing contractor (the victim's
employer) was responsible for protecting employees from falls. Methods for protecting workers from falls
through skylights include removing the skylights and covering the openings, as was done after the incident,
in accordance with CFR 1926.500(b)(4). Alternatively, temporary guardrails or other means of preventing
the worker from falling through the skylight could have been installed. Additional information pertaining
to falls through skylights and roof openings is contained in a NIOSH Alert on this topic (DHHS(NIOSH)
Publication No. 90-100).
Recommendation #2: Prime contractors and subcontractors should ensure that safety and health issues
are included as part of the contract provisions.
Discussion: All contracts should contain provisions that ensure the safety and health of all workers covered
by that contract. Where prime contractors and subcontractors are involved, the contract must contain clear
and concise language as to which party is responsible for a given safety and health issue. Once the
provisions for these responsibilities have been established, the respective parties should ensure that the
provisions of the contract regarding safety and health are upheld.
Recommendation #3: Building owners should consider installing protective covers over skylights to
guard against falls through skylights.
Discussion: Building owner should consider installing guardrails or skylight screens on the skylights as
outlined in CFR 1910.23(a)(4). Although the employees of the bottling plant rarely go onto the roof, the
new membrane material, which becomes very slick when wet, poses a new hazard for anyone working on
the roof and near the skylight. The NIOSH investigator had to move very carefully while inspecting the
incident site to keep from falling. With the new roofing material in place, an individual walking on the roof
could easily slip and fall through a skylight.
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Recommendation #4: Designers/manufacturers of skylights should evaluate current designs to determine
the feasibility of increasing load capacities and/or incorporating other safeguards.
Discussion: Designers/manufacturers of skylights should evaluate the materials used to fabricate skylights
and current skylight designs to determine the feasibility of increasing load capacity. Load capacity could
be increased to provide a margin of safety in the event of an inadvertent fall against a skylight. Additionally,
a metal grid or screen installed over the skylight would reduce the exposure to fall hazards for workers on
roofs.
REFERENCES
1. DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 90-100, Request for Assistance in Preventing Worker Deaths and
Injuries from Falls Through Skylights and Roof Openings
2. 29 CFR 1926.500(b)(4). Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
3. 29 CFR 1910.23(a)(4). Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
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FACE 90-23:  Carpenter Falls 62 Feet to His Death While Attempting to Enter a Personnel Basket
at a Bridge Construction Site in Maryland
SUMMARY
A carpenter fell 62 feet to his death when he attempted to enter a stripping basket while working on a bridge
construction project. The victim was spacing rebar inside a concrete form pier cap (the top part of a bridge
pier which uniformly distributes the concentrated loads from the bridge over the pier). He ran out of spacers
and signalled the crane operator to move the basket over to the pier he was working on. As the crane
operator attempted to move the basket to the pier, the basket bumped the pier form and swung away. The
victim reached out for the basket as it was moving away and lost his balance, falling 62 feet onto the concrete
footing at the base of the pier. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent similar occurrences,
employers should:
• ensure that established safety procedures be followed at all times
• conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections regularly at each jobsite
• conduct a thorough evaluation of accessing piers to determine the safest method.
INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 1990, officials of The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified
the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death of a 30-year-old male carpenter, who fell 62 feet from
the top of a pier cap at a bridge construction site on January 26, 1990. The state officials requested technical
assistance. On February 12 through 14, 1990, a DSR safety engineer conducted an investigation of this
incident. The safety engineer reviewed the incident with company representatives and obtained witness
statements, the state police report, photographs and a diagram of the incident site.
The employer, a heavy construction company that has been in operation for 87 years, employs 450 full-
time employees, including a safety director and assistant safety director. The company has a comprehensive
safety program and provides on-the-job training to the employees. Additionally, the company conducts
monthly safety meetings that are related to the type of work being done at the jobsite. Some of the topics
of recent safety meetings included personnel baskets, crane signals and flagman signals, housekeeping,
hand injuries and fall protection. Quarterly, the company mails safety information to the employees' homes
and presents safety awards to employees with good safety work records.
Before work was started at this jobsite, the company evaluated various methods of having the employees
gain access to the pier forms. They had rented lift equipment such as scissors lifts and scaffolding; however,
based on the existing ground conditions (marshy soils and unstable fill) and other factors, the company
decided that the use of stripping baskets and cranes was the safer means of getting employees to and from
the work areas.
The victim had been employed by the company as a carpenter for over 5 years. He had taken the new
employee safety orientation training and participated in the monthly safety training meetings. He had also
recently taken the safety training for personnel transport baskets and fall protection.
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INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to build a bridge over a waterway. Concrete piers were being built to
support the bridge deck. The piers consisted of a footing with a rectangular pillar 20 feet long by 5 1/2 feet
wide, rising 26 feet (Figure). The top portion of the pillar, which was "V" shaped, rose 36 feet above the
pillar and was 46 1/2 feet wide at the top. The concrete pier was reinforced with steel rebar. The form for
the concrete pier was set in place and the reinforcing steel for the upper section was placed in the form. The
last section of the form was then put in place. The victim was inside the form, installing spacer blocks
between the reinforcing steel and the form. He had run out of spacers and needed to return to the ground
to obtain more spacers. He signaled the crane operator that he needed to come down. The crane operator,
who had just put a worker on another pier, swung the basket 150 feet to the pier the victim was working
in. The basket, which weighed approximately 4000 pounds and was approximately 8 feet wide by 20 feet
long, was designed as a stripping basket to be used in placing and removing parts on the forms. The stripping
basket was also used to transport personnel. As the basket was slowing to a stop, it struck the form, causing
the basket to move away from the form. An eyewitness stated that the victim, standing on the 8-inch flange
on top of the form, lost his balance while reaching for the basket and fell 62 feet to the concrete footing
below.
Co-workers rushed to the victim within a minute of the fall and found that he had a gash in his head and
was not breathing. Calls were made to the emergency medical service (EMS) and the state police.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was attempted by one of the co-workers without success. The victim
was transported to a regional hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival one hour after the incident.
The companies' written procedure required that workers stand inside the pier on the reinforcing steel.
Additionally, written company policy requires that the basket be secured against movement before entering
or exiting the basket. The basket had a rope on its railing that was to be used as a tie off to secure the basket
to an anchor point inside the pier form during entry and exit.
At the time of the incident, the victim was wearing a safety belt and lanyard. While working inside the form,
workers were not required to tie off. However, when riding in the basket, company policy required workers
to secure their lanyard to the tie-off bar in the basket.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician stated the cause of death was due to head injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION:
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that established safety procedures be followed at all
times.
Discussion: Established company safety procedures state that a basket should be secured against movement
with a tie-off before an employee enters or exits the basket when it is elevated as required by 29 CFR
1926.550(g)(6)(ii). The rope on the basket railing was provided for this purpose. Additionally, company
policy requires that employees stand inside a form until the basket is secured in place to be boarded.
Employers should ensure that workers are aware of established company safety procedures, and take steps
to enforce their implementation.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections
regularly at each jobsite.
Discussion: Employers should conduct, or appoint safety personnel to conduct, scheduled and unscheduled
safety inspections at each jobsite to ensure that established safety procedures are being followed.
Conducting such safety inspections demonstrates to workers a management commitment to enforcing its
safety policies and procedures.
Recommendation #3: Employers should conduct a thorough evaluation of accessing piers to determine
the safest method.
Discussion: Employers should evaluate alternative methods for providing worker access to piers; such
alternatives could include, loading and unloading the workers inside the concrete forms.
REFERENCE
1. 29 CFR 1926.550(g)(6)(ii) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register
Figure.
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FACE 90-24:  Ironworker Foreman Dies after Falling 50 Feet from Structural Steel in South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 41-year-old ironworker foreman died as a result of injuries sustained in a 50-foot fall from an 8-inch "I"
beam at a construction site. The victim was the foreman of a steel erection crew which had assembled the
steel "skeleton" of a large structure at the site of a new paper mill. The crew had completed their work on
the structure several days prior to this incident, and had then removed the safety netting, which had been
in place during the construction process. As part of their work, the crew had installed a pair of 8-inch "I"
beams to serve as a track for an overhead crane. On the morning of the incident, an electrician, who had
been working on the overhead crane, told the victim that the "I" beam rails on which the crane operated
were misaligned. The victim and one of his co-workers used a cherry-picker manlift (a small crane or
derrick that can work and lift in cramped spaces) to access the beam. After looking at the beam, the victim
told the co-worker to move the manlift to the far end of the beam while he walked out on the beam to check
for the problem. A heavy frost the night prior to the incident had left a coating of ice on the beam. The co-
worker mentioned the slipping hazard to the victim and was told by the victim not to worry about it. The
victim then stepped from the manlift to the beam and walked approximately 40 feet across the beam before
slipping and falling 50 feet to the ground below. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent
similar occurrences in the future, employers should:
• ensure that workers comply with existing safety policies and procedures at all times
• continually stress to all employees the importance of following established safe work procedures
at all times
• ensure that the proper chain of command is followed when problems or potential problems are
reported.
INTRODUCTION
On January 27, 1990, a 41-year-old male ironworker foreman died after falling 50 feet from structural steel.
On January 30, 1990, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical assistance. A DSR
safety specialist discussed this case with compliance personnel, and traveled to the incident site on February
26, 1990, to conduct an investigation. The safety specialist reviewed the incident with representatives from
the responding Emergency Medical Service (EMS), the coroner's office, and the employer; and then
investigated and photographed the incident site.
The employer in this incident is a large paper manufacturing firm employing 1,300 individuals at the site
of a new pulp and paper plant under construction. On-site safety personnel include a full-time safety
engineer with a staff of five. The company has a comprehensive safety program which actively addresses
the various hazards likely to be encountered in the construction trades. Safety training sessions are
presented to all employees weekly. In addition, the safety program provides for regular periodic inspection
of all safety equipment at the site. Violation of company safety policies is grounds for dismissal, with the
safety engineer having full authority to enforce this provision.
201
INVESTIGATION
The victim worked as the foreman of a structural steel erection crew. This was one of several such crews
at the site, all under the general supervision of an "iron superintendent."
This particular crew had erected the structural steel "skeleton" for a large building at the site. When their
work on this structure had been completed (several days prior to the incident), the crew removed the safety
nets used during the erection of the "skeleton." The removal of these nets was completed 2 days prior to
the incident. A 75-ton overhead crane was installed in this structure following the completion of the
structural steel work. The exterior walls and the roof of this structure were to be installed at a later time by
different work crews.
Standard practice calls for the "iron superintendent" to lay out groundwork for his crews each day. The
crews then spend the first few hours of the workday on the ground accomplishing these tasks. During this
time, the "iron superintendent" inspects the sites to be worked on that day. After the "iron superintendent"
determines that the steel in the area is dry and free of ice, and that no other problems with the steel erection
process exist, the crews are allowed to begin work on the steel itself.
On the day of the incident, the victim and his crew reported to work at 7:00 a.m. (their normal starting time).
A few minutes after reporting for work, the victim was approached by an electrician (who worked for a
subcontractor at the site), who told him that something was wrong with the alignment of the I-beam "rails"
upon which the overhead crane was to run. Upon hearing of this supposed defect in work accomplished
by his crew, the victim and one of his workers went to the area in question without informing the iron
superintendent or any other member of management.
The victim and his co-worker used a "cherry picker" manlift to reach the I-beam rail in question. The rail
ran parallel to the floor of the structure at a height of approximately 50 feet. A heavy frost the preceding
night had left a coating of ice on all exposed steel at the site.
After visually looking at the beam in question for a moment, the victim told his co-worker to lower the
manlift, move it to the other end of the beam, and meet him (the victim) there. In the meantime he (the victim)
would exit the manlift and walk the beam to check it out.
The co-worker told the victim that the beam was covered with ice and that he could not walk on it,
whereupon the victim told the co-worker not to worry about it. The victim then stepped from the manlift
to the beam. The co-worker lowered the manlift bucket from the beam and began to move it to the area
designated by his supervisor.
As the co-worker was moving the manlift to the new position, he observed the victim lying on the ground
approximately 40 feet down the rail from his starting position. Although the fall was not witnessed, it
appears the victim slipped on the ice-covered beam.
The co-worker immediately summoned assistance and the plant Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT's)
responded to the scene. The victim was still breathing at this time, and the EMT's attempted to stabilize the
victim while awaiting the arrival of an ambulance to transport the victim to the hospital. The local
ambulance squad was called by both radio and telephone, and arrived on the scene approximately 25
minutes after the incident.
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The victim was placed in the ambulance and transported to the local hospital. En route to the hospital, the
victim stopped breathing and the EMT's were unable to detect a pulse. At this time they began
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). The victim was pronounced dead shortly after arrival at the
hospital.
It was later determined that the problem with the overhead crane had nothing to do with the "alignment"
of the frame rails, but was instead an electrical problem.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner's report gave the cause of death as massive head injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should continually stress to all employees the importance of following
established safety rules and procedures at all times.
Discussion: In accordance with the OSHA Act, P.L. 91-596, Section 5(b), "Each employee shall comply
with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders ... which are applicable
to his own actions and conduct." The employer in this incident managed a comprehensive and detailed
safety program on the project which addressed the hazards to which their employees could reasonably
expect to be exposed. Existing company safety policies at the time of the incident required all employees
to be tied-off whenever they were working above ground level, prohibited going out onto structural steel
without authorization from the iron superintendent, and prohibited entering a work area without
authorization. Violation of any one of these policies would have been grounds for dismissal. The fact that
the incident occurred in spite of these policies clearly shows the need for employers to continually remind
all employees of the importance of following established safety rules and procedures at all times.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that workers are aware of and follow established
"chain-of-command" reporting procedures whenever any problems or potential problems are detected.
Discussion: An established chain-of-command procedure existed for reporting any problems detected at
the jobsite. Had this procedure been followed, the electrician would have reported the perceived problem
to his supervisor, who would then have reported the problem to the iron superintendent for resolution.
REFERENCE
1. Public Law 91-596, December 29, 1970, the "Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970", Section
5(b).
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FACE 90-25:  Concrete Contractor/Finisher Dies in Virginia Following a 36-foot Fall Through a
Floor Opening
SUMMARY
A concrete contractor/finisher fell 36 feet to his death through a floor opening after stepping on a sheet
of particle board which had been laid across the opening to cover it. At the time of the incident,
concrete had been poured onto floor panel forms on the third story of a building under construction.
The victim and a co-worker, holding opposite ends of a 16-foot aluminum strike-off (a straightedge
used to remove excess freshly-placed concrete), were moving backward as they screeded (smoothed
off/leveled up) the concrete. The victim had reached a point on the floor where an 8-inch by 8-inch
support "H" column was located. Directly behind the "H" column was a 48-inch by 91-inch floor
opening covered by a sheet of particle board. As the victim worked around the "H" column, he
inadvertently stepped on the particle board. The particle board bowed causing it to slip from its
supports, and the victim fell 36 feet to the ground floor. The victim was pronounced dead 1 hour later
at the incident site. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences,
employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii), which requires that floor opening covers be capable of
supporting the maximum intended load and so installed as to prevent accidental displacement
• consider and address worker safety in the planning phase of construction projects
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety program that includes, but is not limited
to, training and educating employees in the proper methods of covering/guarding floor openings
to prevent falls through the openings.
Additionally, prime contractors should:
• utilize contract language that requires subcontractors to implement a site-specific safety and
health program prior to the initiation of work.
INTRODUCTION
On February 6, 1990, a 42-year-old, male concrete contractor/ finisher died after falling 36 feet through
a floor opening. On February 20, 1990, officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health
Administration notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical
assistance. On March 1, 1990, a safety specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation.
The safety specialist reviewed the incident with the general contractor of the project and the state OSHA
compliance officer assigned to the case, and investigated and photographed the incident site. Reports
(police, emergency medical service, and medical examiner) were obtained at this time.
The employer in this incident was a concrete contractor/finisher who had been in operation for 20 years.
The contractor employed 6 workers and had no written safety rules or procedures. Additionally, the
contractor did not require the use of any personal protective equipment on the job.
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INVESTIGATION
A concrete contractor/finisher had been subcontracted to supply and finish the concrete for flooring work in a
newly constructed three-story 60,000-square-foot building. The building skeleton steel, outer walls, floor joists,
concrete floor form panels, and reinforcement wire had been previously constructed at the third-story level.
On the day of the incident, two crews of three men each were working in different locations on the third floor
of the building. The crews were screeding (smoothing off/leveling up) the concrete as it was being poured on
the formwork. The victim (the owner) and one co-worker were using a 16-foot aluminum strike-off (a
straightedge used to remove excess, freshly-placed concrete, mortar, or plaster) to screed the concrete surface,
while the third co-worker spread the concrete with a rake (Figure). The three workers were moving backwards
as they worked on the concrete surface. An 8-inch by 8-inch support "H" column was located directly in the path
of the victim. Approximately 2 feet behind the "H" column was a 48-inch by 91-inch floor opening designed
to accommodate future ductwork for the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system. The floor opening was
covered with a 1/2-inch-thick by 48-inch-wide by 92 1/2-inch-long section of particle board (a generic term used
to describe panel products made from discrete particles of wood or other ligno-cellulosic material rather than
fibers). The words "DO NOT STEP ON THIS" were painted on the surface of the covering. As the victim and
fellow co-worker screeded the concrete near the "H" column, the victim moved backwards around the column
and stepped on the floor opening cover. The cover bowed under the victim's weight, causing it to dislodge from
its supports. The victim and cover fell through the opening 36 feet to the ground floor. Upon landing on the floor
the victim struck the back of his head on the concrete foundation supporting the "H" column.
Workers on the ground floor observed the victim falling and striking the ground, whereupon they
immediately summoned help. An emergency medical service (EMS), located two blocks from the incident
site, arrived approximately 3 minutes after being called. Upon arrival at the scene, the EMS checked the
victim but could not detect any vital signs. The medical examiner arrived 1 hour after the incident occurred
and pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as extensive basilar skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii), which requires that
floor opening covers shall be capable of supporting the maximum intended load and so installed as to
prevent accidental displacement (1).
Discussion: Employers should ensure that all floor openings are guarded with covers which can support
the intended weight, and are installed to prevent movement or displacement.
Recommendation #2: Employers should consider and address worker safety during the planning phase
of construction projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be addressed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout the entire project. Such a procedure would allow for the identification of potential
hazards prior to the initiation of work so that appropriate intervention strategies could be implemented.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: Employers should emphasize worker safety by developing, implementing, and enforcing a
comprehensive safety program to reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to hazardous situations. The
safety program should include, but not be limited to, the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards and
include appropriate worker training.
Recommendation #4: Prime contractors and subcontractors should contractually agree on specific site
safety and health programs to be implemented before subcontractors begin work.
Discussion: Prime contractors should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to identify how
they intend to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Subcontractors' safety programs should be consistent and compatible with the prime contractor's safety
program. Any differences should be negotiated before work begins.
REFERENCE
(1) Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. p. 193. July 1, 1989.
Figure.  Three Story Building Under Construction
206
FACE 90-28:  Carpenter Dies Following an 11-foot Fall from a Roof in North Carolina.
SUMMARY
A carpenter died after falling 11 feet from the roof of a garage under construction. Prior to the incident, the
walls of the garage had been finished with brick veneer, the roof trusses were covered with sheets of
plywood, and the frame work for a dormer, which was located on the apex of the garage roof, had been
completed. On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were assigned the task of boxing up (i.e.,
closing in, by nailing sheeting to studs or otherwise encasing) the dormer. The men climbed a ladder to the
roof, ascended the roof to the dormer, and positioned themselves on opposite sides of the dormer. The
victim apparently slipped or tripped, fell to a sitting position, and slid feet-first down and off the edge of
the roof. He struck the back of his head on the brick veneer garage wall upon landing at ground level. The
victim was pronounced dead approximately 24 hours later in the local hospital. NIOSH investigators
concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.104, which requires the use of safety belts, lifelines, and lanyards when
working from elevations
• consider and address worker safety in the planning phase of construction projects
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety program that includes, but is not limited
to, training in fall hazard recognition and the use of fall protection devices.
INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 1990, a 34-year-old male carpenter died after falling 11 feet from a garage roof the
previous day. On February 22, 1990, officials of the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested
technical assistance. On March 29, 1990, two safety specialists from DSR travelled to the incident site, and
conducted an investigation. The DSR investigators reviewed the incident with the owner of the company,
the jobsite foreman, and the state OSHA compliance officer assigned to the case, investigated and
photographed the incident site, and obtained a copy of the victim's death certificate.
The employer is a general contractor who has been in operation for 23 years. The contractor employs 205
workers, including 15 carpenters. The contractor has no designated safety officer or written safety
procedures, but does conduct bi-weekly "tool box" safety meetings from safety articles obtained outside
the company. The victim had worked for the employer for 3 years and 5 months.
INVESTIGATION
The general contractor had started work on a private residence with an attached 26-foot by 39-foot garage,
4 months prior to the incident. The structure had been partially completed. The foundation, framing,
exterior walls, wiring, plumbing, and windows had all been installed; and the roof trusses had been covered
with plywood sheeting.
On the morning of the incident, a total of 10 workers (brick masons, laborers, and carpenters) were
continuing work on the structure at different locations. The victim and a co-worker had been assigned to
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complete boxing up the dormer located on the apex of the garage roof. The roof had a 5:12 pitch (i.e., the
roof rose 5 inches for every 12 feet in length) with bare plywood sheeting covering the roof trusses. The
edge of the roof was approximately 11 feet above the ground (Figure).
Prior to the incident, the walls of the garage had been finished with brick veneer, the roof trusses were
covered with sheets of plywood, and the frame work for a dormer, which was located on the apex of the
garage roof, had been completed. On the day of the incident, the victim and his co-worker climbed a ladder
to the garage roof and proceeded to the dormer. The workers positioned themselves on opposite sides of
the dormer and started to work. Exactly what happened is unknown, but the victim either slipped or tripped,
fell to a sitting position, then slid feet-first down the plywood covered roof and fell off the roof edge. The
victim fell approximately 11 feet to the ground where he struck the back of his head against the brick veneer
garage wall. The jobsite foreman, who was approximately 20 feet away talking with a mason, saw the
victim fall and strike the ground. The foreman told the mason to telephone for help. An emergency medical
unit arrived in less than 5 minutes. They stabilized the victim and then transported him to the local hospital.
The victim was pronounced dead approximately 24 hours later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The death certificate listed the cause of death as severe head injury. An autopsy was not performed.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.104, which requires the use of safety
belts, lifelines, and lanyards when working form elevations.
Discussion: When working from elevations employers should provide personal protective equipment
(PPE) (i.e., safety belt, lifeline, and lanyard) to employees exposed to fall hazards. Employers should
provide and enforce the use of PPE in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.104. (1)
Recommendation #2: Employers should address worker safety in the planning phase of construction
projects.
Discussion: Worker safety issues should be discussed and incorporated into all construction projects during
planning and throughout the entire project. The planning for and incorporation of safety measures, prior
to any work being performed at construction sites, will help to identify potential worker hazards so that
preventive measures can be implemented at the site.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: Employers should emphasize safety of their employees by developing, implementing, and enforcing
a comprehensive safety program. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, training workers in
the proper selection and use of PPE, along with the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards.
REFERENCE
(1) Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. pp. 105-106. July 1, 1989.
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Figure.  Brick Veneer Garage
(side view)
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FACE 91-07:  Sheet Metal Worker Dies After Falling 35 Feet to a Concrete Floor
SUMMARY
A 54-year-old male sheet metal installer (victim) died after falling 35 feet while installing roof rake angle
iron on an outer roof edge of a processing plant under construction. The rake angle sets the wall line at the
top of a building and provides anchor points for the structure's exterior panels. On the day of the incident
the victim and a co-worker were installing 10-foot sections of rake angle iron to the outer roof edge of the
structure. The rake angle iron was being attached to the outer edge of 5-inch-wide I-beams which supported
the steel roof joists. The perpendicular I-beams were bolted to 35-foot-high, 8-inch steel "H"-shaped
support columns. The victim was carrying a piece of rake angle iron across the I-beam when a co-worker
saw him lose his balance and fall 35 feet to a concrete floor. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order
to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• comply with existing OSHA  regulations regarding fall protection for workers exposed to fall hazards
• evaluate alternative methods of installing rake angle
• develop and implement a  safety program designed to help workers recognize, understand, and
control hazards.
INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 1990, a 54-year-old male sheet metal worker died after falling 35 feet onto a concrete
floor from a steel I-beam. On November 14, 1990, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and
Health Administration notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical
assistance. On December 6, 1990, two safety specialists traveled to the incident site to conduct an
investigation. The incident was reviewed with the jobsite superintendent and the OSHA compliance
officer. Photographs of the incident site, the police and coroner's report, and the death certificate were
obtained during the investigation.
The employer is a general contractor that specializes in constructing industrial complexes and commercial
and multi-family dwellings. The employer has been in operation for 15 years and employs 254 workers,
including 12 sheet metal workers. The employer has no written safety policy or safety program. Safety
materials supplied by insurance companies have been collected over the years and are used during weekly
"tailgate" safety meetings conducted by the jobsite superintendent. Worker training is conducted on the job.
INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to construct a 74,000-square-foot mineral processing plant. Company
employees had been working at the site for 7 months. On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker
were attaching 10-foot-long sections of rake angle iron to the outer roof edge of the structure. The rake angle
iron sets the wall line at the top of the structure and provides anchor points for the structure's exterior siding
panels. The rake angle iron was being attached to the outer side of 5-inch-wide I-beams. The I-beams were
attached to the top of 35-foot-high, 8-inch steel "H"-shaped support columns (Figure). The bolts attaching
the I-beams to the support columns protruded 2 inches above the top of the beam.
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 The victim was walking along the 5-inch I-beam flange carrying a piece of angle iron. A co-worker was
walking behind him. Both men were wearing safety belts with lanyards, but neither man was tied off to
a lifeline. No lifelines or catenary lines were present on the roof. The men would tie off to the 4-inch steel
purlins (ceiling joists) only when sitting and making connections. The co-worker saw the victim suddenly
lose his balance and fall to the concrete floor below, landing on his face.
The job superintendent, who also saw the victim fall, immediately summoned the emergency medical
service (EMS) by telephone from the company trailer. Co-workers could not detect any vital signs. They
did not initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) because the victim's face was crushed. Upon arrival,
EMS personnel called the medical examiner, who pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
The co-worker stated that the victim had been in an area where bolts were protruding through the I-beam,
when he lost his balance. The co-worker was not certain whether the victim tripped over the bolts or lost
his balance for some other reason.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The county coroner listed head trauma as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should comply with existing OSHA regulations regarding fall
protection for workers.
 Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.105 (a) states, "Safety nets shall be provided when workplaces are more than
25 feet above the ground or water surface, or other surfaces where the use of ladders, scaffolds, catch
platforms, temporary floors, safety lines, or safety belts is impractical." Both men were wearing safety belts
and lanyards. However, there were no lifelines or catenary lines present on the roof to use as tie-off points.
Recommendation #2: Employers should evaluate alternative construction methods for installing rake
angle components.
Discussion: Lifelines were not present on the roof because the workers only tied off to the steel purlins when
they were sitting and making connections. No fall protection was afforded the workers while they were
walking across the beams and purlins. Alternative methods of installation that lessen worker exposure to
falls should be explored. At the time of the NIOSH investigation, a scissors lift was present at the jobsite.
One possible alternative work procedure might be to install the rake iron while working from the scissors
lift. This method may have reduced the exposure to a fall hazard.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop and implement a safety program designed to help
workers recognize, understand, and control hazards.
Discussion: OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(2) states, "the employer shall instruct each employee in
the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment
to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." Companies should evaluate the
tasks performed by workers, identify potential hazards, develop and implement a safety program
addressing these hazards, and provide worker training in safe work procedures.
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REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.105(a) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register.
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FACE 91-11:  Ironworker Dies in Ohio Following a 20-foot Fall Through a Skylight Opening
SUMMARY
A 38-year-old ironworker (the victim) fell 20 feet to his death through an unguarded skylight opening. At
the time of the incident, a roof had been constructed over the enclosure surrounding a new bottling operation
inside an existing bottling plant. The victim and a foreman were working overtime to finish welding support
hangers for the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system. The foreman was welding on
the roof of the existing building (external roof), while the victim worked on the newly constructed roof
(enclosure roof), about 15-20 feet directly below. The victim was apparently in the process of putting fire
blankets over the existing ductwork when he either tripped and fell, or stepped, into an 18-inch by 24-inch
skylight opening. The victim fell 20 feet and landed on the concrete floor, striking the back of his head. The
victim was pronounced dead 2 hours later at the emergency room of a local hospital. NIOSH investigators
concluded that, to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(4) and 1926.500 (f)(6), which require that wherever there is
danger of falling through a skylight opening, it shall be guarded by a fixed standard railing on
all exposed sides, or a cover capable of supporting the maximum intended load and so installed
as to prevent accidental displacement
• develop and/or enforce safety programs that include, but are not limited to, training and
educating employees in the proper methods of covering/guarding skylight openings to prevent
falls through the openings
• identify hazards and appropriate safety interventions in the design and review phases of
construction projects
• provide fall protection measures along unguarded roof perimeters as required by 29 CFR
1926.500 (d)(1)
• install permanent railings around skylight perimeters or protective screens over individual
skylights once construction is completed.
Additionally, property owners, prime contractors, and subcontractors should:
• ensure that areas of responsibility for safety and health issues are clearly specified as part of the
contract provisions.
INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 1991, a 38-year-old ironworker died after falling 20 feet through a skylight opening. On
February 19, 1991, officials of the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Division of Safety & Hygiene,
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical assistance. On March
14, 1991, a DSR safety specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The incident was
reviewed with personnel from the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, the employer, and the victim's
foreman. A video of the incident site and the medical examiner's report were also obtained.
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The employer involved in this incident is a metal fabrication and erection contractor which had been in
operation for 18 months. The contractor employs 55 workers, including 20 ironworkers. The employer has
a safety policy, designated safety officer, and a comprehensive safety program which contains specific safe
job procedures. The employer provides on-the-job training, which is included in the 3-year apprentice
program, and jobsite foremen conduct weekly tool box safety meetings. The victim worked for the
employer for only 6 weeks, but had 20 years' experience as an ironworker.
INVESTIGATION
A metal fabrication and erection contractor had been selected as a subcontractor to supply and erect an
enclosure around a bottling operation located inside an existing building. At the time of the incident, the
enclosure's steel skeleton and roof had been constructed. The roof frame was constructed with 3-inch angle
steel, with 3-foot by 8-foot sheets of 14-gauge stainless steel welded to the frame. The roof area was 36
feet long, by 30 feet wide and contained twelve 18-inch by 24-inch skylight openings. The roof had a 1:6
pitch (i.e., the roof rose 1 foot for every 6 feet in width; see Figure).
On the day of the incident, two workers--the victim and a foreman--agreed to work overtime to finish
welding support hangers for the HVAC system. About 6:45 p.m. the foreman was welding on the external
roof, directly above the newly- constructed enclosure roof, attaching support hangers to the external roof's
structural steel. Previously, before the welding began, the victim had been instructed to cover ductwork
located below the welding operation with fire blankets (i.e., material with the ability to withstand fire).
Although no one saw the victim fall, evidence at the site suggests that the victim was in the process of
covering the ductwork with a fire blanket and either tripped on the angle iron and fell into, or stepped
backwards into, a skylight opening. The victim apparently fell 20 feet and landed on the concrete floor,
striking the back of his head.
The foreman, who had seen the victim 15 minutes previously, discovered the victim lying on the concrete
floor. The victim was conscious, but bleeding from the ears, nose, and mouth. The emergency medical
service was called and arrived about 25 minutes later. The victim was transported to the emergency room
of a local hospital where he died 2 hours later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as extensive basilar skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(4) and 1926.500 (f)(6), which
require that skylight openings be guarded by a fixed standard railing on all exposed sides, or a cover
capable of supporting the maximum intended load, and so installed as to prevent accidental displacement.1
Discussion: The surface of the roof, 30 feet by 36 feet, contained twelve 18-inch by 24-inch skylight
openings. Employers should ensure that all skylight openings be secured with a fixed standard railing on
all exposed sides, or a cover which would support a worker's weight, and which would not be subject to
displacement.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and enforce safety programs that include, but are not
limited to, reducing or eliminating worker exposures to hazardous situations.
Discussion: Employers should emphasize worker safety by implementing and enforcing existing safety
programs to reduce or eliminate worker exposures to hazardous situations. Safety programs available at the
time of this incident included the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards and included worker training
which emphasized methods and materials for covering/guarding skylight openings to prevent falls through
the openings. About 2 weeks prior to the incident, the victim attended a tool box meeting which addressed
recognition and avoidance of fall hazards.
Recommendation #3: Employers should identify hazards and appropriate safety interventions in the
design and review phases of construction projects.
Discussion: Worker safety requirements should be addressed and incorporated into construction project
designs and working drawings during the planning phase and throughout the life of the project. Hazard
identification at this preliminary stage allows lead time for training, intervention and protective equipment
allocation. As review and design can be ongoing processes, hazard recognition and safety intervention can
also be ongoing.
Recommendation #4: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1), which requires that every
open-sided floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a
standard railing, or the equivalent.
Discussion: Employers should use an appropriate fall protection system, or a combination of applicable
systems (e.g., warning lines, guardrails, platforms, safety belts, nets, safety monitoring system, etc.,), to
protect employees from falling off the edge of roofs, as required by 29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1).
Recommendation #5: Building owners should consider installing permanent railings around skylight
perimeters or protective covers over individual skylights once construction is completed, to guard against
falls through skylights by maintenance or other personnel who must access the roof.
Discussion: After completing construction of the enclosure, maintenance or other employees of the bottling
plant will still have foreseeable needs to access the roof. The possibility of falling through a laminate
covered skylight will still exist. Building owners should consider installing permanent railings around the
perimeter of the skylight area, or protective screens over individual skylights, to eliminate the hazard of
falling through the skylights once construction is completed.
Recommendation #6: Property owners, prime contractors, and subcontractors should ensure that areas
of responsibility for safety and health issues are clearly specified as part of the contract provisions.
Discussion: Contracts between all parties (i.e., property owners, prime contractors, and subcontractors)
should contain language that identifies the specific site safety and health programs to be implemented before
the initiation of work. Any safety program should be consistent and compatible with the agreed upon
language, and any differences should be negotiated before work begins. Where prime contractors and
subcontractors are involved, the contract should contain clear and concise language as to which party is
responsible for each safety and health issue. The respective parties should periodically inspect worksites
to ensure that the provisions of the contract regarding safety and health issues are being upheld.
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REFERENCE
1. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. PO-13.108-Rule.
July 1, 1990.
Figure.  Bottling Line Enclosure/Roof
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FACE 91-15:  Millwright Foreman Dies in South Carolina Following a 41-foot Fall Through a
Platform Opening
SUMMARY
A 36-year-old millwright foreman (victim) fell 41 feet to his death through an unguarded platform opening.
At the time of the incident, an open-sided steel structure had been constructed to support eight air-
conditioning units on the platform. Four air-conditioning units had been installed and the fifth unit had been
lifted into position by a crane. In order to level the unit, three millwrights were positioned on one side of
the air-conditioning unit, while the victim was kneeling on the opposite side. The victim stood up and
apparently tripped or stumbled and fell backwards landing on the steel grating of the platform walkway.
Momentum from the fall caused the victim to roll into an adjacent opening which was about 17 feet long
by 7 feet wide. The victim fell through the opening, struck a steel support crossbeam about 20 feet below,
and fell an additional 21 feet to the ground. The victim was pronounced dead 4 hours later at the emergency
room of a local hospital. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent future similar occurrences,
employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(1) and 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii), which require that wherever there
is danger of falling through a floor opening, it shall be guarded by a standard railing and
toeboards on all exposed sides, or a cover capable of supporting the maximum intended load and
so installed as to prevent accidental displacement
• identify hazards and appropriate safety interventions in the design and review phases of
construction projects
• provide fall protection measures along unguarded roof perimeters as required by 29 CFR
1926.500 (d)(1), and install permanent railings around the perimeter of the platform once
construction is completed
• conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections to ensure that safety procedures are
being followed.
INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 1991, a 36-year-old millwright foreman died after falling 41 feet through a platform opening.
On April 29, 1991, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical assistance.
On May 30, 1991, two DSR safety specialists and a safety engineer traveled to the incident site to conduct
an investigation. The incident was reviewed with a representative from the company and with the OSHA
compliance officer assigned to the case. Photographs of the incident site and a copy of the death certificate
were obtained.
The company involved in this incident has been in business for 8 1/2 years and provides various services,
including crane and tractor-trailer rentals, steel erection, and equipment/machinery installation. The
company employs 50 workers, including 3 millwright foremen. The company has a written safety policy,
designated safety director, and a written safety program, which includes a hazard communication program.
The foremen conduct monthly safety meetings, and all employees are given safe work practices handbooks
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at the time they are hired. The victim worked for the employer for 5 years, but had approximately 11 years'
experience as a millwright foreman.
INVESTIGATION
The company had been sub-contracted to erect an open-sided steel structure and platform, about 40 feet
high, and to install eight air-conditioning units on top of the flat platform. The steel structure and platform
had been completed and four air-conditioning units had been installed at the time of the incident. The steel-
grating platform was 36 feet wide by 60 feet long with eight openings, which were each approximately 17
feet long by 7 feet wide. Air conditioning units were installed in four of the openings, and installation of
the fifth air conditioner was in process (see Figure).
On the day of the incident, a crew of four workers, consisting of a millwright foreman and three millwrights-
a millwright is a mechanic specializing, in the installation of heavy machinery/equipment--were continuing
work to complete the installation of the air-conditioning units. The fifth air conditioner had been positioned
in the opening on the platform by crane.
At the time of the incident, the crew was working on all four sides of the air conditioner, positioning shims
under the unit to level it. The foreman was kneeling on the steel grating between the air conditioner and
an adjacent opening. When he tried to stand up, he apparently tripped or stumbled, and fell backwards, onto
the steel grating of the platform walkway. Momentum from the fall caused the victim to roll into the opening.
The victim fell through the opening, struck a steel crossbeam about 20 feet below, and fell an additional
21 feet to the ground.
Two millwrights rushed to the victim, while the third millwright ran to a telephone and called the emergency
medical service (EMS). The EMS arrived about 10 minutes after being contacted, stabilized the victim, and
transported him to the local hospital. The victim was later transported by helicopter to another hospital
where he was pronounced dead 4 hours after the incident occurred.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The death certificate listed the cause of death as severe closed head injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(1) and 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii),
which require that wherever there is danger of falling through a floor opening, it shall be guarded by
a standard railing and toeboards on all exposed sides, or a cover capable of supporting the maximum
intended load and so installed as to prevent accidental displacement. (1)
Discussion: The floor surface of the platform, 36 feet by 60 feet, contained eight 16-foot 8-inch long by
6-foot 8-inch wide openings. Employers should ensure that all platform openings be secured with a fixed
standard railing and toeboards on all exposed sides, or a cover which would support a worker's weight, and
which would not be subject to displacement.
Note: A safety belt and lanyard was found on the platform at the incident site, but whether or not
the safety equipment had been used prior to the incident could not be ascertained.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should identify hazards and appropriate safety interventions in the
design and review phases of construction projects.
Discussion: Worker safety requirements should be addressed and incorporated into construction project
designs and working drawings during the planning phase and throughout the life of the project. Hazard
control procedures specified in various working drawings point to newly created or developing hazards,
and allow lead time for developing safe work practices and procedures, including training and protective
equipment needs. As review and design are ongoing processes, hazard recognition and safety intervention
should also be ongoing processes.
Recommendation #3: Employers should provide fall protection measures along unguarded roof
perimeters as required by 29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1) (2), and building owners should consider installing
permanent railings around the perimeter of the platform once construction is completed.
Discussion: Employers should use an appropriate fall protection system, or a combination of applicable
systems (e.g., warning lines, guardrails, platforms, safety belts, nets, safety monitoring system etc.), to
protect employees from falling off the edge of roofs, as required by 29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1).
Additionally, after construction of the platform and installation of the air-conditioning units is completed,
maintenance or other employees will still have foreseeable need to access the platform. The possibility of
falling off the sides of the platform will still exist. Building owners should consider installing permanent
railings around the perimeter of the platform to eliminate the hazard of falling off the sides of the platform
once construction is completed.
Recommendation #4: Employers should conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections
regularly at each jobsite.
Discussion: Although the company has a written safety program which includes monthly safety meetings,
scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted on a regular basis. To be effective, a
safety program must be enforced at the worksite. Regular company safety inspections demonstrate to
workers that the company is committed to enforcing its safety policies and procedures.
REFERENCE
1. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. p. 190 and p. 193 July 1,
1990.
2. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. p. 191 July 1, 1990.
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Figure.  Open-sided Steel Structure Platform.
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FACE 91-18:  Journeyman Ironworker Dies Following a 22.5-foot Fall From a Walkway in
Maryland
SUMMARY
A journeyman ironworker died after falling 22.5 feet from the structural steel supports for a walkway
platform which was under construction. The walkway had been partially completed (i.e., the structural steel
frame, steel grating, and handrails/ toeboards had been installed up to the position where the crew members
were working). Before the incident, the victim had been welding structural steel support beams for the
walkway from a position approximately 8 feet above the co-worker. While the fall was unwitnessed, the
co-worker stated he felt something hit his welding hood, and when he looked around he saw the victim
falling. The victim struck a drive shaft located in a pit about 12 feet below the area where he was working,
and came to rest at the base of the pit about 22.5 feet below the walkway platform (Figure). NIOSH
investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide and enforce the use of personal protective equipment
• conduct a jobsite hazard analysis before each job and implement appropriate controls
• periodically monitor jobsites to evaluate field compliance with company safety rules and
procedures.
INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 1991, a 62-year-old male journeyman ironworker (victim) fell 22.5 feet from a walkway
platform which was under construction. The victim died 2 days later as a result of injuries he sustained in
the fall. On May 30, 1991, officials of the Occupational Safety and Health program from the State of
Maryland, notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death and requested technical assistance.
On June 20, 1991, a safety specialist from DSR traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation.
The DSR investigator reviewed the incident with the employer, plant representatives, and State OSHA
personnel. Photographs of the incident site and copies of the police report were also obtained.
The employer in this incident is an industrial building construction company with about 5000 employees
throughout the country. At the time of the incident, 300 employees were working at the jobsite, including
45 journeymen ironworkers. Most of the employees are ironworkers, carpenters, electricians, pipefitters,
boilermakers, and laborers hired through their respective local union halls. The victim had approximately
20 years of experience as a journeyman ironworker and had been employed by the company for only 2
days. The company employs a safety staff of 10 persons, including a corporate-level safety manager, a
manager of field safety, a safety engineer, and several field safety personnel. The employer has a written
safety policy and written procedures on the use of fall protection equipment and fall prevention methods.
The general foreman at each construction site is responsible for jobsite safety issues, and "tailgate" safety
meetings are conducted weekly.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to build various structures as part of a renovation project for a steel
producing facility. About 300 construction employees were working at the jobsite. Work at the incident
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site included the installation of a walkway platform to access process machinery, piping, and control panels.
The walkway platform had been partially completed (i.e., walkway sections complete with steel grating
and handrails and toeboards had been installed).
On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker had been assigned to continue their work installing
additional sections of the walkway platform. The walkway platform section being worked on was
approximately 6-feet wide by 10-feet long. Supports for the section were being welded by the victim, while
the co-worker was welding brackets in a pit below the walkway platform. The victim was positioned on
the structural steel supports next to a pit about 22.5 feet deep, while the co-worker welded brackets in the
pit area about 8 feet below him (Figure). Although both workers were wearing safety belts and lanyards,
neither worker was tied off.
While the fall was unwitnessed, the co-worker stated he was welding when something hit his welding hood,
and as he looked around, he saw the victim falling. The victim fell about 12 feet and struck, face first, a metal
drive shaft in the pit. The victim's body then landed on the concrete floor of the pit about 22.5 feet below
the walkway platform.
The co-worker yelled "man in the hole," and climbed down to help the injured worker. A foreman working
in the area heard the call for help and radioed for emergency medical service. In the interim, other workers
brought a stretcher to the victim and removed him from the incident area. Within 3 minutes an emergency
medical technician (EMT) arrived at the scene, checked the victim, and found no pulse or respiration. The
EMT began cardiopulmonary resuscitation while awaiting the ambulance that arrived 15 minutes after the
incident occurred. The victim was stabilized and transported to an airlift landing zone. He was then flown
by helicopter to a shock-trauma unit at a nearby hospital, where he remained in the critical care unit on
assisted life support until his death 2 days after the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as head and neck injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should comply with existing OSHA regulations regarding fall
protection for workers.
Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.28(a) states, "The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of
appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous
conditions or where this part indicates the need for using such equipment to reduce the hazards to the
employees." Both workers were wearing safety belts and lanyards. However, neither worker was tied-off
to a secure point, and no lifeline was present to use as a tie-off point.
Recommendation #2: Hazard analysis should be included as an ongoing part of each construction
phase.
Discussion: Before starting each phase of the construction, each crew foreman should identify and review
the potential hazards with his crew and discuss how to control the hazards and how the work can be done
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safely. These discussions should include information on hazards in the immediate work area as well as
information on the activities of other work crews on the site that could create additional hazards for workers.
Recommendation #3: Employers should periodically monitor jobsites to evaluate field compliance with
company safety rules and procedures.
Discussion: Employers should conduct periodic scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections to ensure
that employees are performing their assigned tasks according to established safe work procedures. To be
effective, a safety program must be enforced at the worksite. Regular company safety inspections show
workers that the company is committed to enforcing its safety policies and procedures. Any violations of
safety rules should be corrected immediately.
REFERENCES
1. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. p. 21 July 1, 1990.
Figure.  Walkway/platform
(Top view)
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FACE 91-27:  Cleaning Maid Dies in Ohio Following a 12-foot Fall Through a Floor Opening
SUMMARY
A 71-year-old cleaning maid (victim) fell 12 feet to her death through an unguarded floor opening. At the
time of the incident, an access door to a lower-level boiler room had been left open in the floor of the hall
to the men's showers; a maintenance mechanic was servicing the heating plant for the municipal swimming
pool. The cleaning maid, who was walking backwards as she mopped down the floor to the men's showers,
backed into the access door opening and fell about 12 feet onto the cement floor below. The victim was
transported to the trauma center of a hospital in a neighboring state where she died 7 days later from injuries
sustained in the fall. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent future similar occurrences, village and
municipal administrations should:
• implement 29 CFR 1910.23 (a)(3)(i), which requires that every hatchway floor opening shall be
guarded by a hinged floor opening cover of standard strength and construction equipped with
standard railings or permanently attached thereto so as to leave only one exposed side. When
the opening is not in use, the cover shall be closed or the exposed side shall be guarded at both
top and     intermediate positions by removable standard railings
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety program that includes, but is not limited to,
training and educating employees in the proper methods of covering/guarding floor openings, and
of surveying work areas prior to beginning work, to prevent falls through openings
• conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections to ensure that safety procedures are
being followed.
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1991, a 71-year-old cleaning maid fell 12 feet through an open floor-level access door. On
August 5, 1991, officials from a Pennsylvania Coroner's Office notified the Division of Safety Research
(DSR) of the victim's subsequent death on August 2, 1991, and requested technical assistance. On August
21, 1991, a supervisory industrial hygienist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The
incident was reviewed with representatives from the village. Photographs of the incident site and a copy
of the death certificate were obtained.
The village involved in this incident had been incorporated for 79 years and provided various services, including
parks and the municipal swimming pool. The village employed 37 to 47 workers, including 7 regular full-time
and 30 to 40 part-time laborers. The village had no written safety policy, designated safety director, nor written
safety program. The victim had worked as a cleaning maid for the village for 8 years 3 months.
INVESTIGATION
The village had a municipal swimming pool constructed in a structure shared with the municipal fire
department. The swimming pool was serviced each day by two cleaning maids who mopped floors and
performed other janitorial work. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, a mechanic from the village
would arrive before doors opened to the public to add chlorine to, and service the filters and boilers on, the
pool water system.
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On the day of the incident, both cleaning maids were mopping the men's locker room when the mechanic
stopped in to let them know that he would be in and out of the mechanical/maintenance room servicing the
pool. The mechanic left and the cleaning maids continued mopping the area. One cleaning maid continued
mopping into the hall and adjoining ladies locker/shower facilities, while the other cleaning maid (victim)
mopped in the other direction through the men's shower facilities into the connecting hallway to the pool
area. This hallway also served as the access to the main and lower-level mechanical/maintenance areas of
the building.
As the victim was mopping backwards down the hall, she backed into a access opening in the hall floor
that had been left open by the mechanic as he traveled to-and-from the pool from the lower-level mechanical
room. The victim fell through the opening, and landed on the concrete floor of the mechanical room, 12
feet below. The mechanic, who was working in the mechanical room at the time, heard the fall and
immediately summoned the other cleaning maid to call for help. The local emergency medical service
(EMS) was called to the scene. Because of the victim's condition, EMS elected to transport the victim by
helicopter to a trauma center at a regional hospital. The victim died 7 days later from injuries sustained from
the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The death certificate listed the cause of death as blunt force trauma to the head and chest with atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease contributing.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Village and municipal administrations should implement 29 CFR 1910.23
(a)(3)(i), which requires that every hatchway floor opening shall be guarded by a hinged floor opening
cover of standard strength and construction equipped with standard railings or permanently attached
thereto so as to leave only one exposed side. When the opening is not in use, the cover shall be closed
or the exposed side shall be guarded at both top and intermediate positions by removable standard
railings. (1)
Discussion: Standard removable railings installed at the location of the open, hinged floor cover would
prevent someone from walking directly into an opening and falling through. Entry through a swinging gate
or offset in the railing would prevent direct, inadvertent access to such an opening.
Recommendation #2: Village and municipal administrations should develop, implement, and enforce
a comprehensive safety program that includes, but is not limited to, training and educating employees
in the proper methods of covering/guarding floor openings, and of surveying work areas for hazards
prior to beginning work, to prevent falls through openings.
Discussion: Whenever a floor-level opening is left uncovered/ unguarded, there is a danger of falling
through that should be controlled by some type of barrier or temporary cover. A warning sign could be used
to provide additional protection. It is also inherently unsafe to work backwards into an area that has not first
been surveyed for hazards. A comprehensive safety program based upon job safety analyses for all village
work positions should be developed and implemented.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should conduct scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections
regularly at each jobsite.
Discussion: To be effective, a safety program must be enforced at the worksite. Regular safety inspections
demonstrate to workers that the village or municipality is committed to enforcing its safety policies and
procedures. These inspections also provide opportunity to observe previously unidentified hazards and
implement appropriate preventative or intervention controls. Assessments of occupational safety and
health hazards as addressed by federal and state standards should be an active part of this safety inspection
process.
REFERENCE
1. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1910. p. 98. July 1, 1990.
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FACE 91-33:  Iron Worker Dies Following an 89-Foot Fall Through an Opening in Temporary
Metal Flooring in Virginia
SUMMARY
A 26-year-old male iron worker (victim) died from injuries sustained after falling through an unguarded
temporary floor opening to the ground 89 feet below. Workers had begun removing temporary metal
flooring from the fourth floor of a new paper processing facility. The workers then left the site without safely
securing a newly created 5-foot by 28-foot floor opening. The victim, who had been working on the roof
deck, descended to the fourth floor to get a drink from a water cooler. While there, co-workers reminded
him of some bolting he had missed on the same level. The victim was still wearing his safety belt and
lanyard, but did not tie-off to the existing static lines. As he was looking upward for missed bolting
locations, he walked off the edge of the flooring at the opening, and fell 89 feet to the ground. During the
fall, his head and chest struck against structural steel members causing massive injuries that resulted in his
death. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that workers do not leave a workplace until all floor openings have been safely secured
by barriers with warning signs or safety railings
• ensure that workers continually adhere to established safe work practices
• encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 1991, a 26-year-old male iron worker died from injuries sustained after falling through an
unguarded opening in a temporary metal floor to the ground 89 feet below. On August 29, 1991, officials
of the Virginia Department of Labor and Industries (VAOSHA), notified the Division of Safety Research
(DSR) of the fatality, and requested technical assistance. On September 25, 1991, a DSR Safety Engineer
traveled to the site to conduct an investigation. The fatality was reviewed with company representatives
and the VAOSHA compliance officer, and police and coroner reports were obtained. Photographs of the
site immediately following the incident were reviewed, and additional photographs were taken.
The employer was a steel erection company subcontracted to install the main structural steel elements of
a paper processing facility. The company had been in business for 18 months and had 55 employees,
including 6 iron workers. The company had a corporate safety officer, a comprehensive written safety
program, written safety procedures, and occasional, unscheduled safety meetings. Upon hire, employees
received general safety training with manuals and videos.
INVESTIGATION
The victim was one of six iron workers bolting-up (placing large nuts on bolts and then tightening) the
structural steel at the time of the incident. The structure was six stories high with a small seventh-story
penthouse. A 1/2-inch, wire-rope static line had been installed around the perimeter of each floor, and also
across the working space in several areas, for convenient tie-off. All employees had safety belts and
lanyards, and their use was rigorously enforced. Safety nets were also used, as appropriate. The work area
was very noisy and windy. On the morning of July 12, 1991, the victim and a co-worker were bolting-up
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steel on the roof deck (sixth floor). There were several hundred bolt locations on this job and many were
difficult to find.
About an hour before the fall, some of the temporary metal flooring had been removed from the fourth floor
because most of the work had been completed at that level. This left an opening 5 feet wide and 28 feet
long. The workers who removed the flooring left the fourth floor without safely securing the new opening.
At about 11:30 a.m., the victim left the roof deck to get a drink from the water cooler on the fourth floor.
Co-workers on the fifth floor shouted to the victim that he had missed a few bolts on that floor.
At about 11:55 a.m., the victim began walking along the fourth floor, looking upward for the missed bolts.
He was not tied off; the last time the victim had been on the fourth floor, all the flooring had been in place.
Co-workers above the victim saw him approach the floor opening and shouted warnings. The victim did
not hear them and fell through the opening. His head and chest struck against steel members during the fall,
and he struck the ground with such force that he was embedded six inches in the sandy soil. The site owners'
emergency response team responded within 2 minutes and started cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
At 12:00 p.m., an emergency medical service (EMS) arrived. The victim was completely unresponsive,
and bleeding profusely from the nose and mouth. He was transported to a local hospital, by the EMS, where
he was pronounced dead on arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed the cause of death as massive injuries to the head, neck, and chest.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that employees do not leave a workplace until all floor
openings have been safely secured by barriers with warning signs or by safety railings.
Discussion: When the victim had previously been on the fourth floor, it had been completely covered with
the temporary metal decking. The victim was not aware of an opening in the floor, so he casually walked
about. 29 CFR 1926.750(b)(1)(iii) contains specific requirements concerning floor periphery safety railing
for skeleton steel erection. Additional instruction in the avoidance and recognition of hazards may be
necessary to comply with 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(2) which states, "The employer shall instruct each employee
in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work
environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." The National Safety
Council also recognizes the need to guard floor openings (3).
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that workers continually adhere to established safe
work procedures.
Discussion: In this case, the victim removed his tie-off and descended to a lower level to get a drink of water.
He did not tie-off again upon reaching the lower level. Established company work practices required that
he tie off at both levels.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace
safety.
Discussion: If all workers actively participate in workplace safety, the level of awareness and avoidance
of hazards will improve. In this case, co-workers above the victim could see he was not tied-off, yet did
nothing to remind him to secure himself until it was to late to help. When the fall became inevitable, the
victim could not hear their warnings.
REFERENCES
1. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor, Title 29, Subtitle B, Chapter XVII,
Part 1926.21 (b) (2), p. 20. July 1,1990.
2. Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor, Title 29, Subtitle B, Chapter XVII,
Part 1926.750 (b) (1) (iii), p. 265. July 1,1990.
3. National Safety Council [1988]. Accident prevention manual for industrial operations: engineering and
technology, 9th ed. Laing pm, ed. Chicago, Il: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, p. 25.
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FACE 92-03:  Roofer Helper Dies Following a 22-foot Fall Through a Roof Opening in Virginia
SUMMARY
At the time of the incident, a crew of five workers, including a 21-year-old roofer helper (victim), were
performing various tasks on a newly constructed gymnasium roof. The victim finished applying weather
insulating strips on top of some corrugated metal roof panels, and asked the foreman what had to be done
in the area around the plywood. The foreman replied, "Wait until I finish cutting around this unit and I'll
show you, because there is a hole there." The victim walked to the area where a 4-foot-wide by 8-foot-long
sheet of plywood was covering the roof opening. The incident was unwitnessed; investigators believe the
victim either intentionally moved the plywood, lost his balance and fell, or unintentionally displaced the
plywood and stepped or tripped into a 29 1/2-inch by 35 3/4-inch roof opening. The victim fell 22 feet onto
the concrete floor, striking his head. The victim died approximately 17 hours later at the local hospital.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b) and 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii), which require that wherever there is
danger of falling through a floor opening, it shall be guarded by a standard railing and toe-
boards, or cover capable of supporting the maximum intended load and so installed as to prevent
accidental displacement
• design, develop, and  implement a verbal and/or written examination to reinforce and evaluate
the effectiveness of the safety training program.
INTRODUCTION
On October 2, 1991, a 21-year-old roofer helper died after falling 22 feet through a roof opening. On
October 18, 1991, officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration (VAOSHA)
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the fatality, and requested technical assistance. On
November 25, 1991, a DSR safety specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The
incident was reviewed with a representative from the company and the VAOSHA compliance officer
assigned to the case. A schematic of the incident site and a copy of the medical examiner's report were
obtained.
The employer in this incident was a roofing and sheet metal contractor who had been in operation for 81
years. The contractor employed about 80 workers, including 20 roofer helpers. The employer had a written
safety policy, a comprehensive written safety program, and a full-time designated safety officer. The
employer provided on-the-job training, and each new employee viewed a series of three safety-oriented
video tapes. The employer offered yearly cardiopulmonary resuscitation certification and first aid training
on a voluntary basis. Additionally, the jobsite foreman conducted toolbox safety meetings, and the safety
officer conducted unscheduled safety inspections at each jobsite. The victim had worked for the employer
for only 3 weeks prior to the incident.
INVESTIGATION
A roofing and sheet metal contractor had been subcontracted to provide and install roofing materials on an
addition to the gymnasium at a middle school. Work had been intermittent for about 1 year prior to the
incident. At the time of the incident, corrugated roofing panels had been secured to the roof deck, and
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weather insulating strips were being applied over the panels. The roof area was approximately 114 feet long
by 96 feet wide, and contained one roof hatch opening 29 1/2-inches wide by 35 3/4-inches long. The
opening was covered by a 4-foot-wide by 8-foot-long sheet of 5/8-inch-thick plywood. The roof had a 1:48
pitch (i.e., the roof rose 1 foot for every 48 feet) (Figure).
On the day of the incident, five workers--a foreman, two roofers, and two roofer helpers--were placing
insulating strips over the panels on the roof deck. About 8:25 a.m., the foreman was working on the roof
deck approximately 20 to 25 feet away from the roof opening. The victim, after finishing a task, approached
the foreman and asked what was to be done at the plywood area. The foreman replied "wait until I finish
cutting around this unit and I'll show you, because there is a hole there." The victim walked away in the
direction of the plywood as the foreman continued his task.
Although no one saw the victim fall, evidence at the site suggests that the victim had either intentionally
removed the plywood from the opening, lost his balance and fell, or unintentionally displaced the plywood
and stepped or tripped into the opening. The victim fell 22 feet to the concrete floor, striking his face and
head.
The foreman, upon hearing a noise, turned around and saw the victim falling through the opening. The foreman
yelled to the other crew members and they all descended from the roof to aid the victim. The victim was conscious,
but bleeding from the ears, nose, and mouth. The emergency medical service (EMS) was called and arrived about
10 minutes later. The victim was transported to the local hospital where he died 17 hours later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as a fractured skull and cerebral edema.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b) and 1926.500 (f)(5)(ii), which
require that floor openings be guarded by a standard railing and toe-boards, or a cover capable of
supporting the maximum intended load, and so installed as to prevent accidental displacement. (1)
Discussion: Although the one remaining roof opening was covered with a 4-foot-wide by 8-foot-long by
5/8-inch-thick piece of plywood, the plywood was not secured to prevent inadvertent displacement. Since
the incident was unwitnessed, a determination could not be made as to whether the victim intentionally or
unintentionally moved the plywood. Securing the plywood properly would have eliminated any unintentional
movement. Employers should ensure that all roof openings which have the potential of becoming hazards
during construction, be safeguarded in one of the following manners: The roof opening should be secured
with a standard railing and toe-boards on all exposed sides, or with a cover capable of supporting a worker's
weight without danger of displacement.
Recommendation #2: Employers should design, develop, and implement a verbal and/or written post-
training examination to reinforce and evaluate the effectiveness of the safety training program.
Discussion: Safety programs available at the time of this incident included the recognition and avoidance
of fall hazards, and worker training which emphasized methods and materials for covering roof openings
to prevent falls through openings.
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 Additionally, about 3 weeks prior to the incident, the victim viewed three video tapes which addressed
recognition and avoidance of fall hazards. The incident occurred in spite of the safety program, which
included the video tapes. Employers should design, develop, and implement a verbal and/or written post-
training examination to reinforce and evaluate the effectiveness of the training program immediately after
initial training and at regular intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly, yearly, etc.) thereafter.
REFERENCE
Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926. p. 190. July 1, 1990.
Figure.  Roof Opening
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FACE 92-04:  Steel Connector Dies After Falling 19 Feet From a Bridge Under Construction to the
Highway Below in Indiana
SUMMARY
A 28-year-old male steel connector (victim) died of injuries sustained from a 19-foot fall from a bridge under
construction. The victim was a member of a crew setting steel beams onto two concrete bridge pillars of a highway
overpass. After the steel beams were positioned on the pillars by a crane, the victim and a second steel connector
bolted the beams to flange plates incorporated into the design of the bridge pillars. Each connector was working
from a platform placed between two beams, on top of the beams' lower flanges. The crew was setting the third
beam across the pillars when the incident occurred. As the beam was being lowered, the victim attempted to push
it into place. The platform on which the victim was standing gave way, causing the victim to fall to the highway
below. The victim was transported to the hospital where he died the next day. NIOSH investigators concluded
that, in order to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• require the use of safety belts, lifelines, and lanyards when working from elevations
• always secure temporary flooring from displacement during steel erection
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety program
• consider and address worker safety in the planning phase of construction projects
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety inspections.
INTRODUCTION
 On September 11, 1991, a 28-year-old male steel connector died after having fallen, the previous day, from
a bridge under construction. On November 14, 1991, officials of the Indiana Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (INOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the incident, and
requested technical assistance. On December 19, 1991, a DSR safety specialist traveled to the incident site
to conduct an investigation. The incident was reviewed with the INOSHA compliance officer, county
coroner, medical examiner, and the police. Photographs of the site were obtained during the investigation.
The employer was a steel erection contractor that had been in operation for 3 years. The contractor
employed 85 workers and hired additional personnel as necessary from the local union hall. The employer
had no safety program or designated safety officer. The victim had worked for the employer for two years.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to set steel beams and lay the metal decking for a bridge overpass that
would span an existing state highway. The beams were to be set across two concrete pillars, one on each
side of the highway. Because of the degree of bank of the overpass, the pillars were stepped so that each
beam would be set 6 inches higher than the previous beam.
A 5-man crew consisting of a foreman, a crane operator, a laborer, and two connectors (one of whom was
the victim), and an employee of the state department of highways were at the scene.
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At the time of the incident, the crew was setting the third beam across the pillars. Each connector was
standing on a plywood platform measuring 6-feet 3-inches long by 1-foot wide. Two-inch by 4-inch boards
were nailed underneath the entire length of each side of the platforms to serve as braces. The platforms were
positioned between two beams, on top of the beams' lower flanges.
The two connectors and the laborer (guiding the beams with a tagline) were working near one pillar, while
the supervisor and the state employee were standing in the vicinity of the other pillar. The crane operator
was receiving hand signals from the supervisor (Figure).
As the beam was lowered into position, the victim attempted to push it toward the flange plate on the pillar.
As he pushed against the beam, the platform on which he was standing kicked out from under him. The
victim fell 19 feet to the highway below, striking his head and shoulders on the concrete berm, and his lower
back on the 8-inch-high curb at the edge of the highway. Co-workers ran to the victim and found that he
was not breathing. Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel passing the scene stopped, initiated
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and restored the victim's breathing. The victim was transported to
the hospital where he died 13 hours after the incident.
Investigation revealed that bolts protruding upward from a flange plate (connecting two sections of beam)
on the beam's lower flange limited the platform's bearing surface (overlap) to 2 inches. As the victim pushed
against the beam, the platform slid away from him and off the flange, causing the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause death as closed head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should require the use of safety belts, lifelines, and lanyards when
working from elevations.
Discussion: When working from elevations, employers should provide personal protective equipment
(PPE) (i.e., safety belt, lifeline, and lanyard) to employees exposed to fall hazards. Employers should
provide and enforce the use of PPE in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.104.
Recommendation #2: Employers should always secure temporary flooring from displacement during
steel erection.
Discussion: During bolting, riveting, fitting up, or plumbing up operations, 29 CFR 1926.752 (i) requires
that provisions be made to secure temporary flooring from displacement. In this instance, this requirement
was not satisfied.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: Employers should emphasize safety to their employees by developing, implementing, and enforcing
a comprehensive safety program. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, training workers in
the proper selection and use of PPE, along with the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards.
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Recommendation #4: Employers should consider and address worker safety in the planning stages of
construction projects.
Discussion: Providing workers with the safest work environment, and with procedures that will allow them
to perform tasks in the safest manner, should be a concern addressed during the planning stages of a
construction project. Project engineers, design engineers, architects, and safety professionals should
evaluate the tasks to be performed by workers, and the types of machinery to be used during the completion
of the project. Safe work procedures should be developed for the different tasks to be performed. These
procedures should include, but not be limited to, recognition of fall hazards, the use of personal protective or fall
arresting equipment, access to the work area, type of work platform to be used, temporary flooring, and methods
to secure temporary flooring. In this instance, the temporary flooring was not secured. Elevated work platforms
could have been positioned on the concrete berm on the sides of the highway for access to the work areas, or
safety nets could have been suspended under the connectors to lessen the exposure to the fall hazard.
Recommendation #5: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety
inspections.
Discussion: Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a qualified safety
professional. No matter how comprehensive, a safety program cannot be effective unless implemented in
the workplace. Even though these inspections do not guarantee the elimination of occupational injury, they
do demonstrate the employer's commitment to the enforcement of the safety program.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.104. Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register
29 CFR 1926.752 (i). Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register
Figure.
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FACE 92-05:  Painter Dies After 80-Foot Fall From Electrical Transmission Tower In Indiana
SUMMARY
A 31-year-old painter (victim) died from injuries sustained in an 80-foot fall from a 120-foot-high electrical
transmission tower. The victim was a member of a four-man crew painting the tower. The crew had painted
one side of the tower, from top to bottom, and had begun to paint the other side. The four crew members
were working at the same level on the tower and all were wearing safety belts and lanyards. As the victim
unhooked his lanyard to reposition himself on the tower, he lost his balance and fell to the ground. NIOSH
investigators concluded that, in order to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that workers continually adhere to the safe work procedures that have been established
by the employer
• evaluate the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety inspections.
INTRODUCTION
On September 23, 1991, a 31-year-old painter died from injuries sustained when he fell 80 feet from an
electrical transmission tower. On November 14, 1991, officials of the Indiana Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (INOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and
requested technical assistance. On December 19, 1991, a DSR safety specialist traveled to the incident site
to conduct an investigation. The incident was reviewed with the company owner, INOSHA compliance
officer, county coroner, police department personnel, and medical examiner.
The employer was a painting contractor that specialized in painting electrical transmission towers and
substations. The employer had a written safety program and a written hazard communication program.
Material Safety Data Sheets for the paints and solvents used were available in all company trucks. New
employees listened to a 30-minute safety presentation when hired and had to read the written safety rules
and sign a statement verifying they had read the rules before reporting to a supervisor. The employer
supplied new lanyards and safety belts to the painters on a yearly basis and coveralls were available to all
painters. The employer maintained four full-time crews and hired additional crews as necessary. The victim
and his crew had performed three jobs for the employer, totaling 3 months of employment.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had an ongoing contract with an electric utility to paint cross-country two-sided steel
transmission towers and substations. The employer had two four-man crews at the jobsite painting separate
towers. The victim's crew was painting their second 120-foot-high tower of the day. It took 22 hours to
complete one tower. The crew had painted one side of the tower with solvent-based paint from top to bottom
and had begun to paint down the opposite side of the tower. The crew members were wearing safety belts
and lanyards and were tying the lanyards off directly to the tower. It was necessary to disconnect the
lanyards to change position. The painters would tie off again when they were repositioned. The crew had
progressed 40 feet down the side of the tower. The victim disconnected his lanyard and attempted to move
when he lost his balance and fell from the tower, 80 feet to the ground. The three remaining crew members
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descended the tower and one ran to a nearby farmhouse to tell the owners to call the emergency medical
service (EMS). The second crew, two towers away, also ran to the scene. The victim was breathing and
conscious but was bleeding from the mouth, nose, and ears. The EMS arrived within 10 minutes and
transported the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead by the attending physician.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed massive internal trauma as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that workers continually adhere to the safe work
practices established by the employer.
Discussion: Employers should constantly stress the importance of adherence to established safe work
procedures when possible. In this instance, established practice required workers to use safety belts and
lanyards at all times; however, the victim disconnected the lanyard from the tower to reposition himself.
Employers should provide and enforce the use of PPE in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.124. Whenever
possible, workers performing tasks on elevated surfaces should not attempt to move without their fall
protection being in place.
Recommendation #2: Employers should evaluate the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system.
Discussion: In this instance, the victim relied solely on his safety belt and lanyard as the fall arresting system,
even though the victim would disconnect the lanyard from the tower to reposition himself. Prior to the start
of work on the tower, a rope for each painter could have been attached to the top of the tower to serve as
a lifeline. Either a self-retracting lanyard, or a standard lanyard equipped with a "rope grab" attached to the
lifeline, would have provided a second suspension point for fall protection.
[ A "rope grab"--a friction activated deceleration and locking device--could have been fitted onto the
lifeline; this would have slowed and stopped the victim's fall. Several design configurations are available
for these devices--inertial locking, cam/lever locking, or both--and each is effective against this type of fall
hazard. An alternative safety device would be a self-retracting lanyard. This is another kind of deceleration
and locking device, which contains a drum-wound line. The line can be wound and unwound within certain
limits to accommodate normal worker movements; however, during a fall, centrifugal force activates
locking devices which stop drum rotation and arrests the fall. Either a rope grab or a self-retracting lanyard
would have protected the victim when the lanyard was not attached to the tower.]
Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety
inspections.
Discussion: Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a qualified person to
ensure that required personal protective equipment (PPE) is worn whenever possible. No matter how
comprehensive, a safety program cannot be effective unless implemented in the workplace. Even though
these inspections do not guarantee the elimination of occupational injury, they do demonstrate the
employer's commitment to enforcement of the safety program.
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FACE 92-08:  Roofer Dies in 16-Foot Fall From Residential Roof--Alaska
SUMMARY
A 32-year-old male journeyman roofer (the victim) sustained severe head injuries and died as a result of
a 16-foot fall from the roof of a two-story single family dwelling. The victim was correcting a cosmetic error
in the alignment of the shingle tabs of roofing shingles installed 2 weeks earlier. He fell (unobserved) from
the second-story roof of the residence onto a concrete patio. The roof pitch was 4:12 (4 feet vertical rise
to 12 feet horizontal width). The victim had a documented history of grand mal epileptic seizures, and had
received a prescription for a maintenance dose of Dilantin. Although he presented a medical clearance to
his employer allowing him to work (flat roofs only), it remains unclear whether his pre-existing medical
condition predisposed him to this incident or affected its outcome. NIOSH and Alaska Department of
Health and Social Services (DHSS) investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar
occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that workers with medical conditions or physical limitations are not placed in work
situations disallowed by medical certifications
• comply with existing State regulations regarding fall protection for workers exposed to fall hazards
• develop and implement formal safety programs designed to help workers recognize, understand,
and control fall hazards and other work hazards.
INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1991, a 32-year-old journeyman roofer (the victim) died from severe head injuries
sustained after falling 16 feet 3 inches from the pitched roof of a private residence on September 10, 1991.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
Alaska Activity began monitoring this incident after it was initially reported in local newspapers on
September 11, 1991. An investigation conducted by a safety specialist from the DSR Alaska Activity and
an injury prevention specialist candidate from the State of Alaska, Division of Public Health, Epidemiology
Section began on November 6, 1991. The incident was reviewed with the State of Alaska, Department of
Occupational Safety and Health (AKOSH) compliance officer assigned to this case. An interview with the
owner of the roofing company was delayed until November 20, 1991, because key company officials were
working on a construction project in another state. The incident site was visited, and photographs and
reports were subsequently obtained from the police and coroner.
The employer in this incident was a roofing contractor, specializing in residential and commercial roofing,
that had been in operation for 30 years, with 16 years under the current management; there were five
employees (roofers). The company had a written safety policy including basic rules and procedures with
some application to the type of incident that occurred. The employer indicated that on-site safety meetings
(tailgate meetings) were always conducted prior to the start of a new job.
The victim had a documented history of grand mal epileptic seizures, and had received a prescription for
a maintenance dose of Dilantin. Although he presented a medical clearance to his employer allowing him
to work (flat roofs only), it remains unclear whether his pre-existing medical condition predisposed him to
this incident or affected its outcome.
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INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to re-roof a private residence that was currently occupied. The main
roofing work had been completed approximately 2 weeks prior to the incident. However, the homeowner
complained about a section of the roofing which was misaligned.
The victim returned to the jobsite on September 10, 1991, to correct the cosmetic error in the alignment of
shingle tabs observed by the homeowner.
The victim was working alone on the roof, which had a pitch of 4:12 (4 feet of vertical rise to 12 feet of
horizontal width). He had realigned all but two shingles, when he fell from the edge of the roof to a concrete
patio deck 16 feet, 3 inches below (Figures 1 and 2). The victim was not using any type of fall protection
devices or systems.
Although no one saw the victim fall, the estimated time of occurrence was 6:42 p.m. The homeowner reported
hearing an unusual sound and looked out a window. She saw the victim lying on the patio; he was unresponsive
and bleeding from the back of the head. She called 911 and an emergency medical service (EMS) team arrived
at the scene approximately 3 to 4 minutes later. They found the victim traumatized, unresponsive, and in cardiac
arrest. The EMS team administered CPR, stabilized the victim, and transported him to a local hospital. He
remained in a comatose condition and died 3 days later on September 13, 1991.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as severe head injury.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that workers with medical conditions or physical
limitations are not placed in work situations disallowed by medical certifications.
Discussion: The victim had a medical history of grand mal seizures and had been prescribed a daily dose
of Dilantin (Phenytoin Sodium, 100 mg daily). He had received medical clearance for roofing work on flat
roofs only. Employers should carefully follow any limitations on work imposed by medical certifications.
In this case the employer believed the victim had a general medical clearance, yet limitations were clearly
explained in the certification letter.
Recommendation #2: Employers should comply with existing State regulations regarding fall protection
for workers exposed to fall hazards.
Discussion: The victim was working on a pitched roof with a ground-to-eave height of 16 feet, 3 inches.
The Alaska Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Standard for Construction, CC
05.240(d)(1) states that "during the performance of built-up roofing work on low-pitched roofs with a
ground to eave height greater than 16 feet (4.9 meters), employees engaged in such work shall be protected
from falling from all unprotected sides and edges of the roof." The Standard requires the use of at least one
of three types of fall protection for roofing work: 1) a motion-stopping safety system (MSS System, which
includes safety harness/lanyard systems, guardrails, catch platforms, safety nets, etc.); 2) a safety-
monitoring system (a safety system in which a competent person monitors the safety of all employees in
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a roofing crew, and warns them when it appears that they are unaware of the hazard or are acting in an unsafe
manner); or 3) a warning line system (a line of specified strength, height, and location, designed to warn
workers when they are near a roof's edge) erected and maintained as specified in the Standard [paragraph
(d)(3)]. The unprotected sides and edges of the roof were not fall-protected, and the victim was not wearing
fall protection equipment (safety harness/lanyard system).
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop and implement formal safety programs designed to
help workers recognize, understand, and control fall hazards and other work hazards.
Discussion: Although the employer indicated that training programs were in place, these were largely
informal procedures, such as "tailgate meetings" at the start of new jobs. Written procedural protocols were
available, but safety training was not regularly scheduled. Structured training sessions could provide a
framework for systematic safety training for specific work procedures, and would also reduce the
possibility that training becomes too informal with minimal discussion of actual safety techniques.
REFERENCES
Alaska Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards and Safety, Occupational Safety and Health
Standards for Construction, Section 05.240, Volume II, August 1990.
29 CFR 1926.500(g)(1), 1926.28(a), and 1926.105. Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register, July 1990.
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FACE 92-11:  Ironworker Dies Following an 18-foot Fall From Structural Steel Framework--
Alaska
SUMMARY
A 41-year-old male ironworker (the victim) died after falling from a structural steel framework to a concrete
floor during the construction of an automobile repair shop. The victim and two other ironworkers (co-
workers) were assembling the steel frame "skeleton" (measuring 50 feet wide, 86 feet long and 18 feet high
at the roof edge) of the structure. Sway-bracing rods had not been installed between the beams (combination
column-roof truss units) , the bolts at the base of the beams had not been fully tightened, and two steel beams
had not yet been connected at the roof-line apex. As the victim walked on top of a stack of unsecured purlins
(steel joists) along one edge of the frame to make a final measurement, the frame began to sway. The victim
lost his balance, and fell 18 feet to the concrete floor, receiving fatal injuries. There was no fall protection
equipment in place, and the victim was not wearing a helmet. NIOSH investigators concluded that in order
to prevent similar occurrences in the future, employers should:
• ensure that workers follow building plans and procedures for pre-fabricated structures, and
comply with existing standards regarding  structural steel assembly
• ensure that workers comply with existing standards regarding the use of personnel hoists and
work platforms
• ensure that workers comply with existing standards regarding the use of personal protective
equipment
• ensure that workers develop and implement a jobsite hazard analysis as an ongoing part of each
construction phase.
INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 1991, a 41-year-old ironworker died from severe head injuries sustained 8 days previously,
after falling 18 feet from a structural steel framework. On November 28, 1991, officials of the Alaska
Department of Occupational Safety and Health (AKOSH) notified the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR), Alaska Activity of the death. On
December 12, 1991, a safety specialist from DSR, Alaska Activity and an injury prevention specialist
candidate from the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Public Health,
Section of Epidemiology traveled to the incident site and conducted an investigation. The incident was
reviewed with the AKOSH compliance officer, and the owner of the company. The police report, medical
examiner's report, emergency medical service report, and photographs were obtained.
AKOSH determined that the employer in this incident was the owner of an automobile repair shop that had
been in business for 12 years. The employer was in the process of constructing a new repair shop, and had
contracted with three ironworkers to complete the construction project. The employer did not require any
type of safety policy, or established safe work procedures for construction of the repair shop, nor did the
contracted ironworkers have any such safety policy or procedures. The victim had 6 years of work
experience, in structural steel erection.
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INVESTIGATION
The employer contracted with three ironworkers to construct an automobile repair shop which consisted
of a pre-fabricated (pre-fab) structural steel building. The pre-fab package for the building came with a set
of plans and some basic assembly procedures that the ironworkers did not entirely follow. After 2 weeks
of construction, the skeletal steel frame of the shop was nearly complete. The frame consisted of four 8-
inch sets of steel beams interconnected with purlins around the perimeter (eaves), with an overall dimension
of 50 feet by 86 feet, and a height of 18 feet from the concrete floor to the top of the eave purlins (Figures
1 and 2). Each beam set was to be bolted together at the apex to form the longitudinal cross-section of the
building structure. The three workers used a forklift with a pallet laid over the forks as a personnel hoist
and work platform for connecting and bolting the steel frame units together.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on the day of the incident, the construction had progressed to the following
stage:
• A temporary guy cable was installed (one end of the cable anchored in the concrete below beam
11, the middle of the cable attached to the apex of  beam #2, and the opposite end of the cable
anchored to the base of beam #3). This was not in accordance with the building plans and assembly
procedures which required 3/4-inch sway-bracing steel rods to be installed (in an "XI' configuration
between the vertical beams) and kept in place immediately after hoisting the beams into place.
• All the beams had been bolted to the concrete base, but had not been fully wrench-tightened so that
final adjustments could be made at a later time.
• All the beams except beam #4 had been bolted (wrench tightened) together at the apex. Beam #4
was being held in place temporarily by a choker cable suspended by the forks of a forklift. The final
bolting of this beam was delayed until final measurements could be made for minor adjustments
in the structure.
• All the eave purlins had been bolted (wrench tightened) to the steel beams.
• An unsecured stack of purlins was placed on top of one side of the structure between beam #3 and
beam #4.
The victim was on top of the unsecured stack of purlins between beams #3 and #4; the two co-workers were
working at ground level. The victim walked from beam #4 to beam #3 on top of the stack of purlins to take
a measurement. The co-workers observed that the entire structure began to sway beneath him, causing the
victim to lose his balance and fall to the concrete floor 18 feet below.
The co-workers hurried to the victim and noted that he was unresponsive and bleeding from the side of the
head. One of the co-workers called 911, and an emergency medical service (EMS) team responded,
arriving at the scene 3 minutes later., The EMS team noted that the victim was traumatized and
unresponsive, yet breathing. They stabilized the victim, and transported him to a local hospital where he
remained in a comatose condition. He died 8 days later.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as blunt force trauma to the head.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that workers follow pre-fab building plans and
procedures, and comply with existing standards -regarding structural steel assembly.
Discussion: There were at least five factors in this incident that contributed to the instability or sway effect
of the structure, which may have caused the victim to lose his balance and fall. All of these factors were
contrary to either the building plans and procedures, the existing standards pertaining to structural steel
assembly, or both:
1. Sway bracing rods had not been installed between the beams.
2. The bolts at the base of the beam columns had not been fully tightened.
3. The apex of beam #4 had not been bolted together.
The building plans and procedures specified that 3/4-inch steel sway bracing rods be installed (in an
"XI' configuration between the beam columns) and kept in place immediately after hoisting the beams
into place. Regarding structural steel assembly, AKOSH Standard, CC 05.180(b) requires that during
the final   placing of structural members, "the load shall not be released from the hoisting line until the
members are secured with not less than two bolts, or the equivalent at each connection and drawn up
wrench tight-"
4. An unsecured stack of purlins had been placed on top of one side of the structure between beams
#3 and #4.
The AKOSH Standard states that steel joists (such as   purlins) "shall not be placed on any structural
steel framework unless such "framework is safely bolted or welded."
5. The victim walked on top of the unsecured stack of purlins between beams #4 and #3.
Walking on top of this unstable structure may have caused it to sway. This task could have been
accomplished from a work platform (such as a mobile scaffold or scissors-jack platform) meeting
AKOSH and Federal OSHA standards, thus greatly reducing the potential for a fall.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that workers comply with existing standards regarding
the use of personnel hoists and work platforms.
Discussion: In this incident, the victim and co-workers used a forklift with a pallet laid over the forks as
a personnel hoist and work platform. This does not comply with AKOSH (and Federal OSHA) Standards
CC 05.140(c)(3) and CC 05.140(g) (also cited in Federal OSHA Standards 29 CFR 1926.552(c) and 29
CFR 1926.556) which specify acceptable types of personnel hoists and work platforms. The victim in this
incident could have worked from a mobile elevating work platform or wheel-mounted scaffolding which
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met these standards (instead of from the structural steel beam from which he fell), greatly reducing the
likelihood of a fall.
Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that workers comply with existing standards regarding
the use of personal protective equipment.
Discussion: The victim in this incident was not using any type of fall protection equipment and was not
wearing a protective helmet. AKOSH Standard, CC 05.030(j) (1) [also USDOL Standard 29 CFR
1926.28(a)] states, "The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of appropriate personal
protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous conditions or where this
subchapter indicates the need for using such equipment to reduce the hazards to the employees." The use
of a traditional safety belt/lanyard (or preferably the safety harness/lanyard) combination as required by
AKOSH and USDOL standards CC 05.050(e) and 29 CFR 1926.104 respectively, is sometimes not
practical during construction operations, particularly where worker mobility is required. However, in this
incident, the use of a perimeter guide, attached to the top of the beams (for anchoring the worker's safety
harness/lanyard) could have provided sufficient worker mobility. Additional forms of fall protection, such
as safety nets [as specified in CC 05.050(f) and 29 CFR 1926.105], or a catch platform, could also be
considered. Safety nets can effectively prevent injury or death when a worker falls. Also, in this situation,
wheel-mounted scaffolding might have been placed under the victim to serve as a catch platform. This
portable type of catch platform can be moved to a new location as each area is completed. The use of
alternative fall protection systems should always be carefully considered when the potential for a serious
or fatal fall from elevation exists. Protective helmets are another type of personal protective equipment
required by AKOSH and Federal OSHA standards for this type of work: "Employees working in areas
where there is a danger of head injury from impact, or from falling or flying objects ... shall be protected
by protective helmets." (AKOSH CC 05.050 (a) (1) , and USDOL 29 CFR 1926. 100 (a)] Although such
helmets are not specifically designed for head protection in the event of a fall from elevation, protective
helmets that- meet ANSI Standard Z89.1-1986 (and if equipped with a chin strap, also worn properly) do
provide impact attenuation (including the impact from some types of falls) by limiting the magnitude and
concentration of impact forces (Phase I in the Development of Criteria For Industrial and Firefighters' Head
Protective Devices, January 1975, and Experimental Program for Industrial Head Protective Devices,
Phase II, December 1976, Dayton T. Brown, Inc. under NIOSH contract). Currently, there are industrial
protective helmets available that can provide some head protection for falls from elevation.
Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that workers develop and implement a jobsite hazard
analysis as an ongoing part of each construction phase.
Discussion: The employer owned and operated an automobile repair shop, requiring safety procedures specific
to that type of operation. However, in this incident the same employer contracted with the victim and two co-
workers to construct a building. Therefore, the employer should have required the victim and co-workers to
develop and implement safety procedures specific to each construction phase of the building. Before starting each
phase of construction, the employer should ensure that the potential hazards have been identified and reviewed
with the work crew or contracted employees, including how to implement appropriate safety controls. Federal
OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1926.21(b) (2) states, "The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition
and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate
any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." AKOSH has a voluntary compliance program which offers
safety training to employers and employees on a request basis. Effective safety training in structural steel erection
will increase the employees' awareness of the hazards which confront them.
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FACE 92-36:  Carpenter's Helper Dies After Falling Through Stairwell Opening--Virginia
SUMMARY
A 35-year-old male carpenter's helper (the victim) died after falling into a stairwell opening. The victim was
working with three carpenters to frame a one-story residence with a full basement. Work had progressed
to the point that the men were installing 4-foot by 8-foot sheets of plywood on the roof. The victim was
standing on the floor handing the plywood up to the men on the roof. A 3-foot-wide by 9-foot-long stairwell
opening present in the immediate vicinity of the victim's work area was enclosed on three sides by studded
walls and on the fourth side by a closed door. The three workers on the roof did not see the victim fall, but
it is believed that, as the victim tried to step between two studs in the stairwell wall, he either tripped or lost
his balance and fell toward the stairwell opening. The victim struck his head on the opposite edge of the
opening then fell through the opening 8 feet to the concrete basement floor. NIOSH investigators
concluded that, to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that all floor or roof openings that workers might be exposed to during the performance
of their assigned tasks be guarded
• train workers to recognize and avoid hazards that they might encounter during the performance
of their assigned tasks.
INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 1992, a 35-year-old male carpenter's helper died from injuries sustained the previous day after
falling through a stairwell opening 8 feet to a concrete basement floor. On September 14, 1992, officials of the
Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration (VAOSHA) notified the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR), of the fatality and requested
technical assistance. On September 22, 1992, a DSR safety specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an
investigation. The incident was reviewed with company representatives and the OSHA compliance officer.
The employer in this incident was a construction contractor that specialized in residential, commercial, and multi-
unit housing construction. The employer had been in operation for 6 years and employed five workers. The
employer had written general safety rules. Each new employee had to read these rules and sign his name as proof
that he understood them. New employees worked directly with the owner to demonstrate their proficiency at
carpentry work before being allowed to work alone. New employees were not allowed to work above ground
on framework until they had been employed for 2 weeks and were considered capable by the owner of
performing the work. The victim had worked for the employer for 2 days.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted to frame up a one-story private residence with a full basement at a
residential subdivision. The work consisted of laying the framework and 3/4-inch plywood sheeting for
the ground floor, installing the 2-inch by 4-inch wall studs as called for by the blueprints, and installing the
roof trusses and the 3/8-inch plywood sheeting for the roof. After 2 days at the site, the crew--three
carpenters and a carpenter's helper (the victim)--had completed the installation of the floor, the wall studs,
and the roof trusses. On the third and final day at the site, crew members were installing the plywood
sheeting on top of the roof trusses.
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As the crew prepared for work the victim asked the owner if he could work on the roof. The owner
instructed the victim to stay on the floor and hand the plywood sheets to the men on the roof. Work
progressed in this manner throughout the morning.
A 3-foot by 9-foot stairwell opening was located adjacent to the victim's work area. The opening was
enclosed on three sides by the 2-inch by 4-inch stud walls and on the fourth side by a closed door. The studs
had been installed on 16-inch centers (a distance of 16 inches from the center of one stud to the center of
the next stud in line), leaving 14-inch openings between studs.
Just before noon the victim handed a sheet of plywood to the men on the roof. Shortly thereafter the men
heard the victim falling through the stairwell opening. The victim struck his head on the opposite side of
the opening, then fell to the concrete basement floor, landing face down. The emergency medical service
was summoned by telephone from the construction trailer. The victim was transported to the hospital where
he was placed on life support systems. Life support was disconnected the following morning and the victim
was pronounced dead.
The men on the roof did not actually see the victim pass between the studs. The victim's size--6 feet, 5 inches
tall; 235 pounds--prohibited him from inadvertently falling face forward or sideways through the 14-inch
opening between the studs. It is believed that the victim stepped between two studs either to look into or
to cross the stairwell opening. The victim then either tripped over the floorboard, or caught his hammer,
which was hanging from his tool belt, on one of the studs, and lost his balance and fell into the opening.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as accidental death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that all floor or roof openings that workers might be
exposed to during the performance of their assigned tasks be guarded.
Discussion: Floor openings should be guarded in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.500 (f)(1), which requires
a top rail 42 inches high, an intermediate rail, and a toeboard. Although the stairwell opening in this incident
was surrounded on three sides by studs and on the fourth side by a closed door, access to the opening was
still possible between the studs. Guarding the opening in the prescribed manner would have prohibited
access to the opening. Alternatively, the stud walls around the stairwell opening could have been finished
with wallboard or some other material to totally enclose the opening.
Recommendation #2: Employers should train workers to recognize and avoid hazards that they might
encounter during the performance of their assigned tasks.
Discussion: In accordance with 29 CFR 1926.21 (b)(2), employers should instruct each employee in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to
control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. Workers should be made aware of
the potential hazards presented by stairwell openings and of the control measures which can be used to
prevent injuries.
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FACE 93-19:  Electrician Apprentice Dies Following a 33-foot Fall Through a Roof--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 24-year-old male electrician apprentice (the victim) died of injuries received after falling 33 feet through
a roof. The victim was part of a five-man crew that was installing conduit and wiring to the top of a dust-
collecting silo in the granule plant of a roofing products manufacturer. The victim had just completed
pulling electrical wire through a conduit while standing on a steel platform attached to the side of the silo.
The platform was equipped with a standard protective railing which consisted of a top rail, mid rail, and
toe board. The granule plant roof was directly below the platform, approximately 34 inches from the mid
rail. The foreman and another worker were standing on the granule plant roof about 10 feet from the edge
of the platform, waiting for the victim to finish his task and break for lunch. His back toward the other
workers, the victim climbed over the top rail, and with his feet resting on the mid rail, jumped to the granule
plant roof. He broke through the roof of corrugated transite panels and fell 33 feet to the concrete floor. An
employee working in the granule plant saw the victim fall and strike the concrete. The employee and the
workers from the roof ran to aid the victim, who suffered a severe head injury. The victim was unconscious
and was not breathing. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was started and the Emergency Medical
Service (EMS) was called. The EMS arrived in less than 15 minutes and pronounced the victim dead at
11:50 a.m. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific training procedures emphasizing
the importance of recognizing and controlling hazards in the workplace. These procedures
should include, but not be limited to, conducing hazard evaluations before initiating work at a
jobsite and implementing appropriate controls
• designate a competent person to conduct scheduled and unscheduled site visits to evaluate field
compliance with company safety rules and procedures.
In addition, plant/facility owners should:
• identify areas that may be hazardous to all personnel, including contractors, and restrict or
prohibit the use of or access to these areas.
INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1993, a 24-year-old male electrician apprentice (the victim) died after falling 33 feet through a roof.
On June 25, 1993, officials of the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA)
notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On July 28,
1993, a safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and reviewed the circumstances with a company
representative, a witness to the incident, the plant manager, and the SCOSHA compliance officer assigned to
the case. Photographs of the incident site were taken, and the medical examiner and police reports were obtained.
The employer in this incident was an electrical contractor that had been in operation for 23 years and
employed 27 workers, 7 of whom were electrician apprentices. The employer had a written safety policy
and a general safety program which included a hazardous communication program, pre-hiring and random
drug testing, and a disciplinary program. Company management personnel were responsible for the
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enforcement of the safety program, and the employer provided on-the-job training. Additionally, the
roofing manufacturer provided all contractors with a booklet containing safety information and instructions
which were to be followed when contractors worked at the plant. This booklet included information on
establishment of work boundaries and access to worksites by contract personnel. The victim worked for
the company for 2 months as an electrician apprentice, but had approximately 3 year's experience working
in this occupation. This was the first fatality the company had experienced.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted by a roofing products manufacturer to install electrical conduit, wiring,
and related components at the dust-collecting silo located in the granule plant. The silo was situated adjacent
to and partially above the roof of the 29-year-old granule plant. The plant walls and roof were constructed
of corrugated transite panels, a fire- proofing material used in walls and roofs and for lining ovens. The
panels were composed of asbestos and cement molded under high pressure, and they had a load rating of
200 pounds per square foot. The panels were set in place on steel girders approximately 30-inches apart.
Work on the dust-collecting silo had been in progress for 3 days before the incident.
On the day of the incident, the victim and four co-workers (one foreman, and three other electrician apprentices),
arrived at the plant and started work at 7 a.m. The workers had spent the morning installing the necessary conduit
and pulling electrical wire through it. At approximately 11:35 a.m., the workers were getting ready to break for
lunch. The victim had just completed pulling electrical wire through a conduit while standing on a steel platform
attached to the side of the silo. The platform was equipped with a standard protective steel railing which consisted
of a top rail, mid rail, and toe board. The granule plant roof was directly below the platform, approximately 34
inches from the mid rail (Figure). The foreman and another worker were standing on the granule plant roof about
10 feet from the edge of the platform, waiting for the victim to finish his task and go to lunch. Plant personnel
had seen the workers using the roof as a route of access to the ladder leading to the ground. His back toward the
other workers, the victim climbed over the top rail, and with his feet resting on the mid rail, jumped to the granule
plant roof. The victim, who weighed 235 pounds, broke through the corrugated transite panels and fell to the
concrete floor 33 feet below. An employee working in the granule plant saw the victim fall and strike the concrete
floor. The employee and the workers from the roof ran to aid the victim, who suffered a severe head injury. The
victim was unconscious and was not breathing. Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was started and the EMS
was called. The Emergency Medical Squad (EMS) arrived in less than 15 minutes and pronounced the victim
dead at 11:50 a.m. The medical examiner arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and had the victim transported
to the morgue at the local hospital.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner reported the cause of death as head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific
training procedures emphasizing the importance of recognizing and controlling hazards in the
workplace. These procedures should include, but not be limited to, conducting hazard evaluations
before initiating work at a jobsite, and implementing appropriate controls.
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Discussion: The existence of a safety program is only the first step in obtaining a viable safety record. In
addition to enforcement, safety programs should be evaluated and training procedures incorporated which
emphasize the importance of recognizing and controlling hazards in the workplace, following established
safe work procedures, and wearing appropriate personal protective equipment. The hazard of walking or
jumping on roofing panels constructed of transite apparently was not recognized by the workers.
Additionally, before starting any job at a new worksite, the employer or employer's representative should
identify, by observation and by collaboration with the worksite owner, any potential or existing hazards.
These hazards should be reviewed with the work crew, and methods to control the hazards and to perform
the work safely should be discussed. These discussions should include information on hazards in the
immediate work area as well as information on the activities of other work crews on the site that could create
additional hazards. In this instance, personnel could have been instructed not to access the roof area.
Recommendation #2: Employers should designate a competent person to conduct scheduled and
unscheduled site visits to evaluate field compliance with company safety rules and procedures.
Discussion: Employers should designate a competent person1 to conduct scheduled and unscheduled
safety inspections of worksites to help ensure that employees are performing their assigned tasks according
to established company safety rules and procedures. To be effective, a safety program must be enforced
at the worksite. Any violations of safety rules should be corrected immediately. Such inspections also
demonstrate that the employer is committed to the company safety program and to the prevention of
occupational injury.
Recommendation #3: Plant/facility owners should identify areas that may be hazardous to all personnel,
including contractors, and restrict or prohibit the use of or access to these areas.
Discussion: Owners of plants/facilities where outside contractors perform jobs should work with
contractors to identify areas that may be hazardous. After these areas have been identified, signs and/or
barriers, along with verbal communication with the contractors, should be established. Additionally, if
work must be performed in one of the identified hazardous areas, appropriate precautions and procedures
should be implemented and enforced. [Note: Since this incident, the roofing manufacturer has instituted
a safety procedure prohibiting any access to the roofs without the use of a safety belt, lanyard, and lifeline.]
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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Figure.  Dust-Collecting Silo and Granule Plant Roof
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FACE 93-21:  Cement Finisher Dies After 17-Foot Fall Through Unguarded Floor Opening--North
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 38-year-old male cement finisher (the victim) died of injuries he received after stepping backwards and
falling through an unguarded floor opening. The victim was one of 13 subcontractor employees pouring
cement for a three-story addition to a textile mill. At the time of the incident, one half of the floor of the
second story was being poured. The entire floor measured 84 feet wide by 119 feet long and contained eight
unguarded openings, each measuring 32 inches wide by 18 feet long. These openings were to be used as
vents and ducts for service cables. The floor also contained a 13-foot by 9-foot, 8-inch opening for an
elevator shaft; the opening was guarded by a steel rope barrier. The victim and a co-worker (facing away
from each other) were working approximately 10 feet apart, finishing the poured concrete with aluminum
bullfloats. The victim, who was walking backwards as he worked the bullfloat, stepped into one of the
unguarded floor openings. He fell 17 feet to the concrete floor below, striking his head. The co-worker did
not see the victim fall, but heard him yell; however, the apprentice superintendent for the prime contractor
was on the second story and saw the victim fall through the opening. Textile mill workers on the first floor
also saw the victim fall, and ran to his aid. The victim was unconscious but breathing. The emergency
medical service (EMS) was summoned and transported the victim to the hospital where he died 12 days
later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(1) and (8), which requires that all floor and platform openings
be protected with a standard railing or a floor opening cover secured against displacement
• address worker safety issues in the planning phase of construction projects
• develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program.
 Additionally, prime contractors should:
• utilize contract language that requires subcontractors to implement a site-specific safety and
health program prior to the initiation of work.
INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1993, a 38-year-old male cement finisher (the victim) died of injuries he received on June 21,
1993, when he stepped backwards into an unguarded floor opening and fell 17 feet to the concrete floor
below. On July 6, 1993, officials of the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical
assistance. On August 10, 1993, a safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and reviewed the
circumstances with employer representatives and officials of NCOSHA.
The employer in this incident was a temporary employment service which supplied 22 employees to a
concrete contractor. At the time of the incident, the concrete contractor was the only client of the temporary
service, and both establishments were operated by the same owners. Neither establishment had a written
safety program, and training was provided on the job. Tailgate safety meetings were conducted periodically
by the crew supervisor, who was also responsible for worker safety at the jobsite. The victim had worked
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for the temporary service for 7 years. The service had been in operation for approximately 25 years and
had experienced no previous fatalities.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted to do the concrete work for an addition to the spinning area of a textile
mill that produced fortrel polyester fiber. The addition was three stories high and measured 84 feet by 119
feet. The employer had a 13-man crew at the site performing various tasks, such as forming areas prior to
pouring concrete, laying steel decking on which the concrete would be poured, and working the cement
with bullfloats.
On the day of the incident, the job was approximately 80 percent complete and work had progressed to the
floor of the second story. The forming of the floor had been completed. One half of the floor was to be
poured on the day of the incident and the rest of the concrete was to be poured the following day.
Eight unguarded floor openings, each measuring 32 inches wide by 18 feet long, had been formed into the
floor. These openings would be used as vents and ducts for service cables. A ninth floor opening measuring
13 feet long by 9 feet 8 inches wide, marked the location of the elevator shaft and was guarded by a steel
rope barrier (Figure).
The crew supervisor approached the apprentice superintendent for the prime contractor 1 week before the
pour was to take place and requested that the floor openings be covered. When the openings were not yet
covered on the day of the pour, the crew supervisor again approached the apprentice superintendent. The
men discussed the issue and decided that each would tell their respective workers to be extremely careful
around the openings. Witnesses stated during NCOSHA interviews that some of the openings were
covered by wooden pallets that measured 40 inches by 48 inches. The pallets were obtained from a second
subcontractor doing concrete block work on the addition; however, at the time of the incident, the second
subcontractor had removed some of the pallets from the floor openings to return them for a pre-paid deposit.
It could not be determined whether or not the floor opening involved in the incident had previously been
covered by the pallets, or if any of the floor openings were covered at the time of the incident.
At approximately 11 a.m., the victim and another cement finisher were on the second story floor guiding
the pump truck, which was pouring and working down the concrete. When the surface of a section of the
poured concrete was relatively smooth and level, workers would further smooth the surface, using
aluminum bullfloats. The two men were working approximately 10 feet apart, but were not facing each
other. The apprentice superintendent was on the second story in the vicinity of the elevator shaft opening.
As the victim was walking backward floating the concrete, he stepped into the unguarded opening and fell
approximately 17 feet to the concrete floor below, striking his head. The co-worker did not see the victim
fall, but heard him yell. The apprentice superintendent saw a portion of the victim's body fall through the
opening.
Textile mill workers on the first floor also saw the victim fall and ran to aid him. The victim was unconscious
but breathing. The EMS was summoned; it arrived within 15 minutes and transported the victim to the
hospital, where he remained in a coma until his death 12 days later on July 2, 1993.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as closed head trauma-skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.500 (b)(1) and (8), which requires
that all floor and platform openings be protected with a standard railing or a floor opening cover secured
against displacement.
Discussion: Prior to the start of work, floor openings should be protected with a standard railing, or covered
or guarded with materials that are installed so as to prevent displacement. After the incident, the openings
were properly fitted with secured plywood covers by the prime contractor.
Recommendation #2: Employers should address worker safety in the planning phase of construction
projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be addressed and incorporated into all construction projects during the
planning phase and throughout the entire project. Such a procedure would allow for the identification of
potential hazards prior to the initiation of work so that appropriate intervention strategies could be
implemented.
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety
program.
Discussion: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program which
includes, but is not limited to, the proper use of fall protection equipment, the recognition and control of
fall hazards, and should include appropriate worker training in the proper methods of covering\guarding
floor openings to prevent falls through the openings. Development, implementation, and enforcement of
a written safety program and the establishment of standard safety practices will demonstrate to workers the
employer's commitment to safety.
Recommendation #4: Prime contractors should utilize contract language that requires subcontractors
to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Discussion: Prime contractors should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to identify how
they intend to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Subcontractors' safety programs should be consistent and compatible with the prime contractor's safety
program. The contract should contain clear and concise language as to which party is responsible for a given
safety or health issue. Any differences should be negotiated before work begins.
Once the provisions for these responsibilities have been established, the respective parties should ensure
that the provisions of the contract regarding safety and health are upheld.
REFERENCES
Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926.500 (b)(1) and (8), July 1, 1992.
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Figure.  Second Story Floor Plan
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FACE 94-09:  Meat Packing Plant Employee Dies After Fall From Platform--South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 41-year-old male meat packing plant employee (the victim) died after falling from a platform during the
knocking portion of a beef cattle slaughter operation. Knocking involves stunning beef cattle by an
electrical shock before slaughtering them. The victim and two co-workers were working at a point in the
operation when beef cattle were chased into a chute, knocked or stunned, then slaughtered. The workers
were alternating the jobs of chasing, knocking, and slaughtering the cattle. At the time of the incident, the
victim and a co-worker were standing on a platform in the knocking area. The platform was 29 inches high
and was accessed by 2 steps. As the victim and co-worker waited for the next animal, they entered into an
argument and the victim either had a seizure and fell backward, or was bumped by the co-worker and fell
backward down the steps of the platform, striking his head. The second co-worker called to the supervisor
for help, then ran with the supervisor to the victim. The victim was lying on his back with his feet still on
the steps and his hard hat on his head. He was conscious but incoherent, and was bleeding from a cut on
the left side of his head. The emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned and the EMS transferred
the victim to the hospital where he died 9 days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent
similar incidents, employers should:
• consider guarding all sides of  elevated work platforms
• monitor employees for disruptive, erratic, or impaired behavior
• employers should consider offering employee assistance programs to provide help to employees
whose job performance becomes impaired due to some medical-behavioral problem, including
alcohol-related problems, drug abuse, or mental health problems.
INTRODUCTION
On February 12, 1994, a 41-year-old male meat packing plant employee (the victim) died after falling backward
off a 29-inch-high platform and striking his head on a concrete floor. On February 22, 1994, officials of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration for the State of South Carolina (SCOSHA) notified the Division
of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On March 23, 1994, a DSR safety
specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The incident was reviewed with the SCOSHA
compliance officer assigned to the case and the investigating officer from the sheriff's department. Photographs
of the site taken immediately following the incident were reviewed during the investigation.
The employer was a wholesale beef processing and packing plant that had been in operation for 50 years
and employed 170 workers. The employer had a written safety policy and written safe work procedures.
The employer provided hard hats, safety shoes, ear plugs, steel mesh aprons, and rubber, cotton, steel-mesh,
and kevlar gloves to workers as necessary. Disciplinary procedures were in place that included verbal and
written warnings up to dismissal. Workers were instructed to report hazards to their supervisors, and
supervisors checked equipment on an ongoing basis. Forklift operators received structured training and all
workers received basic training on hazard communication and confined space safety. Supervisors were
responsible to see that safety rules were followed and were instructed that if alcohol abuse by a worker was
suspected, or if a worker was observed acting in an impaired fashion, to send that person home and alert
management of the situation. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
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INVESTIGATION
The plant operated on a three-shift basis with slaughtering and butchering processes conducted during
the first shift (7 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and plant and machinery cleanup occurring during the remaining two
shifts.
Cattle were delivered to the plant in trucks and unloaded into a barn. At the appropriate time, the cattle
were chased through chutes to the knocking area where they were held temporarily. A worker
standing on the 23 1/2-inch-wide by 71-inch-long by 29-inch-high knocking platform then stunned
the animals with an electrical charge (Figure). The platform was accessed by two steps and was
guarded by guardrails on all sides but the entry. The cattle were stunned and slaughtered. After being
hung on hooks, the carcasses were disemboweled, skinned and split, then taken to coolers where they
were later either boned out and cut to order or shipped as hanging sides of beef.
At 3 p.m., the victim and two co-workers were working in the knocking area. The three men were
alternating the jobs of chasing the cattle to the knocking area, and knocking and slaughtering the cattle.
The victim and a co-worker, standing on the 29-inch-high knocking platform, entered into an
argument. The victim either lost his balance, or was bumped by the co-worker and fell backward off
the knocking platform. A third co-worker saw the victim fall and called to a supervisor who was
standing nearby at a meat cooler with his back to the knocking platform. The supervisor ran to the
platform and found the victim lying on his back on the floor. The victim's feet were resting on the 13-
inch high first step and his hard hat was still on his head, although the victim was bleeding from a cut
on the left side of his head. The emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned by phone from the
plant office and arrived shortly thereafter. The victim was transported to the hospital where he died
9 days later.
Plant records revealed that the victim had a history of seizures. One of the responding emergency
medical technicians stated that the victim displayed symptoms that were indicative of a seizure.
Toxicology results revealed that the victim had a blood alcohol level of .24. The victim had been
terminated in 1992 for carrying alcohol into the plant, but was later rehired.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report is not yet complete.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should consider guarding all sides of elevated work platforms.
Discussion: Three sides of the elevated knocking platform were protected by guardrails at the perimeter,
leaving unguarded the side where the steps were located. A spring-loaded, one-way gate could be installed
on this side. The gate would have to be pulled open from inside the perimeter to access the steps, and would
lessen the possibility of an inadvertent fall from the platform.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should monitor employees for disruptive, erratic, or impaired
behavior.
Discussion: Employees should be monitored by employers or supervisors for unusual, erratic, disruptive,
or impaired behavior at the jobsite. When this type of behavior is observed, the supervisor should evaluate
the situation, and the employee, and take immediate, appropriate action.
Recommendation #3: Employers should consider offering employee assistance programs to provide
help to employees whose job performance becomes impaired due to some medical-behavioral problem,
including alcohol-related problems, drug abuse, or mental health problems.
Discussion: Although the role of alcohol in this incident is unclear, the victim had an excessive blood
alcohol level and had been previously terminated for bringing alcohol into the plant. Employer sponsored
assistance programs to help restore employees to optimal performance should be made available to all
employees.
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Figure.
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FACE 94-13:  Drywall Mechanic Dies After 10-Foot Fall From an Open-sided Floor--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 20-year-old male drywall mechanic (the victim) died after falling about 10 feet from an open-sided
second floor landing and striking his head on a concrete floor. The victim was working alone sanding a
ceiling constructed of sheetrock. The victim was operating a sander and apparently unaware of his position
in relation to the open-sided floor. He was observed by a trim carpenter from another company, stepping/
falling off the landing as he sanded the ceiling located over the second floor landing. The victim fell about
10-feet, hitting the concrete floor face first. The carpenter notified his foreman who called 911. The
emergency medical service (EMS) arrived in less than 10 minutes and transported the victim to the local
hospital, where he died 20 days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences,
employers should:
• provide adequate guarding for open-sided floors, platforms, and runways
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• utilize contract language that requires subcontractors to implement a site-specific safety and
health program prior to the initiation of work
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 1994, a 20-year-old male drywall mechanic (the victim) died of injuries sustained in a 10-
foot fall from an open-sided second floor landing on February 22, 1994. On April 21, 1994, officials of
the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of
Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On May 18, 1994, a safety
specialist from DSR investigated and reviewed the incident with the subcontractor on the job and the
SCOSHA compliance officer assigned to the case. The county coroner's report was obtained during the
investigation.
The employer had been in business for about 15 years and employed four workers, three of whom were
drywall mechanics. The employer had no written safety program or procedures; however, 2 or 3 days prior
to the incident the contractor and subcontractor walked through the jobsite (no guardrails were present at
that time). Training was provided on the job, and personal protective equipment was not required by the
employer. The day of the incident was the victim's first day back on the job after a 6-month layoff. This
was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The jobsite was located at a housing subdivision which consisted of single family homes in various stages
of construction. The general contractor had sub-contracted much of the work to various other contractors.
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At this particular jobsite, the frame carpenter crew, trim carpenters, and the dry wall suppliers had been sub-
contracted. The dry wall supplier had sub-contracted the hanging and finishing of sheetrock to the employer
of the victim. Two or 3 days prior to the incident, the employer had conducted a walk through inspection
of the house with the drywall supplier. At that time, the second floor landing and hallway were seen not
to have any guardrails present. Guardrailing had been installed during the framing phase of construction,
but had subsequently been removed to allow the movement of supplies (e.g., doors, windows, sheetrock,
etc.), from the ground floor to the second floor level. The crew, with the exception of the victim, had been
working at the jobsite for 1 week prior to the incident. This was the victim's first day back to work after
a 6-month layoff.
On the day of the incident, the crew arrived at the jobsite around 8 a.m. to finish sanding the sheetrock. Two
employees were assigned to work in the garage, and the victim and his co-worker were assigned to sand
sheetrock in the house at the second floor level. The co-worker was sanding sheetrock inside a closet, while
the victim was sanding the ceiling above the second floor landing. About 10:30 a.m., a trim carpenter who
was nailing windows in a different area on the second floor ran out of nails. As he was going down the
stairway he saw the victim step/fall off the open-sided area of the second floor landing. Apparently the
victim was unaware of his position in relation to the open-sided floor and stepped or fell off the unguarded
open-sided floor landing. The victim fell about 10 feet, striking the concrete floor face first. The carpenter
ran to inform his foreman as to what had occurred and the foreman called 911. The EMS arrived in less
than 10 minutes and stabilized and transported the victim to the local hospital, where he died 20 days later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner's report listed the cause of death as closed-head injury.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate guarding for open-sided floors, platforms,
and runways.
Discussion: The victim was using an electric sander while sanding sheetrock located above an unguarded
open-sided second floor landing. In this incident, where several employers were working at the same
jobsite, the general contractor has the responsibility of insuring that all open-sided floors are protected at
all times. Although initial guardrailing was installed, it was subsequently removed to move supplies to the
second floor level. Providing standard guardrailing as required by CFR 1926.500 (d)(1)(i) may have
prevented this incident from occurring. NOTE: Following the incident, the general contractor had
temporary guardrails reinstalled around the open-sided floor areas.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop, implement and enforce a comprehensive written
safety program.
Discussion: The employer did not have a written safety program. The development, implementation, and
enforcement of a comprehensive safety program should reduce and/or eliminate worker exposures to
hazardous situations. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, protecting open-sided floors
with appropriate guardrailing and handrails, the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards, and the use of
appropriate safety equipment.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace
safety inspections.
Discussion: Although the employer and subcontractor walked through the jobsite and noticed the absence
of guardrailing, no action was taken to alleviate the situation. Employers should be cognizant of the
hazardous conditions at jobsites and take an active role to eliminate them. Additionally, scheduled and
unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a competent person1 to ensure that jobsites are free
of hazardous conditions. Regardless of how comprehensive, a safety program cannot be effective unless
implemented in the workplace. Even though these inspections do not guarantee the elimination of
occupational injury, they do demonstrate the employer's commitment to the enforcement of the safety
program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #4: Employers should utilize contract language that requires subcontractors to
implement a site specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Discussion: General and subcontractors should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to
identify how they intend to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of
work. Subcontractor's safety programs should be consistent and compatible with the general contractor's
safety program. The contract should contain clear and concise language as to which party is responsible
for a given safety or health issue. Any differences should be negotiated before work begins. Once the
provisions for these responsibilities have been established, the respective parties should ensure that the
provisions of the contract regarding safety and health are upheld.
Recommendation #5: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was working in an area without sufficient guarding. Workers and co-workers should
look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper way to perform their tasks. Employers
must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace safer. Increased worker
participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.500 (d)(1)(i) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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FACE 95-09:  Carpenter Dies After Falling 16 Feet From Roof--North Carolina
SUMMARY
A 46-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died after falling 16 feet from a roof onto a concrete porch floor.
The victim was a member of a five-man (foreman and four carpenters) crew laying roofing felt on the gable
roof of a newly-constructed, prefabricated church and sacristy. The roof was 48 feet wide by 106 feet long.
The crew had completed applying the felt to one half of the roof and were applying the eighth course to
the second half of the roof when the incident occurred. The victim was walking backward on the roof
unrolling the felt. Approximately 8 feet in front of the victim, a second crew member was temporarily
nailing down the felt. A short distance behind the second crew member, the two additional crew members
were permanently nailing the felt to the roof sheeting. The foreman was on the roof observing the crew.
The men were only unrolling 8 feet of felt at a time because it was a windy day, with gusts up to 25 miles
per hour. As the men approached the end of the roof, the foreman was called to the ground to discuss the
color of the shingles with the church preacher. The worker temporarily affixing the shingles looked up to
see the victim approaching the edge of the roof and yelled for him to “watch out.” The victim lost his balance
and fell backward off the roof. The victim fell approximately 6 feet, struck a cross brace on the framework
of the church’s porch, then fell another 10 feet, striking his head on the concrete floor of the porch. The
crew members left the roof and ran to the victim, finding him unresponsive, bleeding from the nose and
ears. One of the workers ran to the parsonage and had the preacher call the 911 operator. The crew was
instructed by the 911 operator to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The crew continued CPR
until the emergency medical service (EMS) arrived. When EMS personnel could not detect any vital signs
they called the county coroner, who pronounced the victim dead at the site. NIOSH investigators concluded
that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available and correctly used when working
where there is a danger of falling
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1995, a 46-year-old male carpenter (the victim) died from injuries received in a 16-foot
fall from a roof. On March 10, 1995, officials from the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and
requested technical assistance. On March 22, 1995, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investiga-
tion of this incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer, the crew foreman, the NCOSHA
compliance officer assigned to the case, and a fall-equipment manufacturer representative. The site
was photographed, the police report was reviewed, and the medical examiner’s report was requested
during the investigation.
The employer in this incident consisted of a parent company that manufactured pre-fabricated homes and
employed 15 workers. A subsidiary company included the outside-construction crew on which the victim
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worked. Ninety-five percent of the employer's business involved single-dwelling residential housing,
though the employer would occasionally construct larger structures, such as the church in this incident.  The
employer had been in operation for 38 years and had no written safety policy, program or safe work
procedures. Training was provided on the job, and monthly safety meetings, attended by all workers, were
conducted by the safety director. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer. The victim had
worked for the employer for 2 years.
Since the incident, the employer has begun to develop a comprehensive safety program, and has
purchased a fall protection system consisting of body harnesses, lanyards, four 50-foot lifelines
equipped with rope grabs, and anchorage points to be attached at the crest of the roof, to be used during
roofing operations.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to pre-fabricate and erect a church and sacristy 48 foot wide by 106 foot
long. The fabricated materials were prepared at the parent company’s manufacturing plant, then shipped
to the jobsite. After a concrete footer, four courses of cement block, and a 12-foot by 24-foot concrete and
block porch floor were in place, a 5-man construction crew was dispatched to the site to erect the structure.
In a span of 12 days the crew of 4 carpenters (including the victim) and a foreman had erected the skeletal
structure, laid the plywood floor, attached the aspenite outer walls, and applied the plywood sheeting to
the roof of the church.
On the day of the incident, the crew was applying the roofing felt to the plywood sheeting on the 5:12-
pitched gable roof of the church. The crew had completed half the roof and was applying the eighth course
to the second side of the roof. The victim was walking backward on the roof, unrolling the felt
approximately 8 feet at a time, because the wind was gusting up to 25 miles per hour. Approximately 8 feet
in front of the victim, a co-worker (facing the victim) was temporarily nailing down the felt. A short distance
behind that worker, two crew members were permanently nailing the felt to the roof. The foreman was on
the roof observing the crew. None of the men were wearing fall protection.
As the men approached the roof’s edge the crew foreman, on the roof observing the men, was called to the
ground to discuss the color of the shingles with the church’s preacher. The worker temporarily affixing the
felt looked up to see the victim approaching the edge of the roof and yelled for him to “watch out.” The
victim lost his balance and fell backward off the roof, striking a temporary brace on the skeletal framework
of the church’s front porch, 6 feet below the roof’s edge. The victim fell an additional 10 feet to the concrete
porch floor, striking his head. The crew left the roof and ran to the victim, finding him unresponsive and
bleeding from the nose and ears. One of the workers ran to the parsonage and had the preacher call the 911
operator. The crew was instructed by the 911 operator to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and
to continue until the emergency medical service (EMS) arrived. When EMS personnel arrived and could
not detect any vital signs, they summoned the county coroner, who pronounced the victim dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as skull fracture.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available
and correctly used when working where there is a danger of falling.
Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) states that "each employee on a walking/working surface (horizontal
and vertical surface) with an unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet (1.8m) or more above a lower level
shall be protected from falling by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest
systems." In this incident, there was no fall protection equipment present on the roof; however, on the day
of the NIOSH investigation, the employer purchased a fall protection system that was demonstrated by a
fall-protection equipment manufacturer representative at the site.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written
safety program.
Discussion: The development, implementation, and enforcement of a comprehensive safety program
should identify, and reduce or eliminate worker exposures to hazardous situations. The safety program
should include, but not be limited to, employing workday hazard assessments to enable the recognition and
avoidance of fall hazards; and providing, and enforcing, the use of appropriate safety equipment such as
safety nets, or safety belts and lanyards.
Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace
safety inspections.
Discussion: Employers should be aware of the hazardous conditions at jobsites and should take an active
role to eliminate them. Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a competent
person1 to ensure that jobsites are free of hazardous conditions. Even though these inspections do not
guarantee the prevention of occupational injury, they may identify hazardous conditions and activities that
should be rectified. Further, they demonstrate the employer's commitment to the enforcement of the safety
program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #4: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was walking backward on a roof 16 feet above ground without any guarding or safety
equipment. Workers and co-workers should look out for their personal safety and the safety of co-workers.
When workers observe hazardous conditions or activities, they should, depending on the circumstances,
notify management and/or remind co-workers of the proper way to perform their tasks and protect
themselves. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace
safer. Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
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FACE 95-15:  Shipping Department Employee Dies After Falling Into Floor Opening on Conveyor
Line--Virginia
SUMMARY
On July 12, 1995, a 37-year-old male loader/unloader (the victim) was fatally injured when he fell through
a floor opening of a conveyor line at a furniture manufacturing company warehouse. The victim was
transferring cardboard cartons containing furniture from one conveyor line to another prior to their being
lowered through a floor opening from the third to the second floor of the warehouse. The victim had already
removed a furniture carton from the incoming conveyor line, and was attempting to position it on the
adjacent line. A co-worker working nearby heard the victim call out, and turned to see his feet disappearing
over the edge of the floor opening. The victim fell 11 feet 6 inches to the concrete floor below. A co-worker
contacted the local emergency medical service (EMS), which responded in approximately 5 minutes,
transporting the victim to a nearby hospital. Later that day, he was transferred to a trauma center in a
neighboring state, where he died the following day. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar
occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that floor openings are guarded by standard railings or covers
• establish safe work areas to ensure that work activities take place away from floor openings
• ensure that warning devices incorporating bilingual and/or symbolic signage where appropri-
ate are displayed in work areas with floor openings
• consider installing sensing devices at approaches to floor openings which will activate automatic
shutdown of conveyor lines when workers enter danger zones
• ensure that workers who are part of a bilingual workforce comprehend instructions in safe work
procedures for the tasks to which they are assigned by designating experienced personnel who
share the worker’s native language to act as interpreters and trainers.
INTRODUCTION
On July 13, 1995, a 37-year-old male loader/unloader (the victim) died from injuries sustained the previous
day when he fell through a floor opening of a furniture warehouse conveyor line. On August 3, 1995,
officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration (VAOSHA) notified the Division
of Safety Research (DSR) of the incident and requested technical assistance. On September 12, 1995, a
safety engineer and a statistician from DSR reviewed the incident with the VAOSHA compliance officer.
The corporate safety director, plant manager, and the co-worker who witnessed the incident were
interviewed during the site investigation conducted the following day. The incident site was examined and
photographs and measurements were taken.
The employer, a furniture manufacturing firm in business at this location since the early 1900s, now
employs approximately 8,000 workers at 40 facilities in 14 states. There were 440 employees at the location
where the incident occurred. The warehouse and conveyor system had been in operation since the early
1970s. The victim had been employed at the warehouse for 2 weeks and had received on-the-job training
in the task being performed at the time of the incident. The corporate safety director is responsible for the
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safety program at the site of the incident and oversees the activities of the full-time safety directors employed
at each of the company’s other facilities. Safety performance is considered in evaluating the overall
performance of plant managers. The company instituted an English-Spanish hazard communication
program approximately 1 year prior to the incident, and offers English classes for its Spanish-speaking
workers. Safety topics are incorporated into monthly meetings for supervisory staff, who are expected to
communicate safety information to workers. The company has its own safety inspection program in which
fines are levied against facilities where violations of OSHA standards are found. At the end of each year,
the money assessed in fines is awarded to the three plants with the fewest violations and lowest workers’
compensation costs. The corporate safety director reported that there had been approximately four fatalities
company-wide during his 30 years of employment there, and that none had been associated with the task
being performed by the victim.
INVESTIGATION
On July 12, 1995, workers at the warehouse began work on the 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift. The normal work
week is 32 to 40 hours, depending on the volume of orders to be filled. Two conveyor lines operate on the
third floor of the five-story warehouse (Figure 1), one which moves furniture from an adjacent
manufacturing plant into and throughout the warehouse (the incoming line), and the other which moves
furniture to the first floor for shipment out of the warehouse (the outgoing line). Furniture is loaded onto
“hangers,” which are chairlike cars suspended from the powered overhead trolley-type conveyor. The
hangers have 3/4-inch plywood covered load platforms, 30" by 31", bolted to the metal frames. The
platforms are about 1 foot above the floor and 7 feet below the conveyor trolleys. The backs of the hangers
are covered by another sheet of 3/4-inch plywood extending up from the platform about 50 inches. The
hangers are spaced approximately 6 feet apart, and travel approximately 42 feet per minute.
The incident occurred at a transfer location where furniture is transferred from the incoming line to the
outgoing line before the outgoing line drops through a floor opening to the second floor. The outside edge
of the 26 foot 7 inch by 6 foot 6 inch floor opening (the east side) was located 20 inches from the outside
wall. A ledge (4 1/4 inches wide and 2 5/8 inches high) was located 1 foot from the opening, and extended
the full width of the south side of the opening (Figure 2). A shutoff switch for the incoming conveyor was
located about 12 feet from the southwest corner of the floor opening. The outgoing conveyor’s shutoff
switch was located on the outside building wall 5 feet 2 inches across from the conveyor line and 3 feet
6 inches up the line from the edge of the floor opening.
The victim’s duties consisted of removing furniture cartons from hangers of the incoming conveyor line, sliding
them across the floor to the adjacent conveyor line, and placing them on hangers on the outgoing line located
approximately 8 1/2 feet away. The victim had received on-the-job instruction in his task from the “lead man,”
whose duties consisted of monitoring the activities of the loader/unloaders and using an electronic bar code
scanner to record information about the outgoing shipments. The lead man stated that he had cautioned the victim
several times during the morning of the incident about working too close to the floor opening. He also reported
that he had advised him to let cartons proceed if he was having any difficulty handling them.
The employer stated that this particular floor opening, one of 13 throughout the facility, was the only
opening located near a work area. Fewer furniture cartons than usual were moving through at the time of
the incident. Some pieces of furniture, such as the 135-pound dresser the victim was handling, were packed
in cardboard cartons that were partially open on one end, leaving the furniture legs or base exposed. The
dresser the victim was loading was approximately 20 inches by 30 inches by 49 inches. The surface of the
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concrete floor was very smooth, allowing workers to easily slide the cardboard furniture cartons across the
floor from one conveyor to the other. The loader/unloaders wore athletic shoes or other rubber-soled shoes
to assure safe footing. They also wore rubber-faced gloves provided by the employer to protect their hands
and to provide a secure grip on furniture cartons.
Around 1:15 p.m., the time of the incident, there were four workers in the vicinity: the victim, the lead man,
and two other loader/unloaders who were working farther up the conveyor line. The lead man was
removing a carton from the incoming conveyor line with his back to the victim, and the victim was
positioned between the outgoing conveyor and the wall, attempting to place a carton on a hanger. The lead
man stated that, before he turned away, he noticed the victim was walking backward attempting to adjust
the carton more squarely on the hanger. He heard the victim call out, and turned back and saw the victim’s
feet disappear as he tripped over the water ledge across the floor opening. The victim fell 11 feet 6 inches,
striking his head on the concrete floor below. A co-worker notified the EMS, which responded in
approximately 5 minutes. The victim was transported to a hospital in a nearby town, transferred to a trauma
center in the neighboring state, and died the following day without regaining consciousness.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The cause of death was determined to be head and chest injuries.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that floor openings are guarded by standard railings
or covers.
Discussion: At the time of the incident, the floor opening was partially guarded by standard railings (i.e., 42-inch
high top rail, midrail, and toeboard). One railing extended along the full 26 foot 7 inch length of the west edge
of the floor opening. Another extended across the 6 1/2-foot width of the north end of the floor opening and
continued to the building wall. At the south end of the opening, the standard railing extended from the southwest
corner of the floor opening 20 inches to the building wall. Since the incident, the employer has extended the west
26 foot 7 inch standard railing an additional 8 feet beyond the southwest corner of the floor opening, and has added
a standard railing the full length of the east edge of the opening. At the time of the incident, the south edge of the
floor opening providing conveyor access was not guarded. The employer has since covered the opening with
an 800-pound-capacity cargo net which extends about 10 feet from the south edge (Figure 2). This method of
covering offers fall protection yet still allows the conveyor to descend unimpeded through the opening. In
response to reports that workers commonly sat on standard railings during break periods, the employer has also
covered the north end with a second net secured to the top rail.
Recommendation #2: Employers should establish safe work areas to ensure that work activities take
place away from floor openings.
Discussion: The conveyor lines ran parallel to each other beginning at the edge of the floor opening and
continuing for 30 feet until the incoming conveyor line turned west. At the time of the incident, workers manually
transferred furniture from the incoming to the outgoing line within this work area. Apparently the victim, while
positioning the carton on the hanger, moved progressively closer to the floor opening, ultimately falling backward
over the water ledge. After the incident, the employer extended the standard railing 8 feet beyond the threshold
of the opening, effectively moving the available work area away from the opening.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that warning devices incorporating bilingual and/or
symbolic signage where appropriate are displayed in work areas with floor openings.
Discussion: There were no warning lines or signs in the vicinity of the floor opening at the time of the
incident. Since the incident, the employer has marked a danger zone by painting prominent diagonal yellow
warning lines on the floor in the 8 foot long by 6 1/2 foot wide area in front of the floor opening. Warning
signs in English and Spanish have been affixed to the new 8-foot section of standard railing along the inside
length of the opening. The employer has no educational prerequisites for prospective employees, thus there
is no guarantee that employees, Spanish speaking or otherwise, can read the signs in either language.
Additional signs using symbols rather than text would illustrate the hazards associated with the floor
opening to all workers regardless of their literacy or language skills.
Recommendation #4: Employers should consider locating automatic conveyor shutdown devices at
approaches to floor openings near areas where material is manually transferred between conveyors.
Discussion: The victim had about 40 seconds to transfer a piece of furniture from one line to the other. The
available work area was about 30 feet, and the conveyors travel at a rate of about 42 feet per minute. If in that
amount of time the furniture was not securely positioned on the hanger, unwritten company policy dictated that
the worker should allow the furniture to continue on the line without regard for its security. During the transfer
of material from one line to the other, the victim’s safety depended upon his ability to remain cognizant of his
location relative to the floor opening while walking backward with the conveyor line and adjusting the position
of the furniture on the hanger. A pressure sensitive mat such as those used to activate automatic doors, placed
before the approach to the floor opening, could be used to automatically shut down the conveyor, thereby
stopping worker movement toward the opening without relying on the worker’s sense of location.
Recommendation #5: Employers should ensure that workers who are part of a bilingual workforce
comprehend instructions in safe work procedures for the tasks to which they are assigned by designating
experienced personnel who share the worker’s native language to act as interpreters and trainers.
Discussion: The lead man assigned to explain the victim’s task to him did not speak Spanish, nor did any
of the other workers in the area. It is not known to what extent the victim understood English; however,
it was not his native language. To safely perform the task assigned to him, the victim needed to understand
the importance of avoiding the floor opening, as well as the area available to safely accomplish the transfer
of furniture from one conveyor line to the other. The lead man explained the task to him in English, but
because of the language difference, had difficulty evaluating the victim’s understanding of the work
instructions. The lead man indicated that he and the victim had very little conversation during the morning
prior to the incident; however, he had told the victim that if he had difficulty placing a piece of furniture
on a hanger he should allow the unstabilized furniture to proceed instead of risking getting too close to the
floor opening. Since there were no warning signs or symbols in the work area, the lead man could only
demonstrate the work task and signal for the victim to move away from the opening if he approached it too
closely. A significant portion of the workforce at this location was Hispanic, and the employer had
implemented a bilingual hazard communication program; however, bilingual on-the-job, task-specific
training was not necessarily provided. It is difficult to evaluate worker comprehension of training when
both trainer and worker share a common language, and more so when there is a language barrier, as may
have been the case in this incident. Employers could ensure that workers comprehend training and
instructions by designating experienced workers to act as interpreters, trainers, and safety representatives.
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Figure 1.  Furniture Warehouse
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Figure 2.  Overhead Conveyor System Floor Opening After Modification by Employer
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FACE 95-18:  Roofer Falls to Death From Roof--South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 36-year-old male roofer (the victim) died after falling 23 feet from a roof to the ground below, striking
his head on a flatbed trailer. The victim, a company co-owner, and a laborer were re-roofing a private
residence. The men had stripped the old shingles from the lower roof section and installed the roofing felt
and two parallel lines of 2-inch by 4-inch toeboards along most of the length of the roof. The men then began
to carry the bundles of shingles to the peak of the roof. The victim climbed the roof to the top line of toeboard
and walked the toeboard toward the end of the roof away from the upper roof. As the victim approached
the end of the toeboard line, a 6-foot section of the toeboard broke off, causing the victim to tumble and
fall off the roof. The victim fell to the ground, striking his head on the flatbed trailer. The men climbed down
the ladder to assist the victim, but due to the severity of his injuries, no first aid was administered. The
emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned from the residence and responded within 10 minutes,
along with the police and coroner. The coroner pronounced the victim dead at the scene.  NIOSH
investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• provide adequate fall protection to employees that are exposed to fall hazards
• develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program.
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 1995, a 36-year-old male roofer (the victim) died after falling 23 feet from a roof to the ground,
striking his head on a flatbed trailer. On September 1, 1995, officials of the South Carolina Safety and Health
Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested
technical assistance. On September 11, 1995, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of the incident.
The incident was reviewed with the employer, the coroner, and the SCOSHA compliance officer. Photographs
of the incident site immediately following the incident were reviewed and the coroner’s report was obtained.
The employer was a roofing contractor that had been in operation for 11 years and employed the 2 owners
(including the victim) and a roofer on an as-needed basis. The company had no written safety policy, safety
program, safety procedures, or training. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The company had been contracted to re-roof a private residence. A crew consisting of the 2 co-owners
(including the victim) and a laborer that worked on an as-needed basis were performing the work. The
portion of the roof on which the crew was working was 20-feet long and 35 1/2-feet high, with gabled-
ended eaves approximately 12 1/2-feet above the ground. The roof had a 12:12 pitch.  The men accessed
the work area by means of a 20-foot-long step ladder. A flatbed trailer had been placed at the front side of the
house to catch and haul the old shingles.
 The men had been at the site for 2 days and had removed the old shingles on the front side of the roof, applied
the roofing felt, and had installed two rows of 2-inch by 4-inch toeboards along the 20-foot length of the roof.
The first line of toeboard was installed 5 1/2-feet up from the roof eave. The second line of toeboard was installed
6 1/2-feet above the first.
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On the morning of the incident, the three men were carrying the bundles of shingles to the peak of the roof.
The victim carried a bundle of shingles up the ladder on his shoulder and climbed the roof to the top line
of toeboard. He then walked out along the toeboard away from the upper roof. As the victim approached
the end of the toeboard, a 6-foot-long section of the toeboard broke off, causing the victim to lose his balance
and fall off the roof. The victim fell to the ground, striking his head on the flatbed trailer. The men climbed
down the ladder to assist the victim, but due to the severity of the victim's injuries, no first aid was
administered. The emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned from the residence and responded
within 10 minutes, along with the police department and the coroner. The victim was pronounced dead at
the scene by the coroner.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as massive head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide adequate fall protection to employees that are exposed
to fall hazards.
Discussion: 29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) states that "each employee on a walking/working surface (horizontal
and vertical surface) with an unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet (1.8m) or more above a lower level
shall be protected from falling by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest
systems." In this incident personal fall arrest systems were not available and no form of fall protection was
used.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive safety
program.
Discussion: The development, implementation, and enforcement of a comprehensive safety program
should identify, and reduce or eliminate, worker exposures to hazardous situations. The safety program
should include, but not be limited to, employing worksite hazard assessments to enable the recognition and
avoidance of fall hazards; and providing, and enforcing, the use of appropriate safety equipment such as
safety belts and lanyards, or safety nets.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.501 (b) (1) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
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FACE 95-19:  Sheet Metal Mechanic Dies After Falling 25 Feet Through Roofing Insulation--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 41-year-old male sheet metal mechanic (the victim) died after stepping backward and falling 25 feet
through a roof opening covered only with fiberglass insulation. The victim was a member of a five-man
crew that was replacing the old metal roofing panels and insulation on a church roof. The crew would
remove three 3-foot by 6-foot metal panels and the underlying insulation, then lay down new insulation
and install a new 2-foot by 16-foot panel. The roofer would pull each panel back as the mechanics removed
the screws anchoring the panels to the roof. On the second day at the site, the victim had just removed the
final two screws on his side of a panel when he stood up and stepped backward. The victim stepped on
exposed insulation, lost his balance, and fell between the roof joists to the hardwood church floor below.
The foreman went to the parsonage to tell the preacher to call the emergency medical service (EMS), while
the other crew members went to aid the victim. The victim was found unconscious, but breathing. The EMS
arrived within 10 minutes and transported the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead 1 hour
later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar incidents, employers should:
• perform a hazard evaluation at each worksite before any work is initiated
• ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and utilized by employees whenever work is
performed from an elevation where the potential for a fall exists
• train employees in the recognition of hazards, and methods to control such hazards, including
the use of appropriate safety equipment.
INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 1995, a 41-year-old male sheet metal mechanic (the victim) died after falling 23 feet through
roofing insulation and landing on a hardwood floor. On August 22, 1995, officials of the South Carolina
Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this
fatality, and requested technical assistance. On September 20, 1995, a DSR safety specialist conducted an
investigation of the incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer, the SCOSHA compliance
officer, and the county coroner. Photographs of the incident site taken immediately after the incident were
viewed during the investigation.
The employer in this incident was a roofing contractor that had been in operation for 22 years and employed
12 workers. The employer had a written safety policy and safety program. General written safety rules were
reviewed with all employees upon hire. Training was accomplished on the job. Tailgate safety meetings
were conducted by the job foreman when necessary. Safety meetings were held prior to the start of each
job to discuss the safety hazards associated with that job. The victim had worked for the employer for 12
years and had 15 years prior experience. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to replace the fiberglass insulation and corrugated metal roofing on an
80-foot-wide by 140-foot-long church roof with a 1:12 pitch. A five-man crew (general superintendent,
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foreman, roofer, and 2 sheet metal mechanics) was sent to the site to complete the task. The men were to
remove a 36-inch width of metal roofing and insulation at a time and replace them with new panels and
insulation. This required removing three, 3-foot-wide by 6-foot-long panels and replacing them with the
new 20-inch-wide by 16-foot-long panels.
To remove the panels, the roofer would hold the end of the old panels up and pull them back as the sheet
metal mechanics removed the screws that attached the panels to the roof joists. Because the men were
installing panels smaller in width than those being replaced, open space with exposed insulation existed
around the work area.
At 3:00 p.m. on the second day at the site, work had progressed to a point where the men had completed
work on an area measuring approximately 25 feet by 115 feet. As the victim finished removing the screws
holding the next piece of old roofing, he stood up and stepped backward into an opening approximately
3 feet by 6 feet that was covered only with fiberglass insulation, and fell 23 feet to the hardwood floor inside
the church, striking his head. The foreman went to the church parsonage to have the preacher summon the
emergency medical service (EMS) while the rest of the crew assisted the victim. The victim was found
unconscious but breathing. He was transported to the hospital by the EMS, where he died 1 hour later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed the cause of death as skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should perform a hazard evaluation at each worksite before any work
is initiated.
Discussion: The employer should identify all potential hazards at a worksite. Job hazard analysis consists
of analyzing the sequential steps in routine operations to identify potential hazards, and attempting to
develop procedures or other control measures which effectively eliminate or reduce the hazards. Each
specific job involves hazards particular to that job or working environment. Therefore, employers should
conduct a jobsite survey, identify all hazards, and implement appropriate control measures prior to starting
a job. A jobsite and/or hazard analysis survey in this instance would have determined that there would be
exposed roof openings and a need for some type of fall protection. Both job hazard analysis and pre-job
survey techniques can be effectively used to train workers in hazard identification and appropriate control
measures.
Recommendation #2: Employers need to ensure that fall-protection equipment is provided and utilized
whenever work is performed from an elevation where the potential for a fall exists.
Discussion: The use of a "traditional" safety belt/lanyard combination, as required by 29 CFR 1926.104(d),
is sometimes not practical during roofing operations, particularly where worker mobility is required. Use
of a retracting lanyard equipped with a locking device and attached to a lifeline, can provide sufficient
mobility in some cases. Alternative forms of worker protection, such as safety nets (as specified in 29 CFR
1926.105) or a catch platform, could also be considered.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should train employees in the recognition of hazards, and methods to
control such hazards, including the use of appropriate safety equipment.
Discussion: Employers are required by 29 CFR 1926.21 (b)(2) to instruct each employee in the recognition
and avoidance of unsafe conditions, and to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposures to illness
or injury. Employers need to provide training that ensures that employees understand existing hazards and
how to properly use personal protective equipment to protect themselves.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.104 (d) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register
29 CFR 1926.105 Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Office of the Federal Register
29 CFR 1926.21 (b)(2) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
283
FACE 96-01:  Sign Installer Dies After Falling 12 Feet From A Canopy--Tennessee
SUMMARY
A 22-year-old male sign installer (the victim) died after falling from a canopy located above a loading dock,
and striking his head on the bed of a truck crane. The victim and a co-worker had been assigned to remove
four wooden signs above a loading dock at a food distribution warehouse. The two workers had removed
three signs and were in the process of removing the fourth sign when the incident occurred. While
attempting to remove the fourth sign, the victim was standing on a canopy which was about 15 feet above
the ground and was not using any personal protective equipment (Note: a safety belt and lanyard were
available in the truck crane). The co-worker positioned the truck crane beneath the canopy where the sign
was located and extended the boom above the sign. The victim attached the crane's load line around one
of the metal brackets which secured the sign to the building. He then removed five lag screws which secured
the sign to the building. As he removed the fifth screw the sign swung free. At that time the lag screw which
attached the metal bracket to the wooden sign frame pulled out of the wood. The sign dropped and struck
a diagonal canopy pipe support. The sign then slid down the support and struck the victim, knocking him
off the canopy. The victim fell about 12 feet and struck his head on the corner of the truck bed. The co-
worker, who witnessed the event, ran to aid the victim. He found the victim unresponsive and bleeding
profusely. The co-worker then ran inside the warehouse and contacted the warehouse manager, who
returned to the incident scene with the co-worker and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on
the victim. In the interim, a passerby in a vehicle equipped with a cellular telephone saw the incident and
called 911. An emergency rescue squad arrived in less than 10 minutes, continued CPR, and transported
the victim to the local hospital. The victim was removed from life support the following day and died from
injuries sustained in the fall. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences,
employers should:
• prepare a hazard analysis of each activity involving the installation and/or removal of signs and
implement measures to control these hazards
• review and revise, where applicable, the existing written safety program
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace safety inspections
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 1995, a 22-year-old male sign installer (the victim) died from injuries he received in a
12-foot fall from a canopy. On September 13, 1995, officials of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (TOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and
requested technical assistance. On October 18, 1995, a DSR safety and occupational health specialist
conducted an investigation of this incident. The incident was reviewed with the employer and TOSHA
compliance officer assigned to the case. The sheriff’s report and photographs of the incident site and
equipment were obtained during the investigation.
The employer manufactured, installed, and maintained lighted exterior signs. The employer had been in
business for 30 years and employed 14 workers, six of whom were sign installers. The employer had a
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written general safety program that addressed safety procedures for manufacturing workers, but no specific
written safety procedures for field workers, which included sign installers. Safety meetings were held on
an irregular basis. The victim had worked for the employer for 5 months prior to the incident. This was the
first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The employer had been contracted to remove four wooden signs attached to the exterior of a food
distribution warehouse. The signs would eventually be replaced with new lighted signs. The
warehouse was multi-storied, constructed of concrete, and had 14 loading docks. The signs were
located on the exterior of the warehouse above a metal 3-foot wide canopy, which extended over the
loading docks about 15 feet above ground level. The signs were 8 feet wide by 16 feet long by 2 inches
thick and constructed on 2 inch by 4 inch wood frames with 4 feet by 8 feet plywood panels. Each
sign was estimated to weigh about 250 lbs. The signs were secured to the warehouse with five 1/4-
inch by 2 1/2-inch-long lag screws and metal "L" shaped brackets. The screws were screwed through
the "L"-shaped metal brackets into the sign's wooden frame and into the warehouse's concrete
exterior.
On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker arrived at work and were instructed to proceed
to a food distribution warehouse to remove four wooden signs and bring the signs back to the shop.
The two workers arrived at the jobsite about 8:30 a.m., and commenced work. They removed two
signs without incident. In removing the third sign, the sign reportedly broke into pieces, due to wood
deterioration, while it was being lowered to the ground via the truck crane. In attempting to remove
the fourth sign, the victim positioned himself on a canopy (Figure) above loading dock number 13 and
did not use any personal protective equipment. The canopy was 3 feet wide, 2 to 3 feet below the sign,
and about 15 feet above ground level. The co-worker moved the truck crane into position below the
sign, extended the boom tip above the sign, and lowered the boom cable down to the top of the sign.
The victim secured the boom cable around a corner metal AL@ bracket on the sign and the co-worker
took up the slack in the boom cable. The victim then removed the five lag screws. When the last screw
was removed, the sign swung free of the building. The weight and deteriorated condition of the
wooden frame caused the screw to pull out of the wooden sign frame, allowing the sign to drop. As
it dropped, the sign struck a metal pipe canopy support which was at a 45-degree angle to the canopy
and warehouse wall. The sign then slid down the support and outward toward the victim, striking him
and knocking him off the canopy. The victim fell about 12 feet and struck his head on the corner of
the truck bed. The co-worker, who witnessed the event, ran to aid the victim. He found the victim
unresponsive and bleeding profusely. The co-worker then ran inside the warehouse and contacted the
warehouse manager, who returned to the incident scene with the co-worker and performed cardiop-
ulmonary resuscitation on the victim. In the interim, a passerby in a vehicle equipped with a cellular
telephone saw the incident and called 911. An emergency rescue squad arrived in less than 10 minutes,
continued CPR, and transported the victim to the local hospital. The victim was removed from life
support the following day and died from injuries sustained in the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The official cause of death was listed as severe brain stem trauma.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should conduct job hazard analysis of each activity involving the
installation and/or removal of signs and implement measures to control these hazards.
Discussion: As sign installation and/or removal tasks vary widely from location to location, a job-hazards
analysis and subsequent implementation of control measures should be performed prior to the commence-
ment of any work task. A proper hazard analysis involves three distinct steps: (1) outlining each step of a
task or activity, (2) identifying all potential hazards associated with each step, and (3) developing measures
for controlling each hazard. If a hazard analysis had been performed, the employer may have identified the
dangers associated with working from an elevated work surface and the deteriorated condition of the sign,
and could have subsequently taken measures to prevent this incident (e.g., ensure the use of safety belts
and lanyards by employees who work from elevated work surfaces).
Recommendation #2: Employers should review and revise, where applicable, the existing written safety
program.
Discussion: Although the employer had a written safety program, the program did not address safety
procedures regarding work performed by field personnel, which included sign installers. The implemen-
tation and enforcement of a written comprehensive safety program should reduce and/or eliminate worker
exposures to hazardous situations. The safety program should include, but not be limited to, the recognition
and avoidance of fall hazards, and the use of appropriate safety equipment such as safety belts and
harnesses. Note: A safety belt and harness was available on the truck crane, but was not used by the victim,
possibly due to the unrecognized hazard of falling or being knocked off the canopy. Also, the employer
is working with TOSHA to design and implement a comprehensive written safety program that
encompasses all employees.
Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled workplace
safety inspections.
Discussion: Employers should be cognizant of the hazardous conditions at jobsites and take an active role
to eliminate them. Additionally, scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a
competent person1 to ensure that jobsites are free of hazardous conditions. Even though these inspections
do not guarantee the elimination of occupational injury, they do demonstrate the employer's commitment
to the enforcement of the safety program and to the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #4: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and ensure
that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this instance, the
victim was working from an elevated work surface without the use of personal protective equipment.
Workers and co-workers should look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper way
to perform their tasks. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the
workplace safer. Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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Figure.  Victim’s Position on Canopy
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FACE 96-05:  Electrician Dies Following a 60-foot Fall Through a Roof--Virginia
SUMMARY
A 21-year-old male electrician (the victim) died of injuries received after falling 60 feet through a roof. The
victim and his apprentice co-worker were dispatched to a locomotive repair building to repair electrical
equipment located on the roof of the building. The two workers arrived at the jobsite about 1 p.m. and
proceeded to the roof of the locomotive repair building. Once on the roof, the victim reportedly told the co-
worker to follow in his foot steps since there were numerous, barely distinguishable fiberglass roof panels
located on the roof top. The victim walked down the slightly pitched roof to the ventilator where electrical
work was to be performed. The victim then walked around to the opposite side of the ventilator and
unintentionally stepped on a corrugated fiberglass roof panel. The roof panel broke, causing the victim to
fall through the roof and strike the concrete floor, 60 feet below. Two other employees, who were installing
lighting fixtures inside the building, saw the victim fall through the air and strike the concrete floor. One
worker rushed to the victim’s aid and checked for vital signs while the other worker called 911 for
assistance. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed by the worker until paramedics arrived. A
medical evacuation helicopter arrived about 15 minutes after being called and transported the critically
injured victim to a local hospital. The victim was pronounced brain dead about 43 hours after the incident
occurred. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific training procedures emphasizing
the importance of recognizing and avoiding hazards in the workplace. These procedures should
include, but not be limited to, conducting hazard evaluations before initiating work at a jobsite
and implementing appropriate controls
• owners of buildings should evaluate and identify areas that may be hazardous to any personnel,
including contractors, and prohibit access to these areas, or eliminate the hazard prior to access.
INTRODUCTION
On October 25, 1995, a 21-year-old male electrician (the victim) died after falling 60 feet through a roof. On
October 30, 1995, officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration (VOSH) notified the
Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On December 14, 1995,
a safety specialist from DSR investigated the incident and reviewed the circumstances with the company owner,
a manager at the locomotive repair building, and the VOSH compliance officer assigned to the case. Photographs
of the incident site were obtained and the medical examiners report was reviewed.
The employer in this incident was an electrical contractor that had been in operation for 22 1/2 years and
employed 12 workers, 4 of whom were electricians. The employer had a written general safety program
and on-job-training was provided to all employees. Electricians were responsible for the enforcement of
the safety program and they also conducted tail-gate safety meetings. The victim worked for the company
for 5 years and 2 months prior to the incident. This was the first fatality the company had experienced.
INVESTIGATION
One of the employer's current contracts was to perform various electrical installation and repair services
at a locomotive repair building. The contract had been ongoing for several years. The locomotive repair
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building was about 700-feet long by 170-feet wide by 80-feet high and was constructed in 1969. The
roofing materials consisted mainly of corrugated metal panels with corrugated fiberglass panels inter-
spersed into the roof at irregular intervals. Metal panels have structural integrity to support weight, whereas
fiberglass panels do not. The corrugated fiberglass roof panels comprised at least 10 percent of all the roof
panels and were faded/bleached from exposure to the weather thus looked similar to the metal panels.
Additionally, 24 ventilators equipped with electric motors were located on the roof in a single line at the
north end of the building.
On the day of the incident, the victim and his apprentice co-worker were assigned a job at a different location
from where the incident occurred. Early in the afternoon the victim and co-worker were dispatched to the
locomotive repair building to repair damages to an electric motor and wiring at one of the ventilators. The
motor and wiring had been damaged in a fire the previous week. The two workers arrived at the building
about 1 p.m. and climbed a fixed ladder on the outside of the building to the roof top. Once on the roof,
the victim reportedly told the co-worker to follow in his footsteps, since there were numerous fiberglass
roof panels all over the roof top. The two workers proceeded down the roof (pitch about 4:12) toward the
damaged ventilator motor. Once at the ventilator the victim proceeded to the opposite side of the ventilator
while the co-worker remained stationary. As the victim stepped around the ventilator and out of sight of
the co-worker, he unintentionally stepped on a corrugated fiberglass roof panel. The panel broke and the
victim fell through the roof to a concrete floor, 60 feet below. Two other company employees, who were
installing lighting fixtures inside the building, saw the victim fall through the air and strike the concrete floor.
One worker rushed to the victim’s aid and checked for vital signs while the other worker called 911 for
assistance. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed by one worker until paramedics arrived about
10 minutes after being called. A medical evacuation helicopter was summoned and arrived about 15
minutes later and transported the critically injured victim to a local hospital. The victim was pronounced
brain dead about 43 hours after the incident occurred.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed the cause of death as blunt-force head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should evaluate their current safety program and incorporate specific
training procedures emphasizing the importance of recognizing and avoiding hazards in the workplace.
These procedures should include, but not be limited to, conducting hazard evaluations before initiating
work at a jobsite, and implementing appropriate controls.
Discussion: The existence of a safety program is only the first step in obtaining a viable safety record. In
addition to enforcement, safety programs should be evaluated and training procedures incorporated which
emphasize the importance of recognizing and avoiding hazards in the workplace, following established
safe work procedures, and wearing appropriate personal protective equipment. Before starting any work
at a jobsite, the employer or employer's representative should identify, by observation and by collaboration
with the jobsite owner, any potential or existing hazards. These hazards should be reviewed with the work
crew, and methods to control the hazards and how to perform the work safely should be discussed. In this
instance, the numerous irregularly spaced weathered corrugated-fiberglass roof panels could have been
identified as a potential hazard because of their minimum load rating, proximity to the working area, and
the visual similarity to the corrugated metal roof panels. The hazard of the corrugated fiberglass roof panels,
289
although recognized by the victim, was not dealt with in an effective manner. Workers could have been
instructed not to access the roof area until arrangements for safe access could be provided. Since the
ventilators were all located in a single line across one end of the building, a walkway could have been
constructed over the panels up to and around the ventilators for maintenance and repair. Alternatively, the
corrugated fiberglass roof panels to and around the access area could have been replaced with metal
corrugated panels, thus providing a stable walking/working surface, or a designated walkway marked with
paint and protected by stanchions and handrails could have been installed.
Recommendation #2: Owners of buildings should evaluate and identify areas (e.g., roofs) that may be
hazardous to any personnel, including contractors, and prohibit access to these areas, or eliminate the
hazard prior to access.
Discussion: In 1969 metal and fiberglass corrugated roof panels were used in the construction of the roof
of the locomotive repair building. Additionally, 26 ventilators equipped with electrical motors were
installed on the roof, on one end of the building, to ventilate exhaust fumes from the locomotives. The
fiberglass panels accounted for about 10% of all panels and were irregularly spaced among the metal panels.
Also, the fiberglass panels were faded, due to weathering, and resembled the metal panels in appearance.
These conditions should have been evaluated and appropriate action to mitigate the hazards should have
been taken before access to the roof area was permitted.
Figure.  Roof with Metal and Fiberglass Corrugated Panels and Ventilators
Broken Fiberglass Panel
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FACE 96-21:  Temporary Employee Falls Through Coliseum Roof--Virginia
SUMMARY
On June 27, 1996, a 27-year-old laborer (the victim) was fatally injured when he fell through an unguarded
roof opening while repairing the rubber roof membrane of a college sports coliseum. The victim and his
foreman were repairing the membrane after it had been sliced open to provide access to the underlying roof
structure. The victim had been cleaning the existing membrane while his foreman, working behind him,
was completing the patch. The victim had progressed to the peak of the arched roof, out of sight of the
foreman, and had disconnected his fall protection lanyard from the lifelines. For an unknown reason, the
victim stepped on an exposed ceiling tile which gave way, allowing the victim to fall 90 feet to the gym
floor. Workers inside the gym saw the victim fall and hit the floor. One of the workers, an EMT,
immediately went to the victim and began CPR while another worker notified 911. The campus emergency
medical squad (EMS) responded within 8 minutes and transported the victim to a local emergency room,
where he was pronounced dead.  NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences,
employers should:
• ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available and correctly used when working
from elevations where there is a danger of falling
• consider alternative methods of providing fall protection, such as overhead life line tie-off points.
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 1996, a 27-year-old laborer for a roofing company died of injuries sustained when he fell
through the roof of a sports coliseum. On July 2, 1996, officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (VAOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the incident and
requested technical assistance. On July 30, 1996, a DSR safety engineer and a DSR general engineer
reviewed the incident with the VAOSHA compliance officer. On July 31, 1996, the engineers visited the
incident site and interviewed the prime contractor's safety director and the roofing contractor's foreman.
Photographs of the incident site were taken.
The prime contractor had been in business for about 40 years, employing 75 to 100 employees depending
on industry demand. The victim's employer was a roofing company which had been sub-contracted to
perform roof maintenance and repair related to the structural modification of the existing coliseum structure.
Roof repair work on this jobsite required a crew of two, a foreman and a laborer. The foreman had 11 years
experience in the roofing trades. The victim, a temporary employee, had started work the day before the
incident. Site safety was controlled by the general contractor who employed a full-time safety coordinator.
The general contractor had a written safety policy and written site-specific procedures. These procedures
were comprehensive and included fall protection standards. Weekly safety meetings were conducted on
site for all workers on the project.
INVESTIGATION
The incident occurred on a college campus where a project was underway to strengthen the roof structure
of an arch-shaped sports coliseum 262 feet long, 241 feet wide, and 91 feet high. A construction contractor
had been hired by the school to install additional steel purlins to the roof structure. As originally constructed,
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purlins had been installed on roughly 8-foot centers. The contractor was adding steel purlins between the
existing purlins, essentially reducing the spacing to 4-foot centers. The structure had a "built-up" roof
consisting of ceiling tile roughly 2 inches thick, plywood sheets, asbestos insulation, and a rubber
membrane. To install the additional purlins, it was necessary to open access holes at each arch location
where the purlins were to be secured. Preparatory to this, the rubber membrane was sliced from the eaves
of the roof to the peak, and folded back, exposing the built-up roof structure underneath. Just before
lowering a purlin through the roof, the ceiling tile was removed. Once this was done, the purlin was lifted
by crane, and placed end wise into the structure and lowered to either the floor or bleachers depending on
the location. A lifting beam with an air tugger at each end was then attached to the crane’s load line. The
winch lines from each air tugger were fed through the roof access holes, and the tuggers were used to lift
and hold the purlin while it was clamped in place. Once this was done, the roof was replaced, with the final
step being the repair of the rubber membrane by gluing a strip of rubber over the slice. The access holes
were temporarily covered by sheets of plywood and marked by orange paint on the surface of the roof.
Protection was required to be worn by all workers on the roof. All workers on the roof were required to
wear full-body harnesses with shock absorbing lanyards and rope grabs. Tie-off points were provided by
3/8 inch wire ropes, strung lengthwise along the surface of the roof, at 40 and 80 feet from the eaves. A
third rope was secured around the perimeter of the air-handler ducts mounted at the peak of the roof. Nylon
life lines, size-matched to the lanyard’s rope grabs, were dropped at various locations for the workers to
tie off from.
On the day of the incident, the victim and the roofing foreman had spent the morning patching slices. After
lunch, they were preparing to repair another slice. They were working together at the bottom of the slice.
The victim was using a roller and solvent to clean the membrane while the foreman was readying the
membrane patch and beginning to apply the adhesive. The victim, wearing fall protection, worked his way
towards the peak of the roof while the foreman’s work kept him occupied near the bottom of the slice.
Shortly before 1:30 p.m., the victim had progressed to the peak, between 80 and 90 feet from the eaves,
and was out of sight of the foreman. The victim disconnected his lanyard from the lifeline and his harness.
At 1:30 p.m., workers inside the coliseum heard a noise near the ceiling, and observed the victim fall and
hit the floor. One worker who was a trained EMT immediately went to the victim and began CPR while
another worker contacted 911. The campus EMS responded to the scene in 8 minutes and transported the
victim to the local emergency room where he was pronounced dead.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report established the cause of death as head trauma with probable aortic rupture.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available
and correctly used when working from elevations where there is danger of falling.
Discussion: The victim had been provided with appropriate fall protection equipment, a new harness and
shock absorbing lanyard with rope grab. Additionally, the prime contractor had provided sufficient life
lines to tie off to and the victim had been properly instructed in the use of the equipment. However, once
the victim had made his way to the peak of the roof he disconnected from the life line and removed the
lanyard from his harness. It could not be determined why he did this. The roof was essentially flat in the
area of the incident, he was not near the edge of the roof, and the openings were marked. Although he had
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received instruction the day before, he may have not fully comprehended the necessity to use fall protection
at all times when on the roof. The proper use of fall protection equipment must be continually emphasized.
Recommendation #2: Employers should consider alternative methods of providing fall protection, such
as overhead life line tie-off points.
Discussion: It could not be determined why the victim disconnected his lanyard from the lifeline or why
he disconnected the lanyard from the harness. It is possible that once he reached the peak of the roof, he
did not feel the need for fall protection, since the peak was essentially level so he disconnected from the
lifeline. Also, during discussions with the foreman, it was learned that it was not unusual for employees
to disconnect from lifelines after reaching the top of the roof, since the lifelines were rigged on the surface
of the roof, and the lanyards dragging around the workers were cumbersome and made it difficult to work.
After disconnecting he would have had to carry the lanyard with rope grab attached. To do this, he may
have pulled the lanyard through the straps of the harness, allowing the slack to hang down from his waist.
Walking with the lanyard in this manner, would have allowed the rope grab to bang against his leg. This
may have been enough of an annoyance that he disconnected the lanyard from the harness and laid it on
the air handler duct. It may be possible to alleviate the annoyance of dragging lanyards by suspending them
from overhead lifelines.
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FACE 97-08:  Carpenter's Helper Dies After 120-Foot Fall From an Un-protected Floor Edge of
an Atrium--South Carolina
SUMMARY
A 22-year-old male carpenter's helper (the victim) died of injuries he received after crawling from an
unprotected floor edge onto an unsecured piece of plywood and falling 120 feet to the ground. At the time
of the incident, concrete forming work had been completed on 12 floors of a condominium under
construction. The victim was part of a crew removing form materials (plywood, etc.) and was assigned to
work on the 10th floor. The victim had been on the 12th floor obtaining a safety harness and was en route
to the 10th floor via a personnel hoist when he stopped the hoist and exited at the 11th floor. A co-worker
from the floor above had yelled down to the victim, asking him to plug in an extension cord that was hanging
from the 12th to the 11th floor. He crawled under a red tape warning line at the floor edge of the atrium
onto a piece of unsecured plywood. The plywood gave way and the victim fell 120 feet to the ground. The
local emergency medical service responded in less than 10 minutes, but the victim was pronounced dead
at the scene. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• implement 29 CFR 1926.501(b)(1), which requires that all walking/working surfaces with an
unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet or more above a lower level shall be protected from falling
by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest systems
• develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program
• address worker safety issues in the planning phase of construction projects.
Additionally, prime contractors should:
• utilize contract language that requires subcontractors to implement a site-specific safety and
health program prior to the initiation of work.
INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1997, a 22-year-old male carpenter’s helper (the victim) died of injuries he received after
falling 120 feet from an unprotected floor edge. On April 14, 1997, officials of the South Carolina
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research
(DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On June 10, 1997, a safety specialist from DSR
investigated the incident and reviewed the circumstances with the employer and officials of SCOSHA.
Photographs of the incident scene and witness statements were also reviewed.
The employer in this incident was a concrete forming company which had been in business for 15 years
and had 15 employees. The employer had been contracted to supply the concrete forming work for the
construction of a 12-story condominium. The employer did not have a written safety and health program,
but bi-weekly safety meetings were held by the employer. Also, the owner was the designated safety
officer. The victim had worked for the employer for 9 days. This is the first fatality experienced by the
employer.
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INVESTIGATION
The employer had been subcontracted to do the concrete forming work for the construction of a 12-story
condominium. At the time of the incident, the employer had been at the construction site for 42 months.
The concrete pillars and floors had been completed and the employer was in the process of removing the
wooden forms. On Sunday, the day of the incident, two crews were directed to work on different levels
of the condominium. The crew the victim was assigned to was going to remove forming materials
(plywood, 2x4's, 2x6's, etc.) and perform cleanup duties on the 10th floor. Although the crew was assigned
to work on the 10th floor, the employees could retrieve safety harnesses from either a box on the ground
or from a location on the 12th floor.
At about 7:30 a.m. the employees were reporting to their assigned work locations. The victim traveled to
the 12th floor and was observed obtaining a safety harness. He then rode the personnel hoist down to the
11th floor where he exited. A co-worker located on the 12th floor yelled down to the victim to plug in the
extension cord that was hanging from the 12th to the 11th floor. The victim was observed crawling under
a red warning tape that had been placed around the atrium floor edge on the 11th floor. The cracking of
plywood was heard and before the victim could be alerted to the danger, the plywood and victim fell to the
ground 120 feet below (see Figure). Note: A warning line which consisted of red danger tape and
manila rope tied to rebar strung along the atrium floor edge was being used in lieu of a guardrail
system at the time of the incident.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The coroner listed the cause of death as closed head trauma-skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should implement 29 CFR 1926.501 (b)(1), which requires that all
walking/working surfaces with an unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet or more above a lower level
shall be protected from falling by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest
systems.
Discussion: A warning line which consisted of a red danger tape and manila rope tied to rebar strung along
the atrium floor edge was being used in lieu of a guard rail system at the time of the incident. The warning
line being used was not adequate in that it had been installed at the floor edge of the atrium. The use of a
guardrail system, safety net system, or personal fall arrest system may have prevented this incident.
Recommendation #2: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety
program.
Discussion: Employers should develop and implement a comprehensive written safety program which
includes, but is not limited to, the proper use of fall protection equipment, and the recognition and control
of fall hazards. Development, implementation, and enforcement of a written safety program and the
establishment of standard safety practices will demonstrate to workers the employer's commitment to
safety.
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Recommendation #3: Employers should address worker safety in the planning phase of construction
projects.
Discussion: Safety concerns should be addressed and incorporated into all construction projects during the
planning phase and throughout the entire project. Such a procedure would allow for the identification of
potential hazards prior to the initiation of work so that appropriate intervention strategies could be
implemented.
Recommendation #4: Prime contractors should utilize contract language that requires subcontractors
to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Discussion: Prime contractors should use contract language that requires all subcontractors to identify how
they intend to implement a site-specific safety and health program prior to the initiation of work.
Subcontractors' safety programs should be consistent and compatible with the prime contractor's safety
program. The contract should contain clear and concise language as to which party is responsible for a given
safety or health issue. Any differences should be negotiated before work begins. Once the provisions for
these responsibilities have been established, the respective parties should ensure that the provisions of the
contract regarding safety and health are upheld.
REFERENCES
Office of the Federal Register: Code of Federal Regulations, Labor 29 Part 1926.501 (b)(1), July 1, 1995.
Figure.  Atrium Floor Area
Warning Line
Area Victim Fell Through
Floor Edge
Floor Edge
Plywood Sheeting
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FACE 97-10:  Tower Erector/Inspector Dies after Falling 200 Feet from a Telecommunications
Tower to the Ground -- North Carolina
SUMMARY
On May 15, 1997, a 38-year-old male tower erector/inspector (the victim) died as a result of injuries
sustained in a 200-foot fall from a telecommunications tower. The incident occurred while the victim and
a co-worker were connecting antenna-support brackets onto a leg of the tower. The victim apparently
disconnected or was attempting to re-connect his fall protection and was climbing down the leg of the tower
from 220 feet to 200 feet when he fell to the ground. The victim was pronounced dead at the scene by rescue
personnel. NIOSH investigators determined that to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• enforce existing safety programs, policies and procedures at all times
• thoroughly plan all work and perform a job hazard analysis of the site prior to starting work to
ensure employees’ knowledge of the use of new tools or new tasks
• provide a system or method of fall protection that protects employees at all times when working
at elevations
• ensure that fall protection equipment is appropriate and maintained in good condition.
INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 1997, a 38-year-old male tower erector/inspector (the victim) died as a result of injuries
sustained in a 200-foot fall from a telecommunications tower. On May 21, 1997, officials of the North
Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety
Research (DSR) of this incident, and requested technical assistance. On June 11, 1997, a DSR safety
engineer and safety specialist met with the NCOSHA compliance officer and the company owner, and
examined equipment similar to that involved in the incident. Additional information was obtained from the
NCOSHA file, co-worker witness statements, and the sheriff's report. The site was photographed during
the investigation.
The employer was a construction contractor who specialized in tower erection. The company has been in
business since 1994 and employed 27 workers, several of whom were "tower hands" who worked aloft
regularly. The company had a safety program and written safety procedures. Employee training for
climbing and welding appeared to be gained on the job and through tailgate meetings. Safety topics covered
at the meetings included rigging safety, climbing safety, and first aid. Although the victim had worked for
this company as a tower erector/inspector for only 1 year, he had previously worked as a tower erector for
another company. This was the first fatality experienced by the employer.
INVESTIGATION
The victim was a member of a five-man crew, 2 senior tower erector/inspectors, a junior tower erector/
inspector, a welder, and a supervisor, erecting a 300-foot communications tower (Figure 1). The crew had
been on site for 3 days, and were using a "jin" pole secured on the interior of the three-faced tower, and
a winch truck to lift the tower components into place. A "jin" pole is a pulley-oriented lifting device used
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to position various equipment into place. Each 20-foot tower section (Figure 1a - enlarged) consisted of
3 legs installed in a triangular configuration. The legs were connected to the preceding 20-foot section using
4 bolts, one in each corner of the overlaying plates. Two cross members were then installed diagonally
between the 2 legs on each side to complete the 3 tower faces for that section. The cross members were
connected to the legs by a bolt. As each section was completed, the "jin" pole was repositioned higher in
the interior of the tower. On the day of the incident, the crew arrived at the site at approximately 8:00 a.m.
The victim and a second senior tower erector/inspector (his brother) climbed the tower to the work area.
The junior erector/inspector and welder remained on the ground assembling the section faces, hooking up
and raising the components into position with the winch truck.
At approximately 10:30 a.m., the tower was complete to the 200-foot level. The workers had installed the
legs for the next section and had climbed to the 220-foot level to connect the top of the cross members, which
had been hoisted into place, to the tower legs. After the connections were made, the workers began to climb
back down to the 200-foot level to connect the cross members to the bottom of the legs. As the men were
descending the legs, both the victim’s brother and the men on the ground heard a clanging sound. When
the brother looked across the tower, he did not see the victim. The workers on the ground looked up and
saw someone was falling. A coworker on the ground immediately called 911 and the company owner from
a radio in the company truck. The victim was pronounced dead at the scene.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The Medical Examiner listed the cause of death as multiple trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should continually stress to all employees the importance of following
established safety rules and procedures at all times.
Discussion: Standard practice calls for testing the connection of the anchorage point prior to releasing a grip
on the structure. The company also had a policy of three-point contact at all times if not tied-off. It appears
that the victim did not test his connection prior to relying on it to support his full weight or lost one of his
three points of contact with the structure. In accordance with the OSHA Act, P.L. 91-596, Section 5(b).
"each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations, and
orders... which are applicable to his own actions and conduct." The employer in this incident managed a
comprehensive and detailed safety program on the project that addressed the hazards to which his
employees could reasonably expect to be exposed. The fact the incident occurred in spite of these policies
clearly shows the need for employers to continually remind all employees of the importance of following
established safety rules and procedures at all times.
Recommendation #2: Employers should thoroughly plan all work and perform a job hazard analysis
of the site prior to starting work, anticipating that employees might have a lack of knowledge about safety
at the site, instead of waiting for employees to raise questions.
Discussion: The company states that there is weekly training on climbing safety involving proper personal
protective equipment (PPE) (inspection and use) as well as, a hazard assessment of each jobsite. The site
supervisor is in charge of weekly training, certification (first aid, life safety, etc.) of employees on site, and
hazard assessment of each job. It is recommended that once on site, a job hazard analysis be done by the
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employer and workers together. Worker safety issues should be discussed and incorporated into all projects
during the planning and throughout the entire project. The planning for and incorporation of safety
measures, prior to any work being performed at jobsites, will help to identify potential worker hazards so
that preventive measures can be implemented at the site.
Recommendation #3: Employers should provide a system or method of fall protection that protects
employees at all times when working at elevations. At a minimum, three-point contact (one foot and two
hands or vice versa) should be maintained.
Discussion: In this case, the employee fell from the tower after he apparently disconnected or was
reconnecting his fall protection in order to move down the structure. Moving without fall protection is
standard procedure with this type of work and requires a minimum of three-point contact at all times;
traditional fall protection for this job is more effective when the employee is stationary and tied onto the
structure. It is recommended that other methods of fall protection be used that protect employees while they
are moving as well as when stationary. For example, a lifeline system or cable safety climb device provides
a tie-off point for the employee to hook onto, and provides fall protection coverage at all times. For a tower
leg or similar vertical structure, a fall arrester (e.g., rope grab) should be worn by the employee and attached
to the lifeline, enabling the worker to move freely without interference until a free fall is detected.
Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that fall protection equipment is appropriate and
maintained in good condition. Employers should periodically inspect fall protection equipment to
ensure that all components are in operational order.
Discussion: Connecting clasps on lanyards are equipped with a locking mechanism. Such a mechanism
prevents the clasp from opening unintentionally. To prevent unintentional opening, it is recommended that
all lanyard clasps be equipped with locking mechanisms. It was observed that some of the other lanyards
at the site appeared old and worn. Lanyards and other nylon equipment should also be periodically replaced
to prevent equipment failures, as nylon will deteriorate with age and exposure to ultraviolet light from
sunlight and welding arcs. It is also recommended that employers and employees periodically inspect all
fall protection equipment to ensure that it is in operational order.
REFERENCES
1. Public Law 91-596, December 29,1970, the "Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970", Section
5(b).
2. Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1926, 1996 edition. U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of
the Federal Register, Washington DC.
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Figure 1.  300 Foot Telecommunications Tower
Figure 1a.  Enlarged View, Tower Section
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FACE 86-10:  33 Year-Old Apprentice Substation Electrician Fatally Injured
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
is currently conducting the Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) Project, which is
focusing primarily upon selected electrical-related fatal injuries and confined space fatalities. By scientifically
collecting data from a sample of fatal accidents, it will be possible to identify and rank factors which
influence the risk of fatal injuries for selected employees.
On November 6, 1985, a 33 year-old electrician came in contact with electrical energy while cleaning a
substation switch. He died on November 8, 1985, from injuries sustained as a result of falling from the aerial
bucket from which he was working.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
Officials of the responsible Occupational Safety and Health Program notified DSR of this fatality and
requested technical assistance. This case has been included in the FACE Project. On January 10, 1986, a
member of the DSR research team (a physician) met with representatives of the company and the
Occupational Safety and Health Program compliance officer, who investigated this case. The site of this
fatality was visited and photographed. Interviews were conducted with two workers with essentially the
identical job classification as the victim. A next-of-kin interview was conducted on January 9, 1986.
OVERVIEW OF THE COMPANY AND SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim worked for a large utility company employing over 5000 employees. This company provides
both electrical and natural gas services to approximately one-third of the state. The victim worked for the
electricity distribution division, which has 178 employees. These employees are classified as either
journeyman or apprentice substation electricians. The training program for a substation electrician is
approximately 6 years. Five and one-half years consist of both classroom and on-the-job training. Formal
testing is done to ensure adequate understanding of classroom work. The last six months of the training is
used for final evaluation, prior to attaining journeyman status. The victim was an apprentice substation
electrician in his final six months of training. The victim would have been made journeyman substation
electrician in March of 1986.
The company has a budgeted safety department and a program which emphasizes three functions: (1) to
formulate and communicate a safety program for the entire company; (2) to deal with workman's
compensation claims; and (3) to provide industrial hygiene services for the company.
The safety department has six full-time employees and is headed by a safety engineer with eleven years
of experience in occupational safety and health, in addition to formal training in safety management. The
safety staff also employs an industrial hygienist and a specialist in worker's compensation claims.
A written safety policy and safety program exist for this company. Several safety committees exist
involving various levels of management and union employees. Formal task training is provided by a
department whose only function is training. Safety rules are communicated to new employees at the time
of initial orientation. Each new employee is given a written safety manual and formal classroom instruction
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in safety. New employees are formally tested within ninety days of being hired to ensure adequate
understanding of the safety rules.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
The four-man crew consisted of two journeyman substation electricians and two apprentice substation
electricians. The apprentice substation electricians (one of whom was the victim) were both in their final
six months of training. The crew was cleaning high voltage disconnect circuits at a large substation. This
is considered to be routine maintenance, is performed using established procedures, and had been done by
all members of the crew for at least five years.
The crew was to clean five circuits (15 switches) on the day of the accident. Each circuit consists of three
switches (one for each phase), located 40 feet above ground on a steel frame structure. The switches are
cleaned with solvents, steel wool, and occasionally filed to remove corrosion. The crew was using an aerial
bucket to access the switches. The three switches for each circuit are operated by a single control lever and
are either all open or all closed. The control lever is operated from ground level. Prior to cleaning switches,
the system must be de-energized. The crew foreman is ultimately responsible for this activity. Once the
incoming lines are de-energized, the line is tested using a method called "fuzzing". "Fuzzing" consists of
wrapping insulating material around one end of a metal object and holding it close to the incoming power
line. If no noise is heard, the line is assumed to be dead and grounds are placed from the incoming line to
the steel support structure. The system is also grounded on the outgoing side of the circuit so that there is
no possibility of feedback into the three switches.  The switches are to remain in the open position during
this maintenance procedure.
On the day of the accident, several crews were working at the substation site. One crew was removing
obsolete equipment and had placed grounds on the outgoing side of the circuits that were to be cleaned.
After lunch, this crew left the substation removing their grounds. These grounds were not replaced. The
victim had completed cleaning the fourth circuit shortly before 3:00 p.m. He left the 4th circuit closed to
drain off any static charge that may have built up in the system. (There would have been no static charge
had the outgoing side of the circuit been grounded.) The victim was asked if he wanted the fourth circuit
opened by two different crew members. He supposedly told them he would do it himself. The victim moved
the truck so that the aerial bucket could be positioned for cleaning the fifth circuit. The fourth circuit was
re-energized. The crew foreman de-energized the incoming line to the fifth circuit. The line was "fuzzed"
and grounds were placed on the incoming line. At 3:14 p.m. the victim was in the process of cleaning the
switches when he contacted both sides of one of the three switches. This action completed the connection,
as if the switch itself were closed and current flowed through the victim's body and to ground by way of
the ground on the incoming line. The system was energized by feedback through the fourth circuit. The
victim fell from the aerial bucket approximately forty feet to the ground. The victim had extensive burns
of both arms and hands. It is estimated that the victim completed a single-phase circuit of approximately
20,000 volts. First aid was administered at the accident site by co-workers and subsequently paramedics.
The victim was transported to a local hospital approximately 20 minutes after the accident occurred. He
was later transferred to another medical center and died two days later on November 8, 1985.
Standard operating procedure was not followed by the crew while cleaning the switches. The fourth circuit
should have been left open. The crew was aware of this. The outgoing side of the circuit was not grounded
as required by the company. The victim did not have himself belted to the aerial bucket as required. This
would have prevented his fall and the injuries sustained in the fall.
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CAUSE OF DEATH
Following an autopsy, it is the opinion of the medical examiner that the victim "died as a result of cerebral
injuries when he fell from a height of 40 feet." The victim's contact with electricity is noted in the medical
examiner's report as the cause of the fall.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Standard operating procedures and hazard awareness should be routinely
presented and reviewed at safety meetings. Employers should enforce strict adherence to company
policy. Employees should follow all standard operating procedures.
Discussion: The crew did not follow standard operating procedure while providing maintenance to the
substation. Three violations of standard operating procedure occurred that contributed to this fatality: 1)the
switches on the fourth circuit were left closed when they should have been open; 2)the outgoing side of
the circuits were not grounded; and 3)the victim was not secured to the bucket from which he was working.
Had standard operating procedure been followed, this fatality would not have occurred.
Recommendation #2: De-energization of both sides (incoming and outgoing) of the substation circuit
should be verified.
Discussion: The incoming line to the circuit is "fuzzed" as part of the standard operating procedure to verify
that the line is de-energized. The outgoing side of the circuit should also be checked to verify that no voltage
is present (from feedback). Additionally, the absence of low voltage (not detected by "fuzzing") should be
verified by a low voltage testing device, prior to grounding. Had both sides of the circuit been tested, the
victim would have been alerted that the system was not de-energized.
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FACE 88-46:  Female Receiving Clerk Dies in Fall in Warehouse
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying: the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On September 3, 1988, a 33-year-old female receiving clerk died as the result of a fall sustained on
September 2, 1988, while trying to locate misplaced merchandise on 7-foot-high steel shelving. The
attending physician determined that the victim landed head first on the concrete floor.
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
State officials notified DSR of this fatality and requested technical assistance. On September 20, 1988, a
research safety specialist met with company officials and the victim's immediate supervisor, photographed
the incident site, and discussed the incident with the county coroner and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) compliance officer.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim was employed by a wholesale merchandise distributor that has been in operation for 55 years.
The company employs 240 workers, including 3 receiving clerks. The company has no written safety
program and all training for work-related tasks is conducted on the job.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, the victim was assigned by her supervisor to locate misplaced merchandise that
was previously stocked. The merchandise was on 7-foot-high by 3-foot-wide rows of steel shelving spaced
5 feet apart in a 25,200 square yard warehouse. The shelving was arranged so that four shelves existed for
inventoried merchandise. The top of the shelving was used to store excess merchandise. The victim decided
to check the storage area at the incident site even though a co-worker informed her that the storage area had
already been searched. Co-workers noted that the victim apparently climbed the shelves to reach the top
shelf instead of using an available 6-foot-high wheel-mounted ladder with handrails.
A fork-truck driver passing the scene offered the victim assistance in getting down, but she declined. A short
time later workers in the area heard a scream and found the victim lying in the aisle between two rows of
shelves. The emergency medical service arrived in 10 minutes and summoned a medical helicopter. The
victim was flown to the local hospital where emergency neurosurgery was performed. However, the victim
died the following morning as a result of injuries received in the fall.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed accidental closed-head injuries as the cause of death.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should perform task hazard analysis for all tasks performed at their
establishments, adopt safe work procedures for the performance of these tasks, and ensure that workers
adhere to these procedures at all times.
Discussion: As previously stated, the employer had no written safety program or task procedures. Hazard
analysis should be performed to identify any hazards that may be encountered by workers during the
performance of their duties. Although a receiving clerk might not be identified as a dangerous occupation,
there may be unanticipated hazards. One hazard encountered by receiving clerks is a fall hazard, especially
while working at the level of the top of the shelving (i.e., 7 feet). The employer provides 6-foot-high, wheel-
mounted ladders for working at this level or below, if necessary.
Written safety procedures should be developed that address the task of stocking shelves. These procedures
should require the use of ladders. If a ladder had been used in this incident, the possibility of a fall would
have been reduced once these procedures are developed, workers should be trained to perform their duties
in the safest possible manner. Employers must ensure adherence to these safe job procedures in order to
provide workers with the safest possible work environment.
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FACE 89-45:  Welder Dies in Fall from Fork Lift
INTRODUCTION
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR),
performs Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology (FACE) investigations when a participating
state reports an occupational fatality and requests technical assistance. The goal of these evaluations is to
prevent fatal work injuries in the future by studying the working environment, the worker, the task the
worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in fatal injury, and
the role of management in controlling how these factors interact.
On July 16, 1989, a 47-year-old male welder died as the result of falling approximately 7 feet from a fork
truck (commonly referred to as a fork lift or towmotor).
CONTACTS/ACTIVITIES
The county coroner contacted DSR about this fatality and requested technical assistance. On July 27, 1989,
a research team consisting of a safety specialist and an epidemiologist discussed this case with state officials,
conducted an investigation, met with the company owner, and photographed the site of the incident.
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYER'S SAFETY PROGRAM
The victim had been employed for 5 years as a welder for a welding and machining services company that
has been in operation for 21 years. The company employs 45 workers, including 35 welders. The employer
uses written safety rules and procedures and provides on-the-job training. The company owner is also the
safety officer. Jobsite foremen are responsible for administering and enforcing the safety program. This
fatality is the first in the history of the company.
SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
On the day of the incident, welding and machining tasks were being performed throughout the plant as
usual. The welder (victim) was performing welding tasks assigned to him earlier that morning. A co-worker
(fork lift operator) was moving wheel sets (steel axles with steel wheels attached) inside the building where
the victim was welding.
The co-worker had just off-loaded a wheel set when he noticed that the fork carriage (assembly to which
the forks or other attachments are mounted) was jamming on the mast (upright steel assembly consisting
of hydraulic cylinders, inner channels, telescoping outer channels, chains, and guide rollers) (see Figure).
The co-worker and victim decided to solve the problem without removing the fork truck from service, a
violation of company maintenance procedures.
They backed the fork lift (i.e., a 1979 V225 diesel-powered fork truck with an 11-ton lifting capacity) out
of the work area, set the brakes, blocked the wheels, raised the fork carriage up the mast to the point where
it jammed, and shut off the engine.
The victim noticed that a wear guard strip, attached to the side of the telescoping channel on the mast, had
come loose and was binding against the guide roller. This caused the top of the fork carriage to jam
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approximately 8 feet from the ground. The victim, carrying a cutting torch, climbed up the carriage and
stood on an angled, 6-inch-wide steel support to cut out a section of the wear guard strip as the co-worker
observed. The victim then used a pry bar to move the wear guard strip away from the guide roller. As the
strip dislodged from the roller guide, the carriage dropped approximately 1 foot.
Due to the jerking motion of the carriage, the victim fell from the angled steel support headfirst onto a
concrete pad. The local emergency medical service (EMS) was summoned and arrived approximately 4-
5 minutes later. Approximately 35 minutes thereafter, the victim was air-evacuated to the hospital where
he died 2 days later.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner's report listed blunt force trauma to the head as cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should review, revise where applicable, and enforce current safety
programs.
Discussion: Although the company has a written safety program, including maintenance procedures for
fork trucks, the procedure was not followed. If the victim and co-worker had informed the jobsite foreman
of the fork lift problem, according to procedure, the truck could have been moved to the maintenance shop
and repaired according to company maintenance procedures, thereby avoiding the incident. Employers
should review, revise where applicable, and enforce the current safety program. The program should be
clear and should emphasize the importance of following established operating procedures.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that employees are aware of, and fully understand the
risks associated with, failing to comply with established operating procedures.
Discussion: Unscheduled maintenance by unauthorized personnel can and does lead to injury and even
death. Apparently the two workers (the victim and co-worker) did not perceive the 8-foot distance as a
hazard associated with working on the fork lift, and a fatality resulted. If the standard operating procedure
had been followed, this incident may have been avoided. Employers should ensure that all employees are
aware of, and fully understand, the risks associated with not complying with established operating
procedures.
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Figure.  Fork Truck Components: 1) fork carriage (assembly to which the forks or other attachments
are mounted, and 2) mast (steel upright assembly consisting of hydraulic cylinders, inner channels,
telescoping outer channels, chains, and guide rollers.
308
FACE 90-35:  Electrical Lineman Dies After Falling 35 Feet to the Ground from a Burning Aerial
Bucket in South Carolina
SUMMARY
An electrical lineman died 5 days after attempting to jump from a burning aerial bucket and falling 35 feet
to the ground. The lineman was adjusting the slack in the middle phase of a three-phase, 14,200-volt
powerline. The hydraulic hose attached to the impact wrench he was using burst. Hydraulic fluid spraying
from the hose ignited, covering part of the aerial bucket in flames. As the lineman was rotating the aerial
bucket away from the powerlines, he lost power to the controls. He attempted to escape the intensifying
fire by jumping laterally from the bucket's edge to an adjacent earthen bank approximately 15 feet away.
However, his foot caught on the lip of the bucket, and he fell 35 feet straight down to the ground. The
investigation revealed that the metal-reinforced hydraulic hose used for the impact wrench attachment was
simultaneously in contact with two phases of the powerline. The heat generated in the hose caused it to melt
and burst at one of the points of contact with the powerlines. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to
prevent future similar occurrences, employers and/or equipment, tool, and hose manufacturers, should:
• ensure that metal-reinforced hydraulic hoses are not installed on any part of the boom, aerial
bucket, or hydraulic attachments on aerial bucket trucks that may be used near powerlines
• ensure that fluids used to power hydraulic hand tools are fire resistant
• install all hydraulic hoses for impact attachments in such a manner that the flow of hydraulic
oil can be stopped by the worker in the aerial bucket during an emergency
• label or color code hydraulic hoses to identify hoses that may be used on an aerial bucket
• design a hydraulic coupling system that would ensure that any hydraulic hoses unsuitable for
use on booms, aerial buckets, or aerial bucket attachments, could not be connected to these
components of aerial bucket systems
• provide task-specific training to workers that includes training in the identification and control
of potential hazards
• stress the importance of adherence to established safe work procedures.
INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 1990, a 37-year-old lineman died of injuries sustained on June 25, 1990, when he attempted
to jump from a burning aerial bucket, and fell 35 feet to the ground. On July 16, 1990, officials of the South
Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR)
of the death, and requested technical assistance. On August 9, 1990, a safety specialist and a public health
intern traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The incident was reviewed with employer
representatives, the county sheriff's office, and the county coroner. Photographs of the incident site were
obtained.
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The employer in this incident is an electrical contractor who has been in business for 44 years and employs
550 workers, including 100 electrical lineman. The contractor employs three full-time safety officers and
has a written safety policy, a comprehensive written safety program, and a worker training program. A
comprehensive safety manual is provided to each employee. Daily safety tailgate meetings are held at the
jobsite, and weekly safety meetings are held at the office. During weekly safety meetings, a section of the
safety manual is read and discussed and all personnel are required to sign a statement documenting their
attendance. The employer maintains a video library of safety films dealing with all aspects of powerline
construction. These films are shown in the field, and in the office on days that operations are canceled due
to inclement weather. Supervisors are required to complete a daily safety checklist for each job completed.
INVESTIGATION
The employer was contracted to upgrade an existing electrical system by installing new utility poles parallel
to an existing three-phase electrical system, and transferring the 12,400-volt powerlines to the new utility
poles.
On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were transferring the energized powerlines to the
last new utility pole in the system. As each phase was transferred, it was "dead-ended" (attached at the pole
without further connection to the rest of the power system). Once all three phases were attached, they were
"sagged" (the slack was adjusted) by the lineman. The center phase was sagged first, then the two outside
phases. The center phase was sagged a second time to take out additional slack. The conductor was held
in place by a come-along during attachment to the insulators on the utility pole. A hydraulic impact wrench
was used to tighten connectors around the powerline and insulator.
As the lineman was tightening the center phase connectors, the hydraulic hose supplying fluid to the impact
wrench burst. The hydraulic fluid spraying from the ruptured hose ignited, covering part of the aerial bucket
with flames. The lineman rotated the aerial bucket away from the utility pole. When the bucket was
approximately 12 feet away from the utility pole, the lineman lost power to the controls as additional
hydraulic hoses burst and burned. The lineman attempted to jump laterally to an earthen bank approximately
15 feet away. However, his foot caught on the lip of the bucket and he fell 35 feet to the ground, landing
on his head and chest. The victim rose to his feet but was lowered back to the ground by the co-worker.
The co-worker radioed the company dispatcher from the truck and requested the emergency medical squad
(EMS). The victim was transported to the hospital where he died 5 days later from injuries sustained in the
fall. The bucket burned for approximately 20 minutes until a second line crew de-energized the powerlines
and the fire department extinguished the fire.
Investigation revealed that a field mechanic had installed a metal-reinforced hydraulic hose on the impact
wrench 5 months prior to the incident. When the hose simultaneously contacted two of the energized
phases, electrical continuity was established through the hose's metal reinforcement. The heat generated
by the resistance to the phase-to-phase current melted the hose, and partially melted the metal in the hose.
When the hose ruptured, the spraying hydraulic fluid contacted the hot metal and ignited.
Standard employer practice required the use of common hydraulic hoses (without metal reinforcement) on
any area of the boom or aerial bucket that might be placed near energized powerlines. The mechanic told
investigators that he knew he was installing the wrong type of hose, but did not understand the potential
hazards involved. The electrical contractor had the hydraulic hoses on all aerial bucket trucks inspected and
no other metal-reinforced hoses were found in the bucket area. However, when informed of the cause of
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the fire, the local electric utility company inspected its aerial bucket trucks and found metal-reinforced
hydraulic hoses on several.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed trauma-closed head injury as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should instruct maintenance and mechanical personnel not to install metal-
reinforced rubber hydraulic hoses on any part of the boom, aerial bucket, or hydraulic attachments of aerial
bucket trucks that may be used to work on or near energized high-voltage powerlines.
Discussion: As seen in this case, electrical continuity established between two powerline phases or
powerline phase-to-ground through a metal-reinforced hydraulic hose, can generate heat sufficient to
rupture the hose and cause a fire. Current flowing through the metal reinforcement could also be conducted
to the truck chassis, creating an electrocution hazard. All hydraulic tools used on or near energized lines
or equipment must be equipped with nonconducting hoses, according to 29 CFR 1926.951(f)(3).
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that fire-resistant hydraulic fluid is used to power hand
tools that may be exposed to ignition sources.
Discussion: Fluids used in hydraulic-powered tools must be approved, fire-resistant fluids according to 29 CFR
1926.302(d)(1). In this case, use of a fire-resistant hydraulic fluid could have prevented the ensuing fire.
Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that hydraulic hoses for impact attachments are installed so
that the flow of hydraulic fluid can be stopped by the worker in an aerial bucket during an emergency.
Discussion: A control valve incorporated into the hydraulic system of the aerial bucket would allow a worker
in the bucket to immediately stop the flow of hydraulic fluid to any attachment. In the event of a fire, the control
valve would enable a worker in a bucket to shut off the supply of hydraulic fluid fueling the fire. Although use
of a metal-reinforced hose was a primary cause of fire in this instance, this safeguard should be incorporated for
all hydraulic hoses due to the potential that any type of hydraulic hose could burst.
Recommendation #4: Employers should label or color code hydraulic hoses to identify those that are
appropriate for specific applications on certain areas of machinery (such as aerial buckets).
Discussion: A method or system for labeling or color coding hydraulic hoses might prevent the hazards
introduced when different types of hoses, designed for use in different applications, are used interchangeably.
Recommendation #5: Equipment and tool manufacturers should cooperatively design an independent
coupling system, utilizing a new variation of matched connection components, that could be incorporated
into aerial bucket system designs.
Discussion: Such an independent coupling system would ensure that any hydraulic hoses unsuitable for
use on booms, aerial buckets, or aerial bucket attachments could not be connected to these components of
aerial bucket systems.
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Recommendation #6: Employers should provide task-specific training to workers that correlates steps
in the task with control of the identified potential hazards.
Discussion: In this instance, the field mechanic was aware that he was installing the incorrect type of hose;
however, he was not aware of the fire hazard associated with the use of a metal-reinforced rubber hose near
energized high-voltage powerlines.
Recommendation #7: Employers should ensure that workers are aware of the importance of adherence
to established safe work procedures.
Discussion: Employers should continually stress the importance of adherence to established safe work
procedures. Established safe work procedures required covering energized powerlines in the immediate
work area with insulated line hoses prior to the start of any work. It is not known, however, if insulated line
hoses would have prevented the ignition of the hydraulic fluid in this case.
REFERENCES
1. 29 CFR 1926.951(f)(3) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register. pg. 286.
2. 29 CFR 1926.302(d)(1) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register. pg. 133.
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FACE 91-30:  Tree Trimmer Dies After Falling 65 Feet From Tree in Virginia
SUMMARY
A 34-year-old male tree trimmer died after falling 65 feet from a tree. The victim was limbing and topping
the three forks of a large oak tree with a chain saw in preparation for felling the tree. The victim had limbed
and topped two of the forks and had started on the third. As the limbs fell to the ground, the victim's brother
and a general contractor were cutting them into pieces. The victim's cousin looked up to check on the victim,
then began to cut the branches when he noticed the victim's belt rope falling. He looked up to see the victim
falling to the ground. The victim's climbing cradle had failed. An investigation revealed that the connectors
on both ends of the climbing cradle rope were fastened with wire and electrical tape. NIOSH investigators
concluded that, in order to prevent similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that proper fastenings are used at the connectors for all climbing cradle ropes
• ensure that workers inspect all fall protection equipment each day prior to use
• evaluate the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system.
INTRODUCTION
On September 3, 1991, a 34-year-old tree trimmer died after falling 65 feet from a tree. On September 5,
1991, officials of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the Division of
Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On September 18, 1991, a DSR
safety specialist traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The incident was reviewed with
the investigating police officers, the county coroner, and the OSHA compliance officer. Photographs of
the site were obtained during the investigation.
The victim was employed full time as a tree trimmer by a tree care service. However, during off-duty hours,
the victim and his brother performed tree trimming and tree removal jobs on their own. There were no
written safety rules or safe work procedures for the work that the victim and his brother were performing
on their own time.
INVESTIGATION
The victim, with his brother, had been contracted by a general contractor to remove a large oak tree from
the yard of a private residence on their own time during a weekend.
The large tree had three main forks. The victim decided that he would limb and top each of the forks before
felling the tree, while the victim's brother and the contractor would remain on the ground and cut up the
limbs as they fell. The victim climbed the first fork and tied a rope around it near the top. He would use this
rope to assist him as he made his way up the fork, cutting off the limbs as he went. The victim wore a body
harness, tree climbers, and a climbing cradle (a length of rope with connectors on each end that is placed
around the tree and snapped to the "D" rings on each side of the body harness) as he ascended the tree. The
climbing cradle assisted the victim while climbing and held him in place while he made his cuts with the
chain saw. The victim also had a tool rope hanging from the harness with which he could raise and lower
tools.
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At the time of the incident, the victim had completed work on the first two forks and was approximately
three quarters finished with the third fork (60 feet above ground). The contractor looked up to check on
the victim, then began to cut branches on the ground. The contractor then noticed a rope falling to the ground
and looked up to see the victim falling to the ground. The victim landed on his head and right shoulder. The
owner of the residence immediately called the emergency medical service (EMS). EMS personnel arrived
5 minutes after being dispatched and transported the victim to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead
by the attending physician.
Investigation into the incident revealed that the connectors on both ends of the climbing cradle ropes were
fastened with wire and electrical tape. While the victim was leaning back making a cut, the pressure caused the
rope to pull loose and the victim fell to the ground. The connector was still attached to the D-ring on the harness.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed massive internal trauma as the cause of death.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that proper fastenings are used at the connectors for
all climbing cradle ropes.
Discussion: All rope connectors should be interwoven or mechanically clamped in compliance with
manufacturer's recommendations to ensure that the integrity of the connections is continually maintained.
Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that workers inspect all fall protection equipment for
defects each day prior to use.
Discussion: In this instance, the victim, working as a self employed tree trimmer, did not inspect the
connectors on the climbing harness prior to use. If a visual inspection of the harness had been conducted,
the loose connector might have been identified and could have been repaired. Any defective equipment
should be immediately repaired or removed from service.
Recommendation #3: Employers should evaluate the feasibility of a redundant fall-arresting system.
Discussion: In this instance, the victim relied solely on the climbing cradle as the fall arresting system. When the
connector on the cradle failed, there were no other system components present to prevent the fall. The victim had
tied a rope to the top of the forks prior to beginning the limbing work. This rope could have doubled as a lifeline.
A lanyard attached to the body harness and the rope would have provided a second suspension point.
[ A "rope grab"--a friction activated deceleration and locking device--could have been fitted onto the
lifeline; this would have slowed and stopped the victim's fall. Several design configurations are available
for these devices--inertial locking, cam/lever locking, or both--and each is effective against this kind of fall
hazard. An alternative safety device would be a self-retracting lanyard; this is another kind of
deceleration and locking device, which contains a drum-wound line. The line can be wound and
unwound within certain limits to accommodate normal worker movements; however, during a fall,
centrifugal force activates locking devices which stop drum rotation and arrests the fall. Either a rope
grab or a self-retracting lanyard would have protected the victim when the cradle connector failed.]
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FACE 94-02:  Stocker/Order Picker Dies After 12-Foot Fall From An Elevated Pallet--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
A 25-year-old male stocker/order picker (the victim) died after falling 12 feet to a concrete floor. The victim
was re-stocking the third tier of a row of 36-inch-wide steel shelving units while working from a 47 1/2-
inch-long by 40-inch wide-pallet supported by a cherry picker. A co-worker, facing away from the victim,
was opening boxes of merchandise at floor level on the same row. The victim was wearing a safety belt,
and a permanently affixed 5-foot nylon lanyard was attached to the cherry picker's falling-object protective
structure, above the victim; however, the victim had not attached the lanyard to his safety belt. As the victim
was stepping from the shelving to the pallet, he lost his balance and fell backward off the pallet, 12 feet to
the concrete floor below, landing on his back and striking his head. The co-worker, hearing the victim fall,
ran to him and found him semiconscious but breathing. The co-worker alerted the shift supervisor, who
summoned the emergency medical service (EMS) by phone. The EMS transported the victim to the local
hospital where he died 5 days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences,
employers should:
• ensure that workers continually adhere to the safe work practices that have been established by
the employer
• encourage all employees to actively participate in workplace safety
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety inspections.
INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 1993, a 25 year-old male stocker/order picker died from injuries he received in a 12-foot
fall from an elevated pallet on September 10, 1993. On September 30, 1993, officials of the South Carolina
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research
(DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. On December 21, 1993, a DSR safety specialist
conducted an investigation of this incident. The incident was reviewed with employer representatives, the
coroner, and the SCOSHA compliance officer assigned to the case. Photographs of the incident site taken
immediately following the incident were reviewed during the investigation.
The employer was a multistate retail merchandise distributor that had been in operation for 40 years and
employed 16,000 employees. Two hundred thirty-five workers were employed at the facility where the
incident occurred, including 11 stocker/order pickers. The employer had a comprehensive safety program.
Each new employee received an employee handbook and a "Think Safety" pamphlet that contained
general safety rules. New employee orientation was conducted under the direct supervision of the shift
supervisor until such time that the supervisor felt the employee could perform the job correctly. Employees
received training on such topics as the correct use of personal protective equipment and proper lifting
techniques. Safety inspections were conducted daily by the shift supervisor on all three shifts, weekly safety
meetings were conducted for all personnel, and all personnel received yearly hazard awareness training.
Cherry picker operators received 3 days of specialized training from the shift supervisor before operating
the machines on their own. The victim had been employed at the facility for 2 months. This was the first
fatality experienced by the employer.
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INVESTIGATION
The retail distribution center operated on three shifts--7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., 2:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., and 10:30
p.m. to 6 a.m. Goods, such as non-perishable foods, household items, and various other items were received
from the manufacturer and warehoused. The merchandise was stored on rows of 3-tiered steel shelving.
The top shelf was 12 feet above floor level and the rows were located 102 feet apart. When orders were
received, the merchandise was pulled from the warehouse, transferred to a truck, and then shipped to the
desired destination.
On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were re-stocking shelves on the 10:30 p.m. to 6 a.m.
shift. They began the shift by loading the first batch of merchandise brought to the warehouse on pallets.
Two sizes of pallets were used (472" by 40" and 30" by 38"). At approximately 1 a.m., they began to stock
the shelves. The co-worker raised the victim on a loaded pallet to the top shelf using a cherry picker, then
left the cherry picker and began to load more pallets at floor level. The victim was wearing a safety belt that
was required, by company policy, to be attached to a 5-foot nylon lanyard that was permanently affixed
to the cherry picker's falling-object protective structure above him. A sign, warning workers to keep the
lanyard attached to their safety belt at all times, was posted on the cherry picker. It could not be determined
if the lanyard had been attached to the victim's safety belt at this time. The men continued this activity until
the first batch of merchandise was warehoused.
At approximately 4 a.m. the men began to stock the second batch of merchandise. When the second batch
of merchandise was warehoused, the co-worker raised the victim on an empty 472" by 40" pallet to the
top shelf to pull goods to fill an order. He then turned away from the victim and began to load pallets on
the same row, approximately 20 feet from the cherry picker. As the co-worker was loading a pallet he heard
a sound and turned to see the victim lying on his back on the concrete floor. The co-worker ran to the victim
and found him semiconscious but breathing. The co-worker alerted the shift supervisor, who called the
emergency medical squad (EMS). The EMS arrived on the scene 12 minutes later and transported the
victim to the local hospital where he died 5 days later.
The victim apparently lost his balance as he was loading the pallet and fell backward off the pallet. The
victim was wearing his safety belt but was not attached to the lanyard. An examination of the lanyard
showed it to be free from defects.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The attending physician listed the cause of death as closed head trauma.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that workers continually adhere to established safe
work procedures.
Discussion: Employers should continually stress the importance of adherence to established safe work
procedures. In this instance, the victim was wearing a safety belt but did not attach the permanently affixed
lanyard to it as required by company safe work procedures and as taught in new employee orientation.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim was working without being attached to the lanyard, in violation of established safety
rules. Workers and co-workers should look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper
way to perform their tasks. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making
the workplace safer. Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #3: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety
inspections.
Discussion: Although the shift supervisor conducted a safety inspection during each shift, additional
scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted by a competent person1 to ensure that
company safe work procedures are being followed. No matter how comprehensive, a safety program
cannot be effective unless implemented in the workplace. Even though these inspections do not guarantee
the elimination of occupational injury, they do demonstrate the employer's commitment to the enforcement
of the safety program and to the prevention of occupational injury.  Competent person: One who is capable
of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are
unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
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FACE 94-14:  Construction Foreman Dies After Falling From Aerial Lift Bucket Truck--South
Carolina
SUMMARY
On June 20, 1994, a 46-year-old male construction foreman (the victim) fell 16 feet from the bucket of an
aerial lift truck. He died the following day as a result of his injuries. He had been attempting to estimate the
height of telephone and television cables that were stretched across a two-lane roadway. The roadway had
been guarded against moving traffic by two other employees, but just prior to the incident, the victim
reassigned the employees to a different job. The victim positioned himself in the one-man bucket of the
hydraulically-operated, articulated-boom, aerial lift truck and raised the bucket about 16 feet above ground
level without first donning a safety belt and lanyard and attaching it inside the bucket. As the victim was
judging the height of the cables, a tractor-trailer attempted to drive under the outstretched cables. The top
of the trailer caught the cable and pushed it toward the victim. The cable contacted the victim's abdomen,
and knocked him out of the bucket causing him to fall to the concrete roadway. The victim was immediately
rushed to the local hospital, then transferred to a trauma center. The victim died of internal hemorrhaging the
following day. Although fall protection equipment (a safety belt and lanyard secured to an anchor point inside
the bucket) was provided on the truck, the victim was not wearing the equipment as required by company policy.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
• ensure that appropriate fall  protection equipment is available and correctly used when working
from elevations where there is a danger of falling
• review and revise, where applicable, existing safety programs
• encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
 INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1994, a 46-year-old male construction foreman (the victim) died as a result of injuries sustained
after falling from the bucket of an aerial lift truck the previous day. On July 23, 1994, officials of the South
Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR)
of this fatality, and requested technical assistance. A DSR safety specialist traveled to the site on September
23, 1994, to conduct an investigation of the incident. During the investigation, the company's plant
superintendent was interviewed, photographs of the site and vehicle were taken, and a copy of the death
certificate was obtained.
The employer was a telephone cooperative that has been in operation for 42 years and employed 220
workers, 3 of whom were construction foremen. The company's plant superintendent managed field
operations, as well as performing part-time safety responsibilities. The company maintained a written safety
policy and safety rules, and employees received both formal classroom and on-the-job training. The
company required pre-employment and random drug testing for employees required to drive company
vehicles. Monthly safety meetings were held, quarterly safety films were shown, and speakers were hired
semi-annually to present safety related topics. The victim, a journeyman line mechanic, worked as a
foreman 8 of the 15 years he was employed by the company. This was the first fatality experienced in the
company's history.
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INVESTIGATION
The victim and four crew members had been assigned to replace a cracked wooden utility pole located
alongside a two-lane roadway. The top of the pole was about 20 feet above ground. The pole
supported two sets of telephone and television cables which were strung 16 feet above the roadway.
One set of cables ran parallel with the roadway; the other set ran across the roadway to a pole on the
opposite side (Figure).
On the day of the incident, the victim and four other crew members arrived at the jobsite shortly after
lunch in preparation to perform the routine pole replacement. Two crew members were assigned to
direct traffic around the jobsite, while two other crew members and the victim used an aerial lift bucket
truck and a derrick truck to remove the cables from the cracked pole and the pole itself from the ground,
respectively.
After the task was completed, the cables running across the roadway were supported, in absence of
the cracked pole, by the telephone and television cables which ran parallel to the road. The victim
instructed the two crew members directing traffic to cease their work and help with setting the new
pole. The victim stated he was going to use the bucket truck to check the height of the cables running
across the roadway. Without donning the fall protection equipment provided on the truck (safety belt
and lanyard which secured to an anchor point in the inside of the bucket), he entered the bucket and
raised it about 16 feet from ground level to a position adjacent to where the cables running across the
roadway intersected the cables running parallel with the roadway. As the victim was occupied judging
the height of the cables, a tractor-trailer attempted to drive under the outstretched cables. The top of
the trailer caught the cables, which were about 13 feet 6 inches above ground at that point, and pushed
them toward the victim. The cable contacted the victim's abdomen and knocked him out of the bucket,
causing him to fall to the concrete roadway below. The local emergency medical squad (EMS)
responded 5 minutes after notification by a paramedic who had witnessed the incident and provided
first aid to the victim. The victim was transported by the EMS to a local hospital. He was later
transported to a trauma center, where he died the following day.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The death certificate listed the cause of death as internal hemorrhage.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that appropriate fall protection equipment is available
and correctly used when working from elevations where there is danger of falling.
Discussion: The company had provided appropriate fall protection equipment on the aerial truck, a safety
belt and lanyard to be secured to an anchor point inside the bucket. However, the victim was not wearing
the safety equipment while inside the bucket as required by the Code of Federal Regulations 1926.556(b)(2)(v),
which states "A body belt shall be worn and a lanyard attached to the boom or basket when working from
the an aerial lift." Employers should ensure that workers follow established procedures for wearing fall
protection equipment. Use of fall protection equipment may not have prevented the victim from being
thrown out of the bucket, but it could have prevented his falling to the concrete roadway.
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Recommendation #2: Employers should review and revise, where applicable, existing safety programs.
Discussion: Although the employer had a written safety program, there were no specific procedures
regarding the management of traffic at jobsites. Prior to the incident, a temporary detour had been
established around the jobsite by two workers. If the detour had been maintained by the workers, the
incident may have been prevented. Consideration should be given to the review and possible revision of
safety programs to include provisions that address all facets of traffic control at jobsites.
Recommendation #3: Employers should encourage workers to actively participate in workplace safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
incident, the victim boarded the aerial lift truck, entered the bucket, and raised the bucket without first
donning a safety belt and lanyard and attaching it to the inside of the bucket. Workers and co-workers
should look out for one another's safety and remind each other of the proper way to perform their tasks.
Employers should instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the workplace safer.
Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.556 (b)(2)(v) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of the Federal Register.
Figure.  Incident Site Layout
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FACE 95-20:  Assistant Manager Dies After 15-Foot Fall From Forklift-Suspended Pallet—South Carolina
SUMMARY
On September 6, 1995, a 47-year-old male assistant warehouse manager (the victim) of an automotive tire and
service center died after falling 15 feet from a forklift-suspended pallet and striking his head on a concrete floor.
The victim was working with a forklift, pulling tires for orders and logging tire- inventory sheets. The men were
pulling the tires from a section of bins, 4-bins high and 8-bins wide. The men set a 5-foot-square wooden pallet
on the forks of the machine, then set a steel rack on top of the pallet to help secure the tires when loading and
unloading. The steel rack was not attached to the pallet. The forklift driver then raised the victim, who was
standing on the pallet but not wearing a safety belt or lanyard, to the top row of bins, approximately 16 3/4 feet
above the concrete floor. The victim had placed 10 to 12 tires on the pallet when the forklift operator looked up
and saw that the pallet and rack were unstable. The victim lost his balance and fell to the floor, striking his head.
The forklift operator saw the victim try to stand and then saw him fall. He went to the front counter and told a
worker to call the emergency medical service (EMS) then returned to the warehouse to assist the victim. The
victim was found unconscious but breathing. The EMS responded within 8 minutes and transported the victim
to the hospital. The victim was removed from life support 1 week later and pronounced dead. NIOSH
investigators concluded that, in order to prevent similar incidents, employers should:
• ensure that workers continually adhere to the safe work procedures that have been established
by the employer
• provide workers with a firmly secured work surface
• encourage all employees to actively participate in workplace safety
• routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety inspections.
INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 1995, a 47-year-old male assistant warehouse manager (the victim) of an automotive tire and
service center died after falling 15 feet from a forklift-suspended pallet and striking his head on a concrete
floor. On August 22, 1995, officials from the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (SCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of this fatality, and requested technical
assistance. On September 21, 1995, a DSR safety specialist conducted an investigation of the incident. The
incident was reviewed with employer representatives and the SCOSHA compliance officer. Photographs
of the scene taken immediately after the incident were reviewed during the investigation.
The employer in this incident was an auto and tire service center with a tire warehouse that had been in
operation for 13 months under the present management and employed 6 workers. The company had written
safe-work procedures which were presented to new employees during their orientation training. This
training involved, but was not limited to, safety and environmental issues, proper use of personal protective
equipment, and employee standards of conduct. Additional training was performed on the job. Forklift
drivers attended company operator safety training. Warehouse managers and assistant managers completed
monthly safety/quality inspection reports and were responsible for enforcing safety rules on work activities,
use of PPE, and forklift safety in the warehouse. The victim had worked for the employer for 1 month. This
was the first fatality experienced by the present management.
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INVESTIGATION
Daily activities in the warehouse included the receipt and storage of bulk tires and auto parts. Inventory was
then pulled and shipped to other stores or used to repair cars at the facility.
On the day of the incident, the victim was working with a forklift driver pulling tires for orders and logging
tire inventory sheets. The men were pulling the tires from a section of bins, 4-bins high and 8-bins wide.
Each bin was 5-foot-square by 67-inches high. Normal procedures directed the men to set a 5-foot-square
wooden pallet on the forks of the machine, then set a steel rack measuring 5-foot-square by 69-inches high
on top of the pallet to help secure the tires when loading and unloading. The pallet was not secured to the
forks, nor was the steel rack secured to the pallet. After this was accomplished, the victim stood on the pallet
and was raised approximately 16 3/4 feet above the concrete floor to the top row of bins by the driver. The
victim was not wearing his safety belt or lanyard as required by company safety procedures.
The victim had placed 10 to 12 tires on the pallet when the driver looked up and noticed that the pallet and
rack were becoming unstable as the victim reached into a bin. The pallet began to move and the victim lost
his balance and fell to the floor, striking his head. The rack and tires followed the victim to the floor.
The driver saw the victim attempt to stand, then fall over, and ran to the front counter to tell a worker to
call the emergency medical service (EMS). He then returned to the warehouse to assist the victim. He found
the victim breathing but unconscious. The EMS personnel arrived within 8 minutes and transported the
victim to the hospital. The victim was removed from life support 7 days later and declared dead.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The medical examiner listed the cause of death as skull fracture.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that workers continually adhere to the safe work
procedures that have been established by the employer.
Discussion: Employers should continually stress the importance of adherence to established safe work
procedures. In this instance, a safety belt and lanyard were provided, and required when work was
performed above ground. During employee interviews it was learned that the workers often did not wear
the safety belts and lanyards because the lanyard had to be wrapped around the forklift mast to tie off,
restricting movement. Since the incident, the employer has attached an anchor point to the mast carriage
that allows the employee to move freely when the lanyard is attached.
Recommendation #2: Employers should provide workers with a firmly secured work surface.
Discussion: In this incident, a pallet to be used as a work surface was placed unsecured on the forks of the
lift and a steel rack was placed unsecured on the pallet. This created the potential for dislodging the pallet
due to bumping by the tires when they were placed on the pallet, or uneven loading of the pallet, making
the work surface unstable. In this instance, when the pallet became unstable, the victim lost his balance and
fell, causing the rack and tires to fall. Since the incident, the employer has permanently anchored the rack
to the pallet with bolts, providing for a more stable work surface. Additionally, 29 CFR 1926.602
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1Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or  dangerous to employees, and who has the authority to take prompt corrective
measures to eliminate them.
(c)(1)(viii)(A) requires that whenever a truck is equipped with vertical only, or vertical and horizontal
controls elevatable with the lifting carriage or forks for lifting personnel, a safety platform firmly secured
to the lifting carriage and/or forks shall be used as an additional precaution for the protection of the personnel
being elevated. Although this regulation pertains to construction activities, all work platforms should be
secured to forklift forks to ensure worker safety.
Recommendation #3: Employers should encourage all employees to actively participate in workplace
safety.
Discussion: Employers should encourage all workers to actively participate in workplace safety and should
ensure that all workers understand the role they play in the prevention of occupational injury. In this
instance, the victim, a supervisor, stepped on the pallet without attaching his lanyard, in violation of
established safety rules. Workers and co-workers should look out for their personal safety and the safety
of co-workers. When workers observe hazardous conditions or activities, they should, depending on the
circumstances, notify management and/or remind co-workers of the proper way to perform their tasks and
protect themselves. Employers must instruct workers of their responsibility to participate in making the
workplace safer. Increased worker participation will aid in the prevention of occupational injury.
Recommendation #4: Employers should routinely conduct scheduled and unscheduled worksite safety
inspections.
Discussion: Employers should be aware of any potential hazards or unsafe work conditions or practices
in the workplace and should take an active role to eliminate them. Scheduled and unscheduled safety
inspections should be conducted by a competent person1 to ensure that the workplace is free of hazardous
conditions. Even though these inspections do not guarantee the prevention of occupational injury, they may
identify hazardous conditions and activities that should be rectified. Further, they demonstrate the
employer’s commitment to the enforcement of the safety program and to the prevention of occupational
injury.
REFERENCES
29 CFR 1926.602 (c)(1)(viii)(A) Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register.
